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  1. Jan Almäng (2014). Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
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  2. Holly Andersen (2014). The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience. In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press. 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James' development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1974). Temporal Becoming: The Argument From Physics. Philosophical Forum 6:218-236.
    Arguments about temporal becoming often get nowhere. One reason for the impasse lies in the fact that the issue has been formulated as a choice between science on the one hand and common sense (or ordinary language) on the other as the primary source of ontological commitment.' Often' proponents of attributing temporal becoming to the physical universe look to everyday temporal concepts, find them infested with notions involving temporal becoming and conclude that becoming is a basic feature of the physical (...)
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  4. Adrian Bardon (2010). Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant. Kant-Studien 101 (1):59-74.
    The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time. D.H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief. But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness. It turns out that Kant's theory (...)
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  5. Adrian Bardon (2002). Temporal Passage and Kant's Second Analogy. Ratio 15 (2):134–153.
  6. John C. Begg (1952). Time Order for Minds. Mind 61 (241):75-77.
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  7. E. J. Bond (2005). Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):124-133.
    In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither (...)
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  8. Darren Bradley (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago.
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (...)
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  9. J. Butterfield (1984). Seeing the Present. Mind 93 (370):161-176.
  10. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Full Report.
    This report highlights and explores four questions that arose from the workshop on temporal experience at the University of Toronto, May 20th and 21st, 2013.
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  11. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question One.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can we learn about the nature of time from the nature of ordinary experience?
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  12. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What is the relationship between time as represented in experience, the timing of the experiential act, and the timing of the neural realizer of the experience?
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  13. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What sorts of mechanisms underlie the perceived duration of external events?
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  14. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Do we have one central clock for time, or different clocks for each sense modality?
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  15. William Lane Craig (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time : A Critical Examination. Kluwer Academic.
    In this book and the companion volume The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Craig undertakes the first thorough appraisal of the arguments for and against the tensed and tenseless theories of time.
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  16. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. 382.
  17. Steven M. Duncan, In Defense of Temporal Passage.
    In this paper, I endorse and defend the Common Sense View of Time (CSVT), i.e. Presentism plus the A-theory of time, by arguing for the objective reality of temporal passage.
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  18. Arthur E. Falk (2003). Perceiving Temporal Passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
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  19. M. Oreste Fiocco (forthcoming). Becoming: Temporal, Absolute, and Atemporal. In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Debates in the Metaphysics of Time. Bloomsbury. 87-107.
    There are two conspicuous and inescapable features of this world in which time is real. One experiences a world in flux, a transient world in which things constantly come into existence, change and cease to be. One also experiences a stable world, one in which how things are at any given moment is permanent, unchangeable. Thus, there is transience and permanence. Yet these two features of the world seem incompatible. The primary purpose of this paper is to sketch a metaphysics (...)
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  20. Paul Fitzgerald (1980). Is Temporality Mind-Dependent? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:283 - 291.
    A distinction is made between the indexicality theme and the elapsive theme. The first theme is concerned with the question of whether nowness and other irreducibly indexical A-determinations are mind-dependent or not. It is argued that there are no such A-determinations, within or outside of mind. The second, elapsive theme, which is often not distinguished from the first, deals with whether or not non-indexical felt transiency or elapsiveness is mind-dependent. Four arguments for the mind-dependence of "temporal becoming" are assessed as (...)
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  21. Akiko M. Frischhut (2013). What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time. Topoi:1-13.
    Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...)
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  22. Walter Glannon (1994). Temporal Asymmetry, Life, and Death. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):235 - 244.
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  23. Enrico Grube (2014). Atomism and the Contents of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):13-33.
    Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only ‘snapshots’of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James’s (1890, p. 628) slogan that ‘a succession (...)
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  24. H. Scott Hestevold (1990). Passage and the Presence of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):537-552.
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  25. R. E. Hicks, George W. Miller, G. Gaes & K. Bierman (1977). Concurrent Processing Demands and the Experience of Time-in-Passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.
  26. Christoph Hoerl (forthcoming). Time and the Domain of Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.
    It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a (...)
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  27. Christoph Hoerl (2013). Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage? Philosophical Explorations (2):1-15.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...)
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  28. Christoph Hoerl (1999). Memory, Amnesia, and the Past. Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.
    This paper defends the claim that, in order to have a concept of time, subjects must have memories of particular events they once witnessed. Some patients with severe amnesia arguably still have a concept of time. Two possible explanations of their grasp of this concept are discussed. They take as their respective starting points abilities preserved in the patients in question: (1) the ability to retain factual information over time despite being unable to recall the past event or situation that (...)
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  29. Dennis C. Holt (1981). Timelessness and the Metaphysics of Temporal Existence. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):149 - 156.
  30. Jenann Ismael, Memory.
    In the general project of trying to reconcile the subjective view of the world (how things seem from the perspective of the embedded agent) with the objective view (the view of the world from the outside, as represented, for example, in our best physics), analytic philosophy, especially in recent years, has been almost solely focused on sensory phenomenology.1 There are two very salient features of the subjective view that haven’t been explored even on the descriptive side but that present prima (...)
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  31. Geoffrey Lee, Subjective Duration.
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  32. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
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  33. Pete Mandik, Slow Earth and the Slow-Switching Slowdown Showdown.
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons (...)
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  34. Maurizio Mangiagalli (2009). Il Tempo: Fenomenologia E Metafisica. Aracne.
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  35. Carlos Montemayor (2013). Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time. Brill.
    Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time offers an innovative philosophical account of the most fundamental kinds of time representation.
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  36. J. M. Mozersky (2006). A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience. Philosophical Studies 129 (3):441 - 476.
    Tenseless theories of time entail that the only temporal properties exemplified by events are earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. Such an account seems to conflict with our common experience of time, which suggests that the present moment is ontologically unique and that time flows. Some have argued that only a tensed account of time, one in which past, present and future are objective properties, can do justice to our experience. Any theory that claims that the world is different (...)
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  37. M. Joshua Mozersky (forthcoming). The B-Theory in the 20th Century. In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  38. Gregory Nixon (ed.) (2010). Time & Consciousness: Two Faces of One Mystery. QuantumDream, Inc..
    In what follows, I suggest that, against most theories of time, there really is an actual present, a now, but that such an eternal moment cannot be found before or after time. It may even be semantically incoherent to say that such an eternal present exists since “it” is changeless and formless (presumably a dynamic chaos without location or duration) yet with creative potential. Such a field of near-infinite potential energy could have had no beginning and will have no end, (...)
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  39. L. Nathan Oaklander (1993). On the Experience of Tenseless Time. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:159-166.
    Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H . Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.
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  40. Robert E. Ornstein (1969). On the Experience of Time. Harmondsworth.
  41. L. A. Paul (2010). Temporal Experience. Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
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  42. Simon Prosser (2013). Passage and Perception. Noûs 47 (1):69-84.
    I shall refer to all theories according to which time passes (including dynamic versions of presentism, ‘growing block’ theories, ‘shrinking tree’ theories, and so on) under the umbrella term ‘A-theory’, and I shall use the term ‘B-theory’ in the standard way to refer to the theory according to which time does not pass, and although events are ordered in time there is no objective present time.1 Many philosophers, both A- and B-theorists, have agreed that in experience we are, or at (...)
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  43. Simon Prosser (2013). The Passage of Time. In Adrian Bardon Heather Dyke (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell. 315-327.
  44. Simon Prosser (2012). Why Does Time Seem to Pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):92-116.
    According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content of the (...)
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  45. Simon Prosser (2007). Could We Experience the Passage of Time? Ratio 20 (1):75-90.
    This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. (...)
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  46. Simon Prosser (2000). A New Problem for the a-Theory of Time. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):494-498.
    : I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time, the ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theories. It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, (...)
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  47. Alexander R. Pruss (2000). Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future David Cockburn Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Xiv + 355 Pp., $59.95. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (01):199-.
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  48. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). Diachronic and Synchronic Unity. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):465-484.
    There are two different varieties of question concerning the unity of consciousness: questions about unity at a time, and unity over time. A recent trend in the debate about unity has been to attempt to provide a ‘generalized’ account that purports to solve both problems in the same way. This attempt can be seen in the accounts of Barry Dainton and Michael Tye. In this paper, I argue that there are crucial differences between unity over time and unity at a (...)
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  49. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). The Continuity of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):611-640.
    : In this paper I discuss two puzzles that concern the sense in which consciousness can be described as ‘continuous’. The first puzzle arises out of recent work by Dainton and Tye, both of whom appear to oscillate between ascribing the property of ‘continuity’ to the stream of experience, and ascribing it to the objects of experience. The second puzzle concerns the notion that the stream of consciousness could be in some sense unreal or illusory—a puzzle stemming from the thought (...)
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  50. Oliver Rashbrook (2013). An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
    A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...)
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