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  1. Jan Almäng (2014). Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
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  2. Holly Andersen (2014). The Development of the ‘Specious Present’ and James’ Views on Temporal Experience. In Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila (ed.), Subjective Time: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality. MIT Press 25-42.
    This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James' development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1974). Temporal Becoming: The Argument From Physics. Philosophical Forum 6 (2):218-236.
    Arguments about temporal becoming often get nowhere. One reason for the impasse lies in the fact that the issue has been formulated as a choice between science on the one hand and common sense (or ordinary language) on the other as the primary source of ontological commitment.' Often' proponents of attributing temporal becoming to the physical universe look to everyday temporal concepts, find them infested with notions involving temporal becoming and conclude that becoming is a basic feature of the physical (...)
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  4. Adrian Bardon (2010). Time-Awareness and Projection in Mellor and Kant. Kant-Studien 101 (1):59-74.
    The theorist who denies the objective reality of non-relational temporal properties, or ‘A-series’ determinations, must explain our experience of the passage of time. D.H. Mellor, a prominent denier of the objective reality of temporal passage, draws, in part, on Kant in offering a theory according to which the experience of temporal passage is the result of the projection of change in belief. But Mellor has missed some important points Kant has to make about time-awareness. It turns out that Kant's theory (...)
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  5. Adrian Bardon (2002). Temporal Passage and Kant's Second Analogy. Ratio 15 (2):134–153.
    In this essay I address the question of the reality of temporal passage through a discussion of some of the implications of Kant's reasoning concerning the necessary conditions of objective judgement. Some theorists have claimed that the attribution of non‐relational temporal properties to objects and events represents a conceptual confusion, or ‘category mistake’. By means of an examination of Kant's Second Analogy, and a comparison between that argument and Cassam's recent exploration of an argument regarding the necessity of the conceptualisation (...)
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  6. John C. Begg (1952). Time Order for Minds. Mind 61 (241):75-77.
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  7. E. J. Bond (2005). Does the Subject of Experience Exist in the World? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):124-133.
    In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither (...)
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  8. Evander Bradley McGilvary (1914). Time and the Experience of Time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.
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  9. Darren Bradley (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (...)
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  10. John B. Brough (1992). Time and Experience. Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):622-623.
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  11. J. Butterfield (1984). Seeing the Present. Mind 93 (370):161-176.
  12. Ann Leone Clancy (1996). Toward a Holistic Concept of Time: Exploring the Link Between Internal and External Temporal Experiences. Dissertation, The Fielding Institute
    This study's contribution to the philosophy and phenomenology of time lies in weaving the researcher's intellectual and personal journey and struggles with time with her exploration of the theoretical and philosophical literature. Implications are drawn for the practice of organizational development with evidence presented of an emerging holistic concept of time in the field of organizational development. ;Historically, hermeneutics has arisen out of "gaps" which arise between different languages, times, levels, and even realms of existence and provides a way of (...)
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  13. Jonathan Cohen (1954). The Experience of Time. Acta Psychologica 10:207-19.
  14. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What sorts of mechanisms underlie the perceived duration of external events?
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  15. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: Do we have one central clock for time, or different clocks for each sense modality?
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  16. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Full Report.
    This report highlights and explores four questions that arose from the workshop on temporal experience at the University of Toronto, May 20th and 21st, 2013.
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  17. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question One.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What can we learn about the nature of time from the nature of ordinary experience?
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  18. Kevin Connolly, Mike Arsenault, Akiko Frischhut, David Gray & Enrico Grube, Temporal Experience Workshop Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the Temporal Experience Workshop at the University of Toronto in May of 2013. This portion of the report explores the question: What is the relationship between time as represented in experience, the timing of the experiential act, and the timing of the neural realizer of the experience?
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  19. William Lane Craig (2000). The Tensed Theory of Time : A Critical Examination. Kluwer Academic.
    In this book and the companion volume The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Craig undertakes the first thorough appraisal of the arguments for and against the tensed and tenseless theories of time.
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  20. Benjamin L. Curtis (forthcoming). Material Constitution, the Neuroscience of Consciousness, and the Temporality of Experience. In Steven Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a science and theory.
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  21. Barry Dainton (2011). Time, Passage and Immediate Experience. In Craig Callender (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press 382.
  22. Yuval Dolev (1997). Time From the Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Viewpoints. Dissertation, Harvard University
    The idea that the present is "ontologically privileged" can be traced back to texts as early as St. Augustine's Confessions and Aristotle's Physics. The issue of the ontological status of tense continues to set the agenda in contemporary philosophy of time, which is dominated by two views. Proponents of the Tenseless View argue that all events are, in the timeless sense of 'are', equally real. Defenders of the rival Tensed View maintain that only present events are real, and that the (...)
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  23. Steven M. Duncan, In Defense of Temporal Passage.
    In this paper, I endorse and defend the Common Sense View of Time (CSVT), i.e. Presentism plus the A-theory of time, by arguing for the objective reality of temporal passage.
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  24. Arthur E. Falk (2003). Perceiving Temporal Passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal
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  25. M. Oreste Fiocco (2014). Becoming: Temporal, Absolute, and Atemporal. In L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Debates in the Metaphysics of Time. Bloomsbury 87-107.
    There are two conspicuous and inescapable features of this world in which time is real. One experiences a world in flux, a transient world in which things constantly come into existence, change and cease to be. One also experiences a stable world, one in which how things are at any given moment is permanent, unchangeable. Thus, there is transience and permanence. Yet these two features of the world seem incompatible. The primary purpose of this paper is to sketch a metaphysics (...)
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  26. Paul Fitzgerald (1980). Is Temporality Mind-Dependent? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:283 - 291.
    A distinction is made between the indexicality theme and the elapsive theme. The first theme is concerned with the question of whether nowness and other irreducibly indexical A-determinations are mind-dependent or not. It is argued that there are no such A-determinations, within or outside of mind. The second, elapsive theme, which is often not distinguished from the first, deals with whether or not non-indexical felt transiency or elapsiveness is mind-dependent. Four arguments for the mind-dependence of "temporal becoming" are assessed as (...)
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  27. Akiko M. Frischhut (2013). What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time. Topoi (1):1-13.
    Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...)
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  28. Akiko Monika Frischhut, The Experience of Temporal Passage.
    The project of my dissertation was to advance the metaphysical debate about temporal passage, by relating it to debates about the perceptual experience of time and change. It seems true that we experience temporal passage, even if there is disagreement whether time actually passes, or what temporal passage consists in. This appears to give the defender of dynamic time an advantage in accounting for our experience. I challenge this by arguing that no major account of temporal perception can accommodate experiences (...)
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  29. Walter Glannon (1994). Temporal Asymmetry, Life, and Death. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):235 - 244.
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  30. Enrico Grube (2014). Atomism and the Contents of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):13-33.
    Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only ‘snapshots’of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James’s (1890, p. 628) slogan that ‘a succession (...)
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  31. Ronald Gruber (2008). Neurophysics of the Flow of Time. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (3):241-255.
    Three physical theories explaining the flow of time are examined. One theory suggests that “flow” is associated with the manner of information transfer between registers within the brain. Different robotic systems are predicted to experience different types of flow. Here, human examples are found to support the theory and the model is modified suggesting that flow is a cognitive illusion. A second theory suggests that time is non-existent, that the universe is a complex quantum state which, upon observation, the brain (...)
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  32. Ronald P. Gruber & Richard A. Block (2013). The Flow of Time as a Perceptual Illusion. Journal of Mind and Behavior 34 (1):91-100.
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  33. M. B. N. Hansen (2009). Living (with) Technical Time: From Media Surrogacy to Distributed Cognition. Theory, Culture and Society 26 (2-3):294-315.
    This article proposes that time is not so much constituted by time-consciousness as given by technical inscriptions of time . The `digital gift' of time that comprises one fundamental mode of this giving of time correlates with Aristotle's conception of time as `the number of movement according to the before and after'; more specifically, it furnishes a minimal form of temporal difference — a minimal before-after structure — that proves useful for exploring how the experience of time has changed today. (...)
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  34. H. Scott Hestevold (1990). Passage and the Presence of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):537-552.
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  35. R. E. Hicks, George W. Miller, G. Gaes & K. Bierman (1977). Concurrent Processing Demands and the Experience of Time-in-Passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.
  36. Christoph Hoerl (2014). Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage? Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...)
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  37. Christoph Hoerl (2014). Time and the Domain of Consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326:90-96.
    It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a (...)
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  38. Christoph Hoerl (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (12):1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...)
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  39. Christoph Hoerl (1999). Memory, Amnesia, and the Past. Mind and Language 14 (2):227-51.
    This paper defends the claim that, in order to have a concept of time, subjects must have memories of particular events they once witnessed. Some patients with severe amnesia arguably still have a concept of time. Two possible explanations of their grasp of this concept are discussed. They take as their respective starting points abilities preserved in the patients in question: (1) the ability to retain factual information over time despite being unable to recall the past event or situation that (...)
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  40. Dennis C. Holt (1981). Timelessness and the Metaphysics of Temporal Existence. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (2):149 - 156.
  41. Jenann Ismael, Memory.
    In the general project of trying to reconcile the subjective view of the world (how things seem from the perspective of the embedded agent) with the objective view (the view of the world from the outside, as represented, for example, in our best physics), analytic philosophy, especially in recent years, has been almost solely focused on sensory phenomenology.1 There are two very salient features of the subjective view that haven’t been explored even on the descriptive side but that present prima (...)
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  42. Sean D. Kelly (forthcoming). Time and Experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge
  43. Michal Klincewicz (2013). Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience. Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
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  44. Michal Klincewicz (2012). Neural Correlates of Temporality? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):704-706.
  45. Uriah Kriegel (2009). Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.
    John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable.
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  46. John W. Lango (2008). Time and Experience. In Michel Weber (ed.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought. De Gruyter 653-663.
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  47. Geoffrey Lee, Subjective Duration.
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  48. Geoffrey Lee (2014). Temporal Experience and the Temporal Structure of Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (3).
    I assess a number of connected ideas about temporal experience that are introspectively plausible, but which I believe can be argued to be incorrect. These include the idea that temporal experiences are extended experiential processes, that they have an internal structure that in some way mirrors the structure of the apparent events they present, and the idea that time in experience is in some way represented by time itself. I explain how these ideas can be developed into more sharply defined (...)
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  49. Pete Mandik, Slow Earth and the Slow-Switching Slowdown Showdown.
    The present paper has three aims. The first and foremost aim is to introduce into philosophy of mind and related areas (philosophy of language, etc) a discussion of Slow Earth, an analogue to the classic Twin Earth scenario that features a difference from aboriginal Earth that hinges on time instead of the distribution of natural kinds. The second aim is to use Slow Earth to call into question the central lessons often alleged to flow from consideration of Twin Earth, lessons (...)
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  50. Maurizio Mangiagalli (2009). Il Tempo: Fenomenologia E Metafisica. Aracne.
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