Early work on ordinary causal judgments uncovered a tendency for causal judgments to be affected by normative considerations. Much work has been devoted to understanding the nature of the influence (are normative considerations features of our competence or are they biases?), the types of normative considerations that affect causal judgments (e.g., moral norms, statistical norms) and the extent of their influence in causal cognition (do normative considerations influence causal learning or causal perception?). Other work has been aimed at investigating, for instance, whether we possess a single or multiple concepts of causation and whether we treat omissions as causes.
For work on the nature of normative considerations in causal judgment see Hitchcock & Knobe 2009, Alicke & Rose 2010 and Alicke et al 2011 ; For work on the types of normative considerations that affect causal cognition see Hitchcock & Knobe 2009 and Sytsma et al 2012; and for work on the extent of the influence of normative considerations in causal cognition see Danks et al 2013. For work investigating whether we possess a single or multiple concepts of causation see Lombrozo 2010 and for work investigation whether we treat omissions as causes see Livengood & Machery 2007
|Introductions||For an introduction and overview see Rose & Danks 2012|
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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