Experimental moral philosophy explores issues in ethics using empirical methods, such as surveys to investigate people’s judgments about particular moral issues, brain imagining to examine the neural bases of moral judgment, and behavioral experiments to examine how various factors influence people’s moral behavior. A significant focus of this interdisciplinary work has been on people’s particular judgments concerning issues such as moral permissibility, moral responsibility, and moral relativism and on the roles of moral reasoning, moral intuitions, and moral emotions in our moral judgments. Such empirical research can help support or challenge various ethical theories that rely on assumptions about human psychology.
Key early works on the roles of reasoning, intuition, and emotion in moral judgment include Greene 2008, Haidt 2001, Cushman et al 2006, and Nichols & Mallon 2006. Key studies of moral responsibility include Knobe 2003, Nichols & Knobe 2007, Nahmias et al 2005, Cushman 2008, and Young et al 2007.
|Introductions||For an introduction to issues in experimental moral philosophy, see Doris 2010, Knobe et al 2012, and Appiah 2008.|
Experimental Philosophy: Folk Morality
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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