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  1. Toni Adleberg, Morgan Thompson & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Do Men and Women Have Different Philosophical Intuitions? Further Data. Philosophical Psychology 28 (5):615-641.
    To address the underrepresentation of women in philosophy effectively, we must understand the causes of the early loss of women. In this paper we challenge one of the few explanations that has focused on why women might leave philosophy at early stages. Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich offer some evidence that women have different intuitions than men about philosophical thought experiments. We present some concerns about their evidence and we discuss our own study, in which we (...)
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  2. Fernando Aguiar, Alice Becker & Luis Miller (2013). Whose Impartiality? An Experimental Study of Veiled Stakeholders, Involved Spectators and Detached Observers. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):155-174.
    We present an experiment designed to investigate three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. We consider a first-person procedure, inspired by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance,and two third-party procedures, an involved spectator and a detached observer. First-person veiled stakeholders and involved spectators are affected by an initially unfair distribution that, in the stakeholders’ case,is to be redressed. We find substantial differences in the redressing task.Detached observers propose significantly fairer redistributions than veiled takeholders or involved spectators. Risk preferences partly (...)
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  3. James Andow (forthcoming). Qualitative Tools & Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology.
    Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, freedom, etc. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide (...)
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  4. James Andow (forthcoming). Reliable but Not Home Free? What Framing Effects Mean for Moral Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology.
    Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we (...)
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  5. John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
  6. Renatas Berniūnas & Vilius Dranseika (2016). Folk Concepts of Person and Identity: A Response to Nichols and Bruno. Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):96-122.
    Nichols and Bruno claim that the folk judge that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. In this article, we evaluate this claim. First, we argue that it is likely that in thinking about hypothetical cases of transformations, the folk do not use a unitary concept of personal identity, but instead rely on different concepts of ‘person’, ‘identity’, and ‘individual’. Identity can be ascribed even when post-transformation individuals are no longer categorized as persons. Second, we provide new empirical evidence suggesting (...)
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  7. Roland Bluhm (forthcoming). A Plea for Corpus Analysis. In Martin Hinton (ed.), Evidence, Experiment and Argument in Linguistics and Philosophy of Language.
    The experimental philosophy movement advocates the use of empirical methods in philosophy. The methods most often discussed and in fact employed in experimental philosophy are appropriated from the experimental paradigm in psychology. But there is a variety of other (at least partly) empirical methods from various disciplines that are and others that could be used in philosophy. The paper explores the application of corpus analysis to philosophical issues. Although the method is well established in linguistics, there are only a few (...)
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  8. Roland Bluhm (2014). Empirical Methods of Linguistics in Philosophy. The Reasoner 8 (4):41.
    Report on the workshop "Empirical Methods of Linguistics in Philosophy", which took place at TU Dortmund University, Germany, on March 13–14, 2014.
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  9. Mike Braverman, John Clevenger, Ian Harmon, Andrew Higgins, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino & Jonathan Waskan (2012). Intelligibility is Necessary for Scientific Explanation, but Accuracy May Not Be. In Naomi Miyake, David Peebles & Richard Cooper (eds.), Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society
    Many philosophers of science believe that empirical psychology can contribute little to the philosophical investigation of explanations. They take this to be shown by the fact that certain explanations fail to elicit any relevant psychological events (e.g., familiarity, insight, intelligibility, etc.). We report results from a study suggesting that, at least among those with extensive science training, a capacity to render an event intelligible is considered a requirement for explanation. We also investigate for whom explanations must be capable of rendering (...)
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  10. Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (forthcoming). General Introduction to "A Companion to Experimental Philosophy". In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
    This is the general introduction to the edited collection "A companion to Experimental Philosophy".
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  11. Yuri Cath, Metaphilosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Often philosophers have reason to ask fundamental questions about the aims, methods, nature, or value of their own discipline. When philosophers systematically examine such questions, the resulting work is sometimes referred to as “metaphilosophy.” Metaphilosophy, it should be said, is not a well-established, or clearly demarcated, field of philosophical inquiry like epistemology or the philosophy of art. However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a great deal of metaphilosophical work on issues concerning the methodology of (...)
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  12. Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). The Reality of the Intuitive. Inquiry.
    According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of “negative experimental philosophy” have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. (Cappelen 2012) and (Deutsch 2015) defend traditional philosophy against this critique by rejecting the picture (...)
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  13. Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher & Yoel Inbar (forthcoming). Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment (...)
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  14. Matteo Colombo, Marie Postma & Jan Sprenger, Explanatory Value and Probabilistic Reasoning: An Empirical Study.
    The relation between probabilistic and explanatory reasoning is a classical topic in philosophy of science. Most philosophical analyses are concerned with the compatibility of Inference to the Best Explanation with probabilistic, Bayesian inference, and the impact of explanatory considerations on the assignment of subjective probabilities. This paper reverses the question and asks how causal and explanatory considerations are affected by probabilistic information. We investigate how probabilistic information determines the explanatory value of a hypothesis, and in which sense folk explanatory practice (...)
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  15. Florian Cova, Amanda Garcia & Shen-yi Liao (2015). Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):927-939.
    In the past decade, experimental philosophy---the attempt at making progress on philosophical problems using empirical methods---has thrived in a wide range of domains. However, only in recent years has aesthetics succeeded in drawing the attention of experimental philosophers. The present paper constitutes the first survey of these works and of the nascent field of 'experimental philosophy of aesthetics'. We present both recent experimental works by philosophers on topics such as the ontology of aesthetics, aesthetic epistemology, aesthetic concepts, and imagination, (...)
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  16. Helen De Cruz (2015). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
    Intuitions play a central role in analytic philosophy, but their psychological basis is little understood. This paper provides an empirically-informed, psychological char- acterization of philosophical intuitions. Drawing on McCauley’s distinction between maturational and practiced naturalness, I argue that philosophical intuitions originate from several early-developed, specialized domains of core knowledge (maturational naturalness). Eliciting and deploying such intuitions in argumentative contexts is the domain of philosophical expertise, thus philosophical intuitions are also practiced nat- ural. This characterization has implications for the evidential value (...)
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  17. Oisín Deery (2013). Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):787-791.
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  18. Adam Feltz (2009). Experimental Philosophy. Analyze and Kritik 31 (1):201-219.
    Experimental philosophy is a new approach to philosophy that incorporates the experimental methodologies of psychology, behavioral economics, and sociology. Experimental philosophers generally maintain that, in addition to traditional philosophical practices, these ways of gathering evidence can be instrumental in shedding light on philosophically important issues. Rather than relying on their own intuitions about specific cases, experimental philosophers perform systematic experiments to determine what intuitions people have about those cases. These intuitions are then used as evidence. In this context, four main (...)
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  19. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2012). The Philosophical Personality Argument. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
    Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one’s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, (...)
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  20. Carrie Figdor & Matt L. Drabek (forthcoming). Experimental Philosophy and the Underrepresentation of Women. In W. Buckwalter & J. Sytsma (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell
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  21. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter (2011). How People Interpret Conditionals: Shifts Towards the Conditional Event. Journal of Experimental Psychology 37 (3):635-648.
    We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...)
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  22. Mikkel Gerken & James R. Beebe (2016). Knowledge in and Out of Contrast. Noûs 50 (1):133-164.
    We report and discuss the results of a series of experiments that address a contrast effect exhibited by folk judgments about knowledge ascriptions. The contrast effect, which was first reported by Schaffer and Knobe, is an important aspect of our folk epistemology. However, there are competing theoretical accounts of it. We shed light on the various accounts by providing novel empirical data and theoretical considerations. Our key findings are, firstly, that belief ascriptions exhibit a similar contrast effect and, secondly, that (...)
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  23. Joshua Glasgow (2009). A Theory of Race. Routledge.
    Social commentators have long asked whether racial categories should be conserved or eliminated from our practices, discourse, institutions, and perhaps even private thoughts. In A Theory of Race, Joshua Glasgow argues that this set of choices unnecessarily presents us with too few options. Using both traditional philosophical tools and recent psychological research to investigate folk understandings of race, Glasgow argues that, as ordinarily conceived, race is an illusion. However, our pressing need to speak to and make sense of social life (...)
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  24. Joshua Glasgow, Julie L. Shulman & Enrique G. Covarrubias (2009). The Ordinary Conception of Race in the United States and Its Relation to Racial Attitudes: A New Approach. Journal of Cognition and Culture 9 (1):15-38.
    Many hold that ordinary race-thinking in the USA is committed to the 'one-drop rule', that race is ordinarily represented in terms of essences, and that race is ordinarily represented as a biological (phenotype- and/or ancestry-based, non-social) kind. This study investigated the extent to which ordinary race-thinking subscribes to these commitments. It also investigated the relationship between different conceptions of race and racial attitudes. Participants included 449 USA adults who completed an Internet survey. Unlike previous research, conceptions of race were assessed (...)
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  25. Steven D. Hales & Jennifer Adrienne Johnson (2014). Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):509-528.
    Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were (...)
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  26. Claire Hewson (2012). Empirical Evidence Regarding the Folk Psychological Concept of Belief. Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 16:404-408.
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  27. Geoffrey Holtzman (2013). Do Personality Effects Mean Philosophy is Intrinsically Subjective? Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5-6.
    This paper identifies several ways in which personality informs philosophical belief. In the present study, individuals holding doctorates in philosophy were given a personality inventory and asked to respond to nine philosophical questions, seven of which produced significant sample sizes. Personality predicted response to three of these seven questions, suggesting that philosophers' beliefs are determined in part by their personalities. This is taken as evidence that philosophy is intrinsically subjective, a claim which is herein developed more completely and defended against (...)
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  28. Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann (forthcoming). Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay (...)
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  29. Julie E. Kirsch (2009). Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols, Eds., Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy in Review 29 (5):350.
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  30. Joshua Knobe (2015). Philosophers Are Doing Something Different Now: Quantitative Data. Cognition 135:36-38.
    The philosophical study of mind in the twentieth century was dominated by a research program that used a priori methods to address foundational questions. Since that time, however, the philosophical study of mind has undergone a dramatic shift. To provide a more accurate picture of contemporary philosophical work, I compared a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the past five years with a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the twentieth century. In the twentieth century sample, the majority (...)
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  31. Joshua Knobe & Richard Samuels (2013). Thinking Like a Scientist: Innateness as a Case Study. Cognition 126 (1):72-86.
    The concept of innateness appears in systematic research within cognitive science, but it also appears in less systematic modes of thought that long predate the scientific study of the mind. The present studies therefore explore the relationship between the properly scientific uses of this concept and its role in ordinary folk understanding. Studies 1-4 examined the judgments of people with no specific training in cognitive science. Results showed (a) that judgments about whether a trait was innate were not affected by (...)
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  32. Colin Koopman (2012). Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy: Inquiry in Place of Intuition. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 26 (1):1-24.
    Recent attention given to the upstart movement of experimental philosophy is much deserved. But now that experimental philosophy is beginning to enter a stage of maturity, it is time to consider its relation to other philosophical traditions that have issued similar assaults against ingrained and potentially misguided philosophical habits. Experimental philosophy is widely known for rejecting a philosophical reliance on intuitions as evidence in philosophical argument. In this it shares much with another branch of empiricist philosophy, namely, pragmatism. Taking Kwame (...)
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  33. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place Under the Sun. In D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. Bloomsbury
    What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental <span class='Hi'>philosophy</span>? This paper starts from the contention that common answers to this question are implausible. It then develops a framework within which experimental <span class='Hi'>philosophy</span> fulfills a specific function in an otherwise traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. The framework rests on two principal ideas. The first is Frank Jackson’s claim that <span class='Hi'>conceptual</span> analysis is unavoidable in ‘serious metaphysics’. The second is that the psychological structure of concepts is extremely (...)
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  34. Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines & Edouard Machery (2010). Philosophical Temperament. Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):313-330.
    Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: What are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective. This claim is supported by a study of more than (...)
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  35. Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma, Adam Feltz, Richard Scheines & Edouard Machery (2010). Philosophical Temperament. Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):313-330.
    Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: what are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective: they are less likely than their peers to embrace what (...)
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  36. Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.) (2014). Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This volume gives an overview of the rising field of Experimental Ethics. It is organized into five main parts: PART I – Introduction: An Experimental Philosophy of Ethics? // PART II – Applied Experimental Ethics: Case studies // PART III – On Methodology // PART IV – Critical Reflections // PART V – Future Perspectives. Among the contributors: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Eric Schwitzgebel, Ezio di Nucci, Jacob Rosenthal, and Fernando Aguiar.
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  37. Moti Mizrahi (2015). Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to Intuitions? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):141-158.
    In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption (...)
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  38. Moti Mizrahi (2015). Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study. Methode 4 (6):232-243.
    In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...)
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  39. Moti Mizrahi (2015). Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense. Metaphilosophy 46 (1):52-64.
    Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (...)
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  40. Moti Mizrahi & Wesley Buckwalter (2014). The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):151-166.
    Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the factors that underlie (...)
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  41. Taylor Murphy (2014). Experimental Philosophy: 1935-1965. In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press vol. 1, pp. 325-368.
    In the heyday of linguistic philosophy an experimental philosophy movement was born, and this chapter tells its story, both in its historical and philosophical context and as it is connected to controversies about experimental philosophy today. From its humble beginnings at the Vienna Circle, the movement matured into a vibrant research program at Oslo, and sought adventure at Berkeley thereafter. The harsh and uncharitable reaction it met is surprising but understandable in light of disciplinary tensions and the legacy of antipsychologism—sentiments (...)
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  42. Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias (2008). Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 31 (1):39-58.
    First, we briefly familiarize the reader with the emerging field of “experimental philosophy,” in which philosophers use empirical methods, rather than armchair speculation, to ascertain laypersons’ intuitions about philosophical issues. Second, we discuss how the surveys used by experimental philosophers can serve as valuable pedagogical tools for teaching philosophy—independently of whether one believes surveying laypersons is an illuminating approach to doing philosophy. Giving students surveys that contain questions and thought experiments from philosophical debates gets them to actively engage with the (...)
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  43. Michiru Nagatsu (2013). Experimental Philosophy of Economics. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.
    This article is a prelude to an experimental study of the preference concept in economics. I argue that a new empirical approach called experimental philosophy of science is a promising approach to advance the philosophy of economics. In particular, I discuss two debates in the field, the neuroeconomics controversy and the commonsensible realism debate, and suggest how experimental and survey techniques can generate data that will inform these debates. Some of the likely objections from philosophers and economists are addressed, and (...)
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  44. Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter (2005). Coherence and Nonmonotonicity in Human Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):93 - 109.
    Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, have investigated this claim empirically. We report four experiments which investigate three rules of SYSTEMP, namely the AND, the LEFT LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE, and the OR rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of SYSTEM P. We found a relatively good agreement of human reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic (...)
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  45. Hannah Rubin, Justin Bruner, Cailin O'Connor & Simon Huttegger, Communication Without the Cooperative Principle: A Signaling Experiment.
    According to Grice's `Cooperative Principle', human communicators are involved in a cooperative endeavor. The speaker attempts to make herself understood and the listener, in turn, assumes that the speaker is trying to maximize the ease and effectiveness of communication. While pragmatists recognize that people do not always behave in such a way, the Cooperative Principle is generally assumed to hold. However, it is often the case that the interests of speakers and listeners diverge, at least to some degree. Communication can (...)
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  46. Julie L. Shulman & Joshua Glasgow (2010). Is Race-Thinking Biological or Social, and Does It Matter for Racism? An Exploratory Study. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (3):244-259.
    An empirical study of whether the ordinary conception of race in the United States is biological or social, and how different conceptions connect to racism.
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  47. Tamler Sommers (2011). In Memoriam: The X Phi Debate. The Philosophers' Magazine (52):89-93.
    Experimental philosophy has received a great deal of attention in scholarly journals and the popular media. Often the topic of these articles is precisely what I claim is a non-issue – the value of experimental philosophy as a movement. And here I am writing about this same topic yet again. But I am not going to provide another argument for an obvious position. Instead, I’m writing this as an obituary – an obituary for the so-called controversy about experimental philosophy, and (...)
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  48. Ernest Sosa (2009). A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell 101--112.
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  49. Stephen P. Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2001). Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.
  50. Karola Stotz (2009). Experimental Philosophy of Biology: Notes From the Field. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):233-237.
    I use a recent 'experimental philosophy' study of the concept of the gene conducted by myself and collaborators to discuss the broader epistemological framework within which that research was conducted, and to reflect on the relationship between science, history and philosophy of science, and society.
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