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  1. Adam J. Arico & Don Fallis (2013). Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):790 - 816.
    There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53?120). New York, NY: Catholic University of America). More recently, Thomas Carson (2006. (...)
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  2. Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Factive Verbs and Protagonist Projection. Episteme 11 (4):391-409.
    Nearly all philosophers agree that only true things can be known. But does this principle reflect actual patterns of ordinary usage? Several examples in ordinary language seem to show that ‘know’ is literally used non-factively. By contrast, this paper reports five experiments utilizing explicit paraphrasing tasks, which suggest that non-factive uses are actually not literal. Instead, they are better explained by a phenomenon known as protagonist projection. It is argued that armchair philosophical orthodoxy regarding the truth requirement for knowledge withstands (...)
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  3. Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo (2001). A Re-Examination of Illusory Inferences Based on Factual Conditional Sentences. Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...)
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  4. Jessica de Villiers, Robert J. Stainton & And Peter Szatmari (2007). Pragmatic Abilities in Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Case Study in Philosophy and the Empirical. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):292–317.
    This article has two aims. The first is to introduce some novel data that highlight rather surprising pragmatic abilities in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The second is to consider a possible implication of these data for an emerging empirical methodology in philosophy of language and mind. In pursuing the first aim, we expect our main audience to be clinicians and linguists interested in pragmatics. It is when we turn to methodological issues that we hope to pique the interest of philosophers. (...)
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  5. Joseph S. Fulda & Kevin De Fontes (1989). The A Priori Meaningfulness Measure and Resolution Theorem Proving. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (3):227-230.
    Demonstrates the validity of the measure presented in "Estimating Semantic Content" on textbook examples using (binary) resolution [a generalization of disjunctive syllogism] theorem proving; the measure is based on logical probability and is the mirror image of logical form; it dates to Popper.
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  6. Nat Hansen (forthcoming). Just What Is It That Makes Travis's Examples So Different, So Appealing? In J. Collins A. Davies & T. Dobler (eds.), Themes from Charles Travis: On Language,Thought and Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Odd and memorable examples are a distinctive feature of Charles Travis's work: cases involving squash balls, soot-covered kettles, walls that emit poison gas, faces turning puce, ties made of freshly cooked linguine, and people grunting when punched in the solar plexus all figure in his arguments. One of Travis's examples, involving a pair of situations in which the leaves of a Japanese maple tree are painted green, has even spawned its own literature consisting of attempts to explain the context sensitivity (...)
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  7. Nat Hansen (2014). Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.
    There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing but going by various aliases – in particular (some versions of) ‘contextualism’ and (some versions of) ‘experimental philosophy’. And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the title as well as (...)
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  8. Nat Hansen (2012). On an Alleged Truth/Falsity Asymmetry in Context Shifting Experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):530-545.
    Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose's reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose's bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose's arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good (...)
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  9. Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne & Vittorio Girotto (2009). The Mental Model Theory of Conditionals: A Reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi 28 (1):75-80.
    This paper replies to Politzer’s ( 2007 ) criticisms of the mental model theory of conditionals. It argues that the theory provides a correct account of negation of conditionals, that it does not provide a truth-functional account of their meaning, though it predicts that certain interpretations of conditionals yield acceptable versions of the ‘paradoxes’ of material implication, and that it postulates three main strategies for estimating the probabilities of conditionals.
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  10. Jens Kipper (2010). Philosophers and Grammarians. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):511-527.
    In the essay, I compare the aims and especially the methods of philosophers and grammarians. It transpires that there are several interesting similarities to be found with the method and aim in particular of traditional 'armchair philosophers'. I argue that these similarities go far enough to suggest that if armchair philosophers' method is in a state of challenge, as is claimed by a number of experimental philosophers, then the same can be said about the method of grammarians. However, I also (...)
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  11. Sebastian Lutz (2009). Ideal Language Philosophy and Experiments on Intuitions. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):117-139.
    Proponents of linguistic philosophy hold that all non-empirical philosophical problems can be solved by either analyzing ordinary language or developing an ideal one. I review the debates on linguistic philosophy and between ordinary and ideal language philosophy. Using arguments from these debates, I argue that the results of experimental philosophy on intuitions support linguistic philosophy. Within linguistic philosophy, these experimental results support and complement ideal language philosophy. I argue further that some of the critiques of experimental philosophy are in fact (...)
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  12. Blake Myers-Schulz, Maia Pujara, Richard Wolf & Michael Koenigs (2013). Inherent Emotional Quality of Human Speech Sounds. Cognition and Emotion 27 (6):1105-1113.
  13. Isabel Orenes & P. N. Johnson-Laird (2012). Logic, Models, and Paradoxical Inferences. Mind and Language 27 (4):357-377.
    People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...)
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  14. Carlos Santamaria Juan A. Garcia-Madruga Philip & N. Johnson-Laird (1998). Reasoning From Double Conditionals: The Effects of Logical Structure and Believability. Thinking and Reasoning 4 (2):97 – 122.
    We report three experimental studies of reasoning with double conditionals, i.e. problems based on premises of the form: If A then B. If B then C. where A, B, and C, describe everyday events. We manipulated both the logical structure of the problems, using all four possible arrangements (or ''figures" of their constituents, A, B, and C, and the believability of the two salient conditional conclusions that might follow from them, i.e. If A then C , or If C then (...)
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  15. Guy Politzer (2003). No Problem for Aristotle's Subject and Predicate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):298-299.
    It is argued that, in the traditional subject-predicate sentence, two interpretations of the subject term coexist, one intensional and the other extensional, which explains the superficial difference between the traditional S-P relation and the predication of predicate logic. Data from psychological studies of syllogistic reasoning support the view that the contrast between predicate and argument is carried over to the traditional S-P sentence.
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  16. Max Seeger (2010). Experimental Philosophy and the Twin Earth Intuition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:237-244.
    Jonathan Weinberg (2007) has argued that we should not appeal to intuition as evidence because it cannot be externally corroborated. This paper argues for the normative claim that Weinberg’s demand for external corroboration is misguided. The idea is that Weinberg goes wrong in treating philosophical appeal to intuition analogous to the appeal to evidence in the sciences. Traditional practice is defended against Weinberg’s critique with the argument that some intuitions are true simply in virtue of being intuited by the majority (...)
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