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  1. Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana.
    Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...)
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  2. Fritz Allhoff (ed.) (2010). Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The essays are written by leading scholars in a highly accessible style for the student audience Presents and discusses central debates in the field, making it ...
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  3. Alessandro Antonietti (2010). Do Neurobiological Data Help Us to Understand Economic Decisions Better? Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):207-218.
    The contribution that neurobiological data provide us to comprehend the psychological aspects of economic decision-making is critically examined. First, different kinds of correspondences between neural events and mental activities are identified. On the basis of the distinctions made, some recent studies are selected, each of which focuses on a different stage of decision-making and employs a different set of neurobiological data. The thorough analysis of each study suggests that neuro-mental correspondences do not have an evidentiary function but rather a heuristic (...)
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  4. Justin Barrett, David Leech & Aku Visala (2010). Can Religious Belief Be Explained Away? Reasons and Causes of Religious Belief. In Ulrich J. Frey (ed.), The Nature of God ––– Evolution and Religion. Tectum. 1--75.
  5. Edison Barrios (2012). Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
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  6. Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (forthcoming). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  7. William P. Bechtel (1982). Two Common Errors in Explaining Biological and Psychological Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 49 (December):549-574.
    One way in which philosophy of science can perform a valuable normative function for science is by showing characteristic errors made in scientific research programs and proposing ways in which such errors can be avoided or corrected. This paper examines two errors that have commonly plagued research in biology and psychology: 1) functional localization errors that arise when parts of a complex system are assigned functions which these parts are not themselves able to perform, and 2) vacuous functional explanations in (...)
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  8. William Bechtel & Mitchell Herschbach (2010). Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell. 239--261.
    Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary research endeavor focusing on human cognitive phenomena such as memory, language use, and reasoning. It emerged in the second half of the 20th century and is charting new directions at the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter begins by identifying the disciplines that contribute to cognitive science and reviewing the history of the interdisciplinary engagements that characterize it. The second section examines the role that mechanistic explanation plays in cognitive science, while the third focuses (...)
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  9. William Bechtel & Benjamin Sheredos, HIT on the Psychometric Approach.
    Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly – they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these (...)
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  10. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  11. Robert Borger (ed.) (1970). Explanation In The Behavioural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
    A confrontation of views written by distinguished figures concerned with the behavioural and social sciences.
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  12. Robert W. Burch (1978). Functional Explanation and Normalcy. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):45-53.
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  13. Lawrence R. Carleton (1985). Levels in Description and Explanation. Philosophy Research Archives 11:89-109.
    Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, (...)
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  14. Andy Clark (1998). Twisted Tales: Causal Complexity and Cognitive Scientific Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):79-99.
    Recent work in biology and cognitive science depicts a variety of target phenomena as the products of a tangled web of causal influences. Such influences may include both internal and external factors as well as complex patterns of reciprocal causal interaction. Such twisted tales are sometimes seen as a threat to explanatory strategies that invoke notions such as inner programs, genes for and sometimes even internal representations. But the threat, I shall argue, is more apparent than real. Complex causal influence, (...)
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  15. Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (1999). Stability and Explicitness: In Defense of Implicit Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):151-152.
    Electronic Mail: jimenez@usc.es Abstract Stability of activation, while it may be necessary for information to become available to consciousness, is not sufficient to produce phenomenal experience. We suggest that consciousness involves access to information and that access makes information symbolic. From this perspective, implicit representations exist, and are best thought of as sub-symbolic. Crucially, such representations can be causally efficacious in the absence of consciousness.
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  16. Max Coltheart & Robyn Langdon (1998). Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
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  17. Richard P. Cooper, Nicolas Ruh & Denis Mareschal (2014). The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans. Cognitive Science 38 (2):244-274.
    Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task-dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top-down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed action (...)
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  18. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Social Understanding Through Direct Perception? Yes, by Interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.
    This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I (...)
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  19. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). What Made Me Want the Cheese? A Reply to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):549-550.
  20. Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
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  21. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  22. Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    This volume collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behavior, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition.
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  23. Zoe Drayson (2014). The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...)
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  24. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  25. Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
  26. Mark Fedyk (2014). How (Not) to Bring Psychology and Biology Together. Philosophical Studies 1:1-19.
    Evolutionary psychologists often try to “bring together” biology and psychology by making predictions about what specific psychological mechanisms exist from theories about what patterns of behaviour would have been adaptive in the EEA for humans. This paper shows that one of the deepest methodological generalities in evolutionary biology—that proximate explanations and ultimate explanations stand in a many-to-many relation—entails that this inferential strategy is unsound. Ultimate explanations almost never entail the truth of any particular proximate hypothesis. But of course it does (...)
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  27. Chrisantha Fernando (2013). From Blickets to Synapses: Inferring Temporal Causal Networks by Observation. Cognitive Science 37 (8):1426-1470.
    How do human infants learn the causal dependencies between events? Evidence suggests that this remarkable feat can be achieved by observation of only a handful of examples. Many computational models have been produced to explain how infants perform causal inference without explicit teaching about statistics or the scientific method. Here, we propose a spiking neuronal network implementation that can be entrained to form a dynamical model of the temporal and causal relationships between events that it observes. The network uses spike-time (...)
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  28. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain. International Journal of Neuroscience 114 (7):843 - 862.
    This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of (...)
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  29. Bradley Franks (1995). On Explanation in Cognitive Science: Competence, Idealization, and the Failure of the Classical Cascade. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):475-502.
    underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition.
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  30. Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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  31. Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.
    Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes (...)
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  32. Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm (2007). Tools=Theories=Data? On Some Circular Dynamics in Cognitive Science. In Mitchell G. Ash & Thomas Sturm (eds.), Psychology’s Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives from Different Disciplines. Erlbaum.
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  33. Daniel Gilman (1996). Optimization and Simplicity: Computational Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293 - 323.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been a rich source of inspiration, fascination and confusion. I will suggest that some of this confusion can be traced to discrepancies between the way Marr developed his theory in practice and the way he suggested such a theory ought to be developed in his explicit metatheoretical remarks. I will address claims that Marr's theory may be seen as an optimizing theory, along with the attendant suggestion that optimizing assumptions may be inappropriate for cognitive (...)
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  34. Daniel J. Gilman (1993). Optimization and Simplicity: Marr's Theory of Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293-323.
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  35. Robert Hopkins (2003). Pictures, Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. The Monist 86 (4):653-675.
    This paper argues that an account of picturing in terms of the experience it sustains, in particular an experience of resemblance in outline shape, is superior to Dominic Lopes’, view, on which pictures engage our recognitional capacities for the objects they depict. Lopes’ position fails to do the work proper to a philosophical theory of picturing. Lopes argues that the experienced resemblance view pays insufficient attention to empirical work, and that it incurs unwelcome empirical commitments. I refuse the commitments Lopes (...)
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  36. Steven Horst (2013). Notions of Intuition in the Cognitive Science of Religion. The Monist 96 (3):377-398.
    This article examines the notions of “intuitive” and “counterintuitive” beliefs and concepts in cognitive science of religion. “Intuitive” states are contrasted with those that are products of explicit, conscious reasoning. In many cases the intuitions are grounded in the implicit rules of mental models, frames, or schemas. I argue that the pathway from intuitive to high theological concepts and beliefs may be distinct from that from intuitions to “folk religion,” and discuss how Christian theology might best interpret the results of (...)
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  37. Luis Jimenez & Axel Cleeremans (1999). Fishing with the Wrong Nets: How the Implicit Slips Through the Representational Theory of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (771):771-771.
    that depart radically from classical assumptions.
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  38. David Michael Kaplan & Carl F. Craver (2011). The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):601-627.
    We argue that dynamical and mathematical models in systems and cognitive neuro- science explain (rather than redescribe) a phenomenon only if there is a plausible mapping between elements in the model and elements in the mechanism for the phe- nomenon. We demonstrate how this model-to-mechanism-mapping constraint, when satisfied, endows a model with explanatory force with respect to the phenomenon to be explained. Several paradigmatic models including the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model of bimanual coordination and the difference-of-Gaussians model of visual receptive fields are (...)
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  39. Machiel Keestra (2008). The Diverging Force of Imitation. Integrating Cognitive Science and Hermeneutics. Review of General Psychology 12 (2):127-136.
    Recent research on infant and animal imitation and on mirror neuron systems has
    brought imitation back in focus in psychology and cognitive science. This topic has
    always been important for philosophical hermeneutics as well, focusing on theory and
    method of understanding. Unfortunately, relations between the scientific and the
    hermeneutic approaches to imitation and understanding have scarcely been investigated,
    to the loss of both disciplines. In contrast to the cognitive scientific emphasis on
    sharing and convergence of representations, the hermeneutic analysis emphasizes the
    indeterminacy and openness of action understanding (...)
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  40. Machiel Keestra & Stephen Cowley (2009). Foundationalism and Neuroscience; Silence and Language. Language Sciences 31:531-552.
    Neuroscience offers more than new empirical evidence about the details of cognitive functions such as language, perception and action. Since it also shows many functions to be highly distributed, interconnected and dependent on mechanisms at different levels of processing, it challenges concepts that are traditionally used to describe these functions. The question is how to accommodate these concepts to the recent evidence. A recent proposal, made in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) by Bennett and Hacker, is that concepts play a (...)
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  41. Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson (2000). Explanation and Cognition. MIT Press.
    These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual...
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  42. David Kirsh (2000). A Few Thoughts on Cognitive Overload. Intellectica 1 (30):19-51.
    This article addresses three main questions: What causes cognitive overload in the workplace? What analytical framework should be used to understand how agents interact with their work environments? How can environments be restructured to improve the cognitive workflow of agents? Four primary causes of overload are identified: too much tasking and interruption, and inadequate workplace infrastructure to help reduce the need for planning, monitoring, reminding, reclassifying information, etc… The first step in reducing the cognitive impact of these causes is to (...)
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  43. Alfred Kobsa (1987). What is Explained by AI Models. In Artificial Intelligence. St Martin's Press.
  44. Miriam Kyselo (2013). Enaktivismus. In A. Stephan & S. Walter (eds.), Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. J.B. Metzler.
  45. Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts Are a Functional Kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18.
    This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.
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  46. Rainer Mausfeld (2012). On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience. Frontiers in Cognition 3 (67):1-13.
    The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding (...)
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  47. Patrick Maynard (2003). Pictures of Perspective: Theory or Therapy? In Margaret Atherton Heiko Hecht & Robert Schwartz (eds.), Looking into Pictures.
    From a perceptual psychology and philosophy conference on linear perspective: points out standard fallacies about perspective, then challenges psychology's and philosophy's widespread assumption that a satisfactory understanding of depiction in any medium can be reached via theories of spatial--or any other kind of--visual perception.
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  48. Thomas Metzinger (2008). Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
  49. Marcin Miłkowski (2013). Wyjaśnianie w kognitywistyce. Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 22 (2):151-166.
    The paper defends the claim that the mechanistic explanation of information processing is the fundamental kind of explanation in cognitive science. These mechanisms are complex organized systems whose functioning depends on the orchestrated interaction of their component parts and processes. A constitutive explanation of every mechanism must include both appeal to its environment and to the role it plays in it. This role has been traditionally dubbed competence. To fully explain how this role is played it is necessary to explain (...)
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  50. Marcin Miłkowski (2013). Reverse-Engineering in Cognitive-Science. In Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 12-29.
    I discuss whether there are some lessons for philosophical inquiry over the nature of simulation to be learnt from the practical methodology of reengineering. I will argue that reengineering serves a similar purpose as simulations in theoretical science such as computational neuroscience or neurorobotics, and that the procedures and heuristics of reengineering help to develop solutions to outstanding problems of simulation.
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