This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
152 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 152
  1. Richard A. Abrams (1990). Does Visual-Field Specialization Really Have Implications for Coordinated Visual-Motor Behavior? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (3):542-543.
  2. Peter Achinstein (1989). Explanation and Acceptability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467.
  3. John G. Adair (1978). The Combined Probabilities of 345 Studies: Only Half the Story? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):386.
  4. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   74 citations  
  5. Edward H. Adelson (1983). What is Iconic Storage Good For? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):11.
  6. Kenneth John Aitken (2013). It Ain't What You Do (It's the Way That You Do It). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):347-348.
    Knowledge of the complexity of human communication comes from three main sources – (i) studies of the linguistics and neuropsychology of dysfunction after brain injury; (ii) studies of the development of social communication in infancy, and its dysfunction in developmental psychopathologies; and (iii) the evolutionary history of human communicative interaction. Together, these suggest the need for a broad, integrated theory of communication of which language forms a small but critical component.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana.
    Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Kenneth Aizawa (2013). Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”. Minds and Machines 23 (3):277-286.
  9. Kenneth Aizawa (2010). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  10. Kenneth Lee Aizawa (1989). The Promise of Parallel Distributed Processing. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Explanations of psychological regularities in terms of biological regularities are undoubtedly appealing for many reasons. In addition, the scientific methodology that searches for such explanations certainly has merit. Nonetheless, the history of neuroscience, psychology, and computer science over the last one hundred years, indicates that such explanations are difficult to find and that the methodology of searching for them often frustrating. Recent attempts to provide "neurally-inspired" explanations of psychological regularities embodied in the theory of parallel distributed processing, PDP, also show (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (forthcoming). Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  12. Kathleen A. Akins & Mary E. Windham (1992). Just Science? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):376-377.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Emrah Aktunc (2014). Tackling Duhemian Problems: An Alternative to Skepticism of Neuroimaging in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):449-464.
    Duhem’s problem arises especially in scientific contexts where the tools and procedures of measurement and analysis are numerous and complex. Several philosophers of cognitive science have cited its manifestations in fMRI as grounds for skepticism regarding the epistemic value of neuroimaging. To address these Duhemian arguments for skepticism, I offer an alternative approach based on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical account in which Duhem's problem is more fruitfully approached in terms of error probabilities. This is illustrated in examples such as the use (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Emrah Aktunc (2011). Experimental Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience. Dissertation, Virginia Tech
    This is a work in the epistemology of functional neuroimaging (fNI) and it applies the error-statistical (ES) philosophy to inferential problems in fNI to formulate and address these problems. This gives us a clear, accurate, and more complete understanding of what we can learn from fNI and how we can learn it. I review the works in the epistemology of fNI which I group into two categories; the first category consists of discussions of the theoretical significance of fNI findings and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan Weinberg (2010). Competence: What's In? What's Out? Who Knows? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):329-330.
    Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Fritz Allhoff (ed.) (2010). Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The essays are written by leading scholars in a highly accessible style for the student audience Presents and discusses central debates in the field, making it ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Mike Anderson (2006). What We Need is Better Theory, Not More Data. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):125-126.
    Although I find Blair's case for arguing for the distinction between fluid cognitive functions and general intelligence less than compelling, I believe him. However, I also believe that what is required next is a theory of both general intelligence and fluid cognitive functions that articulates the distinction. In the absence of this, more data, particularly of the neuroscience variety, is likely to stall rather than advance progress. (Published Online April 5 2006).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Norman H. Anderson (1996). Cognitive Algebra Versus Representativeness Heuristic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):17.
  19. Rita E. Anderson (1986). Cognitive Explanations and Cognitive Ethology. In William Bechtel (ed.), Integrating Scientific Disciplines. 323--336.
  20. William Angelette, Drawing the Line: Rational Cognitive Therapy, Information, and Boundary Issues.
    It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivists’ hallmark of rational choice. Since standard cognitive therapists sometimes ask us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Alessandro Antonietti (2010). Do Neurobiological Data Help Us to Understand Economic Decisions Better? Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):207-218.
    The contribution that neurobiological data provide us to comprehend the psychological aspects of economic decision-making is critically examined. First, different kinds of correspondences between neural events and mental activities are identified. On the basis of the distinctions made, some recent studies are selected, each of which focuses on a different stage of decision-making and employs a different set of neurobiological data. The thorough analysis of each study suggests that neuro-mental correspondences do not have an evidentiary function but rather a heuristic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar & Thomas Sturm (2014). The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-18.
    While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Anthony P. Atkinson (1998). Systems, Subsystems and Persons: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20 (20):43-60.
  24. Harald Atmanspacher (2006). Editorial. Mind and Matter 4 (1):3-5.
    Mind and Matter is conceived as an interdisciplinary journal, aimed at an educated readership interested in all aspects of mind-matter research from the perspectives of the sciences and humanities. It is devoted to the publication of empirical, theoretical, and conceptual research and the discussion of its results. The main subject areas of the journal are -- neuroscience, cognitive science, behavioral science -- physical approaches, mathematical modeling, data analysis -- philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, applied metaphysics --cultural and social studies, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Justin Barrett, David Leech & Aku Visala (2010). Can Religious Belief Be Explained Away? Reasons and Causes of Religious Belief. In Ulrich J. Frey (ed.), The Nature of God ––– Evolution and Religion. Tectum 1--75.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Edison Barrios (2012). Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (2015). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Brian Beakley (1992). The Structure of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
    The goal of this dissertation is to show that cognitive science, while dealing with the special subject of the mind, can nonetheless fit into the same general model that Bas van Fraassen provides for the natural sciences. The dissertation focuses specifically on the nature of explanation in the cognitive sciences. ;Chapter One makes clear what I take cognitive science to be in the work. The two central cases here are Noam Chomsky's theory of generative syntax, and David Marr's computational theory (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. William Bechtel (2009). Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 155--170.
  30. William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
    Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   31 citations  
  31. William P. Bechtel (1982). Two Common Errors in Explaining Biological and Psychological Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 49 (December):549-574.
    One way in which philosophy of science can perform a valuable normative function for science is by showing characteristic errors made in scientific research programs and proposing ways in which such errors can be avoided or corrected. This paper examines two errors that have commonly plagued research in biology and psychology: 1) functional localization errors that arise when parts of a complex system are assigned functions which these parts are not themselves able to perform, and 2) vacuous functional explanations in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. William Bechtel & Mitchell Herschbach (2010). Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell 239--261.
    Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary research endeavor focusing on human cognitive phenomena such as memory, language use, and reasoning. It emerged in the second half of the 20th century and is charting new directions at the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter begins by identifying the disciplines that contribute to cognitive science and reviewing the history of the interdisciplinary engagements that characterize it. The second section examines the role that mechanistic explanation plays in cognitive science, while the third focuses (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. William Bechtel & Benjamin Sheredos, HIT on the Psychometric Approach.
    Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly – they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  35. J. L. Bermúdez & M. E. Elton (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: Essays on Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):1-119.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Tamás Biró (2010). Will Optimality Theory Colonize All of Higher Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (5):383 - 384.
    To establish Optimality Theory as a framework in anthropology, or as a general model of higher human cognition, researchers have to demonstrate OT is convincing in a number of ways. This commentary summarizes some of them including factorial typologies, exact formulation of candidate sets and constraints, and computational plausibility.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Sara Bizarro (2008). Mental Mechanisms, by William Bechtel. Disputatio.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Radu J. Bogdan (1994). Grounds for Cognition. Erlbaum.
    This is how guidance of behavior to goal grounds and explains cognition and the main forms in which it manages information.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39. Luca Bonatti (1994). Why Should We Abandon the Mental Logic Hypothesis? Cognition 50 (1-3):17-39.
  40. Robert Borger (ed.) (1970). Explanation In The Behavioural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
    A confrontation of views written by distinguished figures concerned with the behavioural and social sciences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41. Miro Brada, We Are Again at the Very Beginning. Nove Slovo.
    About selected philosophical questions of the past and today, with Egon Bondy (1930-2007). In a reaction to his response, I'll add a redefinition of the existential view of decision that is incomplete, and an explanation why 'social science' can be mathematized. The article also include my other ideas which have been developed since 1995. The interview was published in Blisty and Nove Slovo (2003), and some experts were published in The Ice House, Holland Park, London (2013), and Parallax Art Fair (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Maria Brincker (2015). Beyond Sensorimotor Segregation: On Mirror Neurons and Social Affordance Space Tracking. Cognitive Systems Research 34:18-34.
    Mirror neuron research has come a long way since the early 1990s, and many theorists are now stressing the heterogeneity and complexity of the sensorimotor properties of fronto-parietal circuits. However, core aspects of the initial ‘ mirror mechanism ’ theory, i.e. the idea of a symmetric encapsulated mirroring function translating sensory action perceptions into motor formats, still appears to be shaping much of the debate. This article challenges the empirical plausibility of the sensorimotor segregation implicit in the original mirror metaphor. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Maria Brincker (2015). The Aesthetic Stance - on the Conditions and Consequences of Becoming a Beholder. In Alfonsina Scarinzi (ed.), Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy. Springer 117-138.
    What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be- coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Maria Brincker (2014). Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Maria Brincker (2010). Moving Beyond Mirroring - a Social Affordance Model of Sensorimotor Integration During Action Perception. Dissertation, City University of New York
    The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Robert W. Burch (1978). Functional Explanation and Normalcy. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):45-53.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. William Butos, Roger Koppl & Steve Horwitz (eds.) (forthcoming). Advances in Austrian Economics. Emerald.
  48. Lawrence R. Carleton (1985). Levels in Description and Explanation. Philosophy Research Archives 11:89-109.
    Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. A. Charles Catania (2009). Cognitive Science at Fifty. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):141-141.
    Fifty years or so after the cognitive revolution, some cognitive accounts seem to be converging on treatments of how we come to know about ourselves and others that have much in common with behavior analytic accounts. Among the factors that keep the accounts separate is that behavioral accounts take a much broader view of what counts as behavior.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. A. Charles Catania (1972). Chomsky's Formal Analysis of Natural Languages: A Behavioral Translation. Behaviorism 1 (1):1-15.
1 — 50 / 152