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  1. Richard A. Abrams (1990). Does Visual-Field Specialization Really Have Implications for Coordinated Visual-Motor Behavior? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (3):542-543.
  2. Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (2001). The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
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  3. Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana.
    Carl Gillett Department of Philosophy Northern Illinois University Suppose that scientists discover a high level property G that is prima facie multiply realized by two sets of lower level properties, F1, F2, …, Fn, and F*1, F*2, …, F*m. One response would be to take this situation at face value and conclude that G is in fact so multiply realized. A second response, however, would be to eliminate the property G and instead hypothesize subtypes of G, G1 and G2, and (...)
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  4. Kenneth Lee Aizawa (1989). The Promise of Parallel Distributed Processing. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Explanations of psychological regularities in terms of biological regularities are undoubtedly appealing for many reasons. In addition, the scientific methodology that searches for such explanations certainly has merit. Nonetheless, the history of neuroscience, psychology, and computer science over the last one hundred years, indicates that such explanations are difficult to find and that the methodology of searching for them often frustrating. Recent attempts to provide "neurally-inspired" explanations of psychological regularities embodied in the theory of parallel distributed processing, PDP, also show (...)
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  5. Fritz Allhoff (ed.) (2010). Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The essays are written by leading scholars in a highly accessible style for the student audience Presents and discusses central debates in the field, making it ...
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  6. Rita E. Anderson (1986). Cognitive Explanations and Cognitive Ethology. In William Bechtel (ed.), Integrating Scientific Disciplines. 323--336.
  7. William Angelette, Drawing the Line: Rational Cognitive Therapy, Information, and Boundary Issues.
    It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivists’ hallmark of rational choice. Since standard cognitive therapists sometimes ask us to choose sets of beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of greater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy (...)
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  8. Alessandro Antonietti (2010). Do Neurobiological Data Help Us to Understand Economic Decisions Better? Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):207-218.
    The contribution that neurobiological data provide us to comprehend the psychological aspects of economic decision-making is critically examined. First, different kinds of correspondences between neural events and mental activities are identified. On the basis of the distinctions made, some recent studies are selected, each of which focuses on a different stage of decision-making and employs a different set of neurobiological data. The thorough analysis of each study suggests that neuro-mental correspondences do not have an evidentiary function but rather a heuristic (...)
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  9. Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar & Thomas Sturm (2014). The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-18.
    While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which (...)
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  10. Anthony P. Atkinson (1998). Systems, Subsystems and Persons: The Explanatory Scope of Cognitive Psychology. Acta Analytica 20 (20):43-60.
  11. Justin Barrett, David Leech & Aku Visala (2010). Can Religious Belief Be Explained Away? Reasons and Causes of Religious Belief. In Ulrich J. Frey (ed.), The Nature of God ––– Evolution and Religion. Tectum 1--75.
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  12. Edison Barrios (2012). Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
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  13. Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (2015). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review 7 (1):81-89.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  14. Brian Beakley (1992). The Structure of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
    The goal of this dissertation is to show that cognitive science, while dealing with the special subject of the mind, can nonetheless fit into the same general model that Bas van Fraassen provides for the natural sciences. The dissertation focuses specifically on the nature of explanation in the cognitive sciences. ;Chapter One makes clear what I take cognitive science to be in the work. The two central cases here are Noam Chomsky's theory of generative syntax, and David Marr's computational theory (...)
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  15. William Bechtel (2009). Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge 155--170.
  16. William P. Bechtel (1998). Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist Challenge in Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science 22 (3):295-317.
    Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that (...)
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  17. William P. Bechtel (1982). Two Common Errors in Explaining Biological and Psychological Phenomena. Philosophy of Science 49 (December):549-574.
    One way in which philosophy of science can perform a valuable normative function for science is by showing characteristic errors made in scientific research programs and proposing ways in which such errors can be avoided or corrected. This paper examines two errors that have commonly plagued research in biology and psychology: 1) functional localization errors that arise when parts of a complex system are assigned functions which these parts are not themselves able to perform, and 2) vacuous functional explanations in (...)
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  18. William Bechtel & Mitchell Herschbach (2010). Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences. In Fritz Allhoff (ed.), Philosophies of the Sciences. Wiley-Blackwell 239--261.
    Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary research endeavor focusing on human cognitive phenomena such as memory, language use, and reasoning. It emerged in the second half of the 20th century and is charting new directions at the beginning of the 21st century. This chapter begins by identifying the disciplines that contribute to cognitive science and reviewing the history of the interdisciplinary engagements that characterize it. The second section examines the role that mechanistic explanation plays in cognitive science, while the third focuses (...)
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  19. William Bechtel & Benjamin Sheredos, HIT on the Psychometric Approach.
    Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly – they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these (...)
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  20. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  21. J. L. Bermúdez & M. E. Elton (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: Essays on Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):1-119.
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  22. Tamás Biró (2010). Will Optimality Theory Colonize All of Higher Cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (5):383 - 384.
    To establish Optimality Theory as a framework in anthropology, or as a general model of higher human cognition, researchers have to demonstrate OT is convincing in a number of ways. This commentary summarizes some of them including factorial typologies, exact formulation of candidate sets and constraints, and computational plausibility.
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  23. Sara Bizarro (2008). Mental Mechanisms, by William Bechtel. Disputatio.
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  24. Robert Borger (ed.) (1970). Explanation In The Behavioural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
    A confrontation of views written by distinguished figures concerned with the behavioural and social sciences.
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  25. Miro Brada, We Are Again at the Very Beginning. Nove Slovo.
    About selected philosophical questions of the past and today, with Egon Bondy (1930-2007). In a reaction to his response, I'll add a redefinition of the existential view of decision that is incomplete, and an explanation why 'social science' can be mathematized. The article also include my other ideas which have been developed since 1995. The interview was published in Blisty and Nove Slovo (2003), and some experts were published in The Ice House, Holland Park, London (2013), and Parallax Art Fair (...)
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  26. Robert W. Burch (1978). Functional Explanation and Normalcy. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):45-53.
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  27. William Butos, Roger Koppl & Steve Horwitz (eds.) (forthcoming). Advances in Austrian Economics. Emerald.
  28. Lawrence R. Carleton (1985). Levels in Description and Explanation. Philosophy Research Archives 11:89-109.
    Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, (...)
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  29. A. Charles Catania (2009). Cognitive Science at Fifty. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):141-141.
    Fifty years or so after the cognitive revolution, some cognitive accounts seem to be converging on treatments of how we come to know about ourselves and others that have much in common with behavior analytic accounts. Among the factors that keep the accounts separate is that behavioral accounts take a much broader view of what counts as behavior.
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  30. Andy Clark (1998). Twisted Tales: Causal Complexity and Cognitive Scientific Explanation. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (1):79-99.
    Recent work in biology and cognitive science depicts a variety of target phenomena as the products of a tangled web of causal influences. Such influences may include both internal and external factors as well as complex patterns of reciprocal causal interaction. Such twisted tales are sometimes seen as a threat to explanatory strategies that invoke notions such as inner programs, genes for and sometimes even internal representations. But the threat, I shall argue, is more apparent than real. Complex causal influence, (...)
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  31. Axel Cleeremans & Luis Jimenez (1999). Stability and Explicitness: In Defense of Implicit Representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):151-152.
    Electronic Mail: jimenez@usc.es Abstract Stability of activation, while it may be necessary for information to become available to consciousness, is not sufficient to produce phenomenal experience. We suggest that consciousness involves access to information and that access makes information symbolic. From this perspective, implicit representations exist, and are best thought of as sub-symbolic. Crucially, such representations can be causally efficacious in the absence of consciousness.
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  32. Max Coltheart & Robyn Langdon (1998). Autism, Modularity and Levels of Explanation in Cognitive Science. Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
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  33. Elio Conte (2011). On the Logical Origins of Quantum Mechanics Demonstrated By Using Clifford Algebra. Neuroquantology 9 (2):231-242.
    Recently we have given proof of two theorems characterizing the Clifford algebra. By using such two theorems we have reformulated the well known von Neumann postulate on quantum measurements giving evidence of the algebraic manner in which quantum wave function collapse of quantum mechanics happens. In the present paper we introduce logic in Clifford algebra interpreting its idempotents as logical statements. Using the previously mentioned theorems we demonstrate that the two basic foundations of quantum mechanics, as the indeterminism and the (...)
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  34. Richard P. Cooper, Nicolas Ruh & Denis Mareschal (2014). The Goal Circuit Model: A Hierarchical Multi‐Route Model of the Acquisition and Control of Routine Sequential Action in Humans. Cognitive Science 38 (2):244-274.
    Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay between (a) task-dependent serial ordering constraints; (b) top-down, or intentional, control processes; and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally triggered, affordances. In addition, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed action (...)
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  35. Roberto Cordeschi (1989). Artificial Intelligence: A Tentative Criticism of a Criticism. In Proceedings of the 5th Osterreichische Artificial-Intelligence-Tagung. Springer
  36. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). Social Understanding Through Direct Perception? Yes, by Interacting. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):535-542.
    This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I (...)
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  37. Hanne De Jaegher (2009). What Made Me Want the Cheese? A Reply to Shaun Gallagher and Dan Hutto. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (2):549-550.
  38. Hanne de Jaegher, Ezequiel di Paolo & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (10):441-447.
    An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...)
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  39. Hanne De Jaegher & Tom Froese (2009). On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Behavior 17 (5):444-460.
    Is an individual agent constitutive of or constituted by its social interactions? This question is typically not asked in the cognitive sciences, so strong is the consensus that only individual agents have constitutive efficacy. In this article we challenge this methodological solipsism and argue that interindividual relations and social context do not simply arise from the behavior of individual agents, but themselves enable and shape the individual agents on which they depend. For this, we define the notion of autonomy as (...)
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  40. Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    This volume collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behavior, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition.
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  41. Zoe Drayson (2014). The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's (...)
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  42. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  43. Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
  44. Steven Ericsson-Zenith (forthcoming). Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension. Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering.
    At its core this book is concerned with logic and computation with respect to the mathematical characterization of sentient biophysical structure and its behavior. -/- Three related theories are presented: The first of these provides an explanation of how sentient individuals come to be in the world. The second describes how these individuals operate. And the third proposes a method for reasoning about the behavior of individuals in groups. -/- These theories are based upon a new explanation of experience in (...)
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  45. Mark Fedyk (2014). How to Bring Psychology and Biology Together. Philosophical Studies 1 (4):949-967.
    Evolutionary psychologists often try to “bring together” biology and psychology by making predictions about what specific psychological mechanisms exist from theories about what patterns of behaviour would have been adaptive in the EEA for humans. This paper shows that one of the deepest methodological generalities in evolutionary biology—that proximate explanations and ultimate explanations stand in a many-to-many relation—entails that this inferential strategy is unsound. Ultimate explanations almost never entail the truth of any particular proximate hypothesis. But of course it does (...)
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  46. Chrisantha Fernando (2013). From Blickets to Synapses: Inferring Temporal Causal Networks by Observation. Cognitive Science 37 (8):1426-1470.
    How do human infants learn the causal dependencies between events? Evidence suggests that this remarkable feat can be achieved by observation of only a handful of examples. Many computational models have been produced to explain how infants perform causal inference without explicit teaching about statistics or the scientific method. Here, we propose a spiking neuronal network implementation that can be entrained to form a dynamical model of the temporal and causal relationships between events that it observes. The network uses spike-time (...)
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  47. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2004). Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain. International Journal of Neuroscience 114 (7):843 - 862.
    This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of (...)
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  48. Andy Forceno, The Extended Mind: A Dynamical Systems Perspective.
    Clark and Chalmers (2002) advance two hypotheses that both cognition and the mind extend into the environment. Both hypotheses are grounded in active externalism about mental content and the Parity Principle. Active externalism proposes that the external features of the environment in the present directly influence our mental contents and behavior. The Parity Principle states that a process or state in the environment is cognitive if it is functionally equivalent to a comparable intracranial cognitive process. This paper reviews two of (...)
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  49. Bradley Franks (1995). On Explanation in Cognitive Science: Competence, Idealization, and the Failure of the Classical Cascade. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):475-502.
    underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition.
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  50. Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
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