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  1. Tara H. Abraham (2012). Transcending Disciplines: Scientific Styles in Studies of the Brain in Mid-Twentieth Century America. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (2):552-568.
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  2. Tara H. Abraham (2003). From Theory to Data: Representing Neurons in the 1940s. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (3):415-426.
    Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I (...)
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  3. David B. Adams (1979). Motivational Systems, Motivational Mechanisms, and Aggression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):230-241.
  4. Colin Allen, Macaque Mirror Neurons.
    Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called “mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical (...)
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  5. A. J. Amos & C. D. L. Wynne (2000). The Organization of Organization: Neuronal Scaffold or Cognitive Straitjacket? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):533-534.
    We praise Arbib et al.'s Neural organization for its support of the integration of different levels of analysis, while noting that it does not always achieve what it advocates. We extend this approach into an area of neuropsychological activity in need of the structure offered by Organization at the intersection of the conflated fields of executive function and frontal lobe function.
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  6. Michael A. Arbib (1989). Modularity, Schemas and Neurons: A Critique of Fodor. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer. 193--219.
  7. Jerrold L. Aronson (1976). Some Dubious Neurological Assumptions of Radical Behaviourism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6 (1):49–60.
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  8. Harald Atmanspacher, Interpreting Neurodynamics: Concepts and Facts.
    The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, (...)
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  9. Lynne Rudder Baker, Neuroscience and the Human Mind.
    I want to raise three questions for discussion: 1. How are a philosopher’s concerns about the human mind related to a neuroscientist’s concerns? 2. Can neuroscience explain everything that we want to understand about the human mind? 3. Does neuroscience threaten our dignity or humanity (or anything else that we cherish about ourselves)? Let’s take these questions one at a time.
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  10. Michael W. Barclay (1995). The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection and its Implications for Psychology: A Critique of the Biological Self. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):41-57.
  11. Jennifer S. Bard (2007). Learning From Law's Past: A Call for Caution in Incorporating New Innovations in Neuroscience. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):73-75.
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  12. Jordan Bartol & Stefan Linquist (forthcoming). How Do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making? Emotion Review.
    Several recent criticisms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) identify multiple ambiguities in the way it has been formulated by its chief proponents. Here we provide evidence that this hypothesis has also been interpreted in various different ways by the scientific community. Our diagnosis of this problem is that SMH lacks an adequate computational-level account of practical decision making. Such an account is necessary for drawing meaningful links between neurological- and psychological-level data. The paper concludes by providing a simple, five-step (...)
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  13. Michael Baumgartner & Alexander Gebharter (forthcoming). Constitutive Relevance, Mutual Manipulability, and Fat-Handedness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The first part of this paper argues that if Craver’s ([2007a], [2007b]) popular mutual manipulability account (MM) of mechanistic constitution is embedded within Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist theory of causation--for which it is explicitly designed--it either undermines the mechanistic research paradigm by entailing that there do not exist relationships of constitutive relevance or it gives rise to the unwanted consequence that constitution is a form of causation. The second part shows how Woodward’s theory can be adapted in such a way that (...)
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  14. William P. Bechtel, Mental Mechanisms: What Are the Operations?
    trying to explain these reactions in terms of changes in ele- began trying to characterize physiological processes in.
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  15. William P. Bechtel (2005). The Challenge of Characterizing Operations in the Mechanisms Underlying Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 84:313-325.
    Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become (...)
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  16. William P. Bechtel (2002). Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why Is It Important? Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S48-S58.
    The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scientific practice and discussions of scientific methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose—multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists (...)
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  17. William P. Bechtel (2001). Cognitive Neuroscienec: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.
  18. William P. Bechtel (1983). A Bridge Between Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: The Functional Architecture of Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 44 (November):319-30.
  19. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1996). Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function. Minds and Machines 6 (4):481-505.
    The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of (...)
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  20. William Bechtel & Benjamin Sheredos, HIT on the Psychometric Approach.
    Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly – they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these (...)
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  21. John Bickle (2001). Understanding Neural Complexity: A Role for Reduction. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 11 (4):467-481.
    Psychoneural reduction is under attack again, only this time from a former ally: cognitive neuroscience. It has become popular to think of the brain as a complex system whose theoretically important properties emerge from dynamic, non-linear interactions between its component parts. ``Emergence'' is supposed to replace reduction: the latter is thought to be incapable of explaining the brain qua complex system. Rather than engage this issue at the level of theories of reduction versus theories of emergence, I here emphasize a (...)
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  22. Francois Blanc (2010). Trance and Shamanic Cure on the South American Continent: Psychopharmacological and Neurobiological Interpretations. Anthropology of Consciousness 21 (1):83-105.
    This article examines the neurobiological basis of the healing power attributed to shamanic practices in the Andes and Brazil in light of the pharmacology of neurotransmitters and the new technological explorations of brain functioning. The psychotropic plants used in shamanic psychiatric cures interfere selectively with the intrinsic neuromediators of the brain. Mainly they may alter: (1) the neuroendocrine functioning through the adrenergic system by controlling stressful conditions, (2) the dopaminergic system in incentive learning and emotions incorporation, (3) the serotoninergic system (...)
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  23. Terry Blumenthal & James Schirillo (1999). Biological Neuroscience is Only as Radical as the Evolution of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):831-831.
    A biological neuroscientific theory must acknowledge that the function of a neurological system is to produce behaviors that promote survival. Thus, unlike what Gold & Stoljar claim, function and behavior are the province of neurobiology and cannot be relegated to the field of psychological phenomena, which would then trivialize the radical doctrine if accepted. One possible advantage of adopting such a (correctly revised) radical doctrine is that it might ultimately produce a successful, evolutionarily based, theory of mind.
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  24. Noel Boyle (2008). Neurobiology and Phenomenology: Towards a Three-Tiered Intertheoretic Model of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):34-58.
    Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these (...)
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  25. William Andrew Bradnan (1982). On Behavioristic Versus Neurophysiologic Accounts of Psychotic Behavior. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (3):289-303.
    Skinner has made significant contributions to the science of the behavior of organisms, including human ones, especially through his emphasis on observable behavior. He has correctly placed psychology among the biological sciences. My disagreement with his position stems from his apparent belief that a knowledge of the pertinent neurophysiology is not necessary (though perhaps desirable) to an explanation of the behavior of an organism. I believe this is a significant conceptual shortcoming, and that correcting it will bring psychology into a (...)
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  26. Leslie Brothers (1999). The Logic of Interests in Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):831-832.
    Logical problems inherent in claims that biological neuroscience can ultimately explain mind are not anomalous: They result from underlying social interests. Neuroscientists are currently making a successful bid to fill a vacuum of authority created by the demise of Freudian theory in popular culture. The conflations described in the Gold & Stoljar target article are the result of alliances between certain apologist-philosophers, neuroscientists, and institutions, for the purpose of commanding authority and resources. Social analysis has a role to play in (...)
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  27. Bruce L. Brown, Dawson W. Hedges & Edwin E. Gantt (2008). Brain Processes and Holistic Isomorphism: Moving Toward a Humanistic Neuroscience. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):356-374.
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  28. Silvia A. Bunge & Michael J. Souza (2008). Neural Representations Used to Specify Action. In Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.), Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior. Oxford University Press.
  29. Lawrence R. Carleton (1985). Levels in Description and Explanation. Philosophy Research Archives 11:89-109.
    Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, (...)
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  30. François Chapeau-Blondeau (1995). Information Processing in Neural Networks by Means of Controlled Dynamic Regimes. Acta Biotheoretica 43 (1-2).
    This paper is concerned with the modeling of neural systems regarded as information processing entities. I investigate the various dynamic regimes that are accessible in neural networks considered as nonlinear adaptive dynamic systems. The possibilities of obtaining steady, oscillatory or chaotic regimes are illustrated with different neural network models. Some aspects of the dependence of the dynamic regimes upon the synaptic couplings are examined. I emphasize the role that the various regimes may play to support information processing abilities. I present (...)
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  31. M. Chirimuuta (2013). Extending, Changing, and Explaining the Brain. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):613-638.
    This paper addresses concerns raised recently by Datteri (Biol Philos 24:301–324, 2009) and Craver (Philos Sci 77(5):840–851, 2010) about the use of brain-extending prosthetics in experimental neuroscience. Since the operation of the implant induces plastic changes in neural circuits, it is reasonable to worry that operational knowledge of the hybrid system will not be an accurate basis for generalisation when modelling the unextended brain. I argue, however, that Datteri’s no-plasticity constraint unwittingly rules out numerous experimental paradigms in behavioural and systems (...)
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  32. D. Cliff (1990). Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto. In Jean-Arcady Meyer & Stewart W. Wilson (eds.), From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems). Cambridge University Press.
  33. G. Colombetti (2013). Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):288-297.
    Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. (...)
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  34. Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (2003). Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology. Cortex 39 (1):188-191.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...)
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  35. Mark B. Couch (2011). Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance. Synthese 183 (3):375-388.
    This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism’s operation. I first consider Craver’s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie’s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their various features.
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  36. Jeff Coulter (1995). The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.
    The concept of “information” is virtually ubiquitous in contemporary cognitive science. It is claimed to be “processed” (in cognitivist theories of perception and comprehension), “stored” (in cognitivist theories of memory and recognition), and otherwise manipulated and transformed by the human central nervous system. Fred Dretske's extensive philosophical defense of a theory of informational content (“semantic” information) based upon the Shannon-Weaver formal theory of information is subjected to critical scrutiny. A major difficulty is identified in Dretske's equivocations in the use of (...)
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  37. Carl Craver, Why the Hodgkin and Huxely Model Does Not Explain the Action Potential.
    Hodgkin and Huxley’s 1952 model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering-law explanation. The model appeals to general laws of physics and chemistry (specifically, Ohm’s law and the Nernst equation), and the laws, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, entail many of the significant properties of the action potential. However, Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model falls short of an explanation. This historical fact suggests either that there is more to explaining the action (...)
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  38. Carl F. Craver (2008). Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action Potential. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):1022-1033.
    Hodgkin and Huxley’s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering‐law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong. I defend Hodgkin (...)
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  39. Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.
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  40. Carl F. Craver (2005). Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 36 (2):373-395.
  41. Carl F. Craver (2003). The Making of a Memory Mechanism. Journal of the History of Biology 36 (1):153-95.
    Long-Term Potentiation (LTP) is a kind of synaptic plasticity that many contemporary neuroscientists believe is a component in mechanisms of memory. This essay describes the discovery of LTP and the development of the LTP research program. The story begins in the 1950's with the discovery of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (a medial temporal lobe structure now associated with memory), and it ends in 1973 with the publication of three papers sketching the future course of the LTP research program. The (...)
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  42. Carl F. Craver (2002). Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory. Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume 69 (3):S83-S97.
  43. Carl F. Craver (2001). Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 68 (1):53-74.
    Many areas of science develop by discovering mechanisms and role functions. Cummins' (1975) analysis of role functions-according to which an item's role function is a capacity of that item that appears in an analytic explanation of the capacity of some containing system-captures one important sense of "function" in the biological sciences and elsewhere. Here I synthesize Cummins' account with recent work on mechanisms and causal/mechanical explanation. The synthesis produces an analysis of specifically mechanistic role functions, one that uses the characteristic (...)
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  44. Carl F. Craver & William Bechtel (2007). Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes. Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):547-563.
    We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel (...)
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  45. Carl F. Craver & Lindley Darden (2001). Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial Memory. In P.K. Machamer, Rick Grush & Peter McLaughlin (eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience. Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press. 112--137.
  46. H. Cruse (2001). The Explanatory Power and Limits of Simulation Models in the Neurosciences. In Peter K. Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press. 138--154.
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  47. Martin Davies, Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...)
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  48. Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (eds.) (2007). The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    This volume collects the latest work on central topics where neuroscience is now making inroads in traditional psychological terrain, such as adaptive behavior, reward systems, consciousness, and social cognition.
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  49. Guillermo Del Pinal & Marco J. Nathan (2013). There and Up Again: On the Uses and Misuses of Neuroimaging in Psychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology 30 (4):233-252.
    The aim of this article is to discuss the conditions under which functional neuroimaging can contribute to the study of higher cognition. We begin by presenting two case studies—on moral and economic decision making—which will help us identify and examine one of the main ways in which neuroimaging can help advance the study of higher cognition. We agree with critics that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies seldom “refine” or “confirm” particular psychological hypotheses, or even provide details of the neural (...)
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  50. Fred Delcomyn (2001). Biorobotic Models Can Contribute to Neurobiology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1056-1057.
    The idea that biorobots can be used as a testbed for the evaluation of hypotheses about how an animal functions is supported. Generation of realistic feedback is a major advantage of biorobotic models. Nevertheless, skeptics can only be convinced that this approach is valid if significant biological insights are generated from its application.
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