@article{Abraham2012-ABRTDS, volume = {43}, number = {2}, author = {Tara H. Abraham}, title = {Transcending Disciplines: Scientific Styles in Studies of the Brain in Mid-Twentieth Century America}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C}, year = {2012}, pages = {552--568} } @article{Abraham2003-ABRFTT, volume = {18}, number = {3}, author = {Tara H. Abraham}, abstract = {Recent literature on the role of pictorial representation in the life sciences has focused on the relationship between detailed representations of empirical data and more abstract, formal representations of theory. The standard argument is that in both a historical and epistemic sense, this relationship is a directional one: beginning with raw, unmediated images and moving towards diagrams that are more interpreted and more theoretically rich. Using the neural network diagrams of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts as a case study, I argue that while in the empirical sciences, pictorial representation tends to move from data to theory, in areas of the life sciences that are predominantly theoretical, when abstraction occurs at the outset, the relationship between detail and abstraction in pictorial representations can be of a different character.}, title = {From Theory to Data: Representing Neurons in the 1940s}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003} } @unpublished{AllenManuscript-ALLMMN, author = {Colin Allen}, abstract = {Primatologists generally agree that monkeys lack higher-order intentional capacities related to theory of mind. Yet the discovery of the so-called \textquotedblleft{}mirror neurons\textquotedblright in monkeys suggests to many neuroscientists that they have the rudiments of intentional understanding. Given a standard philosophical view about intentional understanding, which requires higher-order intentionality, a paradox arises. Different ways of resolving the paradox are assessed, using evidence from neural, cognitive, and behavioral studies of humans and monkeys. A decisive resolution to the paradox requires substantial additional empirical work and perhaps a rejection of the standard philosophical view.}, title = {Macaque Mirror Neurons} } @article{Amos2000-AMOTOO, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {A. J. Amos and C. D. L. Wynne}, abstract = {We praise Arbib et al.'s Neural organization for its support of the integration of different levels of analysis, while noting that it does not always achieve what it advocates. We extend this approach into an area of neuropsychological activity in need of the structure offered by Organization at the intersection of the conflated fields of executive function and frontal lobe function.}, title = {The Organization of Organization: Neuronal Scaffold or Cognitive Straitjacket?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {533--534} } @incollection{Arbib1989-ARBMSA, author = {Michael A. Arbib}, booktitle = {Computers, Brains and Minds}, title = {Modularity, Schemas and Neurons: A Critique of Fodor}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1989} } @article{Aronson1976-AROSDN, volume = {6}, number = {1}, author = {Jerrold L. Aronson}, title = {Some Dubious Neurological Assumptions of Radical Behaviourism}, journal = {Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour}, year = {1976}, pages = {49--8211} } @unpublished{AtmanspacherManuscript-ATMINC, author = {Harald Atmanspacher}, abstract = {The dynamics of neuronal systems, briefly neurodynamics, has developed into an attractive and influential research branch within neuroscience. In this paper, we discuss a number of conceptual issues in neurodynamics that are important for an appropriate interpretation and evaluation of its results. We demonstrate their relevance for selected topics of theoretical and empirical work. In particular, we refer to the notions of determinacy and stochasticity in neurodynamics across levels of microscopic, mesoscopic and macroscopic descriptions. The issue of correlations between neural, mental and behavioral states is also addressed in some detail. We propose an informed discussion of conceptual foundations with respect to neurobiological results as a viable step to a fruitful future philosophy of neuroscience.}, title = {Interpreting Neurodynamics: Concepts and Facts} } @unpublished{Baker1992-BAKANP, author = {LR Baker}, title = {A Neurocomputational Perspective - the Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science - Churchland,Pm}, year = {1992} } @unpublished{BakerManuscript-BAKNAT-2, author = {Lynne Rudder Baker}, abstract = {I want to raise three questions for discussion: 1. How are a philosopher\textquoteright{}s concerns about the human mind related to a neuroscientist\textquoteright{}s concerns? 2. Can neuroscience explain everything that we want to understand about the human mind? 3. Does neuroscience threaten our dignity or humanity (or anything else that we cherish about ourselves)? Let\textquoteright{}s take these questions one at a time.}, title = {Neuroscience and the Human Mind} } @article{Barclay1995-BARTTO-7, volume = {15}, number = {1}, author = {Michael W. Barclay}, title = {The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection and its Implications for Psychology: A Critique of the Biological Self}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology}, year = {1995}, pages = {41--57} } @article{Bard2007-BARLFL, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Jennifer S. Bard}, title = {Learning From Law's Past: A Call for Caution in Incorporating New Innovations in Neuroscience}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {73--75} } @unpublished{Bechtel2005-BECMMW, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {trying to explain these reactions in terms of changes in ele- began trying to characterize physiological processes in}, title = {Mental Mechanisms: What Are the Operations?}, year = {2005} } @article{Bechtel2005-BECTCO-2, volume = {84}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists}, title = {The Challenge of Characterizing Operations in the Mechanisms Underlying Behavior}, journal = {Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior}, year = {2005}, pages = {313--325} } @article{Bechtel2002-BECAMR, volume = {69}, number = {S3}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {The need to align multiple experimental procedures and produce converging results so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon under investigation is real and not an artifact is a commonplace both in scienti{}c practice and discussions of scienti{}c methodology (Campbell and Stanley 1963; Wimsatt 1981). Although sometimes this is the purpose of aligning techniques, often there is a different purpose---{}multiple techniques are sought to supply different perspectives on the phenomena under investigation that need to be integrated to answer the questions scientists are asking. After introducing this function, I will illustrate it by considering three of the major techniques in cognitive neuroscience for linking cognitive function with neural structure}, title = {Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive Neuroscience: Why Is It Important?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {48--58} } @incollection{Bechtel2001-BECCNR, author = {William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscienec: Relating Neural Mechanisms and Cognition}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @article{Bechtel1983-BECABB, volume = {44}, number = {November}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, title = {A Bridge Between Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: The Functional Architecture of Mind}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1983}, pages = {319--30} } @article{Bechtel1996-BECINP, volume = {6}, number = {4}, author = {William P. Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale}, abstract = {The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psyychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory.}, title = {Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function}, journal = {Minds And Machines}, year = {1996}, pages = {481--505} } @unpublished{BechtelManuscript-BECHOT, author = {William Bechtel and Benjamin Sheredos}, abstract = {Traditionally, identity and supervenience have been proposed in philosophy of mind as metaphysical accounts of how mental activities (fully understood, as they might be at the end of science) relate to brain processes. Kievet et al. suggest that to be relevant to cognitive neuroscience, these philosophical positions must make empirically testable claims and be evaluated accordingly -- they cannot sit on the sidelines, awaiting the hypothetical completion of cognitive neuroscience. We agree with the authors on the importance of rendering these positions relevant to ongoing science. We disagree, however, with their proposal that a metaphysical relationship (identity or supervenience) should \textquotedblleft{}serve as a means to conceptually organize and guide the analysis of neurological and behavioral data\textquotedblright (p. 7). Instead, we advance a different view of the goals of cognitive neuroscience and of the proper means of relating metaphysics and explanation. Our central objection to the psychometric approach deployed by Kievet et al. is that the formal models only account for correlations between variables (measurements) and do not aid in explaining phenomena. Cognitive neuroscience is concerned with the latter. We develop this point in section 2 in which we present what we find to be problematic in their proposed models. In section 3 we advance an account of what is required to explain phenomena: (a) providing an adequate description of a phenomenon; and (b) characterizing the mechanism responsible for it. In doing so we will characterize a version of the identity theory, heuristic identity theory (HIT) which figures centrally in developing such explanations and illustrate its role in what we take to..}, title = {HIT on the Psychometric Approach} } @article{Blanc2010-BLATAS-2, volume = {21}, number = {1}, author = {Francois Blanc}, abstract = {This article examines the neurobiological basis of the healing power attributed to shamanic practices in the Andes and Brazil in light of the pharmacology of neurotransmitters and the new technological explorations of brain functioning. The psychotropic plants used in shamanic psychiatric cures interfere selectively with the intrinsic neuromediators of the brain. Mainly they may alter: (1) the neuroendocrine functioning through the adrenergic system by controlling stressful conditions, (2) the dopaminergic system in incentive learning and emotions incorporation, (3) the serotoninergic system in modulating behaviors, and mood, and (4) basic functions implied in anxiety or depression. PET scans and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of hypnotic trance and altered states of consciousness may provide a useful model for the neurophysiological phenomena of shamanic drum-and-dance trance. The reorganization of cortical areas and the direct interconnections between the prefrontal cortex and the dopaminergic reward centers in the limbic system are of particular significance for human social judgment and symbolic processing. Those centers---{}including the hypothalamus and the amygdala (associated with psychosomatic equilibrium, memory, and emotion) are enhanced. This arousal may be amplified in order to induce a cathartic crisis---{}the shamanic trance. It is suggested that through this holistic approach the shaman empirically interferes in neurobiological dysfunctions}, title = {Trance and Shamanic Cure on the South American Continent: Psychopharmacological and Neurobiological Interpretations}, journal = {Anthropology of Consciousness}, year = {2010}, pages = {83--105} } @article{Blumenthal1999-BLUBNI, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Terry Blumenthal and James Schirillo}, abstract = {A biological neuroscientific theory must acknowledge that the function of a neurological system is to produce behaviors that promote survival. Thus, unlike what Gold \& Stoljar claim, function and behavior are the province of neurobiology and cannot be relegated to the field of psychological phenomena, which would then trivialize the radical doctrine if accepted. One possible advantage of adopting such a (correctly revised) radical doctrine is that it might ultimately produce a successful, evolutionarily based, theory of mind.}, title = {Biological Neuroscience is Only as Radical as the Evolution of Mind}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {831--831} } @article{Boyle2008-BOYNAP, volume = {15}, number = {3}, author = {Noel Boyle}, abstract = {Analytic and continental philosophies of mind are too long divided. In both traditions there is extensive discussion of consciousness, the mind-body problem, intentionality, subjectivity, perception (especially visual) and so on. Between these two discussions there are substantive disagreements, overlapping points of insight, meaningful differences in emphasis, and points of comparison which seems to offer nothing but confusion. In other words, there are the ideal circumstances for doing philosophy. Yet, there has been little discourse. This paper invites expanding discourse between these two philosophical traditions. The first part briefly describes the existing literature which works across the analytic- phenomenology divide, situating my work within it as a focus on analytic physicalism and phenomenal explanation. In the longer second part, I sketch a model for explanation embedded simultaneously in both traditions. Hopefully, a theoretical framework emerges that the unlikely combination of Maurice Merleau- Ponty and Patricia Churchland could accept. In the third part, I apply the three-tiered model to a discussion of plasticity and suggest that the model both reflects existing research across three levels of analysis and can be a fruitful way to approach future research. My suggestion for a three-tiered model is quite tentative. Much less tentative is my claim that constructive dialogue between phenomeno- logical and physicalist study of consciousness is long-overdue, illuminating, and practical.}, title = {Neurobiology and Phenomenology: Towards a Three-Tiered Intertheoretic Model of Explanation}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {34--58} } @article{Bradnan1982-BRAOBV, volume = {7}, number = {3}, author = {William Andrew Bradnan}, abstract = {Skinner has made significant contributions to the science of the behavior of organisms, including human ones, especially through his emphasis on observable behavior. He has correctly placed psychology among the biological sciences. My disagreement with his position stems from his apparent belief that a knowledge of the pertinent neurophysiology is not necessary (though perhaps desirable) to an explanation of the behavior of an organism. I believe this is a significant conceptual shortcoming, and that correcting it will bring psychology into a more consistent position with the biological sciences in general. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {On Behavioristic Versus Neurophysiologic Accounts of Psychotic Behavior}, journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy}, year = {1982}, pages = {289--303} } @article{Brothers1999-BROTLO-7, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Leslie Brothers}, abstract = {Logical problems inherent in claims that biological neuroscience can ultimately explain mind are not anomalous: They result from underlying social interests. Neuroscientists are currently making a successful bid to fill a vacuum of authority created by the demise of Freudian theory in popular culture. The conflations described in the Gold \& Stoljar target article are the result of alliances between certain apologist-philosophers, neuroscientists, and institutions, for the purpose of commanding authority and resources. Social analysis has a role to play in addressing logical issues in the philosophy of neuroscience.}, title = {The Logic of Interests in Neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {831--832} } @article{Brown2008-BROBPA-2, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Bruce L. Brown and Dawson W. Hedges and Edwin E. Gantt}, title = {Brain Processes and Holistic Isomorphism: Moving Toward a Humanistic Neuroscience}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2008}, pages = {356--374} } @incollection{Bunge2008-BUNNRU, author = {Silvia A. Bunge and Michael J. Souza}, booktitle = {Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior}, title = {Neural Representations Used to Specify Action}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008} } @unpublished{BurockManuscript-BUREFI, author = {Marc Burock}, abstract = {Many cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of science consider it uncontroversial that the brain processes information. In this work we broadly consider the types of experimental evidence that would support this claim, and find that although physical features of specific brain areas selectively covary with external stimuli or abilities, there is no direct evidence supporting an information processing function of any particular brain area.}, title = {Evidence for Information Processing in the Brain} } @unpublished{BurockManuscript-BURIAT-5, author = {Marc Burock}, abstract = {Many of us consider it uncontroversial that information processing is a natural function of the brain. Since functions in biology are only won through empirical investigation, there should be a significant body of unambiguous evidence that supports this functional claim. Before we can interpret the evidence, however, we must ask what it means for a biological system to process information. Although a concept of information is generally accepted in the neurosciences without critique, in other biological sciences applications of information, despite careful analysis, remain controversial. In this work I will review classical stimulus-response studies in neuroscience and use Claude Shannon\textquoteright{}s mathematical information theory as a starting point to interpret information processing as a function of the brain. I will illustrate a disanalogy between Shannon\textquoteright{}s communication model (source, encode, channel, receiver, decode) and neural systems, and will argue that the neural code is not very code-like in comparison to genetic and engineered codes. I suggest that we have conflated the act of representing neuroscientific facts---{}which we do to summarize and communicate our findings with others---{}with taking experimental facts to be representations.}, title = {Information and the Function of Neurons} } @article{Carleton1985-CARLID, volume = {11}, author = {Lawrence R. Carleton}, abstract = {Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, and try to forestall certain misunderstandings of those presuppositions and that definition}, title = {Levels in Description and Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy Research Archives}, year = {1985}, pages = {89--109} } @article{CarlosM2008-CARDID, author = {Mu\~n{}oz-Su\'a{}rez Carlos M. and Campis Ren\'e J.}, abstract = {In this paper we analyze Libet\textquoteright{}s conclusions on \guillemotleft{}free will\guillemotright (FW), rejecting his view of the concept and defending a partially aligned view with Wittgenstein\textquoteright{}s early remarks on FW. First, the concept of Readiness Potential (RP) and Libet\textquoteright{}s view are presented. Second, we offer an account of Wittgenstein\textasciiacute{}s point of view. Third, a dual-domain analysis is proposed; finally, we offer our conclusions. This article\textasciiacute{}s conclusion is part of an ongoing research.}, title = {DID I DO IT? -YEAH, YOU DID!}, journal = {Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {34--37} } @article{Changeux1973-CHAATO-3, volume = {70}, number = {10}, author = {Jean Pierre Changeux and Philippe Courr\`e{}ge and Antoine Danchin}, abstract = {A formalism is introduced to represent the connective organization of an evolving neuronal network and the effects of environment on this organization by stabilization or degeneration of labile synapses associated with functioning. Learning, or the acquisition of an associative property, is related to a characteristic variability of the connective organization: the interaction of the environment with the genetic program is printed as a particular pattern of such organization through neuronal functioning. An application of the theory to the development of the neuromuscular junction is proposed and the basic selective aspect of learning emphasized.}, title = {A Theory of the Epigenesis of Neuronal Networks by Selective Stabilization of Synapses}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA}, year = {1973}, pages = {2974--8} } @article{Chirimuuta2013-CHIECA, volume = {28}, number = {4}, author = {M. Chirimuuta}, abstract = {This paper addresses concerns raised recently by Datteri (Biol Philos 24:301--{}324, 2009) and Craver (Philos Sci 77(5):840--{}851, 2010) about the use of brain-extending prosthetics in experimental neuroscience. Since the operation of the implant induces plastic changes in neural circuits, it is reasonable to worry that operational knowledge of the hybrid system will not be an accurate basis for generalisation when modelling the unextended brain. I argue, however, that Datteri\textquoteright{}s no-plasticity constraint unwittingly rules out numerous experimental paradigms in behavioural and systems neuroscience which also elicit neural plasticity. Furthermore, I propose that Datteri and Craver\textquoteright{}s arguments concerning the limitations of prosthetic modelling in basic neuroscience, as opposed to neuroengineering, rests on too narrow a view of the ways models in neuroscience should be evaluated, and that a more pluralist approach is needed. I distinguish organisational validity of models from mechanistic validity. I argue that while prosthetic models may be deficient in the latter of these explanatory virtues because of neuroplasticity, they excel in the former since organisational validity tracks the extent to which a model captures coding principles that are invariant with plasticity. Changing the brain, I conclude, is one viable route towards explaining the brain}, title = {Extending, Changing, and Explaining the Brain}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2013}, pages = {613--638} } @incollection{Cliff1990-CLICNA, author = {D. Cliff}, booktitle = {From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems)}, title = {Computational Neuroethology: A Provisional Manifesto}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990} } @article{Coltheart2003-COLIAE, volume = {39}, number = {1}, author = {Max Coltheart and Martin Davies}, abstract = {The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D\&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science}, title = {Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology}, journal = {Cortex}, year = {2003}, pages = {188--191} } @article{Conte2012-CONMWV, volume = {10}, number = {1}, author = {Elio Conte}, abstract = {Von Neumann in 1932 was the first to outline the possible non-existence of dispersion free ensembles in quantum mechanics, and he used this basic evidence to give a preliminary proof on incompatibility between quantum mechanics and local hidden variables theory. In the present paper, we give a detailed theoretical elaboration on the manner in which such a fundamental subject could be explored at perceptive and cognitive levels in humans. We also discuss a general design of the experiment that we have in progress so to give direct indications to other researchers engaged in such field.}, title = {May We Verify Non-Existing Dispersion Free Ensembles By Application of Quantum Mechanics in Experiments at Perceptive and Cognitive Level?}, journal = {Neuroquantology}, year = {2012}, pages = {14--19} } @article{Conte2011-CONOTL, volume = {8}, number = {25}, author = {Elio Conte}, abstract = {We review a rough scheme of quantum mechanics using the Clifford algebra. Following the steps previously published in a paper by another author [31], we demonstrate that quantum interference arises in a Clifford algebraic formulation of quantum mechanics. In 1932 J. von Neumann showed that projection operators and, in particular, quantum density matrices can be interpreted as logical statements. In accord with a previously obtained result by V. F Orlov , in this paper we invert von Neumann\textquoteright{}s result. Instead of constructing logic from quantum mechanics , we construct quantum mechanics from an extended classical logic. It follows that the origins of the two most fundamental quantum phenomena , the indeterminism and the interference of probabilities, lie not in the traditional physics by itself but in the logical structure as realized here by the Clifford algebra.}, title = {On the Logical Origins of Quantum Mechanics Demonstrated by Using Clifford Algebra}, journal = {Electronic Journal of Theoretical Physics}, year = {2011}, pages = {109--126} } @article{Couch2011-COUMAC, volume = {183}, number = {3}, author = {Mark B. Couch}, abstract = {This paper will examine the nature of mechanisms and the distinction between the relevant and irrelevant parts involved in a mechanism\textquoteright{}s operation. I first consider Craver\textquoteright{}s account of this distinction in his book on the nature of mechanisms, and explain some problems. I then offer a novel account of the distinction that appeals to some resources from Mackie\textquoteright{}s theory of causation. I end by explaining how this account enables us to better understand what mechanisms are and their various features.}, title = {Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2011}, pages = {375--388} } @article{Coulter1995-COUTIN, volume = {5}, number = {4}, author = {Jeff Coulter}, title = {The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1995}, pages = {583--96} } @unpublished{Craver2006-CRAWTH, author = {Carl Craver}, abstract = {Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s 1952 model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering-law explanation. The model appeals to general laws of physics and chemistry (specifically, Ohm\textquoteright{}s law and the Nernst equation), and the laws, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, entail many of the significant properties of the action potential. However, Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model falls short of an explanation. This historical fact suggests either that there is more to explaining the action potential than subsuming it under a general laws or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong about the explanatory import of their model. In this paper, I defend Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s view that their model alone does not explain the action potential (contra Weber 2005). I argue further that neuroscientists lacked crucial explanatory details about the action potential until they could describe the molecular and ionic mechanisms by virtue of which their model holds (see Bogen 2005). Mathematical generalizations are important epistemic tools for assessing mechanistic explanations, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for adequate explanations, even at the lowest levels of organization where biological phenomena are integrated with physics and chemistry.}, title = {Why the Hodgkin and Huxely Model Does Not Explain the Action Potential}, year = {2006} } @article{Craver2008-CRAPLA, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s model of the action potential is an apparent dream case of covering{}law explanation in biology. The model includes laws of physics and chemistry that, coupled with details about antecedent and background conditions, can be used to derive features of the action potential. Hodgkin and Huxley insist that their model is not an explanation. This suggests either that subsuming a phenomenon under physical laws is insufficient to explain it or that Hodgkin and Huxley were wrong. I defend Hodgkin and Huxley against Weber\textquoteright{}s heteronomy thesis and argue that explanations are descriptions of mechanisms. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Philosophy{}Neuroscience{}Psychology Program, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Wilson Hall, St. Louis, MO 63130; e{}mail: ccraver@artsci.wustl.edu.}, title = {Physical Law and Mechanistic Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action Potential}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {1022--1033} } @book{Craver2007-CRAETB, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.}, title = {Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience}, publisher = {Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;}, year = {2007} } @article{Craver2005-CCRBRM, volume = {36}, number = {2}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, title = {Beyond Reduction: Mechanisms, Multifield Integration and the Unity of Neuroscience}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C}, year = {2005}, pages = {373--395} } @article{Craver2003-CRATMO, volume = {36}, number = {1}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {Long-Term Potentiation (LTP) is a kind of synaptic plasticity that many contemporary neuroscientists believe is a component in mechanisms of memory. This essay describes the discovery of LTP and the development of the LTP research program. The story begins in the 1950's with the discovery of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (a medial temporal lobe structure now associated with memory), and it ends in 1973 with the publication of three papers sketching the future course of the LTP research program. The making of LTP was a protracted affair. Hippocampal synaptic plasticity was initially encountered as an experimental tool, then reported as a curiosity, and finally included in the ontic store of the neurosciences. Early researchers were not investigating the hippocampus in search of a memory mechanism; rather, they saw the hippocampus as a useful experimental model or as a structure implicated in the etiology of epilepsy. The link between hippocampal synaptic plasticity and learning or memory was a separate conceptual achievement. That link was formulated in at least three different ways at different times: reductively (claiming that plasticity is identical to learning), analogically (claiming that plasticity is an example or model of learning), and mechanistically (claiming that plasticity is a component in learning or memory mechanisms). The hypothesized link with learning or memory, coupled with developments in experimental techniques and preparations, shaped how researchers understood LTP itself. By 1973, the mechanistic formulation of the link between LTP and memory provided an abstract framework around which findings from multiple perspectives could be integrated into a multifield research program}, title = {The Making of a Memory Mechanism}, journal = {Journal of the History of Biology}, year = {2003}, pages = {153--95} } @article{Craver2002-CRAIEA, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, title = {Interlevel Experiments and Multilevel Mechanisms in the Neuroscience of Memory}, journal = {Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume}, year = {2002}, pages = {83--97} } @article{Craver2001-CRARFM, volume = {68}, number = {1}, author = {Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {Many areas of science develop by discovering mechanisms and role functions. Cummins' (1975) analysis of role functions-according to which an item's role function is a capacity of that item that appears in an analytic explanation of the capacity of some containing system-captures one important sense of "function" in the biological sciences and elsewhere. Here I synthesize Cummins' account with recent work on mechanisms and causal/mechanical explanation. The synthesis produces an analysis of specifically mechanistic role functions, one that uses the characteristic active, spatial, temporal, and hierarchical organization of mechanisms to add precision and content to Cummins' original suggestion. This synthesis also shows why the discovery of role functions is a scientific achievement. Discovering a role function (i) contributes to the interlevel integration of multilevel mechanisms, and (ii) provides a unique, contextual variety of causal/mechanical explanation}, title = {Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, pages = {53--74} } @article{Craver2007-CRATCW, volume = {22}, number = {4}, author = {Carl F. Craver and William Bechtel}, abstract = {We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect.}, title = {Top-Down Causation Without Top-Down Causes}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2007}, pages = {547--563} } @incollection{Craver2001-CRADMI, author = {Carl F. Craver and Lindley Darden}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in Neuroscience}, title = {Discovering Mechanisms in Neurobiology: The Case of Spatial Memory}, publisher = {Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press}, year = {2001} } @incollection{Cruse2001-CRUTEP, author = {H. Cruse}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {The Explanatory Power and Limits of Simulation Models in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @unpublished{DaviesManuscript-DAVAPA-3, author = {Martin Davies}, abstract = {What does it mean to say that the discipline of psychology is autonomous? Jerry Fodor (1998, p. 9) says that \textquoteleft{}a law or theory that figures in bona fide empirical explanations but that is not reducible to a law or theory of physics is ipso facto autonomous\textquoteright. F-autonomy is irreducibility. The Churchlands mean more than this by autonomy; for them, to regard a discipline as autonomous is to \textquoteleft{}try to conduct the affairs of [that discipline] independently of the affairs of its immediate neighbours, both upward and downward in level\textquoteright (Churchland and Churchland, 1996, p. 220). We take it that this is not just a matter of pragmatic choices about conducting research with limited resources; rather, a discipline is autonomous when it is not governed or constrained by other disciplines. In this sense, C-autonomy is independence. On the face of it, the two doctrines are distinct and C-autonomy entails F- autonomy}, title = {Autonomous Psychology and the Moderate Neuron Doctrine} } @unpublished{DaviesManuscript-DAVIAE, author = {Martin Davies}, abstract = {The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D\&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. This is not just a point about cognitive neuropsychology, or even about psychology in general. It is a familiar point about all science}, title = {Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology} } @book{deJong2007-DEJTMO, author = {Huib Looren de Jong and Maurice K. D. Schouten}, title = {The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction}, publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell}, year = {2007} } @article{Delcomyn2001-DELBMC, volume = {24}, number = {6}, author = {Fred Delcomyn}, abstract = {The idea that biorobots can be used as a testbed for the evaluation of hypotheses about how an animal functions is supported. Generation of realistic feedback is a major advantage of biorobotic models. Nevertheless, skeptics can only be convinced that this approach is valid if significant biological insights are generated from its application.}, title = {Biorobotic Models Can Contribute to Neurobiology}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {1056--1057} } @article{denBosch2005-DENSIN-2, volume = {84}, number = {1}, author = {den Bosch and M. P.}, abstract = {This paper explores structuralism as a way to model theories from scientific practice. As a case study I analyzed a theory about the dynamics of the basal ganglia, a part of the brain that is involved in Parkinson's disease. After introducing the case study I explore how to structurally represent qualitative assumptions about disease, intervention and dynamical systems in general. I further explicate the structure of the basal ganglia theory in detail, how it explains Parkinson's disease and how it implies treatments. I close with a consideration of how a structuralist representation could be useful in practice to explore and develop theories with the aid of a computer.}, title = {Structures in Neuropharmacology}, journal = {Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities}, year = {2005}, pages = {343--359} } @article{Dubreuil2010-DUBRET, volume = {18}, number = {3}, author = {Beno\^i{}t Dubreuil}, title = {Reviews: Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neurosciences, by Carl F. Craver}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2010}, pages = {471--474} } @article{Eckardvont2004-BARMAE, volume = {71}, number = {5}, author = {Barbara Eckardvont and Jeffrey S. Poland}, title = {Mechanism and Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {972--984} } @book{Edelman2012-EDEBIT, author = {Shimon Edelman and Tomer Fekete and Neta Zach}, abstract = {The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration.}, title = {Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience}, publisher = {John Benjamins Pub. Co.}, year = {2012} } @article{Elliott1997-ELLNFN, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {T. Elliott and N. R. Shadbolt}, abstract = {Quartz \& Sejnowski (Q\&S) disregard evidence that suggests that their view of dendrites is inadequate and they ignore recent results concerning the role of neurotrophic factors in synaptic remodelling. They misrepresent neuronal selectionism and thus erect a straw-man argument. Finally, the results discussed in section 4.2 require neuronal proliferation, but this does not occur during the period of neuronal development of relevance here. Footnotes1 Address correspondence to TE at te@proteus.psyc.nott.ac.uk.}, title = {Neurotrophic Factors, Neuronal Selectionism, and Neuronal Proliferation}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {561--562} } @book{Ericsson-ZenithForthcoming-ERIEEI, author = {Steven Ericsson-Zenith}, abstract = {At its core this book is concerned with logic and computation with respect to the mathematical characterization of sentient biophysical structure and its behavior. Three related theories are presented: The first of these provides an explanation of how sentient individuals come to be in the world. The second describes how these individuals operate. And the third proposes a method for reasoning about the behavior of individuals in groups. These theories are based upon a new explanation of experience in nature, the construction of senses, and motile behavior. This new approach is developed from first principles to enable a rigorous and systematic explanation of the variety of associated intelligent behaviors. Alongside this development is a further account that focuses upon the nature of our work. It discusses the existential aspects of scientific inquiry, its epistemology and logic. It seeks to clarify the nature of the mathematical characterization and computation of natural behaviors, dealing with questions in the foundations of logic. It explores methodological issues related to reduction and the refinement of ideas from intuition to formal logical structure. In support of this inquiry we work toward the development of a calculus for biophysical construction and its dynamics. If successful this mechanics mathematically characterizes sensory and motile behavior. Upon this foundation we propose a model of apprehension and explore how its products are processed by the organism. Finally, we develop a probabilistic theory that enables us to reason about inaccessible factors in group behavior. The mechanics we propose suggests the design and physical realization of a new model of computation; one in which structure and the concurrency of action are a first-order consideration. We identify opportunities for experimental verification of the theory and we suggest a proof of our results in practice by the identification of this mechanism, allowing the construction of machines that experience.}, title = {Explaining Experience In Nature: The Foundations Of Logic And Apprehension}, publisher = {Institute for Advanced Science \& Engineering}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{EronenForthcoming-EROHIE, author = {Markus I. Eronen}, abstract = {Recently, several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds for accepting the type identity theory}, title = {Hypothetical Identities: Explanatory Problems for the Explanatory Argument}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--12} } @article{Favareau2002-FAVBSA, volume = {30}, number = {1}, author = {Donald Favareau}, abstract = {The explosive growth over the last two decades of neuroscience, cognitive science, and \textquotedblleft{}consciousness studies\textquotedblright as generally conceived, remains as yet unaccompanied by a corresponding development in the establishment of an explicitly semiotic understanding of how the relations of sign exchange at the neuronal level function in the larger network of psychologically accessible sign exchange. This article attempts a preliminary foray into the establishment of just such a neurosemiotic. It takes, as its test case and as its point of departure, recent discoveries from the neurobiological research on viuso-motor transformations and on the widespread cortical phenomena of selectively tuned, single-neuron response to argue for a vision of \textquotedblleft{}intersubjectivity\textquotedblright whereby the ens rationis arising as a function of the neuronal semiosphere may be abstracted, constructed, and shared mutually across agents}, title = {Beyond Self and Other}, journal = {Sign Systems Studies}, year = {2002}, pages = {57--99} } @article{Fekete2010-FEKRS, volume = {20}, number = {1}, author = {Tomer Fekete}, abstract = {The concept of representation has been a key element in the scientific study of mental processes, ever since such studies commenced. However, usage of the term has been all but too liberal---{}if one were to adhere to common use it remains unclear if there are examples of physical systems which cannot be construed in terms of representation. The problem is considered afresh, taking as the starting point the notion of activity spaces---{}spaces of spatiotemporal events produced by dynamical systems. It is argued that representation can be analyzed in terms of the geometrical and topological properties of such spaces. Several attributes and processes associated with conceptual domains, such as logical structure, generalization and learning are considered, and given analogues in structural facets of activity spaces, as are misrepresentation and states of arousal. Based on this analysis, representational systems are defined, as is a key concept associated with such systems, the notion of representational capacity. According to the proposed theory, rather than being an all or none phenomenon, representation is in fact a matter of degree---{}that is can be associated with measurable quantities, as is behooving of a putative naturalistic construct.}, title = {Representational Systems}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2010}, pages = {69--101} } @article{Fekete2011-FEKTAC, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Tomer Fekete and Shimon Edelman}, abstract = {A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate -- that is, unmediated -- fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must satisfy for it to constitute not just a sufficient but a necessary, and therefore naturalistic and intrinsic, explanation of qualia. We show that a common assumption behind many neurocomputational theories of the mind, according to which mind states can be formalized solely in terms of instantaneous vectors of activities of representational units such as neurons, does not meet the requisite conditions, in part because it relies on inactive units to shape presently experienced qualia and implies a homogeneous representation space, which is devoid of intrinsic structure. We then sketch a naturalistic computational theory of qualia, which posits that experience is realized by dynamical activity-space trajectories (rather than points) and that its richness is measured by the representational capacity of the trajectory space in which it unfolds. }, title = {Towards a Computational Theory of Experience}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {2011}, pages = {807--827} } @article{Fingelkurts2012-FINMAA, volume = {9}, number = {1}, author = {Andrew A. Fingelkurts and Alexander A. Fingelkurts}, abstract = {The target paper of Dr. Feinberg is a testimony to an admirable scholarship and deep thoughtfulness. This paper develops a general theoretical framework of nested hierarchy in the brain that allows production of mind with consciousness. The difference between non-nested and nested hierarchies is the following. In a non-nested hierarchy the entities at higher levels of the hierarchy are physically independent from the entities at lower levels and there is strong constraint of higher upon lower levels. In a nested hierarchy, higher levels are physically composed of lower levels, and there is no central control of the system resulting in weak constraint of higher upon lower levels.}, title = {Mind as a Nested Operational Architectonics of the Brain}, journal = {Physics of Life Reviews}, year = {2012}, pages = {49--50} } @article{Fingelkurts2012-FINDOS, volume = {6}, author = {Andrew A. Fingelkurts and Alexander A. Fingelkurts and Sergio Bagnato and Cristina Boccagni and Giuseppe Galardi}, abstract = {The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN\textquoteright{}s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG operational synchrony analysis was performed in patients with severe brain injuries in vegetative and minimally conscious states to study the strength of DMN operational synchrony as a function of self-consciousness expression. We demonstrated that the strength of DMN EEG operational synchrony was smallest or even absent in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and highest in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. At the same time the process of decoupling of operations performed by neuronal assemblies that comprise the DMN was highest in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and minimal in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. The DMN\textquoteright{}s frontal EEG operational module had the strongest decrease in operational synchrony strength as a function of selfconsciousness loss, when compared with the DMN\textquoteright{}s posterior modules. Based on these results it is suggested that the strength of DMN functional connectivity could mediate the strength of self-consciousness expression. The observed alterations similarly occurred across EEG alpha, beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. Presented results suggest that the EEG operational synchrony within DMN may provide an objective and accurate measure for the assessment of signs of self-(un)consciousness in these challenging patient populations. This method therefore, may complement the current diagnostic procedures for patients with severe brain injuries and, hence, the planning of a rational rehabilitation intervention.}, title = {DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence From Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States}, journal = {Open Neuroimaging Journal}, year = {2012}, pages = {55--68} } @article{Freeman1997-FRENNO, volume = {18}, number = {2-3}, author = {Walter J. Freeman}, title = {Nonlinear Neurodynamics of Intentionality}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {1997}, pages = {291--304} } @article{Garson2011-GARSEA-2, volume = {26}, number = {4}, author = {Justin Garson}, abstract = {Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a \textquoteleft{}selection process\textquoteright to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning---{}that is, to include structures that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature}, title = {Selected Effects and Causal Role Functions in the Brain: The Case for an Etiological Approach to Neuroscience}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2011}, pages = {547--565} } @article{Gaveau2004-GAVDMP, volume = {27}, number = {1}, author = {Val\'e{}rie Gaveau and Michel Desmurget}, abstract = {We address three issues that might be important in evaluating the validity of the planning--{}control model: (1) It could be artificial to distinguish between control and planning when control involves the re-planning of a new corrective submovement that overlaps with the initial response; (2) experiments involving illusions are not totally compelling; (3) selectively implicating the superior parietal lobe in movement control and the basal ganglia in movement planning, appears questionable.}, title = {Do Movement Planning and Control Represent Independent Modules?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {35--36} } @article{Gentilucci2004-GENHAC, volume = {27}, number = {1}, author = {Maurizio Gentilucci and Sergio Chieffi}, abstract = {Our commentary focuses, first, on Glover's proposal that only motor planning is sensitive to cognitive aspects of the target object, whereas the on-line control is completely immune to them. We present behavioural data showing that movement phases traditionally (and by Glover) thought to be under on-line control, are also modulated by object cognitive aspects. Next, we present data showing that some aspects of cognition can be coded by means of movement planning. We propose a reformulation of Glover's theory to include both an influence of cognition on on-line movement control, and a mutual influence between motor planning and some aspects of cognition.}, title = {How Are Cognition and Movement Control Related to Each Other?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {36--37} } @article{Georgiadis2012-GEODI, volume = {2}, author = {Janniko R. Georgiadis}, abstract = {Background: We like to think about sexual activity as something fixed, basic and primal. However, this does not seem to fully capture reality. Even when we relish sex, we may be capable of mentalizing, talking, voluntarily postponing orgasm, and much more. This might indicate that the central control mechanisms of sexual activity are quite flexible and susceptible to learning mechanisms, and that cortical brain areas play a critical part. Objective: This study aimed to identify those cortical areas and mechanisms most consistently implicated in sexual activity. Design: A comprehensive review of the human functional neuroimaging literature on sexual activity, i.e. genital stimulation and orgasm, is made. Results: Genital stimulation recruits the classical somatosensory matrix, but also areas far beyond that. The posterior insula may be particularly important for processing input from the engorged penis and coordinating penile responses. Extrastriate visual cortex tracks sexual arousal and responds to genital stimulation even when subjects have their eyes closed. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is also tightly coupled to sexual arousal, but low activity in this area predicts high sexual arousal. Conclusion: This review has indicated cortical sites where activity is moderated by tactile genital inflow and high sexual arousal. Behavioral implications are discussed and where possible the relevance for learning mechanisms is indicated. Overall, it is clear that the cerebral cortex has something to say about sexual activity. Keywords: functional neuroimaging; insula; ventromedial prefrontal cortex; extrastriate visual cortex; penis; clitoris; orgasm (Published: 15 March 2012) Citation: Socioaffective Neuroscience \& Psychology 2012, 2 : 17337 - DOI: 10.3402/snp.v2i0.17337}, title = {Doing It . . . Wild? On the Role of the Cerebral Cortex in Human Sexual Activity}, journal = {Socioaffective Neuroscience and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @article{Gerrans2008-GERGOP, volume = {59}, number = {2}, author = {Philip Gerrans and Valerie E. Stone}, abstract = {Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {121--141} } @article{Gerrans2003-GERNAN, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Philip Gerrans}, abstract = {~~{}Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects -- and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a developmental disorder cannot beadequately distinguished using the standard gross behavioural tests ofneuropsychology and that the linguistic abilities of the WMS subject canbe equally well explained by a constructivist strategy of neurallearning in the individual, with linguisitic functions implemented in anassociationist architecture. The neuroconstructivist interpretation ofWMS undermines the hypothesis of a double dissociation between SLI andWMS, leaving unresolved the question of nativism about syntax. Theapparent linguistic virtuosity of WMS subjects is an artefact ofenhanced phonological processing, a fact which is easier to demonstratevia the associationist computational model embraced byneuroconstructivism}, title = {Nativism and Neuroconstructivism in the Explanation of Williams Syndrome}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, pages = {41--52} } @article{Gerrans2002-GERNNA, volume = {25}, number = {6}, author = {Philip Gerrans}, abstract = {Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS) that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax, is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma that radical nativism cannot accommodate.}, title = {Nativism, Neuroconstructivism, and Developmental Disorder}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {757--758} } @article{Gilman1994-GILSCA-4, volume = {1994}, author = {Daniel Gilman}, abstract = {A large body of research in computational vision science stems from the pioneering work of David Marr. Recently, Patricia Kitcher and others have criticized this work as depending upon optimizing assumptions, assumptions which are held to be inappropriate for evolved cognitive mechanisms just as anti-adaptationists (e.g., Lewontin and Gould) have argued they are inappropriate for other evolved physiological mechanisms. The paper discusses the criticism and suggests that it is, in part, misdirected. It is further suggested that the criticism leads to interesting questions about how one formulates constraints--across "levels of organization" and disciplinary boundaries--on one's models of complex systems, such as human vision.}, title = {Simplicity, Cognition and Adaptation: Some Remarks on Marr's Theory of Vision}, journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1994}, pages = {454--464} } @article{Gold1999-GOLINA, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Ian Gold and Daniel Stoljar}, abstract = {Although a wide variety of questions were raised about different aspects of the target article, most of them fall into one of five $<$span class='Hi'$>$categories$<$/span$>$ each of which deals with a general question. These questions are (1) Is the radical neuron doctrine really radical? (2) Is the trivial neuron doctrine really trivial? (3) Were we sufficiently critical of the radical neuron doctrine? (4) Is there a distinction to be drawn at all between the two doctrines? and (5) How does our argument bear on related issues in the ontology of mind? Our replies to the objections and observations presented are organized around these five questions.}, title = {Interpreting Neuroscience and Explaining the Mind}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {856--866} } @article{Harbecke2011-HARMCI, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Jens Harbecke}, title = {Mechanistic Constitution in Neurobiological Explanations}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2011}, pages = {267--285} } @article{Hardcastle2008-HARROC-5, volume = {2008}, number = {1}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle}, title = {Review of Carl F. Craver, \_Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2008} } @incollection{Hardcastle2001-HARTSI, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Theory Structure in Neuroscience}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @article{HarreForthcoming-HARFAT-9, author = {Michael S. Harr\'e}, abstract = {The ability to group perceptual objects into functionally relevant categories is vital to our comprehension of the world. Such categorisation aids in how we search for objects in familiar scenes and how we identify an object and its likely uses despite never having seen that specific object before. The systems that mediate this process are only now coming to be understood through considerable research efforts combining neurological, psychological and behavioural studies. What is much less well understood are the differences between the categories, how they are formed and how they are used by experts and non-experts in a complex task that can take decades to master. In a quite different direction to previous studies, this work infers the different categorical structures that might be used by amateurs and professionals in the oriental game of Go. This is achieved by using a newly developed combination of artificial neural networks (Self-organising Maps) and perceptual inference to show that categories of strategic scenes can be learned while playing games using a model of \textquoteleft{}conditional perceptual learning\textquoteright. Applying this technique to two databases of games, one of amateurs and one of professionals, shows that a structural hierarchy of scene information develops that can be readily incorporated into traditional psychological models of decisions and readily implemented in computational systems. The results are discussed in terms of the heuristics and biases literature, emphasising where the significant similarities and differences lie between this work and previous work}, title = {From Amateur to Professional: A Neuro-Cognitive Model of Categories and Expert Development}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--30} } @incollection{Hartmann2001-HARTAM, author = {Stephan Hartmann}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences.}, abstract = {Let me first state that I like Antti Revonsuo\textquoteright{}s discussion of the various methodological and interpretational problems in neuroscience. It shows how careful and methodologically reflected scientists have to proceed in this fascinating field of research. I have nothing to add here. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic towards Revonsuo\textquoteright{}s general proposal to call for a Philosophy of Neuroscience that stresses foundational issues, but also focuses on methodological and explanatory strategies.2 In a footnote of his paper, Revonsuo complains -- as many others do today -- about what is sometimes called \textquotedblleft{}physics imperialism\textquotedblright. This is the view that physics dominates the philosophy of science. I am not sure if this is still the case nowadays, but it is certainly historically correct that almost all work in the field of methodology centered around cases from physics. Although this has been changing, there are still plenty of special sciences philosophers did not worry about much. Admittedly, I am myself a trained physicist and not a neuroscientist and will therefore probably be biased negatively. As it is, I will discuss some examples from physics in order to illustrate my points}, title = {Mechanisms, Coherence, and Theory Choice in the Cognitive Neurosciences}, year = {2001} } @incollection{Hartmann2001-HARMCA, author = {Stephan Hartmann}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Mechanisms, Coherence, and the Place of Psychology}, publisher = {Pittsburgh: University of Pitt Press}, year = {2001} } @incollection{Hartmann2001-HARMCA-2, author = {Stephan Hartmann}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, abstract = {Let me first state that I like Antti Revonsuo\textquoteright{}s discussion of the various methodological and interpretational problems in neuroscience. It shows how careful and methodologically reflected scientists have to proceed in this fascinating field of research. I have nothing to add here. Furthermore, I am very sympathetic towards Revonsuo\textquoteright{}s general proposal to call for a Philosophy of Neuroscience that stresses foundational issues, but also focuses on methodological and explanatory strategies. In a footnote of his paper, Revonsuo complains -- as many others do today -- about what is sometimes called \textquotedblleft{}physics imperialism\textquotedblright. This is the view that physics dominates the philosophy of science. I am not sure if this is still the case nowadays, but it is certainly historically correct that almost all work in the field of methodology centered around cases from physics. Although this has been changing, there are still plenty of special sciences philosophers did not worry about much. Admittedly, I am myself a trained physicist and not a neuroscientist and will therefore probably be biased negatively. As it is, I will discuss some examples from physics in order to illustrate my points}, title = {Mechanisms, Coherence, and Theory Choice in the Cognitive Neurosciences}, publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, year = {2001} } @article{Hatfield2010-HATROJ-2, volume = {2010}, number = {5}, author = {Gary Hatfield}, title = {Review of John Bickle (Ed.), \_The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2010} } @article{Heinke2000-HEIADS, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {D. Heinke}, abstract = {Neural organization contains a wealth of facts from all areas of brain research and provides a useful overview of physiological data for those working outside the immediate field. Furthermore, it gives a good example that the approach of dynamical system theory together with the concepts of cooperative and competitive interaction can be fruitful for an interdisciplinary approach to cognition.}, title = {A Dynamical System Theory Approach to Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {543--543} } @article{Hurley2008-HURTSC, volume = {31}, number = {1}, author = {Susan L. Hurley}, abstract = {Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, functional level of description, between the level of neural implementation and the level of conscious perceptions and intentional actions. The shared circuits model connects shared informational dynamics for perception and action with shared informational dynamics for self and other, while also showing how the action/perception, self/other and actual/possible distinctions can be overlaid on these shared informational dynamics. It avoids the common conception of perception and action as separate and peripheral to central cognition. Rather, it contributes to the situated cognition movement by showing how mechanisms for perceiving action can be built on those for active perception.}, title = {The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {1--22} } @unpublished{JacobsonManuscript-JACDKT, author = {Anne J. Jacobson}, title = {Draft: Keeping the World in Mind, Intro \& Chpt One} } @article{Johnson2012-JOHTRB-3, volume = {2}, number = {3}, author = {Gregory Johnson}, abstract = {This paper addresses the relationship between psychological capacities, as they are understood within cognitive psychology, and neurobiological activities. First, Lycan\textquoteright{}s (1987) account of this relationship is examined and certain problems with his account are explained. According to Lycan, psychological capacities occupy a higher level than neurobiological activities in a hierarchy of levels of nature, and psychological entities can be decomposed into neurobiological entities. After discussing some problems with Lycan\textquoteright{}s account, a similar, more recent account built around levels of mechanisms is examined (Craver 2007). In the second half of this paper, an alternative is laid out. This new account uses levels of organization and levels of explanation to create a two-dimensional model. Psychological capacities occupy a high level of explanation relative to the cellular and molecular levels of organization. As a result, according to this model, psychological capacities are a particular way of describing the activities that occur at the cellular and molecular levels of organization.}, title = {The Relationship Between Psychological Capacities and Neurobiological Activities}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, year = {2012}, pages = {453--480} } @incollection{Keestra2012-KEEBMJ, author = {Machiel Keestra}, booktitle = {Thinking about the Body Politic: Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory}, abstract = {A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights (Kant 1968). Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously yields the development of new group boundaries (Castells 1997). Group membership is indeed a fundamental issue in political processes, for: \textquotedblleft{}the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community\textquotedblright (Walzer 1983: 31) -- it is within the political community that power is being shared and, if possible, held back from non-members. In sum, it is appropriate to consider group membership a fundamental ingredient of politics and political theory (Latham 1952). How group boundaries are drawn is then of only secondary importance. Indeed, Schmitt famously declared that \textquotedblleft[e]very religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is suffciently strong to group human beings e\#ectively according to friend and enemy\textquotedblright (Schmitt 1996: 37). Even though Schmitt\textquoteright{}s idea of politics as being constituted by such antithetical groupings is debatable, it is plausible to consider politics among other things as a way of handling intergroup di\#erences. Obviously, some of the group-constituting factors are more easily discernable from one\textquoteright{}s appearance than others, like race, ethnicity, or gender. As a result, factors like skin color or sexual orientation sometimes carry much political weight even though individuals would rather con!ne these to their private lives and individual identity (Appiah 1992). Given the potential tension between the political reality of particular groupmembership defnitions and the -- individual and political -- struggles against those definitions and corresponding attitudes, citizenship and civic behavior becomes a complex issue. As Kymlicka points out, it implies for citizens an additional obligation to non-discrimination regarding those groups: \textquotedblleft[t]his extension of non-discrimination from government to civil society is not just a shift in the scale of liberal norms, it also involves a radical extension in the obligations of liberal citizenship\textquotedblright (Kymlicka 2001: 298--{}99). Unfortunately, empirical research suggests that political intolerance towards other groups \textquotedblleft{}may be the more natural and \textquoteleft{}easy\textquoteright position to hold\textquotedblright (Marcus et al. 1995: 224). Indeed, since development of a virtue of civility or decency regarding other groups is not easy, as it often runs against deeply engrained stereotypes and prejudices, political care for matters like education is justified. Separate schools, for example, may erode children\textquoteright{}s motivation to act as citizens, erode their capacity for it and !nally diminish their opportunities to experience transcending their particular group membership and behave as decent citizens (Kymlicka \& Norman 2000). This chapter outlines a possible explanation for such consequences. That explanation will be found to be interdisciplinary in nature, combining insights from political theory and cognitive neuroscience. In doing so, it does not focus on collective action, even though that is a usual focus for political studies. For example, results pertaining to collective political action have demonstrated that the relation between attitudes and overt voting behavior or political participation is not as direct and strong as was hoped for. Several conditions, including the individual\textquoteright{}s experiences, self-interest, and relevant social norms, turned out to interfere in the link between his or her attitude and behavior (Marcus et al. 1995). Important as collective action is, this chapter is concerned with direct interaction between agents and the in\$uence of group membership on such interaction -- in particular joint action. Although politics does include many forms of action that require no such physical interaction, such physical interaction between individuals remains fundamental to politics -- this is the reason why separate schooling may eventually undermine the citizenship of its isolated pupils (Kymlicka \& Norman 2000). This chapter will focus on joint action, de!ned as: \textquotedblleft{}any form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment\textquotedblright (Sebanz, Bekkering, \& Knoblich 2006: 70). Cognitive neuroscienti!c evidence demonstrates that for such joint action to succeed, the agents have to integrate the actions and expected actions of the other person in their own action plans at several levels of speci!city. Although neuroscienti!c research is necessarily limited to simple forms of action, this concurs with a philosophical analysis of joint action, which I will discuss below.}, title = {Bounded Mirroring. Joint Action and Group Membership in Political Theory and Cognitive Neuroscience}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2012} } @unpublished{KeilManuscript-KEITSA, author = {Frank Keil}, abstract = {\& Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to genervs. with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience inate more public interest when they contain neuroscientific..}, title = {The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations} } @article{Kistler2009-KISCAN, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Max Kistler}, abstract = {The papers collected in this volume explore some of the powers and limitations of the concept of mechanism for the scientific understanding of cognitive systems, and aim at bringing together some of the most recent developments in the philosophical understanding of the relation of cognition to neuroscience. Earlier versions of most papers have been presented at a workshop held in Paris on June 19th, 2006, which was organized by Institut Jean Nicod and supported by RESCIF (R seau des sciences cognitives en Ile-de-France)}, title = {Cognition and Neurophysiology: Mechanism, Reduction, and Pluralism}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2009}, pages = {539--541} } @unpublished{Krebs2005-KREMOC, author = {Peter R. Krebs}, abstract = {Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, have been modeled and these models are the basis for many claims about human cognitive capacities. Artificial neural nets (ANNs) have had some successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, but the results from experiments with simple ANNs may have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating cognitive concepts that belong in the `top-down' approach to models grounded in the `bottom-up' connectionist methodology. Merging the two fundamentally different paradigms within a single model can obfuscate what is really modeled. When the tools (simple artificial neural networks) to solve the problems (explaining aspects of higher cognitive functions) are mismatched, models with little value in terms of explaining functions of the human mind are produced. The ability to learn functions from data-points makes ANNs very attractive analytical tools. These tools can be developed into valuable models, if the data is adequate and a meaningful interpretation of the data is possible. The problem is, that with appropriate data and labels that fit the desired level of description, almost any function can be modeled. It is my argument that small networks offer a universal framework for modeling any conceivable cognitive theory, so that neurological possibility can be demonstrated easily with relatively simple models. However, a model demonstrating the possibility of implementation of a cognitive function using a distributed methodology, does not necessarily add support to any claims or assumptions that the cognitive function in question, is neurologically plausible.}, title = {Models of Cognition: Neurological Possibility Does Not Indicate Neurological Plausibility}, year = {2005} } @article{Kuorikoski2010-KUOERA, volume = {17}, number = {2}, author = {Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski}, abstract = {Many of the arguments for neuroeconomics rely on mistaken assumptions about criteria of explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries and fail to distinguish between evidential and explanatory relevance. Building on recent philosophical work on mechanistic research programmes and the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation, we argue that explaining an explanatory presupposition or providing a lower-level explanation does not necessarily constitute explanatory improvement. Neuroscientific findings have explanatory relevance only when they inform a causal and explanatory account of the psychology of human decision-making.}, title = {Explanatory Relevance Across Disciplinary Boundaries: The Case of Neuroeconomics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, year = {2010}, pages = {219--228} } @article{LevyForthcoming-LEVWWH, author = {Arnon Levy}, abstract = {The Hodgkin--{}Huxley (HH) model of the action potential is a theoretical pillar of modern neurobiology. In a number of recent publications, Carl Craver ([2006], [2007], [2008]) has argued that the model is explanatorily deficient because it does not reveal enough about underlying molecular mechanisms. I offer an alternative picture of the HH model, according to which it deliberately abstracts from molecular specifics. By doing so, the model explains whole-cell behaviour as the product of a mass of underlying low-level events. The issue goes beyond cellular neurobiology, for the strategy of abstraction exhibited in the HH case is found in a range of biological contexts. I discuss why it has been largely neglected by advocates of the mechanist approach to explanation. 1 Introduction2 A Primer on the HH Model2.1 The basic qualitative picture2.2 The quantitative model3 Interlude: What Did Hodgkin and Huxley Think?4 Craver\textquoteright{}s View4.1 Mechanistic explanation4.2 Sketches4.3 Craver's view: The HH model as a mechanism sketch5 An Alternative View of the HH Model5.1 Another look at the equations5.2 The discrete-gating picture5.3 The road paved by Hodgkin and Huxley5.4 Summary and comparison to Craver6 Conclusion: The HH Model and Mechanistic Explanation6.1 Sketches and abstractions6.2 Why has aggregative abstraction been overlooked?}, title = {What Was Hodgkin and Huxley's Achievement?}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{Levy2009-LEVCFC, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {Arnon Levy}, abstract = {Carl Craver\textquoteright{}s recent book offers an account of the explanatory and theoretical structure of neuroscience. It depicts it as centered around the idea of achieving mechanistic understanding, i.e., obtaining knowledge of how a set of underlying components interacts to produce a given function of the brain. Its core account of mechanistic explanation and relevance is causal-manipulationist in spirit, and offers substantial insight into casual explanation in brain science and the associated notion of levels of explanation. However, the focus on mechanistic explanation leaves some open questions regarding the role of computation and cognition.}, title = {Explaining What? Review of Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience by Carl F. Craver}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2009} } @book{MachamerPeter2001-MACTAM-3, author = {Peter Machamer et al}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences.}, year = {2001} } @article{Machamer2000-MACTAM, volume = {67}, number = {1}, author = {Peter K. Machamer and Lindley Darden and Carl F. Craver}, abstract = {The concept of mechanism is analyzed in terms of entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Examples show how mechanisms work in neurobiology and molecular biology. Thinking in terms of mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical issues: causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change}, title = {Thinking About Mechanisms}, journal = {Philosophy Of Science}, year = {2000}, pages = {1--25} } @book{Machamer2001-MACTAM-2, author = {Peter K. Machamer and Peter McLaughlin and Rick Grush}, abstract = {Surveys theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems.}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @article{Machery2012-MACDIN, volume = {79}, number = {4}, author = {Edouard Machery}, title = {Dissociations in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2012}, pages = {490--518} } @article{Maynard2011-MAYWDD, volume = {47}, number = {51}, author = {Patrick Maynard}, abstract = {At fiftieth anniversary of Gombrich\textquoteright{}s Art and Illusion, an extended, highly critical review of current applications of cognitive and neuro sciences to understanding depiction, in an attempt to improve their directions by including mental content.}, title = {What Drawing Draws On: The Relevance of Current Vision Research}, journal = {Rivista di Estetica}, year = {2011}, pages = {9--29} } @book{McLaughlin2001-MCLTAM, author = {Peter McLaughlin and Peter Machamer and Rick Grush}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {Pittsburgh University Press}, year = {2001} } @article{Metzinger2009-METFIA-2, volume = {13}, number = {1}, author = {Thomas Metzinger and Olaf Blanke}, title = {Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood}, journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences,}, year = {2009}, pages = {7--13} } @article{MeurkForthcoming-MEUPUO, author = {Carla Meurk and Adrian Carter and Wayne Hall and Jayne Lucke}, abstract = {Developments in the field of neuroscience, according to its proponents, offer the prospect of an enhanced understanding and treatment of addicted persons. Consequently, its advocates consider that improving public understanding of addiction neuroscience is a desirable aim. Those critical of neuroscientific approaches, however, charge that it is a totalising, reductive perspective--{}one that ignores other known causes in favour of neurobiological explanations. Sociologist Nikolas Rose has argued that neuroscience, and its associated technologies, are coming to dominate cultural models to the extent that 'we' increasingly understand ourselves as 'neurochemical selves'. Drawing on 55 qualitative interviews conducted with members of the Australian public residing in the Greater Brisbane area, we challenge both the 'expectational discourses' of neuroscientists and the criticisms of its detractors. Members of the public accepted multiple perspectives on the causes of addiction, including some elements of neurobiological explanations. Their discussions of addiction drew upon a broad range of philosophical, sociological, anthropological, psychological and neurobiological vocabularies, suggesting that they synthesised newer technical understandings, such as that offered by neuroscience, with older ones. Holding conceptual models that acknowledge the complexity of addiction aetiology into which new information is incorporated suggests that the impact of neuroscientific discourse in directing the public's beliefs about addiction is likely to be more limited than proponents or opponents of neuroscience expect}, title = {Public Understandings of Addiction: Where Do Neurobiological Explanations Fit?}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {forthcoming} } @book{Meyer1990-MEYFAT, author = {Jean-Arcady Meyer and Stewart W. Wilson}, title = {From Animals to Animats: Proceedings of The First International Conference on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (Complex Adaptive Systems)}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990} } @article{Miranda1997-MIRHGA, volume = {45}, number = {2}, author = {E. N. Miranda}, abstract = {A formal neuron has been studied mathematically. The spiking behaviour of a single neuron has been considered and the influence of the other neurons has been replaced by an average activity level. Four different kinds of spiking behaviour are predicted by the model: B (bursts), C (continuous), P (periodic) and S (silent) neurons and several real neurons can be classified within these four categories. Some properties of the spiking neuron are calculated: 1) the time between spikes, 2) the spike train length and 3) the silent time. Because these magnitudes can be measured in the laboratory, an experimental validation of the model is proposed.}, title = {How Good Are Formal Neurons for Modelling Real Ones?}, journal = {Acta Biotheoretica}, year = {1997} } @book{Mikowski2013-MIKETC, author = {Marcin Mi\l{}kowski}, abstract = {In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational---{}whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.}, title = {Explaining the Computational Mind}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2013} } @article{Mole2009-MOLOEH, volume = {17}, number = {5}, author = {Christopher Mole}, abstract = {A critical notice of Carl Craver's $<$em$>$Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience$<$/em$>$}, title = {On Explaining How Things Work and Explaining How to Work Things}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, year = {2009}, pages = {739--752} } @article{Moskop1982-JOHBRA-19, volume = {92}, number = {2}, author = {John C. Moskop}, title = {Book Review:Philosophy and Medicine Series. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 1: Explanation and Evaluation in the Biomedical Sciences. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 2: Philosophical Dimensions of the Neuro-Medical Sciences. Stuart F. Spicker, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 3: Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance. Stuart F. Spicker, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 4. Mental Health: Philosophical Perspectives. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 5: Mental Illness: Law and Public Policy. Baruch A. Brody, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 6: Clinical Judgment: A Critical Appraisal. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Stuart F. Spicker, Bernard Towers; Philosophy and Medicine Series. Vol. 7. Organism, Medicine, and Metaphysi}, journal = {Ethics}, year = {1982}, pages = {381-} } @article{Mroczko2009-MROITO, volume = {9}, number = {12}, author = {Aleksandra Mroczko and Thomas Metzinger and Wolf Singer and Danko Nikoli}, title = {Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer}, journal = {Journal of Vision}, year = {2009}, pages = {1--8} } @article{Mucciolo1975-MUCNRP, volume = {5}, number = {3}, author = {Laurence F. Mucciolo}, title = {Neurophysiological Reduction, Psychological Explanation and Neuropsychology}, journal = {Philosophy of the Social Sciences}, year = {1975}, pages = {451--462} } @article{Mundale1996-MUNINP, volume = {6}, number = {4}, author = {Jennifer Mundale and William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {The idea of integrating evolutionary biology and psychology has great promise, but one that will be compromised if psychological functions are conceived too abstractly and neuroscience is not allowed to play a contructive role. We argue that the proper integration of neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology requires a telelogical as opposed to a merely componential analysis of function. A teleological analysis is required in neuroscience itself; we point to traditional and curent research methods in neuroscience, which make critical use of distinctly teleological functional considerations in brain cartography. Only by invoking teleological criteria can researchers distinguish the fruitful ways of identifying brain components from the myriad of possible ways. One likely reason for reluctance to turn to neuroscience is fear of reduction, but we argue that, in the context of a teleological perspective on function, this concern is misplaced. Adducing such theoretical considerations as top-down and bottom-up constraints on neuroscientific and psychological models, as well as existing cases of productive, multidisciplinary cooperation, we argue that integration of neuroscience into psychology and evolutionary biology is likely to be mutually beneficial. We also show how it can be accommodated methodologically within the framework of an interfield theory.}, title = {Integrating Neuroscience, Psychology, and Evolutionary Biology Through a Teleological Conception of Function}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {1996}, pages = {481--505} } @article{Munsat1999-MUNNLM, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Stanley Munsat}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar pose a dilemma for linguistics should neurobiology win out as the science of mind. The dilemma can be avoided by reestablishing linguistics as an autonomous discipline, rather than a branch of the science of mind. Independent considerations for doing this are presented.}, title = {Neurobiology: Linguistics' Millennium Bug?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {845--846} } @article{Nagatsu2010-NAGFAM, volume = {17}, number = {2}, author = {Michiru Nagatsu}, abstract = {In this paper, I examine metaphysical aspects in the neuroeconomics debate. I propose that part of the debate can be better understood by supposing two metaphysical stances, mechanistic and functional. I characterize the two stances, and discuss their relations. I consider two models of framing, in order to illustrate how the features of mechanistic and functional stances figure in the practice of the sciences of individual decision making.}, title = {Function and Mechanism: The Metaphysics of Neuroeconomics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology}, year = {2010}, pages = {197--205} } @article{OGrady2000-OGRLMA, volume = {23}, number = {1}, author = {William O'Grady}, abstract = {The cerebral distinctness of the linguistic and mathematical faculties does not entail their functional independence. Approaches to language that posit a common foundation for the two make claims about design features, not location, and are thus not affected by the finding that one ability can be spared by a neurological accident that compromises the other.}, title = {Language, Mathematics, and Cerebral Distinctness}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {45--45} } @article{OMeara1999-OMEBTQ, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {J. Tim O'Meara}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's argument rejecting the \textquotedblleft{}explanatory sufficiency\textquotedblright of the radical neuron doctrine depends on distinguishing it from the trivial neuron doctrine. This distinction depends on the thesis of \textquotedblleft{}supervenience,\textquotedblright which depends on Hume's regularity theory of causation. In contrast, the radical neuron doctrine depends on a physical theory of causation, which denies the supervenience thesis. Insofar as the target article argues by drawing implications from the premise of Humean causation, whereas the radical doctrine depends on the competing premise of physical causation, the resulting critique of the neuron doctrine amounts largely to begging the question of causation.}, title = {Begging the Question of Causation in a Critique of the Neuron Doctrine}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {846--846} } @book{Overgaard2012-OVECAN, author = {Morten Overgaard and Mads Jensen}, title = {Consciousness and Neural Plasticity}, publisher = {Frontiers Books}, year = {2012} } @article{PatonForthcoming-PATSPA-2, author = {Bryan Paton and Joshua Skewes and Chris Frith and Jakob Hohwy}, abstract = {Clark acknowledges but resists the indirect mind-world relation inherent in prediction error minimization (PEM). But directness should also be resisted. This creates a puzzle, which calls for reconceptualization of the relation. We suggest that a causal conception captures both aspects. With this conception, aspects of situated cognition, social interaction and culture can be understood as emerging through precision optimization}, title = {Skull-Bound Perception and Precision Optimization Through Culture}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{Patterson2003-PATROM, volume = {2003}, number = {9}, author = {Dennis Patterson}, title = {Review of M.R. Bennett, P.M.S. Hacker, \_Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2003} } @article{PereiraJunior2001-PERCSS, volume = {11}, number = {4}, author = {Alfredo Pereira J\'u{}nior}, abstract = {In this study I propose an epistemological discussion of multiple spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience. Are such scales merely convenient levels of description of structure and function, or do they correspond to irreducible levels of brain organization? What criteria should we employ in order to reduce one level to another, or to identify levels that are not reducible to others? Should we think of these criteria as based on empirical and/or theoretical reasons? Beginning with an empirical criterion \^a€ the necessity of different experimental methodologies for the measurement of different phenomena in the same system \^a€ I summarize spatial and temporal scales currently used in neuroscience and discuss the possibility of a more general theoretical criterion. I conclude that multiscaling should be recognized as a central concept in the epistemology of neuroscience}, title = {Coexisting Spatio-Temporal Scales In Neuroscience}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2001}, pages = {457--465} } @article{PereiraJunior2001-ALFCSS, volume = {11}, number = {4}, author = {Alfredo Pereira J\'u{}nior}, abstract = {In this study I propose an epistemological discussion of multiple spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience. Are such scales merely convenient levels of description of structure and function, or do they correspond to irreducible levels of brain organization? What criteria should we employ in order to reduce one level to another, or to identify levels that are not reducible to others? Should we think of these criteria as based on empirical and/or theoretical reasons? Beginning with an empirical criterion \^a€ the necessity of different experimental methodologies for the measurement of different phenomena in the same system \^a€ I summarize spatial and temporal scales currently used in neuroscience and discuss the possibility of a more general theoretical criterion. I conclude that multiscaling should be recognized as a central concept in the epistemology of neuroscience}, title = {Coexisting Spatio-Temporal Scales In Neuroscience}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2001}, pages = {457--465} } @article{Perone2013-PERAIA-3, volume = {37}, number = {1}, author = {Sammy Perone and John P. Spencer}, abstract = {Looking is a fundamental exploratory behavior by which infants acquire knowledge about the world. In theories of infant habituation, however, looking as an exploratory behavior has been deemphasized relative to the reliable nature with which looking indexes active cognitive processing. We present a new theory that connects looking to the dynamics of memory formation and formally implement this theory in a Dynamic Neural Field model that learns autonomously as it actively looks and looks away from a stimulus. We situate this model in a habituation task and illustrate the mechanisms by which looking, encoding, working memory formation, and long-term memory formation give rise to habituation across multiple stimulus and task contexts. We also illustrate how the act of looking and the temporal dynamics of learning affect each other. Finally, we test a new hypothesis about the sources of developmental differences in looking}, title = {Autonomy in Action: Linking the Act of Looking to Memory Formation in Infancy Via Dynamic Neural Fields}, journal = {Cognitive Science}, year = {2013}, pages = {1--60} } @article{Perring1999-PERTND, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Christian Perring}, abstract = {Gold \& Stoljar's target article is important because it shows the limitations of neurobiological theories of the mind more powerfully than previous philosophical criticisms, especially those that focus on the subjective nature of experience and those that use considerations from philosophy of language to argue for the holism of the mental. They use less controversial assumptions and clearer arguments, the conclusions of which are applicable to the whole of neuroscience. Their conclusions can be applied to psychiatry to argue that, contrary to many researchers' assumptions, the approaches to both understanding and treating mental disorders must be interdisciplinary.}, title = {The Neuron Doctrine in Psychiatry}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {846--847} } @article{Pezzullo2002-LUCCNA, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {Luca Pezzullo}, abstract = {This research was carried out to explore some of the cognitive processes involved in scientific anomalies resolution. 40 subjects with a good neuropsychology expertise were asked to explain two (invented) anomalous neuropsychological cases. The subjects' efforts to give a meaningful structure to the data were recorded, and the resulting reasoning blocks were analysed to extract and compute the inferential (deductive, inductive and abductive) and analogical processes used. The processes were intercorrelated to experimentally verify the co-occurrence of different forms of logical thinking. Statistical analysis point out the relevance of abductive inferences, the possible presence of an inferential-style switching process , the high number of external analogies used, the cognitive closeness manifested by expert reasoners}, title = {Cheating Neuropsychologists: A Study of Cognitive Processes Involved in Scientific Anomalies Resolution}, publisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg}, journal = {Mind and Society}, year = {2002}, pages = {43--50} } @incollection{Piccinini2007-PICEP, volume = {153}, number = {3}, author = {Gualtiero Piccinini}, booktitle = {Cartographies of the Mind: The Interface Between Philosophy and Cognitive Science}, abstract = {According to the computational theory of mind (CTM), mental capacities are explained by inner computations, which in biological organisms are realized in the brain. Computational explanation is so popular and entrenched that it\textquoteright{}s common for scientists and philosophers to assume CTM without argument}, title = {Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of Mind}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2007}, pages = {343--353} } @article{Piccinini2006-PICCEI, volume = {153}, number = {3}, author = {Gualtiero Piccinini}, abstract = {According to some philosophers, computational explanation is proprietary$<$br$>$to psychology---{}it does not belong in neuroscience. But neuroscientists routinely offer computational explanations of cognitive phenomena. In fact, computational explanation was initially imported from computability theory into the science of mind by neuroscientists, who justified this move on neurophysiological grounds. Establishing the legitimacy and importance of computational explanation in neuroscience is one thing; shedding light on it is another. I raise some philosophical questions pertaining to computational explanation and outline some promising answers that are being developed by a number of authors.}, title = {Computational Explanation in Neuroscience}, publisher = {Springer}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2006}, pages = {343--353} } @article{Piccinini2011-PICIPA, volume = {183}, number = {3}, author = {Gualtiero Piccinini and Carl Craver}, abstract = {We sketch a framework for building a unified science of cognition. This unification is achieved by showing how functional analyses of cognitive capacities can be integrated with the multilevel mechanistic explanations of neural systems. The core idea is that functional analyses are sketches of mechanisms , in which some structural aspects of a mechanistic explanation are omitted. Once the missing aspects are filled in, a functional analysis turns into a full-blown mechanistic explanation. By this process, functional analyses are seamlessly integrated with multilevel mechanistic explanations}, title = {Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2011}, pages = {283--311} } @book{Poirier2008-POIDNA, author = {Pierre Poirier and Luc Faucher}, title = {Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences}, publisher = {\'E{}ditions Syllepse}, year = {2008} } @article{Poland2004-VONMAE, volume = {71}, number = {5}, author = {Jeffrey S. Poland and Barbara Von Eckardt}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) mechanism approach to gaining an understanding of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that although the mechanism approach can capture many aspects of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, it cannot capture everything. In particular, it cannot completely capture all aspects of the content and significance of mental representations or the evaluative features constitutive of psychopathology.}, title = {Mechanism and Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, pages = {972--984} } @article{Posner1999-POSFNC, volume = {22}, number = {2}, author = {Michael I. Posner and Gregory J. DiGirolamo}, abstract = {ERP studies have shown modulation of activation in left frontal and posterior cortical language areas, as well as recruitment of right hemisphere homologues, based on task demands. Furthermore, blood-flow studies have demonstrated changes in the neural circuitry of word processing based on experience. The neural areas and time course of language processing are plastic depending on task demands and experience.}, title = {Flexible Neural Circuitry in Word Processing}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {299--300} } @article{Posner1997-POSBMO, volume = {6}, number = {2-3}, author = {Michael I. Posner and Gregory J. DiGirolamo and Diego Fernandez-Duque}, title = {Brain Mechanisms of Cognitive Skills}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {1997}, pages = {267--290} } @article{Preston2008-PRECAT-2, volume = {49}, number = {1}, author = {John Preston}, title = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement - Edited by Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, journal = {Philosophical Books}, year = {2008}, pages = {68--71} } @unpublished{Quartz2002-QUASD, author = {Steven Quartz and Jackie Sullivan and Peter Machamer and Andrea Scarantino}, abstract = {Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, March 23-24 2001 Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology.}, title = {Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology}, year = {2002} } @article{Rathkopf2013-RATLAI, volume = {80}, number = {1}, author = {Charles Rathkopf}, abstract = {This paper describes one style of functional analysis commonly used in the neurosciences called task-bound functional analysis. The concept of function invoked by this style of analysis is distinctive in virtue of the dependence relations it bears to transient environmental properties. It is argued that task-bound functional analysis cannot explain the presence of structural properties in nervous systems. An alternative concept of neural function is introduced that draws on the theoretical neuroscience literature, and an argument is given to show that this alternative concept of may help to overcome the explanatory limitations of task-bound functional analysis.}, title = {Localization and Intrinsic Function}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2013}, pages = {1--21} } @incollection{Revonsuo2001-REVOTN, author = {Antti Revonsuo}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {On the Nature of Explanation in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Wpress}, year = {2001} } @article{Revonsuo1999-REVNAT, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Antti Revonsuo}, abstract = {Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic biological explanations across different levels of description can be extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.}, title = {Neuroscience and the Explanation of Psychological Phenomena}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {847--849} } @book{Rizzolatti2007-RIZMIT, author = {Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia}, abstract = {Emotions and actions are powerfully contagious; when we see someone laugh, cry, show disgust, or experience pain, in some sense, we share that emotion. When we see someone in distress, we share that distress. When we see a great actor, musician or sportsperson perform at the peak of their abilities, it can feel like we are experiencing just something of what they are experiencing. Yet only recently, with the discover of mirror neurons, has it become clear just how this powerful sharing of experience is realised within the human brain. This book provides, for the first time, a systematic overview of mirror neurons, written by the man who first discovered them. In the early 1990's Giacomo Rizzolatti and his co-workers at the University of Parma discovered that some neurons had a surprising property. They responded not only when a subject performed a given action, but also when the subject oberved someone else performing that same action. These results had a deep impact on cognitive neuroscience, leading the neuroscientist VS Ramachandran to predict that 'mirror neurons would do for psychology what DNA did for biology'. The unexpected properties of these neurons have not only attracted the attention of neuroscientists. Many sociologists, anthropologists, and even artists have been fascinated by mirror neurons. The director and playwright Peter Brook stated that mirror neurons throw new light on the mysterious link that is created each time actors take the stage and face their audience - the sight of a great actor performing activates in the brain of the observer the very same areas that are active in the performer - including both their actions and their emotions. Written in a highly accessible style, that conveys something of the excitement of this groundbreaking theory, Mirrors in the brain is the definitive account of one the major scientific discoveries of the past 50 years.}, title = {Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions}, publisher = {OUP Oxford}, year = {2007} } @article{Robinson2004-ROBPFO, volume = {79}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel N. Robinson}, title = {Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by M. R. Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker Oxford: Blackwell Publishing; 2003. XVII +461pp}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {2004}, pages = {141--146} } @unpublished{RosenbergManuscript-ROSLFC, author = {Alex Rosenberg}, abstract = {1. From developmental molecular biology to neurogenomics 2. More than you wanted to know about short term and long term implicit memory 3. How are explicit memories stored? 4. How the brain recalls memories 5. Each explicit memory is just a lot of implicit memories 6. Is \textquoteleft{}knowledge how\textquoteright computable? 7. Computationalism and neuroscience..}, title = {Lessons for Cognitive Science From Neurogenomics} } @article{Ryder2004-RYDREM, volume = {141}, number = {2}, author = {Dan Ryder}, title = {Review Essay: Meditations on First Neuroscience: Critical Notice of Mark Changizi's the Brain From 25,000 Feet}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2004}, pages = {277--285} } @article{Schaffner2008-SCHTMA, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Kenneth F. Schaffner}, abstract = {This article considers claims that biology should seek general theories similar to those found in physics but argues for an alternative framework for biological theories as collections of prototypical interlevel models that can be extrapolated by analogy to different organisms. This position is exemplified in the development of the Hodgkin{}Huxley giant squid model for action potentials, which uses equations in specialized ways. This model is viewed as an \textquotedblleft{}emergent unifier.\textquotedblright Such unifiers, which require various simplifications, involve the types of heuristics discussed in Wimsatt\textquoteright{}s writings on reduction, but with a twist. Here, the heuristics are used to generate emergent rather than reductive explanations. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e{}mail: kfs@pitt.edu.}, title = {Theories, Models, and Equations in Biology: The Heuristic Search for Emergent Simplifications in Neurobiology}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {1008--1021} } @article{Scheibel1997-SCHTRW, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Arnold B. Scheibel}, abstract = {We suggest that neither selectionism nor constructivism alone are responsible for learning-based changes in the brain. On the basis of quantitative structural studies of human brain tissue it has been possible to find evidence of both increase and decrease in tissue mass at synaptic and dendritic levels. It would appear that both processes are involved in the course of learning-dependent changes.}, title = {The Right Way, the Wrong Way, and the Army Way: A Dendritic Parable}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {575--575} } @article{Schmaus2005-SCHEAN-2, volume = {72}, number = {5}, author = {Warren Schmaus}, abstract = {There is a lack of connection between the cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary approaches to the study of the mind, in philosophy as well as the sciences. For instance, although Millikan may display a thorough understanding of evolutionary theory in her arguments for the adaptive value of substance concepts, she gives scant attention to what could be the neural substrates of these concepts. Neuroscience research calls into question her assumption that substance concepts play a role in practical skills and suggests that conceptual knowledge in the brain may be organized by perceptual features rather than by individuals and natural kinds.}, title = {Evolutionary and Neuroscience Approaches to the Study of Cognition}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2005}, pages = {675--686} } @article{Schore2005-SCHDAN, volume = {28}, number = {2}, author = {Allan N. Schore}, abstract = {Lewis describes the developmental core of dynamic systems theory. I offer recent data from developmental neuroscience on the sequential experience-dependent maturation of components of the limbic system over the stages of infancy. Increasing interconnectivity within the vertically integrated limbic system allows for more complex appraisals of emotional value. The earliest organization of limbic structures has an enduring impact on all later emotional processing.}, title = {Developmental Affective Neuroscience Describes Mechanisms at the Core of Dynamic Systems Theory}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {217--218} } @incollection{SheaForthcoming-SHENMO, author = {Nicholas Shea}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry}, abstract = {Can findings from psychology and cognitive neuroscience about the neural mechanisms involved in decision-making can tell us anything useful about the commonly-understood mental phenomenon of making voluntary choices? Two philosophical objections are considered. First, that the neural data is subpersonal, and so cannot enter into illuminating explanations of personal level phenomena like voluntary action. Secondly, that mental properties are multiply realized in the brain in such a way as to make them insusceptible to neuroscientific study. The paper argues that both objections would be weakened by the discovery of empirical generalisations connecting subpersonal properties with the personal level. It gives three case studies that furnish evidence to that effect. It argues that the existence of such interrelations are consistent with a plausible construal of the personal-subpersonal distinction. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the notion subpersonal representation relied on in cognitive neuroscience illicitly imports personal-level phenomena like consciousness or normativity, or is otherwise explanatorily problematic.}, title = {Neural Mechanisms of Decision-Making and the Personal Level}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{Shukla2011-SHUTMS, volume = {4}, number = {3}, author = {Vinay K. Shukla}, title = {Magnetic Resonance Imaging}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2011}, pages = {271--271} } @article{Shultz2006-SHUNND, volume = {16}, number = {2}, author = {Thomas R. Shultz and Alan C. Bale}, abstract = {Computer simulations show that an unstructured neural-network model [Shultz, T. R., \& Bale, A. C. (2001). Infancy, 2, 501--{}536] covers the essential features{}of infant learning of simple grammars in an artificial language [Marcus, G. F., Vijayan, S., Bandi Rao, S., \& Vishton, P. M. (1999). Science, 283, 77--{}80], and generalizes to examples both outside and inside of the range of training sentences. Knowledge-representation analyses confirm that these networks discover that duplicate words in the sentences are nearly identical and that they use this near-identity relation to distinguish sentences that are consistent or inconsistent with a familiar grammar. Recent simulations that were claimed to show that this model did not really learn these grammars [Vilcu, M., \& Hadley, R. F. (2005). Minds and Machines, 15, 359--{}382] confounded syntactic types with speech sounds and did not perform standard statistical tests of results.}, title = {Neural Networks Discover a Near-Identity Relation to Distinguish Simple Syntactic Forms}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, year = {2006} } @article{Skarda1986-SKAEBB, volume = {29}, number = {June}, author = {S. Skarda}, abstract = {What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so?called mind?body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti?biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind?brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ?represent? anything, that brains do not ?read? or ?transform? representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal?directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self?organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end?state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined}, title = {Explaining Behavior: Bringing the Brain Back In}, journal = {Inquiry}, year = {1986}, pages = {187--201} } @article{Slaney2005-KATAAM-2, volume = {25}, number = {2}, author = {Kathleen L. Slaney and Michael D. Maraun}, title = {Analogy and Metaphor Running Amok: An Examination of the Use of Explanatory Devices in Neuroscience}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2005}, pages = {153--172} } @book{Slezak1989-SLECBA, author = {Peter Slezak}, title = {Computers, Brains and Minds}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1989} } @article{Soom2012-SOOMDA, volume = {43}, number = {3}, author = {Patrice Soom}, title = {Mechanisms, Determination and the Metaphysics of Neuroscience}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C}, year = {2012}, pages = {655--664} } @article{Sporns2000-SPOSAT, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Olaf Sporns}, abstract = {Cognition and behavior are the result of neural processes occurring at multiple levels of organization. Synthetic computational approaches are capable of bridging the gaps between multiple organizational levels and contribute to our understanding of how neural structures give rise to specific dynamical states. Such approaches are indispensable for formulating the theoretical foundations of cognitive neuroscience.}, title = {Synthetic Approaches to Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {548--549} } @unpublished{StappManuscript-STAPFO, author = {Henry Stapp}, abstract = {The problem at issue here is the nature of connection between the features of the experiments described in psychological/mentalistic terms and the features described in spacio-temporally-based physical terms. This question is an aspect of the long-standing problem of the relationship between mind and matter, which has a history dating back to the time of the ancient Greeks. The issue was rekindled by the rise of Newtonian physics during the seventeenth century, and it generated a huge body of speculation and argumentation during the second half of the twentieth century. It is neither appropriate nor feasible try to review or explain here the complexities of contemporary philosophical opinions on this question, except to say that the reigning view is \textquotedblleft{}materialism,\textquotedblright and that: (1), there is no agreement among its proponents as to how to make rational good sense of this doctrine (Horgan, 1994); and (2), the doctrine, and its supporters, seem, nevertheless, to have strongly influenced the thinking of many neuroscientists. The central thesis of materialism is that: \textquotedblleft{}The human body is a causally complete physico-chemical system: although the body is highly susceptible to external causal influences, all physical events in the body, and all bodily movements are fully explainable in physico-chemical terms.\textquotedblright (Horgan, 1994:472)}, title = {Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience} } @article{Stinson2009-STISFT, volume = {15}, number = {1}, author = {Catherine Stinson}, abstract = {William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of \textquotedblleft{}Cartesian error\textquotedblright. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an executive director can be localized in prefrontal cortex unless dubious assumptions are made, and that computational models purporting to support these assumptions either beg the question, or fail to model executive attention in terms of cause theories.}, title = {Searching for the Source of Executive Attention}, journal = {PSYCHE}, year = {2009}, pages = {137--154} } @unpublished{StoljarManuscript-STOAND, author = {Daniel Stoljar}, abstract = {It is widely held that a successful theory of the mind will be neuroscientific. In this paper we ask, first, what this claim means, and, secondly, whether it is true. In answer to the first question, we argue that the claim is ambiguous between two views--{}one plausible but unsubstantive, and one substantive but highly controversial. In answer to the second question, we argue that neither the evidence from neuroscience itself nor from other scientific and philosophical considerations supports the controversial view.}, title = {A Neuron Doctrine in the Philosophy of Neuroscience} } @article{Stoljar1998-STOOBA, volume = {13}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel Stoljar and Ian Gold}, title = {On Biological and Cognitive Neuroscience}, journal = {Mind and Language}, year = {1998}, pages = {110--31} } @article{Stone2000-STOAPA, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Tony Stone and Martin Davies}, abstract = {\_Two notions of autonomy are distinguished. The respective\_ \_denials that psychology is autonomous from neurobiology are neuron\_ \_doctrines, moderate and radical. According to the moderate neuron\_ \_doctrine, inter-disciplinary interaction need not aim at reduction. It is\_ \_proposed that it is more plausible that there is slippage from the\_ \_moderate to the radical neuron doctrine than that there is confusion\_ \_between the radical neuron doctrine and the trivial version.\_}, title = {Autonomous Psychology and the Moderate Neuron Doctrine}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {849--850} } @article{Sullivan2009-SULTMO, volume = {167}, number = {3}, author = {Jacqueline A. Sullivan}, abstract = {Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., Bechtel, Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007; Bickle, Philosophy and neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2003; Bickle, Synthese, 151, 411--{}434, 2006; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and with them new understandings of the $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of $<$span class='Hi'$>$experimental$<$/span$>$ practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments.}, title = {The Multiplicity of Experimental Protocols: A Challenge to Reductionist and Non-Reductionist Models of the Unity of Neuroscience}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2009}, pages = {511--539} } @article{Sullivan2010-SULARF, volume = {77}, number = {5}, author = {Jacqueline Anne Sullivan}, abstract = {What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is needed is for representation to instead play a more substantive role.}, title = {A Role for Representation in Cognitive Neurobiology}, journal = {Philosophy of Science (Supplement)}, year = {2010}, pages = {875--887} } @article{Sullivan2008-SULMCM, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Jacqueline Anne Sullivan}, abstract = {This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state--{}physical state to function{}mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists themselves have claimed.}, title = {Memory Consolidation, Multiple Realizations, and Modest Reductions}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {501--513} } @article{Sutton1999-SUTTCN, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {John Sutton}, abstract = {According to Gold \& Stoljar, one cannot consistently be both reductionist about psychoneural relations and invoke concepts developed in the psychological sciences. I deny the utility of their distinction between biological and cognitive neuroscience, suggesting that they construe biological neuroscience too rigidly and cognitive neuroscience too liberally. Then, I reject their characterization of reductionism. Reductions need not go down past neurobiology straight to physics, and cases of partial, local reduction are not neatly distinguishable from cases of mere implementation. Modifying the argument from unification as reduction, I defend a position weaker than the radical but stronger than the trivial neuron doctrine.}, title = {The Churchlands' Neuron Doctrine: Both Cognitive and Reductionist}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {850--851} } @article{Symons2001-SYMWCN, volume = {2}, number = {2}, author = {John Symons}, abstract = {Horgan\textquoteright{}s perceptive discussion of Freudian psychology, Prozac and evolutionary biology cannot mitigate the problems that seriously weaken his book (Horgan, 1999). While he certainly manages to deflate some of the more outrageous hype surrounding the scientific and often not-so-scientific study of the mind, his criticism of the brain and behavioral sciences contains a number of flaws, some of which I will address below. My response focuses on his discussion of neuroscience. As we shall see, the three mysteries that Horgan believes cripple neuroscience are certainly not as serious as he insists.}, title = {What Can Neuroscience Explain?}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2001}, pages = {243--248} } @book{Tallis2004-TALWTM, author = {Raymond C. Tallis}, abstract = {Taking a series of key words such as calculation, language, information and memory, Professor Tallis shows how their misuse has lured a whole generation into...}, title = {Why the Mind Is Not a Computer: A Pocket Lexicon of Neuromythology}, publisher = {Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic}, year = {2004} } @book{Thagard2007-THAPOP, author = {Paul Thagard}, abstract = {Psychology is the study of thinking, and cognitive science is the interdisciplinary investigation of mind and intelligence that also includes philosophy, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. In these investigations, many philosophical issues arise concerning methods and central concepts. The Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science contains 16 essays by leading philosophers of science that illuminate the nature of the theories and explanations used in the investigation of minds. Topics discussed include representation, mechanisms, reduction, perception, consciousness, language, emotions, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology. Key Features - Comprehensive coverage of philosophy of psychology and cognitive science - Distinguished contributors: leading philosophers in this area - Contributions closely tied to relevant scientific research}, title = {Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {2007} } @article{Tolbert2003-TOLNAG, volume = {4}, number = {1}, author = {Leslie P. Tolbert and Lynne A. Oland and Thomas C. Christensen and Anita R. Goriely}, abstract = {The shapes of neurons and glial cells dictate many important aspects of their functions. In olfactory systems, certain architectural features are characteristics of these two cell types across a wide variety of species. The accumulated evidence suggests that these common features may play fundamental roles in olfactoryinformation processing. For instance, the primary olfactory neuropil in most vertebrate and invertebrate olfactory systems is organized into discrete modules called glomeruli. Inside each glomerulus, sensory axons and CNS neurons branch and synapse in patterns that are repeated across species. In many species, moreover, the glomeruli are enveloped by a thin and ordered layer of glial processes. Theglomerular arrangement reflects the processing of odor information in modules that encode the discrete molecular attributes of odorant stimuli being processed. Recent studies of the mechanisms that guide the development of olfactory neurons and glial cells have revealed complex reciprocal interactions between these two cell types, which may be necessary for the establishment of modular compartments. Collectively, the findings reviewed here suggest that specialized cellular architecture plays key functional roles in the detection, analysis, and discrimination of odors at early steps in olfactory processing.}, title = {Neuronal and Glial Morphology in Olfactory Systems: Significance for Information-Processing and Underlying Developmental Mechanisms}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2003}, pages = {27--49} } @article{Toombs2003-TOOHEC, volume = {34}, number = {4}, author = {E. Toombs}, abstract = {During the latter part of the nineteenth century our description of nerve cell structure underwent a relatively unrecognized, though fundamental, transformation-a quiet revolution of sorts. The central problem facing scientists in neurology (the study of the nervous system) was a related pair: are nerve cells continuous with each other or not, and how is information conducted? Microscope resolution and staining techniques were inadequate at the time to yield definitive proof either way. I contend that explanatory coherence provides a means to elucidate this instance of theory change in the history of science. The means of elucidation will be Thagard's computational model of explanatory coherence, ECHO ().}, title = {Harmony, Explanatory Coherence and the Debate Between the Reticular Theory and Neuron Theory of Nerve Cell Structure: Echo's Resolution of a Quiet Revolution}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C}, year = {2003}, pages = {615--632} } @book{Tucker2007-TUCMFB, author = {Don M. Tucker}, abstract = {The neural structures of the brain exist to construct information. They do this by creating concepts that relate internal, personal need to external, environmental reality. Meaning is formed in the brain by neural network patterns that traverse these two structures of experience: the visceral nervous system (representing personal need) and the somatic nervous system (interfacing with external reality). How exactly does the brain get from constructing information to creating meaning, and what can this process tell us about the nature of experience? This book addresses both of these questions, making an important contribution to both neuroscience and philosophy.}, title = {Mind From Body: Experience From Neural Structure}, publisher = {OUP USA}, year = {2007} } @article{Tyler2001-TYLCAC, volume = {24}, number = {3}, author = {Lorraine K. Tyler and Helen E. Moss}, abstract = {Humphreys and Forde argue that semantic memory is divided into separate substores for different kinds of information. However, the neuro-imaging results cited in support of this view are inconsistent and often methodologically and statistically unreliable. Our own data indicate no regional specialisation as a function of semantic category or domain and support instead a distributed unitary account.}, title = {Concepts and Categories: What is the Evidence for Neural Specialisation?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {495--496} } @book{Vacariu2012-VACCNV-2, author = {Gabriel Vacariu}, abstract = {From the \textquotedblleft{}epistemologically different worlds\textquotedblright perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman\textquoteright{}s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. The conclusion is that this \textquotedblleft{}science\textquotedblright has \textquotedblleft{}No ontology landscape\textquotedblright and, therefore, cognitive neuroscience is a pseudo-science.}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds}, publisher = {University of Bucharest Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Vacariu2011-VACTMP, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Gabriel Vacariu}, abstract = {An old philosophical problem, the mind-body problem, has not been yet solved by philosophers or scientists. Even if in cognitive neuroscience has been a stunning development in the last 20 years, the mind-body problem remained unsolved. Even if the majority of researchers in this domain accept the identity theory from an ontological viewpoint, many of them reject this position from an epistemological viewpoint. In this context, I consider that it is quite possible the framework of this problem to be wrong and this is the main reason the problem could not be solved. I offer an alternative, the epistemologically different world\textquoteright{}s perspective, which replaces the world or the universe. In this new context, the mind-body problem becomes a pseudo-problem.}, title = {The Mind-Body Problem Today}, journal = {Open Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2011}, pages = {26--34} } @article{Weber2008-WEBCWM, volume = {75}, number = {5}, author = {Marcel Weber}, abstract = {This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley\textquoteright{}s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular (both in James Woodward\textquoteright{}s sense). Further, I argue that there is a sense in which the explanatory heteronomy thesis holds true for this case. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: SNF{}Professorship for Philosophy of Science, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland; e{}mail: marcel.weber@unibas.ch.}, title = {Causes Without Mechanisms: Experimental Regularities, Physical Laws, and Neuroscientific Explanation}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {995--1007} } @article{Weiskopf2011-WEIMAM, volume = {183}, number = {3}, author = {Daniel A. Weiskopf}, abstract = {Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track record of advancing our understanding of complex, hierarchically organized physical systems, particularly biological and neural systems. But not every complex system can be understood mechanistically. Psychological capacities are often understood by providing cognitive models of the systems that underlie them. I argue that these models, while superficially similar to mechanistic models, in fact have a substantially more complex relation to the real underlying system. They are typically constructed using a range of techniques for abstracting the functional properties of the system, which may not coincide with its mechanistic organization. I describe these techniques and show that despite being non-mechanistic, these cognitive models can satisfy the normative constraints on good explanations}, title = {Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2011}, pages = {313--338} } @article{Werner2004-WERSCO-2, author = {M. D. Gerhard Werner}, abstract = {Under the assumption that nervous systems form a distinct category among the objects in Nature, applying metaphors of psychological and behavioral science disciplines is flawed and invites confusion. Moreover, such practices obscure and detract from the primary task of Neurophysiology: to investigate the intrinsic properties of nervous systems, uncontaminated with concepts borrowed from other disciplines. A comprehensive fundamental theory of nervous systems is expected to have the character of high dimensional nonlinear systems in which state space transitions, set in motion by external influences, self-organize to dynamic state space configuration with consequences for behavior.}, title = {Siren Call of Metaphor: Subverting the Proper Task of System Neuroscience}, journal = {[Journal (Paginated)] (in Press)}, year = {2004} } @incollection{Wright2007-WRIIPE, author = {Cory D. Wright}, booktitle = {The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction}, abstract = {Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic system in order to demonstrate why preclusion/extinction claims are dubious}, title = {Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct?}, publisher = {Oxford: Blackwell}, year = {2007} } @incollection{Wright2007-WRIMAP, author = {Cory D. Wright and William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science}, abstract = {As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than reduce them, as well as the different ways in which mechanisms are discovered. Finally, we offer a more detailed example of an important psychological phenomenon for which mechanistic explanation has provided the main source of scientific understanding.}, title = {Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2007} }