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  1. Rani Lill Anjum, Because You’Ll Find Out Anyway, Your Wife is Having an Affair - If and Because.
    In an explanation ‘y because x’, because can be used to express an explanatory relation between an explanandum ‘y’ and an explanans ‘x’. But because can also be used to express the speaker’s reason for uttering ‘y’. This difference will be elucidated by connecting it with the distinction between the at-issue dimension and the speaker dimension of meaning. There are also internal relations between if and because that can help us find and analyse different uses of because, and thus also (...)
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  2. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  3. John Cornwell (ed.) (2004). Explanations: Styles of Explanation in Science. Oxford University Press.
    Our lives, states of health, relationships, behavior, experiences of the natural world, and the technologies that shape our contemporary existence are subject to a superfluity of competing, multi-faceted and sometimes incompatible explanations. Widespread confusion about the nature of "explanation" and its scope and limits pervades popular exposition of the natural sciences, popular history and philosophy of science. This fascinating book explores the way explanations work, why they vary between disciplines, periods, and cultures, and whether they have any necessary boundaries. In (...)
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  4. A. E. Denham (2007). Varieties of Explanation: A Memoir of Patrick Lancaster Gardiner 1922-1997. In P. J. Marshall (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, 138 Biographical Memoirs of Fellows, V. Oxford University Press.
    Patrick Lancaster Gardiner is best known and most widely esteemed for his work on the nature of historical explanation. By addressing the problem of the limits of objectivity in relation to a variety of philosophical issues, he presciently identified the source of a number of philosophical disputes well before they had properly developed. This was certainly the case in Gardiner's treatment of historical explanation, and it is true also of his later treatment of the claims of the personal versus the (...)
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  5. Louis deRosset (2013). Grounding Explanations. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (7).
    A compelling idea holds that reality has a layered structure. We often disagree about what inhabits the bottom layer (or even if there is one), but we agree that higher up we find chemical, biological, geological, psychological, sociological, economic, /etc./, entities: molecules, human beings, diamonds, mental states, cities, interest rates, and so on. How is this intuitive talk of a layered structure of entities to be understood? Traditionally, philosophers have proposed to understand layered structure in terms of either reduction or (...)
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  6. Alexander Gebharter (2014). A Formal Framework for Representing Mechanisms? Philosophy of Science 81 (1):138-153.
    In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the (...)
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  7. Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz (2014). Explanation, Causality, and Unification. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 29 (1):5-7.
  8. Sören Häggqvist (2005). Kinds, Projectibility and Explanation. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):71-87.
    Two ways of characterizing natural kinds are currently popular: the Kripke-Putnam appeal to microstructure and Boyd’s appeal to causal homeostasis. I argue that these conceptions are more divergent than is often acknowledged, that they give no credence to essentialism, and that they are both faulty. In their place, I sketch an alternative view of natural kinds, which I call “bare projectibilism”. This conception avoids the appeal to explanation common to microstructuralism and the causal homeostasis view, but is still compatible with (...)
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  9. Norwood Russell Hanson (1972). Observation and Explanation: A Guide to Philosophy of Science. London,Allen and Unwin.
  10. C. S. Jenkins & Daniel Nolan (2008). Backwards Explanation. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):103 - 115.
    We discuss explanation of an earlier event by a later event, and argue that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation are ubiquitous. Some examples: (1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. (2) The scarlet pimpernels are closing because it is about to rain. (3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon. We then look at various ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing (...)
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  11. Nicholaos Jones & Olaf Wolkenhauer (2012). Diagrams as Locality Aids for Explanation and Model Construction in Cell Biology. Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):705-721.
    Using as case studies two early diagrams that represent mechanisms of the cell division cycle, we aim to extend prior philosophical analyses of the roles of diagrams in scientific reasoning, and specifically their role in biological reasoning. The diagrams we discuss are, in practice, integral and indispensible elements of reasoning from experimental data about the cell division cycle to mathematical models of the cycle’s molecular mechanisms. In accordance with prior analyses, the diagrams provide functional explanations of the cell cycle and (...)
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  12. Robert Kraut (2010). Universals, Metaphysical Explanations, and Pragmatism. Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):590-609.
  13. Shen-yi Liao (forthcoming). Explanations: Aesthetic and Scientific. In Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin & Margaret Moore (eds.), Philosophical Aesthetics and the Sciences of Art. Cambridge University Press.
    Methodologically, philosophical aesthetics is undergoing an evolution that takes it closer to the sciences. Taking this methodological convergence as the starting point, I argue for a pragmatist and pluralist view of aesthetic explanations. To bring concreteness to discussion, I focus on vindicating genre explanations, which are explanations of aesthetic phenomena that centrally cite a work’s genre classification. I show that theoretical resources that philosophers of science have developed with attention to actual scientific practice and the special sciences can be used (...)
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  14. Laureano Luna (forthcoming). No Successful Infinite Regress. Logic and Logical Philosophy.
    We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.
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  15. Laureano Luna (2014). No Successfull Infinite Regress. Logic and Logical Philosophy 23 (2).
    We model infinite regress structures -not arguments- by means of ungrounded recursively defined functions in order to show that no such structure can perform the task of providing determination to the items composing it, that is, that no determination process containing an infinite regress structure is successful.
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  16. G. Randolph Mayes, Theories of Explanation. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  17. Seungbae Park (2014). A Pessimistic Induction Against Scientific Antirealism. Organon F 21 (1):3-21.
    There are nine antirealist explanations of the success of science in the literature. I raise difficulties against all of them except the latest one, and then construct a pessimistic induction that the latest one will turn out to be problematic because its eight forerunners turned out to be problematic. This pessimistic induction is on a par with the traditional pessimistic induction that successful present scientific theories will be revealed to be false because successful past scientific theories were revealed to be (...)
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  18. Kenneth L. Pearce (forthcoming). The Puzzle of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? [REVIEW] Faith and Philosophy.
  19. David-Hillel Ruben (1987). Explaining Contrastive Facts. Analysis 47 (1):35-37.
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  20. M. Siebel (2011). Why Explanation and Thus Coherence Cannot Be Reduced to Probability. Analysis 71 (2):264-266.
  21. Alexander Skiles (forthcoming). Against Grounding Necessitarianism. Erkenntnis.
    Can there be grounding without necessitation? That is, can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain but not the former? It is an orthodoxy in recent literature about the nature of grounding, and in first-order philosophical disputes about what grounds what, that the answer is no. I will argue that the correct answer is yes. I present two novel arguments against grounding necessitarianism, and then (...)
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  22. Bradford Skow (2013). Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axs047.
    Philosophers have proposed many alleged examples of non-causal explanations of particular events. I discuss several well-known examples and argue that they fail to be non-causal. 1 Questions2 Preliminaries3 Explanations That Cite Causally Inert Entities4 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws I5 Stellar Collapse6 Explanations That Merely Cite Laws II7 A Final Example8 Conclusion.
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  23. Nicholas Tebben (forthcoming). On the Prospects for Naturalism. In Christian Illies & Christian Shaefer (eds.), Metaphysics or Modernity? Bamberg University Press.
    Contemporary naturalism has two components. The first is ontological, and says, roughly, that all and only what the sciences say exists, really does exist. The other is methodological, and it says that only scientific explanations are legitimate explanations. Together these commitments promise a coherent picture of the world that is nicely integrated with an attractive epistemology. Despite the obvious appeal of naturalism, I would like to sound a note of caution. First, I would like to argue that naturalism's ontological commitment (...)
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  24. Cory D. Wright (2012). Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception. European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
    The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have (...)
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  25. Byeong-uk Yi (1994). Glymour on Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):914-917.
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