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  1. Peter Achinstein (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Offering a new approach to scientific explanation, this book focuses initially on the explaining act itself.
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  2. Hans Albert (1993). Some Remarks on Reasons in Explaining Human Action. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1):25 – 27.
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  3. Peter Alexander (1963/1992). Sensationalism And Scientific Explanation. Humanities Press.
    SENSATIONALISM 1 1. Introductory 1 2. Mach's Sensationalism 4 3. Developments of Sensationalism 22 II. THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF SEN- SATIONALISM 25 1. The Point of Sensationalism 25 2. The Ambiguity of 'Sensation' 27 3. The Fundamental Conflict 35 4. Mistakes, Incorrigibility and Simplicity 40 III. DESCRIPTION 51 1. Describing and Descriptions 51 2. Describing in Terms of Sensations 67 IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF 'PURE' DES- CRIPTIONS 79 V. SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS 99 VI. DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY 142 INDEX 145 (...)
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  4. Peter Alexander (1962). Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation. Mind 71 (283):326-341.
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  5. Maria Alvarez (2010). Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning. Ratio 23 (4):355-373.
    This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...)
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  6. R. J. B. (1967). Explanation and Human Action. Review of Metaphysics 21 (1):161-161.
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  7. Hiranmoy Banerjee & Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay (eds.) (1990). Action: Explanation and Interpretation. K.P. Bagchi & Co. In Collaboration with Jadavpur University.
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  8. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  9. Stephen Boulter (2009). Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  10. Myles Brand (1983). The Human Output System. Grazer Philosophische Studien 20:241-264.
    This paper recommends a framework for explaining largescale, complex actions. Philosophers have concentrated on simple actions — on hand raisings — far too long. Large-scale actions are the normal objects of legal and moral responsibility, as well as the kmd of activity for which the question of freedom is most pertinent. I focus on that part of the causal sequence constituting an action that begins after the decision and continues through the bodily movements: I call this part of the sequence (...)
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  11. John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
    Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to ϕ are either facts that explain why one ought to ϕ (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts that play a for-ϕ role in weighing explanations (what he calls “pro tanto reasons”). I argue against (...)
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  12. Randolph Clarke (1992). A Principle of Rational Explanation? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-12.
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  13. R. G. Collingwood (1999). The Principles of History: And Other Writings in Philosophy of History. Oxford University Press.
    Published here for the first time is much of a final and long-anticipated work on philosophy of history by the great Oxford philosopher and historian R. G. Collingwood. The original text of this uncompleted work has only recently been discovered. It is accompanied by further, shorter writings on historical knowledge and inquiry. A lengthy editorial introduction sets these writings in their context, and discusses philosophical questions to which they give rise.
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  14. Giuseppina D'Oro (2000). Collingwood on Re-Enactment and the Identity of Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):87-101.
  15. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Action, Content, and Inference. In P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford University Press.
  16. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Action in Moral Metaphysics. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  17. Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. 79-101.
  18. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  19. R. E. Dowling (1967). 'Can an Action Have Many Descriptions?'? Inquiry 10 (1-4):447-448.
    Dr. Cody (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) argues that since we cannot say how a person could learn that different descriptions are of the same action, therefore each action has only one true description. But precisely the same reasoning could lead to the conclusion that each material object has only one true description. The falsity of this conclusion indicates the unsoundness of the argument, which probably goes wrong where Cody requires us to see actions ?stripped of their descriptive rags altogether?
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  20. William H. Dray (1979). Laws and Explanation in History. Greenwood Press.
  21. C. J. Ducasse (1925). Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22 (6):150-155.
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  22. Paul Egré (forthcoming). Intentional Action and the Semantics of Gradable Expressions (On the Knobe Effect). In B. Copley & F. Martin (eds.), Causation in Grammatical Structures. Oxford University Press.
    This paper examines an hypothesis put forward by Pettit and Knobe 2009 to account for the Knobe effect. According to Pettit and Knobe, one should look at the semantics of the adjective “intentional” on a par with that of other gradable adjectives such as “warm”, “rich” or “expensive”. What Pettit and Knobe’s analogy suggests is that the Knobe effect might be an instance of a much broader phenomenon which concerns the context-dependence of normative standards relevant for the application of gradable (...)
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  23. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  24. Patrick R. Frierson (2005). Kant's Empirical Account of Human Action. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (7):1-34.
    In the first Critique, Kant says, “[A]ll the actions of a human being are determined in accord with the order of nature,” adding that “if we could investigate all the appearances . . . there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty.” Most Kantian treatments of human action discuss action from a practical perspective, according to which human beings are transcendentally free, and thus do not sufficiently lay out this Kant’s empirical, causal description of human action. (...)
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  25. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
    Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].
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  26. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief in Action (and Reaction). Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  27. Allan F. Gibbard (2002). Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
  28. Carl Ginet (1984). Book Review. Actions. Jennifer Hornsby. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 93 (1):120-26.
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  29. Hans-Johann Glock (2009). Can Animals Act For Reasons? Inquiry 52 (3):232-254.
    This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that (...)
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  30. Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events (...)
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  31. Anthony Greenwald & L. H. Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.
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  32. John D. Greenwood (1990). The Social Constitution of Action: Objectivity and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207.
    It is argued in this article that human actions may be said to be socially constituted : as being behavior that is constituted as human action by social relations and by participant agent and collective representations of behavior. In contrast to recent social constructionist accounts, it is argued that the social constitution of action does not pose any threat to the objectivity of classification or explanation in social psychological science. It does mark some significant ontological differences between natural and social (...)
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  33. Adolf Grünbaum (1984). The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. University of California Press.
    Introduction Critique of the Hermeneutic Conception of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy The study before you is a philosophical critique of the foundations ...
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  34. Ned Hall (2001). Ontology of Mind. Helen Steward. Mind 110 (440):1123-1127.
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  35. Carl Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press.
  36. Carl G. Hempel (1942). The Function of General Laws in History. Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):35-48.
    The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...)
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  37. Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim (1948). Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
  38. Frank Hindriks (2014). Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives. Mind and Language 29 (1):51-72.
    Intuitions about intentional action have turned out to be sensitive to normative factors: most people say that an indifferent agent brings about an effect of her action intentionally when it is harmful, but unintentionally when it is beneficial. Joshua Knobe explains this asymmetry, which is known as ‘the Knobe effect’, in terms of the moral valence of the effect, arguing that this explanation generalizes to other asymmetries concerning notions as diverse as deciding and being free. I present an alternative explanation (...)
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  39. Martin Hollis (1977). Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action. Cambridge University Press.
    All social theorists and philosophers who seek to explain human action have a 'model of man', a metaphysical view of human nature. Some make man a plastic creature of nature and nurture, some present him as the autonomous creator of his social world, some offer a compromise. Each view needs its own theory of scientific knowledge calling for philosophic appraisal and the compromise sets harder puzzles than either. Passive accounts of man, for example, have a robust notion of causal explanation (...)
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  40. Jennifer Hornsby (2001). Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press.
    These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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  41. Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Actions. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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  42. Daniel D. Hutto (2007). Folk Psychology Without Theory or Simulation. In D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer. 115--135.
    This paper spells out just how the Narrative Practice Hypothesis, if true, undercuts any need to appeal to either theory or simulation when it comes to explaining the basis of folk psychological understanding: these heuristics do not come into play other than in cases of in which the framework is used to speculate about why another may have acted. To add appropriate force to this observation, I first say something about why we should reject the widely held assumption that the (...)
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  43. John Hyman (2013). Voluntariness and Choice. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):683-708.
    Philosophers have shown little interest in the concept of voluntariness during the last fifty years, mainly because Anscombe's book Intention persuaded us that it plays a relatively minor role in thought about human action, compared to the concept of acting intentionally or acting for a reason, and does not raise any interesting problems of its own, once the nature of intentional action has been explained. But this seems to be wrong. The nature of voluntariness, and its relationship with guilt, coercion, (...)
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  44. John Hyman (2010). The Road to Larissa. Ratio 23 (4):393-414.
    In the Meno, Socrates asks why knowledge is a better guide to acting the right way than true belief. The answer he proposes is ingenious, but it fails to solve the puzzle, and some recent attempts to solve it also fail. I shall argue that the puzzle cannot be solved as long as we conceive of knowledge as a kind of belief, or allow our conception of knowledge to be governed by the contrast between knowledge and belief.
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  45. Suzanne Duvall Jacobitti (1979). Causes, Reasons, and Voting. Political Theory 7 (3):390-413.
  46. Nicholas Jardine (1991). The Scenes of Inquiry: On the Reality of Questions in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    This book advocates a radical shift of concern in philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of the sciences, and explores the consequences of such a shift. The historically-oriented first part of the work deals with the ways in which ranges of questions become real and cease to be real for communities of inquirers. The more philosophically-oriented second part of the work introduces the notion of absolute reality of questions, and addresses doubt about the claims of the sciences to have accumulated absolutely (...)
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  47. Geert Keil (2007). What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From? In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy. Ashgate.
    The problem of deviant causal chains is endemic to any theory of action that makes definitional or explanatory use of a causal connection between an agent’s beliefs and pro-attitudes and his bodily movements. Other causal theories of intentional phenomena are similarly plagued. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, to defend Davidson’s defeatism. In his treatment of deviant causal chains, Davidson makes use of the clause “in the right way” to rule out causal waywardness, but he regards any attempt (...)
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  48. Jaegwon Kim (1981). Causes as Explanations: A Critique. Theory and Decision 13 (4):293-309.
    This paper offers a critique of the view that causation can be analyzed in terms of explanation. In particular, the following points are argued: (1) a genuine explanatory analysis of causation must make use of a fully epistemological-psychological notion of explanation; (2) it is unlikely that the relatively clear-cut structure of the causal relation can be captured by the relatively unstructured relation of explanation; (3) the explanatory relation does not always parallel the direction of causation; (4) certain difficulties arise for (...)
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  49. A. C. MacIntyre (1958). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Study. London.
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  50. Bertram F. Malle (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. MIT Press.
    In this provocative monograph, Bertram Malle describes behavior explanations as having a dual nature -- as being both cognitive and social acts -- and proposes...
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