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  1. Peter Achinstein (1983). The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Offering a new approach to scientific explanation, this book focuses initially on the explaining act itself.
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  2. Hans Albert (1993). Some Remarks on Reasons in Explaining Human Action. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1):25 – 27.
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  3. Peter Alexander (1963/1992). Sensationalism And Scientific Explanation. Humanities Press.
    SENSATIONALISM 1 1. Introductory 1 2. Mach's Sensationalism 4 3. Developments of Sensationalism 22 II. THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF SEN- SATIONALISM 25 1. The Point of Sensationalism 25 2. The Ambiguity of 'Sensation' 27 3. The Fundamental Conflict 35 4. Mistakes, Incorrigibility and Simplicity 40 III. DESCRIPTION 51 1. Describing and Descriptions 51 2. Describing in Terms of Sensations 67 IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF 'PURE' DES- CRIPTIONS 79 V. SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS 99 VI. DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY 142 INDEX 145 (...)
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  4. Peter Alexander (1962). Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic Explanation. Mind 71 (283):326-341.
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  5. Maria Alvarez (2010). Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning. Ratio 23 (4):355-373.
    This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...)
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  6. Thomas Atwater (1980). Theory of Action. New Scholasticism 54 (1):111-115.
  7. Robert Audi (1980). Review: Tuomela on the Explanation of Human Action. [REVIEW] Synthese 44 (2):285 - 306.
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  8. Bruce Aune (1977). Reason and Action. --. Holland, Boston, D. Reidel Pub. Co.
  9. R. J. B. (1967). Explanation and Human Action. Review of Metaphysics 21 (1):161-161.
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  10. Archie J. Bahm (1967). R. Taylor's "Action and Purpose". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (2):290.
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  11. Annette Baier (1985). Explaining the Actions of the Explainers. Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):155 - 173.
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  12. Annette Baier (1979). Action Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  13. Annette Baier (1971). The Search for Basic Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):161 - 170.
  14. Kurt Baier (1965). Acting and Producing. Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):645-648.
  15. Hiranmoy Banerjee & Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay (eds.) (1990). Action: Explanation and Interpretation. K.P. Bagchi & Co. In Collaboration with Jadavpur University.
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  16. John A. Barker & Fred Adams (2012). Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
  17. Stephen Boulter (2009). Aquinas on Action and Action Explanation. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  18. Myles Brand (1983). The Human Output System. Grazer Philosophische Studien 20:241-264.
    This paper recommends a framework for explaining largescale, complex actions. Philosophers have concentrated on simple actions — on hand raisings — far too long. Large-scale actions are the normal objects of legal and moral responsibility, as well as the kmd of activity for which the question of freedom is most pertinent. I focus on that part of the causal sequence constituting an action that begins after the decision and continues through the bodily movements: I call this part of the sequence (...)
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  19. John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
    Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to ϕ are either facts that explain why one ought to ϕ (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts that play a for-ϕ role in weighing explanations (what he calls “pro tanto reasons”). I argue against (...)
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  20. Ann Bumpus (2000). Aiming and Intending. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):581-595.
  21. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2001). Two Kinds of Purposive Action. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.
    It is normally assumed that there is only one kind of purposive action. This article argues that there are two kinds of purposive action, which require different models of explanation. One kind of action is done without awareness of reasons; another kind of action is done because the agent is aware of reasons for that action. The argument starts by noting that philosophers disagree about what explains action. Some claim that actions are explained by impersonal facts, such as facts about (...)
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  22. David K. Chan (1995). Non-Intentional Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):139 - 151.
  23. Randolph Clarke (1992). A Principle of Rational Explanation? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-12.
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  24. R. G. Collingwood (1999). The Principles of History: And Other Writings in Philosophy of History. Oxford University Press.
    Published here for the first time is much of a final and long-anticipated work on philosophy of history by the great Oxford philosopher and historian R. G. Collingwood. The original text of this uncompleted work has only recently been discovered. It is accompanied by further, shorter writings on historical knowledge and inquiry. A lengthy editorial introduction sets these writings in their context, and discusses philosophical questions to which they give rise.
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  25. Giuseppina D'Oro (2000). Collingwood on Re-Enactment and the Identity of Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):87-101.
  26. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Action, Content, and Inference. In P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford University Press.
  27. Jonathan Dancy (2009). Action in Moral Metaphysics. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  28. Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. 79-101.
  29. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  30. R. E. Dowling (1967). 'Can an Action Have Many Descriptions?'? Inquiry 10 (1-4):447-448.
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  31. William H. Dray (1979). Laws and Explanation in History. Greenwood Press.
  32. C. J. Ducasse (1925). Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22 (6):150-155.
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  33. Antony Duff (1980). Desire, Duty and Moral Absolutes. Philosophy 55 (212):223 - 238.
    Philosophers have often claimed that the requirements of morality have an absolute and categorical status. Other values may be relative to the agent's ends, other imperatives hypothetical on his desires: their requirements must be justified by relating the action enjoined to the attainment of those ends or desires, and can be avoided by being shown to be incompatible with them. But the requirements of morality bind us whatever our ends or desires might be: they are not to be justified by (...)
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  34. Paul Egré (forthcoming). Intentional Action and the Semantics of Gradable Expressions (On the Knobe Effect). In B. Copley & F. Martin (eds.), Causation in Grammatical Structures. Oxford University Press.
    This paper examines an hypothesis put forward by Pettit and Knobe 2009 to account for the Knobe effect. According to Pettit and Knobe, one should look at the semantics of the adjective “intentional” on a par with that of other gradable adjectives such as “warm”, “rich” or “expensive”. What Pettit and Knobe’s analogy suggests is that the Knobe effect might be an instance of a much broader phenomenon which concerns the context-dependence of normative standards relevant for the application of gradable (...)
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  35. Carlos Moya Espí (1998). Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation. Critica 30 (89):29-43.
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  36. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  37. Patrick R. Frierson (2005). Kant's Empirical Account of Human Action. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (7):1-34.
    In the first Critique, Kant says, “[A]ll the actions of a human being are determined in accord with the order of nature,” adding that “if we could investigate all the appearances . . . there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty.” Most Kantian treatments of human action discuss action from a practical perspective, according to which human beings are transcendentally free, and thus do not sufficiently lay out this Kant’s empirical, causal description of human action. (...)
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  38. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
    Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].
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  39. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief in Action (and Reaction). Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
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  40. Allan F. Gibbard (2002). Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings. In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon.
  41. Carl Ginet (1984). Book Review. Actions. Jennifer Hornsby. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 93 (1):120-26.
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  42. Hans-Johann Glock (2009). Can Animals Act For Reasons? Inquiry 52 (3):232-254.
    This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that (...)
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  43. Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events (...)
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  44. Anthony Greenwald & L. H. Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations.
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  45. John D. Greenwood (1990). The Social Constitution of Action: Objectivity and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207.
    It is argued in this article that human actions may be said to be socially constituted : as being behavior that is constituted as human action by social relations and by participant agent and collective representations of behavior. In contrast to recent social constructionist accounts, it is argued that the social constitution of action does not pose any threat to the objectivity of classification or explanation in social psychological science. It does mark some significant ontological differences between natural and social (...)
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  46. Adolf Grünbaum (1984). The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. University of California Press.
    Introduction Critique of the Hermeneutic Conception of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy The study before you is a philosophical critique of the foundations ...
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  47. Hegel Gwf (forthcoming). ACTION, Philosophy Of. Philosophy Today.
  48. Ned Hall (2001). Ontology of Mind. Helen Steward. Mind 110 (440):1123-1127.
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  49. Carl Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press.
  50. Carl G. Hempel (1942). The Function of General Laws in History. Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):35-48.
    The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...)
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