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  1. Frederick R. Adams (1991). Causal Contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  2. Daniel Anderson Arnold (2012). Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. Columbia University Press.
    Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists believe that the mental continuum is uninterrupted ..
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
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  4. Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Syntax, Semantics, and Levels of Explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):361-367.
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  5. Radu J. Bogdan (1989). Does Semantics Run the Psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
    If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes (...)
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  6. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  7. Tyler Burge (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  8. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1986). Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  9. Robert C. Cummins (1991). The Role of Mental Meaning in Psychological Explanation. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  10. Michael Devitt (1991). Why Fodor Can't Have It Both Ways. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell. 95--118.
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  11. Eric Dietrich (ed.) (1994). Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
  12. Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are (what I call) triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and (what I call) structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts (how an (...)
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  13. Fred Dretske (2003). Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  14. Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 157--173.
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  15. Fred Dretske (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  16. Fred Dretske (1996). How Reasons Explain Behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof. Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.
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  17. Fred Dretske (1994). Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero. Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.
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  18. Fred Dretske (1991). How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker. Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.
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  19. Fred Dretske (1990). Does Meaning Matter? In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  20. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply: Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  21. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers of Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
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  22. Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  23. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  24. Fred Dretske (1987). The Explanatory Role of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
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  25. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Content and the Subtle Extensionality of " -Explains...". Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.
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  26. Hartry Field, Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.
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  27. Carrie Figdor (2003). Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account (...)
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  28. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  29. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). Reply to Dretske's Does Meaning Matter?. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  30. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Banish Discontent. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
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  31. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning. Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.
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  32. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.
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  33. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.
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  34. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). Belief, Content, and Cause. In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.
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  35. Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.) (1988). Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
  36. B. Hassrick (1995). Fred Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Semantic Content. Conference 6 (1):59-66.
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  37. Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte (2014). The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation? Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
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  38. Terence E. Horgan (1991). Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  39. Pierre Jacob (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  40. Pierre Jacob (1998). What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain? In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 175--197.
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  41. Benjamin Jarvis (forthcoming). Representing as Adapting. Acta Analytica:1-23.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature (basically) represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by (...)
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  42. Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behavior. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  43. Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  44. Karel J. Lambert (1978). The Place of the Intentional in the Explanation of Behavior: A Brief Survey. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:75-84.
    This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.
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  45. Mohan Matthen (2014). Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW] Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  46. Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.) (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell.
  47. Alfred R. Mele (1991). Dretske's Intricate Behavior. Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.
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  48. Andrew Melnyk (1996). The Prospects for Dretske's Account of the Explanatory Role of Belief. Mind and Language 11 (2):203-15.
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  49. Ruth G. Millikan (1990). Seismograph Readings for Explaining Behavior. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):807-812.
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  50. Paul Noordhof (1996). Accidental Associations, Local Potency, and a Dilemma for Dretske. Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.
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