This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
70 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 70
  1. Peter Godfrey -Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (2):223-236.
  2. Frederick R. Adams (1991). Causal Contents. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  3. Daniel Anderson Arnold (2012). Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind. Columbia University Press.
    Aiming to complicate this story, Dan Arnold confronts a significant obstacle to popular attempts at harmonizing classical Buddhist and modern scientific thought: since most Indian Buddhists believe that the mental continuum is uninterrupted ..
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  5. Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Syntax, Semantics, and Levels of Explanation. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):361-367.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Radu J. Bogdan (1989). Does Semantics Run the Psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
    If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Paul Boswell (2016). Making Sense of Unpleasantness: Evaluationism and Shooting the Messenger. Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2969-2992.
    Unpleasant sensations possess a unique ability to make certain aversive actions seem reasonable to us. But what is it about these experiences that give them that ability? According to some recent evaluationist accounts, it is their representational content: unpleasant sensations represent a certain event as bad for one. Unfortunately evaluationism seems unable to make sense of our aversive behavior to the sensations themselves, for it appears to entail that taking a painkiller is akin to shooting the messenger, and is every (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  9. Tyler Burge (2003). Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1986). Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11. Robert C. Cummins (1991). The Role of Mental Meaning in Psychological Explanation. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  12. Michael Devitt (1991). Why Fodor Can't Have It Both Ways. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell 95--118.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Eric Dietrich (ed.) (1994). Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
  14. Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):167-177.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring causes of behavior even though (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  15. Fred Dretske (2003). Burge on Mentalistic Explanations, or Why I Am Still Epiphobic. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior. In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 157--173.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Fred Dretske (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Fred Dretske (1996). How Reasons Explain Behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof. Mind and Language 11 (2):223-229.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  19. Fred Dretske (1994). Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero. Mind and Language 9 (2):203-8.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20. Fred Dretske (1991). How Beliefs Explain: Reply to Baker. Philosophical Studies 113 (July):113-117.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  21. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply: Causal Relevance and Explanatory Exclusion. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  22. Fred Dretske (1990). Does Meaning Matter? In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  23. Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers of Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819-839.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Fred Dretske (1989). Reasons and Causes. Philosophical Perspectives 3:1-15.
  25. Fred Dretske (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   477 citations  
  26. Fred Dretske (1988). The Explanatory Role of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  27. Crawford L. Elder (1996). Content and the Subtle Extensionality of " -Explains...". Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):320-32.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Hartry Field, Remarks on Content and its Role in Explanation.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Carrie Figdor (2003). Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  31. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). Reply to Dretske's Does Meaning Matter?. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Banish Discontent. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic. Cambridge University Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  33. Bryan Frances, A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Bryan Frances (1998). Twin Earth Thought Experiments.
  35. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1994). Dretske on the Causal Efficacy of Meaning. Mind and Language 9 (2):181-202.
    The object of this paper is to discuss several issues raised by Fred Dretske’s account of the causal efficacy of content, as given in his book Explaining Behavior. To warrant the causal efficacy of folk-psychological properties while keeping attached to a naturalistic framework, Fred Dretske proposes that these properties are causes of a peculiar type, what he calls structuring causes. Structuring causes are not postulated ad hoc, to somehow account for the causal efficacy of content. Dretske claims that we independently (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  36. Cressida Gaukroger (forthcoming). Why Broad Content Can't Influence Behaviour. Synthese:1-16.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1986). Why Semantic Properties Won't Earn Their Keep. Philosophical Studies 50 (September):223-36.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). Belief, Content, and Cause. In European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya (1997). European Review of Philosophy, Vol. 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Stanford: CSLI.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.) (1988). Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
  41. B. Hassrick (1995). Fred Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Semantic Content. Conference 6 (1):59-66.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Frank Hofmann & Peter Schulte (2014). The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation? Acta Analytica 29 (3):267-284.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Terence E. Horgan (1991). Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  44. Pierre Jacob (1998). Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Pierre Jacob (1997). What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain? In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer 175--197.
    Dretske has argued that, unlike the content of beliefs and desires, the contents of innate representations cannot in principle play a role in the causal explanation of an individual's behavior. I examine this "asymmetry" and against it, I argue that the content of innate mental representations too can play a causal role in the explanation of behavior.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Benjamin Jarvis (2015). Representing as Adapting. Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.
    In this paper, I recommend a creature-level theory of representing. On this theory, a creature represents some entity just in case the creature adapts its behavior to that entity. Adapting is analyzed in terms of establishing new patterns of behavior. The theory of representing as adapting is contrasted with traditional causal and informational theories of mental representation. Moreover, I examine the theory in light of Putnam-Burge style externalism; I show that Putnam-Burge style externalism follows from and is explained by it. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  48. Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske on How Reasons Explain Behavior. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  49. Karel J. Lambert (1978). The Place of the Intentional in the Explanation of Behavior: A Brief Survey. Grazer Philosophische Studien 6:75-84.
    This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich (2000). In Defense of Representation. Cognitive Psychology 40 (2):138--171.
    The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
1 — 50 / 70