Related categories
Siblings:See also:
58 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 58
  1. Rogers Albritton (1995). Comments on Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):229-239.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robert F. Allen, The Subject is Qualia: Paronyms and Temporary Identity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Dorit Bar-On, Externalism and Skepticism: Recognition, Expression, and Self-Knowledge.
    As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Dorit Bar-On, Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge (Reply to Brueckner) UNC-Chapel Hill.
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Précis of Dorit Bar-On's Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):1-7.
  6. Dorit Bar-On (2010). Avowals: Expression, Security, and Knowledge: Reply to Matthew Boyle, David Rosenthal, and Maura Tumulty. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 25 (1):47-63.
    In my reply to Boyle, Rosenthal, and Tumulty, I revisit my view of avowals’ security as a matter of a special immunity to error, their character as intentional expressive acts that employ self-ascriptive vehicles (without being grounded in self-beliefs), Moore’s paradox, the idea of expressing as contrasting with reporting and its connection to showing one’s mental state, and the ‘performance equivalence’ between avowals and other expressive acts.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Dorit Bar-On (2009). First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):53 - 71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Dorit Bar-On (2008). Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Here are some things that I know right now: that I’m feeling a bit hungry, that there’s a red cardinal on my bird feeder, that I’m sitting down, that I have a lot of grading to do today, that my daughter is mad at me, that I’ll be going for a run soon, that I’d like to go out to the movies tonight. As orthodoxy would have it, some among these represent things to which I have privileged epistemic access, namely: (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Dorit Bar-On (2007). Review of Akeel Bilgrami, Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Dorit Bar-On (2000). Speaking My Mind. Philsophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2003). Expressing Truths and Knowing Truths. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Dorit Bar-On & Douglas C. Long (2001). Avowals and First-Person Privilege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):311-35.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Matthew Boyle (2011). Transparent Self-Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
    I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Matthew Boyle (2010). Bar-on on Self-Knowledge and Expression. Acta Analytica 25 (1):9-20.
    I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but how (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matthew Boyle (2009). Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Alex Byrne (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's "Speaking My Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):705 - 717.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. William Child (2006). Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76.
    How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of "response" and that the "language-game" of reporting past attitudes is "the primary thing"? The epistemology and metaphysics (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. William Child (2006). Wittgenstein's Externalism: Context, Self-Knowledge & the Past. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
  20. Matthew Chrisman (2009). Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (3):1-26.
    In this paper, I consider the prospects of two different kinds of expressivism – ethical expressivism and avowal expressivism – in light of two common objections. The first objection stems from the fact that it is natural to think of ethical statements and avowals as at least potential manifestations of knowledge. The second objection stems from the fact that it is natural to treat ethical statements and avowals as truth-evaluable. I argue that, although a recent avowal expressivist attempt (Bar-On 2004) (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Annalisa Coliva (2009). Self-Knowledge and Commitments. Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Josep E. Corbí (2010). First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):325-362.
    Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran's account of how first-person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of the analyst's interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate, first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the deliberative (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Richard Eldridge (2003). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):360–368.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Kevin Falvey (2000). The Basis of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. David H. Finkelstein (2003). Expression and the Inner. Harvard University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Sebastian Gardner (2004). Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Review 113 (2):249-267.
  28. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief. In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brie Gertler (ed.) (2003). Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    When read as demands for justification, these questions seem absurd. We don’t normally ask people to substantiate assertions like “I think it will rain tomorrow” or “I have a headache”. There is, at the very least, a strong presumption that sincere self-attributions about one’s thoughts and feelings are true. In fact, some philosophers believe that such self-attributions are less susceptible to doubt than any other claims. Even those who reject that extreme view generally acknowledge that there is some salient epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. SANFORD C. GOLDBERG (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165 - 199.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Edward Harcourt (2008). Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):299-333.
  33. Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.) (2008). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    The essays featured in this collection seek to deepen our understanding of self-knowledge, to solve some of the genuine (and to resolve some of the spurious) ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Frank Hofmann (2005). Immediate Self-Knowledge and Avowal. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):193-213.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Richard Holton (1993). Intention Detecting. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.
    Crispin Wright has argued that our concept of intention is extension-determining, and that this explains why we are so good at knowing our intentions: it does so by subverting the idea that we detect them. This paper has two aims. The first is to make sense of Wright's claim that intention is extension-determining; this is achieved by comparing his position to that of analytic functionalism. The second is to show that it doesn't follow from this that we do not detect (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Rockney Jacobsen (1996). Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):12-30.
  37. John A. Lambie (2009). Emotion Experience, Rational Action, and Self-Knowledge. Emotion Review 1 (3):272-280.
    This article examines the role of emotion experience in both rational action and self-knowledge. A key distinction is made between emotion experiences of which we are unaware, and those of which we are aware. The former motivate action and color our view of the world, but they do not do so in a rational way, and their nonreflective nature obscures self-understanding. The article provides arguments and evidence to support the view that emotion experiences contribute to rational action only if one (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. K. Lawlor (2008). Review: Akeel Bilgrami: Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (466):469-472.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jonathan Lear (2004). Avowal and Unfreedom. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):448-454.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Aidan McGlynn (2011). Review of Anthony Hatzimoysis (Ed.), Self-Knowledge, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  41. Benjamin McMyler (2011). Believing What the Man Says About His Own Feelings. In Martin Gustafsson Richard Sorli (ed.), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford University Press.
  42. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2000). Words as Deeds: Wittgenstein's ''Spontaneous Utterances'' and the Dissolution of the Explanatory Gap. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):355 – 372.
    Wittgenstein demystified the notion of 'observational self-knowledge'. He dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our first-person present-tense psychological statements. He was not thereby questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions nondescriptive. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Calvin G. Normore (2010). Fool's Good and Other Issues: Comments on Self-Knowledge and Resentment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):766-772.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. David Owens (2008). Deliberation and the First Person. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Alois Pichler & Simo Säätelä (eds.) (2006). Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works. Ontos.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Review of "Self-Knowledge and Resentment", by Akeel Bilgrami, 2006. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):185–187.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Alessandra Tanesini (2008). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Philosophical Books 49 (3):238-245.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. J. Tanney (2007). Review: Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):727-732.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Alan Thomas, Moran on Self-Knowledge and Practical Agency.
    Richard Moran’s Authority and Estrangement develops a compelling explanation of the characteristic features of self-knowledge that involve the use of ‘I’ as subject. Such knowledge is immediate in the sense of non-inferential, is not evidentially grounded and is epistemically authoritative.1 A&E develops its distinctive explanation while also offering accounts of other features of self-knowledge that are often overlooked, such as the centrality of self-knowledge characterised in this way to the concept of the person and its ethical importance. Moran recognises that (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. James E. Tomberlin (1968). The Expression Theory of Avowals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (September):91-96.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 58