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  1. Andreas Elpidorou (2012). Where is My Mind? Mark Rowlands on the Vehicles of Cognition. Avant 3 (1):145-160.
    Do our minds extend beyond our brains? In a series of publications, Mark Rowlands has argued that the correct answer to this question is an affirmative one. According to Rowlands, certain types of operations on bodily and worldly structures should be considered to be proper and literal parts of our cognitive and mental processes. In this article, I present and critically evaluate Rowlands' position.
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  2. David Ludwig (2014). Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge. Philosophical Psychology:1-14.
    Extended cognition and the explosion of knowledge. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.867319.
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Externalism and Computation
  1. Daniel Andler (1995). Can We Knock Off the Shackles of Syntax? Philosophical Issues 6:265-270.
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  2. Murat Aydede (2000). Computation and Intentional Psychology. Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.
    The relation between computational and intentional psychology has always been a vexing issue. The worry is that if mental processes are computational, then these processes, which are defined over symbols, are sensitive solely to the non-semantic properties of symbols. If so, perhaps psychology could dispense with adverting in its laws to intentional/semantic properties of symbols. Stich, as is well-known, has made a great deal out of this tension and argued for a purely "syntactic" psychology by driving a wedge between a (...)
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  3. Thomas D. Bontly (1998). Individualism and the Nature of Syntactic States. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.
    It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions (...)
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  4. Keith Butler (1998). Content, Computation, and Individuation. Synthese 114 (2):277-92.
    The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that (...)
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  5. Frances Egan (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.
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  6. Amir Horowitz (2007). Computation, External Factors, and Cognitive Explanations. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.
    Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I (...)
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  7. Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.
    Abstract It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that ?syntax does not suffice for semantics?, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that (...)
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  8. J. R. Kazez (1994). Computationalism and the Causal Role of Content. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.
  9. Bernard W. Kobes (1990). Individualism and Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.
  10. John-Michael Kuczynski (2007). Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism. John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
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  11. Nenad Miscevic (1996). Computation, Content, and Cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.
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  12. Nenad Miščević (1996). Computation, Content and Cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.
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  13. Christopher Peacocke (1999). Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan. Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.
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  14. Christopher Peacocke (1995). Content, Computation, and Externalism. Philosophical Issues 6 (3):227-264.
  15. Susan Schneider (2005). Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases. Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.
    In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that (...)
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  16. William E. Seager (1992). Thought and Syntax. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.
    It has been argued that Psychological Externalism is irrelevant to psychology. The grounds for this are that PE fails to individuate intentional states in accord with causal power, and that psychology is primarily interested in the causal roles of psychological states. It is also claimed that one can individuate psychological states via their syntactic structure in some internal "language of thought". This syntactic structure is an internal feature of psychological states and thus provides a key to their causal powers. I (...)
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  17. Oron Shagrir (2001). Content, Computation and Externalism. Mind 110 (438):369-400.
    The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the (...)
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Externalism and the Theory of Vision
  1. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  2. Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
  3. Keith Butler (1996). Content, Computation, and Individualism in Vision Theory. Analysis 56 (3):146-54.
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  4. Keith Butler (1996). Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.
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  5. M. J. Cain (2000). Individualism, Twin Scenarios and Visual Content. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.
    In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it (...)
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  6. Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  7. Frances Egan (1996). Intentionality and the Theory of Vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Frances Egan (1992). Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.
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  9. Robert Francescotti (1991). Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
  10. P. S. Kitcher (1988). Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I consider what the phenomenon of (...)
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  11. Basileios Kroustallis (2006). Content Individuation in Marr's Theory of Vision. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.
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  12. P. Morton (1993). Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.
    According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, (...)
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  13. Sarah Patterson (1996). Success-Orientation and Individualism in the Theory of Vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press. 5--248.
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  14. Gabriel Segal (1991). Defence of a Reasonable Individualism. Mind 100 (399):485-94.
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  15. Gabriel Segal (1989). Seeing What is Not There. Philosophical Review 97 (April):189-214.
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  16. Lawrence A. Shapiro (1997). A Clearer Vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
    Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content (...)
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  17. Lawrence A. Shapiro (1997). Junk Representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.
    Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations?representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible?so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some (...)
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  18. Lawrence A. Shapiro (1993). Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.
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  19. Arnold Silverberg (2006). Chomsky and Egan on Computational Theories of Vision. Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
    Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr.
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  20. William T. Wojtach (2009). Reconsidering Perceptual Content. Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according (...)
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  21. Wayne Wright, Individualism, Behavior, and Marr's Theory of Vision.
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Externalism and Psychological Explanation
  1. Frederick Adams (1993). Reply to Russow. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
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  2. D. Arjo (1996). Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.
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  3. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  4. Kent Bach (1982). "De Re" Belief and Methodological Solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1986). Just What Do We Have In Mind? In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X (1986). University of Minnesota Press. 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  6. Sven Bernecker (2011). Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
    This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.
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  7. Sven Bernecker (2010). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues ...
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  8. Sven Bernecker (2010). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
    Précis of memory: a philosophical study Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4 Authors Sven Bernecker, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  9. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.
  10. Akeel Bilgrami (1987). An Externalist Account of Psychological Content. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):191-226.
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