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  1. Frederick Adams (1993). Reply to Russow. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
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  2. D. Arjo (1996). Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.
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  3. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  4. Kent Bach (1982). "De Re" Belief and Methodological Solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1986). Just What Do We Have In Mind? In Theodore E. Uehling Peter A. French (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, X (1986). University of Minnesota Press. 25-48.
    M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..
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  6. Sven Bernecker (2011). Further Thoughts on Memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):109-121.
    This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, Memory and Identity , Fred Adams, Husker Du? , and Sanford Goldberg The Metasemantics of Memory.
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  7. Sven Bernecker (2010). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents an analysis of the concept of propositional (or factual) memory, and examines a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues ...
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  8. Sven Bernecker (2010). Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
    Précis of memory: a philosophical study Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4 Authors Sven Bernecker, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  9. Akeel Bilgrami (1992). Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content. Blackwell.
  10. Akeel Bilgrami (1987). An Externalist Account of Psychological Content. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):191-226.
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  11. David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.
    Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one (...)
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  12. David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-Mindedness Breeds Inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.
    Discussion of Fodor's doctrine of 'methodological solipsism' and Stich's principle of autonomy' has been concerned to show that these principles are incompatible with psychological theories which appeal to states with content (e.g. beliefs and desires). Concern with these issues, and the subsequent attempt to develop a notion of 'narrow' content which is solipsistic or autonomous, has, I believe, obscured a more fundamental issue: No theory which satisfies these principles would ever be able to explain behavior under descriptions which are in (...)
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  13. Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
  14. Tyler Burge (1982). Two Thought Experiments Reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):284-94.
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  15. Jeremy Butterfield (ed.) (1986). Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of eleven original essays in analytical philosophy by British and American philosophers, centering on the connection between mind and language. Two themes predominate: how it is that thoughts and sentences can represent the world; and what having a thought - a belief, for instance - involves. Developing from these themes are the questions: what does having a belief require of the believer, and of the way he or she relates to the environment? In particular, does having (...)
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  16. David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.) (1992). Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.
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  17. Noam Chomsky (1995). Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  18. Eros Corazza (1994). Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations. Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.
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  19. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
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  20. Sean Crawford (1999). The Nature of Commonsense Psychological Explanation. Dissertation, University of Oxford
  21. Sean Crawford (1998). In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
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  22. Martin Davies (1986). Individualism and Supervenience: Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.
  23. Fred Dretske (2001). Where is the Mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.
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  24. Fred Dretske (1992). What Isn't Wrong with Folk Psychology. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):1-13.
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  25. Frances Egan (1991). Must Psychology Be Individualistic? Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.
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  26. Andreas Elpidorou (2013). The “New Mind” Revisited, or Minding the Content/Vehicle Distinction: A Response to Manzotti and Pepperell. AI and Society 28 (4):461-466.
    I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications (...)
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  27. Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.
    "Twim earth" examples have motivated a number of proposals for the lexicography of kind terms in natural languages. it is argued that these proposals create unacceptable difficulties for the analysis of de dicto propositional attitudes. a conservative solution of the twin earth problems is then proposed according to which they reflect pragmatic features of language use rather than semantic features of lexical content.
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  28. Jerry A. Fodor (1980). Methodological Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109.
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  29. Bryan Frances (1999). On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
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  30. Mattia Gallotti (2012). Naturalizing Intention in Action. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):1-4.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  31. Christopher Gauker (1987). Mind and Chance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):533-52.
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  32. Gordon G. Globus (1984). Can Methodological Solipsism Be Confined to Psychology? Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46.
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  33. Alison Gopnik (1998). What Can Externalism Do for Psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):73-74.
    I suggest several ways that externalism could influence psychological theorizing. Externalism could just capture our everyday intuitions about concepts and meanings. More profoundly, it could enter into psychology through evolutionary theory, guide our hypotheses about conceptual abilities, and, most significantly, it could influence our accounts of learning and conceptual change.
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  34. James A. Hampton (1998). Staying in Touch: Externalism Needs Descriptions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):74-74.
    Externalism cannot work as a theory of concepts without explaining how we reidentify substances as being of the same kind. Yet this process implies just the level of descriptive content to which externalism seeks to deny a role in conceptual content.
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  35. Philip P. Hanson (ed.) (1990). Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
  36. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). [Explanation] is Explanation Better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-60.
    Robert Wilson (1994) maintains that many interesting and fundamental aspects of psychology are non-individualistic because large chunks of psychology depend upon organisms being deeply embedded in some environment. I disagree and present one version of narrow content that allows enough reference to the environment to meet any wide challenge. I argue that most psychologists are already this sort of narrow content theorist and that these narrow content explanations of psychological phenomena meet Wilson's criteria for being a good explanation better than (...)
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  37. John Heil (2002). Mental Causation. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 29--52.
    This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, including Donald Davidson, Ted Honderich, and Philip Pettit, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature.
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  38. Pierre Jacob (2002). Can Mental Content Explain Behavior? In Languages of the Brain.
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  39. Pierre Jacob (2002). Languages of the Brain.
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  40. Pierre Jacob (1995). Belief-Attribution and Rationality: A Dilemma for Jerry Fodor. In. In D. Andler (ed.), Facets of Rationality. Sage Publications. 19--34.
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  41. Pierre Jacob (1993). Externalism and the Explanatory Relevance of Broad Content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.
  42. Jussi Jylkkä, Henry Railo & Jussi Haukioja (2009). Psychological Essentialism and Semantic Externalism: Evidence for Externalism in Lay Speakers' Language Use. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):37-60.
    Some experimental studies have recently claimed to undermine semantic externalism about natural kind terms. However, it is unclear how philosophical accounts of reference can be experimentally tested. We present two externalistic adaptations of psychological placeholder essentialism, a strict externalist and a hybrid externalist view, which are experimentally testable. We examine Braisby's et al. (1996) study which claims to undermine externalism, and argue that the study fails in its aims. We conducted two experiments, the results of which undermine internalism and the (...)
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  43. P. S. Kitcher (1985). Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.
    Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in (...)
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  44. Bernard W. Kobes (1989). Semantics and Psychological Prototypes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):1-18.
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  45. Michael Losonsky (1995). Emdedded Systems Vs. Individualism. Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.
    The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational (...)
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  46. Cynthia Macdonald (1995). Anti-Individualism and Psychological Explanation. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  47. Cynthia Macdonald (1992). Weak Externalism and Psychological Reduction. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  48. J. Christopher Maloney (1985). Methodological Solipsism Reconsidered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.
    Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psychological investigations, embracing methodological, not ontological, solipsism. I intend to argue that computational (...)
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  49. Ausonio Marras (1985). The Churchlands on Methodological Solipsism and Computational Psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (June):295-309.
    This paper addresses a recent argument of the Churchlands against the "linguistic-rationalist" tradition exemplified by current cognitive-computational psychology. Because of its commitment to methodological solipsism--the argument goes--computational psychology cannot provide an account of how organisms are able to represent and "hook up to" the world. First I attempt to determine the exact nature of this charge and its relation to the Churchlands' long-standing polemic against 'folk psychology' and the linguistic-rationalist methodology. I then turn my attention to the Churchlands' account of (...)
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  50. Ron McClamrock (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.
    While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides (...)
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