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  1. Alan Ross Anderson, Max Black, Irving M. Copi, Campbell Crockett, Abraham Edel & Arthur Pap (1956). Comments on Kolenda's Theses. Review of Metaphysics 10 (1):108 - 117.
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  2. Alexei Angelides (2003). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction and Other Essays. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 (1):235-242.
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  3. Stephen W. Ball (1988). Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):317-348.
    Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved (...)
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  4. John Collier (2000). Is There Any Virtue in Modern Science? Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):773-784.
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  5. Julian Dodd & Suzanne Stern-Gillet (1995). The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Dialogue 34 (04):727-.
  6. Jeffrey Ernest Foss (1977). Knowledge and Values. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
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  7. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds of (...)
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  8. Per Nortvedt (2005). On the Fact-Value Distinction and the Phenomenology of Caring. Nursing Philosophy 6 (2):81–82.
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  9. Govind C. Persad (2009). Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law. Stan. L. Rev 62:1445.
    This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriate response to mass harm. The first Part argues that the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist, which makes the lay intuitions more defensible. The (...)
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  10. Debbie Roberts (2011). Shapelessness and the Thick. Ethics 121 (3):489-520.
    This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are, I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical) holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim (...)
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  11. Re'em Segev (2006). Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law is No Excuse? It Might Be a Justificaton! Law and Philosophy 25 (1):31-79.
    According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...)
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  12. J. J. C. Smart (1999). Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction. Philosophy 74 (3):431-437.
    This article is a defence of the Fact-Value distinction against considerations brought up by Ruth Anna Putnam in three articles in Philosophy, especially her ‘Perceiving Facts and Values’ January 1998. I defend metaphysical realism about facts and anti-realism about values against Putnam' intermediate position about both and I relate the matter to the logic of imperatives. The motivations of scientists or historians to select fields of investigation are irrelevant to the objectivity of their hypotheses, and so is the goodness or (...)
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  13. Narve Strand (2011). Putnam and the Political. Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (7):743-757.
    This article deals with how to talk about the political. After the introduction (I), I show, first, that Putnam’s arguments against the root dichotomies between facts and values (II), and between values and norms (III), are valid. I then discuss Putnam’s resistance to drawing skeptical lessons from these negative arguments, a fight that is largely successful (IV). I go on to sketch his own middle position, looking at the way he expands cognitive meaning in the practical sphere (V). I end (...)
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  14. Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi (forthcoming). What is Value? Where Does It Come From? A Philosophical Perspective. In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation.
    Are values objective or subjective? To clarify this question we start with an overview of the main concepts and debates in the philosophy of values. We then discuss the arguments for and against value realism, the thesis that there are objective evaluative facts. By contrast with value anti-realism, which is generally associated with sentimentalism, according to which evaluative judgements are grounded in sentiments, value realism is commonly coupled with rationalism. Against this common view, we argue that value realism can be (...)
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  15. Pekka Väyrynen (2014). Shapelessness in Context. Noûs 48 (3):573-593.
    Many philosophers believe that the extensions of evaluative terms and concepts aren’t unified under non-evaluative similarity relations and that this “shapelessness thesis” (ST) has significant metaethical implications regarding non-cognitivism, ethical naturalism, moral particularism, thick concepts and more. ST is typically offered as an explanation of why evaluative classifications appear to “outrun” classifications specifiable in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms. This paper argues that both ST and the outrunning point used to motivate it can be explained on the basis of more general (...)
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  16. Pekka Väyrynen (2013). The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick (...)
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  17. Pekka Väyrynen (2012). Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press 235-70.
    This paper presents an alternative to the standard view that the evaluations that the so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. I describe a large variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that the evaluations that (at least a very wide range of) thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are a certain kind of defeasible implications of their utterances which can (...)
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  18. Roger Wertheimer (1972). The Significance of Sense. Ithaca [N.Y.]Cornell University Press.
    Univocalist analyses of the modal auxiliary verbs ('ought'/'must'/'can') and the adjective 'right'/'wrong'.
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  19. Cory D. Wright (2005). Review of Michael Lynch's 'True to Life: Why Truth Matters'. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):271-273.
  20. Arnold Zuboff (2002). Morality and Hot Mud. Philosophy Now 37:39-40.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
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  21. Arnold Zuboff (2001). Why Should I Care About Morality? Philosophy Now 31:24-27.
    For a while in this article it seems impossible to articulate a compelling reason for refraining from killing an innocent stranger with the press of a button when this would earn one a small prize and would be done with absolutely guaranteed immunity from any punishment or other harm (including even an instantaneous elimination of any chance of a guilty memory, achieved through hypnosis, and an ironclad commitment from God not to condemn the killing). After many failed attempts, a compelling (...)
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  22. Arnold Zuboff (1995). Morality as What One Really Desires. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):142-164.
    If I desire to drink some stuff thinking it is hot chocolate when actually it is hot mud, my desire is not a real one - it’s mistaken or only apparent. This example illustrates how a desire must always depend on a belief about its object, a belief about what it is and what it’s like. But beliefs are correctable, so desires are correctable. This leads us directly to a very sweeping principle - that I only really desire what I (...)
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