This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:History/traditions: Faith
220 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 220
  1. G. A. (1961). Great Western Mystics. Review of Metaphysics 15 (1):189-189.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Raziel Abelson (1961). The Logic of Faith and Belief. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Religious Experience and Truth. [New York]New York University Press. 116--129.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Merrihew Adams (1990). The Knight of Faith. Faith and Philosophy 7 (4):383-395.
    The essay is about the “Preliminary Expectoration” of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. It argues that “the absurd” there refers primarily to the practical paradox that in faith (so it is claimed) one must simultaneously renounce and gladly accept a loved object. In other words it is about a problem of detachment as a feature of religious life. The paper goes on to interpret, and discuss critically, the views expressed in the book about both renunciation (infinite resignation) and the nature of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. George Allan (2005). Review of Two Great Truths. [REVIEW] Process Studies 34 (1):144-146.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Norm R. Allen Jr (2003). This Far by Faith. Free Inquiry 23 (4).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Henry E. Allison (1969). Faith and Falsifiability. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):499 - 522.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. William P. Alston (1994). Swinburne on Faith and Belief.". In Alan G. Padgett (ed.), Reason and the Christian Religion. Clarendon.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William P. Alston & Marcus B. Hester (eds.) (1992). Faith, Reason, and Skepticism: Essays. Temple University Press.
    INTRODUCTION William Alston opens this dialogue on faith, reason, and skepticism by arguing that if the belief-forming processes of a typical Christian are ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. A. R. Ascoli (2003). Faith and Rewriting. The Furioso of 1532. Rinascimento 43:93-130.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Richard Askew (1988). On Fideism and Alvin Plantinga. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23 (1):3 - 16.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert Audi (2008). Belief, Faith, and Acceptance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):87 - 102.
    Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term 'belief' is used where 'faith' or 'acceptance' would better express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Guy Axtell (2006). Blind Man's Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-Skeptical Stratagem. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. B. M. B. (1972). The Erosion of Faith. Review of Metaphysics 25 (4):757-757.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. D. B. B. (1964). Belief and Faith. Review of Metaphysics 17 (3):481-481.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. F. E. B. (1960). Ways of Faith. Review of Metaphysics 14 (1):177-177.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. G. B. (1958). After Utopia, The Decline of Political Faith. Review of Metaphysics 11 (3):517-517.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. R. J. B. (1968). The Essence of Faith According to Luther. Review of Metaphysics 21 (4):749-750.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Julian Baggini (2003). Faith on Trial. Think 2 (4):81-84.
    Julian Baggini's inspector Gore is puzzled by Abraham's faith in God, which, Gore suspects, boils down to a form of mental illness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard L. Barber (1953). Experience, Reason and Faith. Tulane Studies in Philosophy 2:25-37.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. D. C. Barrett (1988). Faith and the Existence of God: Faith and Rationality. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24:135-143.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. J. D. Bastable (1965). Belief and Faith. Philosophical Studies 14:254-256.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. James Beach (2013). John Bishop's Leaps of Faith: Doxastic Ventures and the Logical Equivalence of Religious Faith and Agnosticism. Religious Studies 50 (1):1-17.
    In recent essays John Bishop proposes a model of religious faith. This author notices that a so-called doxastic venture model of theistic faith is self-defeating for the following reason: a venture suggests a process with an outcome; by definition a venture into Christian faith denies itself an outcome in virtue of the transcendent character of its claims – for what is claimed cannot be settled. Taking instruction from logical positivism, I stress the nonsensical character of religious claims while attacking Bishop's (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Burnham P. Beckwith (1986). The Effect of Intelligence on Religious Faith. Free Inquiry 6:46-53.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. M. Bent, Spoelstra Sverre & Lütge Christopher (2013). Faith. In Christopher Luetege (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Matthew A. Benton (2006). The Modal Gap: The Objective Problem of Lessing's Ditch(Es) and Kierkegaard's Subjective Reply. Religious Studies 42 (1):27-44.
    This essay expands upon the suggestion that Lessing's infamous ‘ditch’ is actually three ditches: temporal, metaphysical, and existential gaps. It examines the complex problems these ditches raise, and then proposes that Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript exhibit a similar triadic organizational structure, which may signal a deliberate attempt to engage and respond to Lessing's three gaps. Viewing the Climacean project in this way offers an enhanced understanding of the intricacies of Lessing's rationalist approach to both religion and historical truth, and illuminates (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Debra B. Bergoffen (1992). The Look as Bad Faith. Philosophy Today 36 (3):221-227.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Telma de Souza Birchal (2006). Faith, Reason and Belief in the" Apology for Raymond Sebon": Are We Christians as We Are Perigordines or Germans? Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 2 (SE):0-0.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John Bishop (2010). Faith. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Bishop (2007). Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Does our available evidence show that some particular religion is correct?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. John Bishop (2005). On the Possibility of Doxastic Venture: A Reply to Buckareff. Religious Studies 41 (4):447-451.
    In response to Buckareff, I agree that it is indeed impossible intentionally and directly to acquire a belief one judges not to be supported by one's evidence. But Jamesian doxastic venture does not involve any such direct self-inducing of belief: it is rather a matter of an agent's taking to be true in practical reasoning what she already, through some ‘passional’, non-epistemic, cause, holds true beyond the support of her evidence. To deny that beliefs may sometimes have passional causes is, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Bishop (2002). Faith as Doxastic Venture. Religious Studies 38 (4):471-487.
    A ‘doxastic venture’ model of faith – according to which having faith involves believing beyond what is rationally justifiable – can be defended only on condition that such venturesome believing is both possible and ethically acceptable. I show how a development of the position argued by William James in ‘The will to believe’ can succeed in meeting these conditions. A Jamesian defence of doxastic venture is, however, open to the objection that decision theory teaches us that there can be no (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.
    Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Gregory Brazeal (2011). Webs of Faith as a Source of Reasonable Disagreement. Critical Review 23 (4):421-448.
    Abstract An individual's beliefs can be seen as rationally related to one another in a kind of web. These beliefs, however, may not form a single, seamless web. There may exist smaller, largely self-contained webs with few or no rational relations to the larger web. Such ?webs of faith? make it possible for reasonable deliberators to persist in a disagreement even under ideal deliberative conditions. The possibility of reasonable disagreement challenges the assumption that rationality should lead to consensus and presents (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. L. Buchak (2012). Reasonable Faith * by John Haldane. Analysis 72 (2):413-415.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Lara Buchak (2014). Rational Faith and Justified Belief. In Timothy O'Connor & Laura Frances Callahan (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press. 49-73.
    In “Can it be rational to have faith?”, it was argued that to have faith in some proposition consists, roughly speaking, in stopping one’s search for evidence and committing to act on that proposition without further evidence. That paper also outlined when and why stopping the search for evidence and acting is rationally required. Because the framework of that paper was that of formal decision theory, it primarily considered the relationship between faith and degrees of belief, rather than between faith (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jacob Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. 225.
    This paper provides an account of what it is to have faith in a proposition p, in both religious and mundane contexts. It is argued that faith in p doesn’t require adopting a degree of belief that isn’t supported by one’s evidence but rather it requires terminating one’s search for further evidence and acting on the supposition that p. It is then shown, by responding to a formal result due to I.J. Good, that doing so can be rational in a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Lara Buchak (2012). Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oup Oxford. 225.
  39. Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Permissible Faith Ventures. Sophia 48 (1):85-90.
  40. Andrei A. Buckareff (2005). Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture? Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Scott Burnham (1990). Criticism, Faith, and The. Idee”: Ab Marx’s Early Reception of Beethoven 19:183-192.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. V. C. C. (1956). Faith, Reason, and Existence. Review of Metaphysics 10 (1):177-177.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2014). Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press.
    Is religious faith consistent with being an intellectually virtuous thinker? In seeking to answer this question, one quickly finds others, each of which has been the focus of recent renewed attention by epistemologists: What is it to be an intellectually virtuous thinker? Must all reasonable belief be grounded in public evidence? Under what circumstances is a person rationally justified in believing something on trust, on the testimony of another, or because of the conclusions drawn by an intellectual authority? Can it (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Kelly James Clark, Religious Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  45. Stephen Clark (2009). Understanding Faith: Religious Belief and its Place in Society. Imprint Academic.
  46. Stephen R. L. Clark (2012). Folly to the Greeks: Good Reasons to Give Up Reason. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4:93-113.
    A discussion of why a strong doctrine of 'reason' may not be worth sustaining in the face of modern scientific speculation, and the difficulties this poses for scientific rationality, together with comments on the social understanding of religion, and why we might wish to transcend common sense.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Philip Clayton & Steven Knapp (2011). The Predicament of Belief: Science, Philosophy, and Faith. Oup Oxford.
    Can it make sense for someone who appreciates the explanatory power of modern science to continue believing in a traditional religious account of the ultimate nature and purpose of our universe?
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Sarah Coakley (ed.) (2013). Faith, Rationality, and the Passions. Wiley.
    The book re-examines some notable pre-modern accounts of the relation of passion, reason and faith, and from there goes on to overturn the widely-held presumption that it was the Enlightenment that was responsible for creating a gulf ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. John B. Cobb (forthcoming). Faith. Buddhist-Christian Studies.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Andrew Collier (2003). On Christian Belief: A Defence of a Cognitive Conception of Religious Belief in a Christian Context. Routledge.
    On Christian Belief offers a defense of realism in the philosophy of religion. It argues that religious belief--with particular reference to Christian belief--unlike any other kind of belief, is cognitive; making claims about what is real, and open to rational discussion between believers and non-believers. The author begins by providing a critique of several views which either try to describe a faith without cognitive context, or to justify believing on non-cognitive grounds. He then discusses what sense can be made of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 220