This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
46 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Davis Baird (1995). Common Sense, Science and Scepticism. Review of Metaphysics 48 (4):917-918.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Charles Brittain (2001). Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics. OUP Oxford.
    This is the first book-length study of Philo , the principal philosophical teacher of Cicero. Charles Brittain reconstructs the Platonic Academy's gradual rejection of scepticism under Philo's leadership, which prepared the way for the revival of Platonism in the first century AD. The Appendix contains a full collection of the testimonia and 'fragments' of Philo.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):384–391.
    Fallibilism about knowledge and justification is a widely held view in epistemology. In this paper, I will try to arrive at a proper formulation of fallibilism. Fallibilists often hold that Cartesian skepticism is a view that deserves to be taken seriously and dealt with somehow. I argue that it turns out that a canonical form of skeptical argument depends upon the denial of fallibilism. I conclude by considering a response on behalf of the skeptic.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5. E. J. Coffman (2006). Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism. Synthese 151 (2):257 - 272.
    In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between a cognitive subject and a proposition that’s expressed by locutions like ‘S has a source of justification for p’ and ‘p is justifiable for S’. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein’s thesis based on work by Robert Audi and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
    Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Trent Dougherty (2011). Fallibilism. In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge
    Fallibilism in epistemology is neither identical to nor unrelated to the ordinary notion of fallibility. In ordinary life we are forced to the conclusion that human beings are prone to error. The epistemological doctrine of fallibilism, though, is about the consistency of holding that humans have knowledge while admitting certain limitations in human ways of knowing. As will be seen, making the content of the basic intuition more precise is both somewhat contentious and the key to an adequate definition of (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8. Jonathan Finch (2015). A Crisis of Belief, Ethics, and Faith. Upa.
    This book presents a self-corrective and contemporary system of philosophy and attempts to explain how we might go about forming our thoughts and beliefs about ourselves, our world and how we should properly conduct ourselves in a justifiable and non-arbitrary fashion.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Jonathan Finch (2002). Some Thoughts on Thinking: Philosophy at Five Miles Per Hour. University Press of America.
    Some Thoughts on Thinking is a work dealing with the issues one faces when one attempts to construct non-arbitrary beliefs about ourselves and our surroundings. The text opens up with a discussion of the similarities and differences between science, theology, philosophy and tradition. This initial discussion provides the foundation for a deeper push into what is, and what is not, a recommendable and non-arbitrary belief. No previous exposure to philosophy is assumed and the language of the work is free of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Gregor Flock, Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.
    In this paper it will be attempted to dissolve the lottery problem based on fallibilism, probabilism and the introduction of a so far widely neglected second context of knowledge. First, it will be argued that the lottery problem is actually an exemplification of the much wider Humean "future knowledge problem" (ch. 1). Two types of inferences and arguments will be examined, compared and evaluated in respect to their ability to fittingly describe the thought processes behind lottery/future knowledge propositions (ch. 2). (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Luciano Floridi (1994). Scepticism and the Search for Knowledge: A Peirceish Answer to a Kantian Doubt. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 30 (3):543 - 573.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
    Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains-in-vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge-claims is much (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. J. N. Hattiangadi (1983). To Save Fallibilism. Mind 92 (367):407-409.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science.
    AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Stephen Hetherington (2006). Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice. Philosophia 34 (3):303-310.
    It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Stephen Hetherington, Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, though, it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17. Christopher Hookway (2008). Peirce and Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Darryl Jung, The Problem of the External World : A Fallibilist Vindication of Our Claim to Knowledge.
    The celebrated 'veil-of-ideas' argument is a skeptical argument that moves from a certain epistemological doctrine about perception to a general negative conclusion concerning our thoughts about external material objects. Indeed, the argument concludes not only that we do not know, but that neither could we know nor even reasonably believe, any of the thoughts that we may possibly entertain concerning external material objects. The epistemological doctrine about perception referred to in the argument has been in fashion since Descartes and states (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Charles Landesman (2008). Review of Joseph Agassi, Abraham Meidan, Philosophy From a Skeptical Perspective. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (12).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Živan Lazović (2011). Scepticism, Externalism and Predictive Dimension of Knowledge Claims. Prolegomena 10 (2):215-237.
    Ordinary knowledge claims are challenged by philosophical scepticism which holds that we are unable to exclude the possibilities of error involved in well-known sceptical alternatives . In order to explain how we can resist this challenge, first I compare philosophical and ordinary doubt. I point out that they do not differ in terms of the way they aim to undermine knowledge claims, but rather in the character of the alternatives to which they appeal. Thus, in ordinary contexts, philosophical sceptical alternatives (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Adam Leite, Fallibilism.
    In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Adam Leite (2006). Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington. Philosophia 34 (3):311-324.
    This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. By Adam Leite (2004). Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming? Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232–251.
    A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.
    Lewis thought concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s just a cleverly disguised mule’) caused serious trouble for fallibilists. As he saw it, CKAs are overt statements of the fallibilist view and they are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that their pragmatic response to Lewis fails, but the fallibilist cause is not lost because Lewis was wrong about the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. Clayton Littlejohn (2008). From E = K to Scepticism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):679-684.
    In a recent article Dylan Dodd has argued that anyone who holds that all knowledge is evidence must concede that we know next to nothing about die external world. The argument is intended to show that any infallibilist account of knowledge is committed to scepticism, and that anyone who identifies our evidence with the propositions we know is committed to infallibilism. I shall offer some reasons for thinking Dodd's argument is unsound, and explain where his argument goes wrong.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). It’s Not so Easy to Be a Fallibilist. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:1-25.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). It’s Not so Easy to Be a Fallibilist. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:1-25.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Quee Nelson, A Refutation of Skepticism Via Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosopher's Carnival #82.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Anne Newstead (2006). Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science 183.
    A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Nikolaj Nottelmann (forthcoming). Against Overconfidence in Radical A Priori Fallibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Manuel Perez Otero (2011). Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):9-32.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  33. Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  34. Baron Reed (2002). Knowledge, Agency, and Personhood. Dissertation, Brown University
    Fallibilism is the philosophical view that reconciles our ability to have knowledge with our constant vulnerability to error: we know even though our basis for knowledge might have failed to be adequate. In the central chapter, I trace a parallel between fallibilism and compatibilism. Recent work in the philosophy of free agency has drawn attention to a connection between freedom and personhood . I suggest that a similar connection is crucial in epistemology: only persons can know, and knowledge must be (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Brian Ribeiro (2010). Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed's Long Road to Skepticism. Philosophia 38 (4):789-793.
    Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: (1) contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, (2) these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, (3) knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributabilism that is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful that many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. George N. Schlesinger (1984). Possibilities and Fallibilism. Erkenntnis 21 (3):263 - 278.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Richard Shusterman (2007). Fallibilism and Faith. Common Knowledge 13 (2):379-384.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Leo Simons (1951). The Doctrine of Fallibilism. Dissertation, Columbia University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Certainty. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  40. Roger Trigg (1981). Scepticism By Nicholas Rescher Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, Xii + 265 Pp., £12.50. [REVIEW] Philosophy 56 (218):591-.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Ruth Weintraub (1993). Fallibilism and Rational Belief. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):251-261.
    Fallibilism is an attractive epistemological position, avoiding the Scylla of rationalism, and the Charybdis of scepticism. Acknowledging, on the one hand, human imperfection, yet claiming that science and rational inquiry are possible. Fallibilism is a thesis, but equally importantly – an epistemological recommendation. that we should never be absolutely sure of anything. My aim in this paper is to drive a wedge between the thesis and the recommendation. The (eminently plausible) doctrine, I shall argue, cannot be used to ground the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Sten Olaf Welding (2005). Kann Es Ein Argument Für den Skeptizismus Geben? Das Epistemische Problem der Irrtumsmöglichkeit. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):107 - 118.
    Is there any argument for scepticism? The epistemic problem of the possibility of error. Arguments for scepticism rest on the assumption that knowledge claims are fallible. For this reason the concept of knowledge appears to be questionable. Since it is necessary to distinguish doubts from possible doubts, the arguments for scepticism appear to be unconvincing. If we take it into account that we know something that is immune to doubt, we should draw the conclusion that, contrary to scepticism, knowledge claims (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Kenneth R. Westphal (2011). ‘Urteilskraft, Gegenseitige Anerkennung Und Rationale Rechtfertigung’. In Hans-Dieter Klein (ed.), Ethik Als Prima Philosophia? Königshausen & Neumann
    This paper extends my prior analysis of Hegel’s solution to the Pyrrhonian Dilemma of the Criterion to moral philosophy. So doing provides a uniform account of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains, i.e. empirical knowledge and morals. It argues that the Pyrrhonian Dilemma refutes both foundationalist and coherentist models of justification, and raises serious issues about the justificatory adequacy of contemporary forms of moral constructivism. It explicates and defends Kant’s account of the autonomy of reason as the self-critical regulation of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Proving Realism Transcendentally: Replies to Rolf George and William Harper. Dialogue 46 (4):737-750.
  45. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). ‘Frederick L. Will’s Pragmatic Realism: An Introduction’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism. Rowman & Littlefield
    This critical editorial introduction summarizes and explicates Frederick Will’s pragmatic realism and his account of the nature, assessment, and revision of cognitive and practical norms in connection with: the development of Will’s pragmatic realism, Hume’s problem of induction, the oscillations between foundationalism and coherentism, the nature of philosophical reflection, Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, the open texture of empirical concepts, the correspondence conception of truth, Putnam’s ‘internal realism’, the redundancy theory of truth, sociology of knowledge, the governance of practice by norms (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Margaret Dauler Wilson (1999). CHAPTER 1. Skepticism Without Indubitability. In Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy. Princeton University Press 1-9.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography