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Siblings:History/traditions: Falsification
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  1. Alfonso Arroyo-Santos, Mark E. Olson & Francisco Vergara-Silva (2015). Practice-Oriented Controversies and Borrowed Epistemic Credibility in Current Evolutionary Biology: Phylogeography as a Case Study. Perspectives on Science 25 (3):310-334.
    Philosophical treatments of scientific controversies usually focus on theory, excluding important practice related aspects. However, scientists in conflict often appeal to extra-theoretical and extra-empirical elements. To understand better the role that non-empirical elements play in scientific controversies, we introduce the notion of borrowed epistemic credibility, illustrating our proposal with a recent controversy in a field of evolutionary biology known as phylogeography. Our analysis shows how scientific controversies that spring from disagreements about methodological issues potentially involve deeper debates regarding what constitutes (...)
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  2. Patricia Baillie (1972). Falsifiability and Probability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):61.
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  3. Patricia Baillie (1970). Falsifiability and Probability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):99 – 100.
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  4. David Balduzzi, Falsification and Future Performance.
    We information-theoretically reformulate two measures of capacity from statistical learning theory: empirical VC-entropy and empirical Rademacher complexity. We show these capacity measures count the number of hypotheses about a dataset that a learning algorithm falsifies when it finds the classifier in its repertoire minimizing empirical risk. It then follows from that the future performance of predictors on unseen data is controlled in part by how many hypotheses the learner falsifies. As a corollary we show that empirical VC-entropy quantifies the message (...)
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  5. David Balduzzi, Falsifiable Implies Learnable.
    The paper demonstrates that falsifiability is fundamental to learning. We prove the following theorem for statistical learning and sequential prediction: If a theory is falsifiable then it is learnable -- i.e. admits a strategy that predicts optimally. An analogous result is shown for universal induction.
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  6. David Balduzzi, Information, Learning and Falsification.
    There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...)
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  7. Greg Bamford (1999). What is the Problem of Ad Hoc Hypotheses? Science and Education 8 (4):375 - 86..
    The received view of an ad hochypothesis is that it accounts for only the observation(s) it was designed to account for, and so non-ad hocness is generally held to be necessary or important for an introduced hypothesis or modification to a theory. Attempts by Popper and several others to convincingly explicate this view, however, prove to be unsuccessful or of doubtful value, and familiar and firmer criteria for evaluating the hypotheses or modified theories so classified are characteristically available. These points (...)
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  8. Pedro Beade (1989). Falsification and Falsifiability in Historical Linguistics. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (2):173-181.
  9. Richard Cole (1968). Falsifiability. Mind 77 (305):133-135.
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  10. Douglas D. Daye (1979). Empirical Falsifiability And The Frequence Of Darsana Relevance In The Sixth Century Buddhist Logic Of Sankarasvamin. Logique Et Analyse 22 (March-June):223-237.
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  11. A. A. Derksen (1985). The Alleged Unity of Popper's Philosophy of Science: Falsifiability as Fake Cement. Philosophical Studies 48 (3):313 - 336.
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  12. Caleb Dewey, Baconian Induction.
    Recently, Hattiangadi presented several historical and hermeneutic arguments for a novel interpretation of Francis Bacon's scientific method. In this essay, I provide a formalization of this new interpretation in order to adduce it to modern philosophical discourse. That is, Baconian induction is a semantically-guided meta-activity between multiple models: a function that maps first- and higher-order theories to even higher-order theories according to certain constraints. Once it is carefully defined as such, I show that induction becomes immune to some of its (...)
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  13. Herbert Dingle (1959). The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (39):228-229.
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  14. Georg J. W. Dorn (1984). Poppers zwei Definitionsvarianten von 'falsifizierbar'. Eine logische Notiz zu einer klassischen Stelle aus der 'Logik der Forschung'. Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 18:42–49.
    In paragraph 21 of his "Logic of Scientific Discovery", Karl Popper characterizes with the help of two seemingly synonymous definitions the falsifiability of a theory as a logical relation between the theory itself and its basic statements. It is shown that his definitions do not agree with each other, and this result is applied to the problem of the falsifiability of contradictions, to the difference between falsifiable and empirical statements and to the demarcation criterion.
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  15. Milton Fisk (1959). Falsifiability and Corroboration. Philosophical Studies 9:49-65.
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  16. Danny Frederick, A Regimented and Concise Exposition of Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalist Epistemology.
  17. Danny Frederick, Haack's Defective Discussion of Popper and the Courts.
    Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...)
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  18. Adolf Grunbaum (1970). Space, Time and Falsifiability Critical Exposition and Reply to "A Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science". Philosophy of Science 37 (4):469 - 588.
    Prompted by the "Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science" (Philosophy of Science 36, December, 1969) and other recent literature, this essay ranges over major issues in the philosophy of space, time and space-time as well as over problems in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. The author's philosophy of geometry has recently been challenged along three main distinct lines as follows: (i) The Panel article by G. J. Massey calls for a more precise and more (...)
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  19. Adolf Grünbaum (1970). Space, Time and Falsifiability Critical Exposition and Reply to "a Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science". Philosophy of Science 37 (4):469-588.
    Prompted by the "Panel Discussion of Grünbaum's Philosophy of Science" (Philosophy of Science 36, December, 1969) and other recent literature, this essay ranges over major issues in the philosophy of space, time and space-time as well as over problems in the logic of ascertaining the falsity of a scientific hypothesis. The author's philosophy of geometry has recently been challenged along three main distinct lines as follows: (i) The Panel article by G. J. Massey calls for a more precise and more (...)
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  20. Adolf Grünbaum (1962). The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis. Synthese 14 (1):17 - 34.
  21. Adolf Grünbaum (1961). Professor Dingle on Falsifiability: A Second Rejoinder. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (46):153-156.
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  22. Adolf Grūnbaum (1961). Professor Dingle on Falsifiability: A Second Rejoinder. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (46):153-156.
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  23. Adolf Grünbaum (1960). The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis: A Rejoinder to Professor Dingle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):143-145.
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  24. Adolf Grünbaum (1959). Discussions: Thb Falsifiability Op the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):48-50.
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  25. Adolf Grünbaum (1959). The Falsifiability of the Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):48-50.
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  26. Carl G. Hempel (1958). Empirical Statements and Falsifiability. Philosophy 33 (127):342 - 348.
    1. Object of this note . In his lively essay, “Between Analytic and Empirical,” , Mr. J. W. N. Watkins challenges the empiricist identification of synthetic statements with empirical ones by arguing that there exists an important class of statements which are synthetic, i.e. not analytically true or false, and yet not empirical. I find Mr. Watkins's arguments very stimulating, but I do not think they provide a sound basis for his contention. In the present note, I wish to indicate (...)
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  27. Ingvar Johansson (1980). Ceteris Paribus Clauses, Closure Clauses and Falsifiability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11 (1):16-22.
    Summary The article argues thatceteris paribus clauses have to be separated from another type of clauses called closure clauses. The former are associated with laws and theories, the latter with test situations of a particular kind. It is also argued that closure clauses, but notceteris paribus clauses, make Popper's falsifiability principle untenable. In that way, it also resolves the quarrel between Popper and Lakatos aboutceteris paribus clauses and falsifiability by saying that both are partly wrong and partly right.
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  28. Kile Jones (2010). Falsifiability and Traction in Theories of Divine Action. Zygon 45 (3):575-589.
    One of the most focused research programs in the science-religion dialogue that has taken place up to the present is the series of volumes published jointly by the Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences. Originating with the encouragement of Pope John Paul II, this series has produced seven volumes focusing on how divine action can be understood in light of contemporary science. A retrospective volume published in 2008, Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action: Twenty Years of (...)
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  29. Yasuyuki Kageyama (2003). Openness to the Unknown: The Role of Falsifiability in Search of Better Knowledge. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):100-121.
    From the time of its birth, Popper’s theory of falsifiability has been fiercely criticized from various viewpoints. In the author’s view, however, those various criticisms all have the same root in their assumption that a falsification must be certain and conclusive. As the theory of falsifiability has never had such an assumption, it is the source of misunderstanding. By discarding it, we can reply to every criticism and thereby clarify the role of falsifiability in our search for better knowledge; that (...)
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  30. Stan Klein (forthcoming). The Curious Case of the Self-Refuting Straw Man: Trafimow and Earp’s Response to Klein (2014). Theory and Psychology.
    In their critique of Klein (2014a), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (T&E’s misreading of what I said), and (b) (...)
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  31. Peter Knapp (1984). Domains of Applicability of Social-Scientific Theories: Problems in the Empirical Falsifiability of Bounded Generalizations. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (1):25–41.
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  32. Carl R. Kordig (1972). Falsifiability and the Cosmological Argument. New Scholasticism 46 (4):485-487.
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  33. K. K. Lee (1969). Popper's Falsifiability and Darwin's Natural Selection. Philosophy 44 (170):291 - 302.
    Popper Proposed the criterion of falsifiability as a solution to the problem of demarcation i.e. of distinguishing science from pseudo-science and not, as many of his contemporaries in the Vienna Circle mistook it to be, a solution to the quite different problem with which they themselves were preoccupied, viz. of providing a criterion of meaning to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless. While the positivists were concerned to damn metaphysics and exalt science, by identifying the empirically verifiable with the meaningful, (...)
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  34. Robert Lee, Wai-Chung & 李慧忠, Falsifiability, Rationality, and the Growth of Knowledge.
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  35. Arnold B. Levison (1965). Professor Scheffler on Falsifiability and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 16 (5):76 - 79.
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  36. Daniel Little (1981). Countervailing Tendencies and Falsifiability in Capital. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (2):283-291.
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  37. Sebastian Lutz, Criteria of Empirical Significance: A Success Story.
    The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, (...)
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  38. Sebastian Lutz (forthcoming). Carnap on Empirical Significance. Synthese.
    Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to the empirical significance (...)
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  39. Lorenzo Magnani (1999). Withdrawing Unfalsifiable Hypotheses. Foundations of Science 4 (2):133-153.
    There has been little research into the weak kindsof negating hypotheses. Hypotheses may be unfalsifiable. In this case it is impossible tofind a contradiction in some area of the conceptualsystems in which they are incorporated.Notwithstanding this fact, it is sometimes necessaryto construct ways of rejecting the unfalsifiablehypothesis at hand by resorting to some external forms of negation, external because wewant to avoid any arbitrary and subjectiveelimination, which would be rationally orepistemologically unjustified. I will consider akind of ``weak'''' (unfalsifiable) hypotheses that (...)
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  40. Michael Martin (1965). The Falsifiability of Curve-Hypotheses. Philosophical Studies 16 (4):56 - 60.
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  41. Rainer Willi Maurer, Falsification of Theories Without Verification of Basic Statements – an Argument for the Possibility of Knowledge Growth.
    Karl Popper rightly contests the possibility of a verification of basic statements. At the same time he strictly believes in the possibility of growth of empirical knowledge. Knowledge growth, however, is only possible if empirical theories can be falsified. This raises the question, how theories can be falsified, if a verification of those statements that falsify theories – i.e. basic statements – is not possible. This problem is often referred to as the “basic problem” or “problem of the empirical basis”. (...)
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  42. Ningombam Bupenda Meitei (2013). Science Without Inductivism. viXra.Org:6.
    The paper aims to expound on the issue of science being different from non science or prescience in the form of the scientific methodology used. Popper’s method of falsifiability ensures the aim of science to be successful. The aim of science which also needs a critical attitude, can enable scientific progress by rejecting inductivism as its scientific methodology. Popper’s view on what the aim of science is and why and how inductivism fails in the case of science, along with examples (...)
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  43. Arthur B. Millman (1990). Falsification and Grünbaum's Duhemian Theses. Synthese 82 (1):23 - 52.
    This paper is a detailed critical study of Adolf Grünbaum's work on the Duhemian thesis. I show that (a) Grünbaum's geometrical counterexample to the (D1) subthesis is unsuccessful, even with minimal claims made for what the counterexample is supposed to show, and (b) the (D2) subthesis is not a reasonable one (and cannot correctly be attributed to Duhem). The paper concludes with an argument about the relation between the Duhemian thesis, concerning component hypotheses of a scientific theory, and the view (...)
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  44. Frederik A. Muller (2003). Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena. Erkenntnis 58 (2):189 - 211.
    On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...)
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  45. A. E. Musgrave (1972). Falsifiability and Probability: A Comment. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):58 – 60.
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  46. Seungbae Park (2016). To Be Scientific Is To Be Interactive. European Journal of Science and Theology 12 (1):77-86.
    Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...)
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  47. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). Corroboration and Auxiliary Hypotheses: Duhem's Thesis Revisited. Synthese 177 (1):139-149.
    This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.
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  48. Robert A. Rynasiewicz (1983). Falsifiability and the Semantic Eliminability of Theoretical Languages. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):225-241.
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  49. Scott Scheall, Lesser Degrees of Explanation: Some Implications of F.A. Hayek’s Methodology of Sciences of Complex Phenomena.
    From the early-1950s on, F.A. Hayek was concerned with the development of a methodology of sciences that study systems of complex phenomena. Hayek argued that the knowledge that can be acquired about such systems is, in virtue of their complexity (and the comparatively narrow boundaries of human cognitive faculties), relatively limited. The paper aims to elucidate the implications of Hayek’s methodology with respect to the specific dimensions along which the scientist’s knowledge of some complex phenomena may be limited. Hayek’s fallibilism (...)
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  50. Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (1988). Why Popper's Basic Statements Are Not Falsifiable. Some Paradoxes in Popper's “Logic of Scientific Discovery”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):124-143.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Basic statements play a central role in Popper's "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", since they permit a distinction between empirical and non-empirical theories. A theory is empirical iff it consists of falsifiable statements, and statements (of any kind) are falsifiable iff they are inconsistent with at least one basic statement. Popper obviously presupposes that basic statements are themselves empirical and hence falsifiable; at any rate, he claims several times that they are falsifiable. In this paper we prove that (...)
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