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Summary According to fatalists, our actions are not merely determined but fated. If our actions are determined, then it is in some sense already settled how we will decide to act; if our actions are fated, then what we will do is already settled regardless of how we will decide. Most philosophers think that fatalism is a confusion and of no relevance to the free will debate, but there is a substantive problem concerning logical fatalism. A sentence concerning some future event seems to have a truth value prior to the event's occurrence, but if the sentence is to have a truth-value prior to the event's occurrence it seems that the event must be fated to occur.
Key works The problem of logical fatalism has its canonical statement in Aristotle unknown. Some solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and free will also serve as solutions to the problem of logical fatalism: for instance Ockham's distinction between hard and soft facts, where only the former concern the past alone: Ockham 1983. A much more recent argument for fatalism is Taylor 1962.
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  1. Gabriel A. Acevedo (2005). Turning Anomie on its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim's Concealed and Multidimensional Alienation Theory. Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.
    Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We (...)
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  2. Peter Adamson (2006). The Arabic Sea Battle: Al-Fārābī on the Problem of Future Contingents. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (2):163-188.
    Ancient commentators like Ammonius and Boethius tried to solve Aristotle's “sea battle argument” in On Interpretation 9 by saying that statements about future contingents are “indefinitely” true or false. They were followed by al-Fārābī in his commentary on On Interpretation. The article sets out two possible interpretations of what “indefinitely” means here, and shows that al-Fārābī actually has both conceptions: one applied in his interpretation of Aristotle, and another that he is forced into by the problem of divine foreknowledge. It (...)
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  3. James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology.
    In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (in press) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance, and are rather willing to attribute free will no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper we first argue that Feltz (...)
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  4. Bruce Aune (1962). Fatalism and Professor Taylor. Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.
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  5. P. K. Awua (2009). Destiny: A Reality or Mirage? Faustag Ventures.
    PART I. -- 1. The Asian, European and the American views on destiny -- 2. Biblical fulfilment of destiny -- 3. Destiny in the Ghanaian context -- 4. Mystical effects of names on destiny -- PART II. -- 5. My childhood days and primary education -- 6. My secondary education -- 7. University education -- 8. Employment after graduation, mariage life and children -- 9. Post-graduate studies at the University of Strathclyde, Glascgow, Scotland and working experience -- 10. Resignation from (...)
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  6. Bruce Baugh (2009). Freedom, Fatalism, and the Other in Being and Nothingness and The Imaginary. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):63-69.
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  7. Andrew Beedle (1996). Modal Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.
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  8. M. Benstein (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press.
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  9. Boran Berčić (2000). Fatalism. Theoria 43 (3-4):25-63.
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  10. M. Bernstein (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  11. Mark Bernstein (1990). Fatalism Revisited. Metaphilosophy 21 (3):270-281.
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  12. Mark Bernstein (1989). Fatalism and Time. Dialogue 28 (03):461-.
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  13. Mark Bernstein (1989). Fatalism, Tense, and Changing the Past. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):175 - 186.
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  14. Martin A. Bertman (1976). Logical Fatalism and the Excluded Middle. New Scholasticism 50 (4):481-489.
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  15. Philippe Besnard (1993). Anomie and Fatalism in Durkheim's Theory of Regulation. In Stephen P. Turner (ed.), Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist. Routledge. 169--90.
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  16. Sukumari Bhattacharji (1982). Fatalism — its Roots and Effects. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2):135-154.
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  17. Thomas Bittner (2000). Jordan Howard Sobel, Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 20:222-224.
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  18. Alex Blum (2007). A Note on Theological Fatalism1. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2):143-147.
    We contend that a very seductive argument for theological fatalism fails. In the course of our discussion we point out that theological fatalism is incompatible with the existence of a being who is omnipotent, omniscient and infallible. We suggest that ‘possible’ formalized as ‘◊’ is to be understood as ‘can or could have been’ and not simply as ‘can’. The argument we discuss conflates the two. We end by rounding out, hope-fully, some left over corners of serious concern to the (...)
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  19. Daniel Nathan Boone (1971). Fatalism: Arguments and Attitudes. Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
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  20. Andrea Borghini & Giuliano Torrengo, The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line.
    There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary).1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an (...)
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  21. Sophie Botros (1985). Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274 - 304.
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  22. Sophie Botros (1985). Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274-304.
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  23. Craig Bourne (2011). Fatalism and the Future. In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press. 41.
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  24. R. D. Bradley (1963). Causality, Fatalism, and Morality. Mind 72 (288):591-594.
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  25. R. D. Bradley (1959). Must the Future Be What It is Going to Be. Mind 68 (270):193-208.
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  26. Raymond D. Bradley, Fatalism.
    The belief in fatalism, like many others, has its roots in the quasi-religious mythologies of ancient peoples many of whom personified the notion of fate. Thus Greek mythology supposed that three Fates, daughters of the goddess of Necessity, had control of our lives from beginning to end and that it was therefore impossible for us to do anything contrary to what they had prescribed for us. We may think we are in control of our own destinies. But we are mistaken. (...)
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  27. Charles D. Brown (1965). Fallacies in Taylor's "Fatalism". Journal of Philosophy 62 (13):349-353.
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  28. David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the (...)
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  29. Steven Mark Cahn (1966). Fatalism: A Philosophical Study. Dissertation, Columbia University
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  30. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  31. Richmond Campbell (2001). Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience Jordan Howard Sobel Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, Xiii + 212 Pp., $55.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 40 (03):634-.
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  32. James Cargile (1996). Some Comments on Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.
    This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here.
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  33. John Carroll, Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Freedom & Time Travel.
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  34. John Carroll (2010). Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Time Travel, and Freedom. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press. 79.
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  35. Audrey Chamberlain (1976). Planning Versus Fatalism. Journal of Biosocial Science 8 (1):1.
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  36. Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
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  37. Nicola Ciprotti & Tommaso Piazza (forthcoming). Alethic Determinism. Or: How to Make Free Will Inconsistent with Timeless Truth. Logique and Analyse.
    The paper purports to show that truth-atemporalism, the thesis that truth is timeless, is incompatible with power to do otherwise. Since a parallel and simpler argument can be run to the effect that truth-omnitemporalism, the thesis that truth is sempiternal, is incompatible with power to do otherwise, our conclusion achieves greater generality, and the possible shift from the claim that truth is omnitemporal to the claim that it is atemporal becomes useless for the purpose to resist it. On the other (...)
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  38. Michael Clark (1970). Discourse About the Future. In G. Vesey (ed.), Knowledge and Necessity. Macmillan. 169-190.
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  39. William Lane Craig (1990). Purtill on Fatalism and Truth. Faith and Philosophy 7 (2):229-234.
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  40. Teo Forcht Dagi (1983). And How Can One Die Better? Courage, Faith, and Fatalism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (4):431-435.
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  41. Maria De Cillis (2014). Free Will and Predestination in Iislamic Thought: Theoretical Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, Ghazali and Ibn Arabi. Routledge.
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  42. Joseph Diekemper (2007). B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.
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  43. Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.
    I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two (...)
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  44. Leonard William Doob (1988). Inevitability Determinism, Fatalism, and Destiny.
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  45. Andreas Dorschel (2015). Ästhetik des Fado. Merkur 69 (2):79-86.
    Fado, the urban folk of Lisbon and Coimbra, is an art of nuances. These nuances music takes from poetry; as ‘sung poetry’ (‘poema cantado’ in Portuguese) fados are not to be equated with ‘songs’ that turn the word into a vehicle – a dominant procedure in, e.g., rock music. Again, ‘voice’ in fado does not so much manifest individual expression; rather it is, as it were, ‘on loan’ from tradition. Keeping some distance from dance, too, fado at the beginning of (...)
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  46. Bradley Harris Dowden (2009). The Metaphysics of Time: A Dialogue. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Introduction -- Fatalism, free will, and foreknowledge -- Mind, the metric, and conventionality -- Time travel and backward causation -- Time's origin, and relationism vs. substantivalism -- McTaggart, tensed facts, and time's flow -- Presentism, the block universe, and perduring objects -- The arrow of time -- Zeno's paradoxes and supertasks.
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  47. Michael Dummett (1964). Bringing About the Past. Philosophical Review 73 (3):338-359.
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  48. Ralph M. Eaton (1921). Social Fatalism. Philosophical Review 30 (4):380-392.
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  49. Terence Rajivan Edward, Astrology, Fate and Causation.
    Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions about which propositions are essential to astrology.
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  50. Helena Eilstein (1997). Life Contemplative, Life Practical: An Essay on Fatalism. Rodopi.
    Contents: Acknowledgements. Preface. CHAPTER ONE: OLDCOMB AND NEWCOMB. 1. In the King Comb's Chamber of Game. 2. The Newcombian Predicaments. CHAPTER TWO: ANANKE. 1. Fatalism: What It Is Not? 2. Fatalism: What Is It? 3. Fatalism and a priori Arguments. 4. Fatalism and ‘Internal' Experience. 5. Determinism, Indeterminism and Fatalism. 6. Transientism, Eternism and Fatalism. 7. Fatalism: What It Does Not Imply? CHAPTER THREE: FATED FREEDOM. 1. More on Libertarianism. 2. On the Deterministic Concept of Freedom. 3. Moral Self and (...)
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