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Summary According to fatalists, our actions are not merely determined but fated. If our actions are determined, then it is in some sense already settled how we will decide to act; if our actions are fated, then what we will do is already settled regardless of how we will decide. Most philosophers think that fatalism is a confusion and of no relevance to the free will debate, but there is a substantive problem concerning logical fatalism. A sentence concerning some future event seems to have a truth value prior to the event's occurrence, but if the sentence is to have a truth-value prior to the event's occurrence it seems that the event must be fated to occur.
Key works The problem of logical fatalism has its canonical statement in Aristotle unknown. Some solutions to the problem of foreknowledge and free will also serve as solutions to the problem of logical fatalism: for instance Ockham's distinction between hard and soft facts, where only the former concern the past alone: Ockham 1983. A much more recent argument for fatalism is Taylor 1962.
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  1. Gabriel A. Acevedo (2005). Turning Anomie on its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim's Concealed and Multidimensional Alienation Theory. Sociological Theory 23 (1):75-85.
    Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We (...)
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  2. Bruce Aune (1962). Fatalism and Professor Taylor. Philosophical Review 71 (4):512-519.
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  3. P. K. Awua (2009). Destiny: A Reality or Mirage? Faustag Ventures.
    PART I. -- 1. The Asian, European and the American views on destiny -- 2. Biblical fulfilment of destiny -- 3. Destiny in the Ghanaian context -- 4. Mystical effects of names on destiny -- PART II. -- 5. My childhood days and primary education -- 6. My secondary education -- 7. University education -- 8. Employment after graduation, mariage life and children -- 9. Post-graduate studies at the University of Strathclyde, Glascgow, Scotland and working experience -- 10. Resignation from (...)
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  4. Bruce Baugh (2009). Freedom, Fatalism, and the Other in Being and Nothingness and The Imaginary. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):63-69.
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  5. Andrew Beedle (1996). Modal Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):488-495.
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  6. M. Benstein (1992). Fatalism. University of Nebraska Press.
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  7. M. Bernstein (2002). Fatalism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Mark Bernstein (1990). Fatalism Revisited. Metaphilosophy 21 (3):270-281.
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  9. Mark Bernstein (1989). Fatalism and Time. Dialogue 28 (03):461-.
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  10. Mark Bernstein (1989). Fatalism, Tense, and Changing the Past. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):175 - 186.
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  11. Martin A. Bertman (1976). Logical Fatalism and the Excluded Middle. New Scholasticism 50 (4):481-489.
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  12. Sukumari Bhattacharji (1982). Fatalism — its Roots and Effects. Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (2):135-154.
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  13. Andrea Borghini & Giuliano Torrengo, The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line.
    There seems to be a minimal core that every theory wishing to accommodate the intuition that the future is open must contain: a denial of physical determinism (i.e. the thesis that what future states the universe will be in is implied by what states it has been in), and a denial of strong fatalism (i.e. the thesis that, at every time, what will subsequently be the case is metaphysically necessary).1 Those two requirements are often associated with the idea of an (...)
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  14. Sophie Botros (1985). Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274-304.
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  15. Sophie Botros (1985). Freedom, Causality, Fatalism and Early Stoic Philosophy. Phronesis 30 (3):274 - 304.
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  16. R. D. Bradley (1963). Causality, Fatalism, and Morality. Mind 72 (288):591-594.
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  17. R. D. Bradley (1959). Must the Future Be What It is Going to Be. Mind 68 (270):193-208.
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  18. Raymond D. Bradley, Fatalism.
    The belief in fatalism, like many others, has its roots in the quasi-religious mythologies of ancient peoples many of whom personified the notion of fate. Thus Greek mythology supposed that three Fates, daughters of the goddess of Necessity, had control of our lives from beginning to end and that it was therefore impossible for us to do anything contrary to what they had prescribed for us. We may think we are in control of our own destinies. But we are mistaken. (...)
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  19. Charles D. Brown (1965). Fallacies in Taylor's "Fatalism". Journal of Philosophy 62 (13):349-353.
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  20. David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
    What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the (...)
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  21. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  22. Richmond Campbell (2001). Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience Jordan Howard Sobel Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998, Xiii + 212 Pp., $55.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 40 (03):634-.
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  23. James Cargile (1996). Some Comments on Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):1-11.
    This paper discusses fatalism, defined as the view that it is never both in one's power to do X and in one's power to not do X. It is argued that this view is made out as more plausible than it really is, because of unclarity as to its meaning. Some philosophers, such as Michael Dummett or David Lewis, who criticise fatalism, actually advocate views closely in line with fatalism as defined here.
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  24. John Carroll, Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Freedom & Time Travel.
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  25. John Carroll (2010). Context, Conditionals, Fatalism, Time Travel, and Freedom. In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. Mit Press. 79.
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  26. Nicola Ciprotti (2012). Metaphysical Fatalism, in Five Steps. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):35-54.
    The paper presents an argument for the conclusion that a certain conception of truth, according to which truth is timeless, truth-values are just two and the primary truth-bearers are propositions, leads to a kind of inevitabilism here labelled Metaphysical Fatalism. After the presentation of the argument for Metaphysical Fatalism, three objections to it are discussed and rebutted.
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  27. Nicola Ciprotti & Tommaso Piazza (forthcoming). Alethic Determinism. Or: How to Make Free Will Inconsistent with Timeless Truth. Logique and Analyse.
    The paper purports to show that truth-atemporalism, the thesis that truth is timeless, is incompatible with power to do otherwise. Since a parallel and simpler argument can be run to the effect that truth-omnitemporalism, the thesis that truth is sempiternal, is incompatible with power to do otherwise, our conclusion achieves greater generality, and the possible shift from the claim that truth is omnitemporal to the claim that it is atemporal becomes useless for the purpose to resist it. On the other (...)
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  28. Michael Clark (1970). Discourse About the Future. In G. Vesey (ed.), Knowledge and Necessity. Macmillan. 169-190.
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  29. William Lane Craig (1990). Purtill on Fatalism and Truth. Faith and Philosophy 7 (2):229-234.
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  30. Teo Forcht Dagi (1983). And How Can One Die Better? Courage, Faith, and Fatalism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (4):431-435.
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  31. Maria De Cillis (2014). Free Will and Predestination in Iislamic Thought: Theoretical Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, Ghazali and Ibn Arabi. Routledge.
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  32. Joseph Diekemper (2007). B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.
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  33. Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.
    I begin by briefly mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specifically, two (...)
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  34. Bradley Harris Dowden (2009). The Metaphysics of Time: A Dialogue. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Introduction -- Fatalism, free will, and foreknowledge -- Mind, the metric, and conventionality -- Time travel and backward causation -- Time's origin, and relationism vs. substantivalism -- McTaggart, tensed facts, and time's flow -- Presentism, the block universe, and perduring objects -- The arrow of time -- Zeno's paradoxes and supertasks.
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  35. Michael Dummett (1964). Bringing About the Past. Philosophical Review 73 (3):338-359.
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  36. Ralph M. Eaton (1921). Social Fatalism. Philosophical Review 30 (4):380-392.
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  37. M. Oreste Fiocco (forthcoming). Fatalism and the Metaphysics of Contingency. In Steven M. Cahn & Maureen Eckert (eds.), Freedom and the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. Columbia University Press.
    Contingency is the presence of non-actualized possibility in the world. Fatalism is a view of reality on which there is no contingency. Since it is contingency that permits agency, there has traditionally been much interest in contingency. This interest has long been embarrassed by the contention that simple and plausible assumptions about the world lead to fatalism. I begin with an Aristotelian argument as presented by Richard Taylor. Appreciation of this argument has been stultified by a question pertaining to the (...)
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  38. Klaus P. Fischer (2008). Schicksal in Theologie Und Philosophie. Wbg, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
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  39. Peter Forrest (2010). 1. Why It Matters That We Cannot Alter the Past. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:29.
  40. Lewis Foster (1971). Fatalism and Precognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (3):341-351.
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  41. Richard Gaskin (1998). Fatalism, Bivalence and the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):83-88.
    In his paper ‘Some Comments on Fatalism’, The Philosophical Quartery, 46 (1996), pp. 1–11, James Cargile offers an argument against the view that the correct response to fatalism is to restrict the principle of bivalence with respect to statements about future contingencies. His argument fails because it is question‐begging. Further, he fails to give due weight to the reason behind this view, which is the desire to give an adequate account of the past/future asymmetry. He supposes that mere appeal to (...)
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  42. Richard Gaskin (1998). Middle Knowledge, Fatalism and Comparative Similarity of Worlds. Religious Studies 34 (2):189-203.
    The doctrine of Middle Knowledge presupposes that conditionals of freedom (statements of the form 'If A were circumstances C, he would perform X') can be true. Such conditions are, where true, not true in virtue of the truth of any categorical proposition. Nor can their truth be modelled in terms of comparative similarity of possible worlds, because the structure of possible worlds is a necessary one, whereas the connection between antecedent and consequent of a conditional of freedom is a contingent (...)
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  43. Richard M. Gaskin (1994). Fatalism, Foreknowledge, and the Reality of the Future. The Modern Schoolman 71 (2):83-113.
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  44. Michael Gelven (1991). Why Me?: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Fate. Northern Illinois University Press.
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  45. Jeffrey Green & Katherin Rogers (2012). Time, Foreknowledge, and Alternative Possibilities. Religious Studies 48 (2):151 - 164.
    In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are 'ontologically necessary'. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue (...)
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  46. William Gruen (1936). Determinism, Fatalism, and Historical Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 33 (23):617-628.
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  47. Susan Haack (1975). On "on Theological Fatalism Again" Again. Philosophical Quarterly 25 (99):159-161.
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  48. Susan Haack (1974). On a Theological Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.
    It is the aim of this paper to show that [the theological argument from Divine omniscience] is not more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborate version of the argument for fatalism discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9, which, since its sole premise is the Principle of Bivalence, may conveniently be called the logical argument for fatalism. If this is right, if the theological premisses of the theological argument can be shown to be strictly irrelevant to the fatalist conclusion, then (...)
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  49. Everett W. Hall (1931). Book Review:The Fallacies of Fatalism; or the Real World and the Rational Will. Charles E. Hooper. [REVIEW] Ethics 41 (4):533-.
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  50. William Hasker (1988). Hard Facts and Theological Fatalism. Noûs 22 (3):419-436.
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