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  1. Christopher M. Aanstoos (ed.) (1984). Exploring the Lived World: Readings in Phenomenological Psychology. West Georgia College].
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  2. M. T. Alkire (2001). The Power of Observation. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):236-240.
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  3. J. Allan Hobson (2002). Sleep and Dream Suppression Following a Lateral Medullary Infarct: A First-Person Account. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (3):377-390.
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  4. John R. Anderson (2007). How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe? OUP USA.
    "The question for me is how can the human mind occur in the physical universe? We now know that the world is governed by physics. We now understand the way biology nestles comfortably within that. The issue is how will the mind do that as well?" Alan Newell, 4 December 1991, Carnegie Mellon University -/- The argument John Anderson gives in this book was inspired by the passage above, from the last lecture by one of the pioneers of cognitive science. (...)
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  5. Walter Anderson (2007). Bringing Experience Out of the Closet. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):110-116.
    Reflections on the Conference on First-Person Methodologies in the Study of Consciousness, Ratna Ling Retreat Center, Cazadero, California, March 29-April 2, 2007.
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  6. Michael Andres, Samuel Di Luca & Mauro Pesenti (2008). Finger Counting: The Missing Tool? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):642-643.
    Rips et al. claim that the principles underlying the structure of natural numbers cannot be inferred from interactions with the physical world. However, in their target article they failed to consider an important source of interaction: finger counting. Here, we show that finger counting satisfies all the conditions required for allowing the concept of numbers to emerge from sensorimotor experience through a bottom-up process.
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  7. Alessandro Antonietti (2010). Do Neurobiological Data Help Us to Understand Economic Decisions Better? Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):207-218.
    The contribution that neurobiological data provide us to comprehend the psychological aspects of economic decision-making is critically examined. First, different kinds of correspondences between neural events and mental activities are identified. On the basis of the distinctions made, some recent studies are selected, each of which focuses on a different stage of decision-making and employs a different set of neurobiological data. The thorough analysis of each study suggests that neuro-mental correspondences do not have an evidentiary function but rather a heuristic (...)
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  8. Kathleen M. Arnold, Kathleen B. McDermott & Karl K. Szpunar (2011). Individual Differences in Time Perspective Predict Autonoetic Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):712-719.
  9. Alexios Arvanitis & Antonis Karampatzos (2013). Negotiation as an Intersubjective Process: Creating and Validating Claim-Rights. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):89-108.
    Negotiation is mainly treated as a process through which counterparts try to satisfy their conflicting interests. This traditional, subjective approach focuses on the interests-based relation between subjects and the resources which are on the bargaining table; negotiation is viewed as a series of joint decisions regarding the relation of each subject to the negotiated resources. In this paper, we will attempt to outline an intersubjective perspective that focuses on the communication-based relation among subjects, a relation that is founded upon communicative (...)
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  10. Yochai Ataria (2013). Sense of Ownership and Sense of Agency During Trauma. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    This paper seeks to describe and analyze the traumatic experience through an examination of the sense of agency—the sense of controlling one’s body, and sense of ownership—the sense that it is my body that undergoes experiences. It appears that there exist (at least) two levels of traumatic experience: on the first level one loses the sense of agency but retains the sense of ownership, whilst on the second one loses both of these, with symptoms becoming progressively more severe. A comparison (...)
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  11. John Barresi (2004). Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
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  12. Tim Bayne, Mind-Reading.
    Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mind-reading—forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent form (...)
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  13. Anthony F. Beavers (2009). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):533-537.
    The Phenomenological Mind, by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, is part of a recent initiative to show that phenomenology, classically conceived as the tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and not as mere introspection, contributes something important to cognitive science. (For other examples, see “References” below.) Phenomenology, of course, has been a part of cognitive science for a long time. It implicitly informs the works of Andy Clark (e.g. 1997) and John Haugeland (e.g. 1998), and Hubert Dreyfus explicitly uses it (e.g. (...)
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  14. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2011). The Motivational State of the Virtuous Agent. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.
    Julia Annas argues that Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenological experience of the virtuous agent corresponds to psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's concept of the ?flow,? which is a form of intrinsic motivation. In this paper, I explore whether or not Annas? understanding of virtuous agency is a plausible one. After a thorough analysis of psychological accounts of intrinsic and extrinsic states of motivation, I argue that despite the attractiveness of Annas? understanding of virtuous agency, it is subject to a serious problem: all (...)
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  15. M. Bitbol & C. Petitmengin (2013). A Defense of Introspection From Within. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):269-279.
    Context: We are presently witnessing a revival of introspective methods, which implicitly challenges an impressive list of in-principle objections that were addressed to introspection by various philosophers and by behaviorists. Problem: How can one overcome those objections and provide introspection with a secure basis? Results: A renewed definition of introspection as “enlargement of the field of attention and contact with re-enacted experience,” rather than “looking-within,” is formulated. This entails (i) an alternative status of introspective phenomena, which are no longer taken (...)
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  16. Peter J. Boettke & J. Robert Subrick (2002). From the Philosophy of Mind to the Philosophy of the Market. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):53-64.
    John Searle has argued against the viability of strong versions of artificial intelligence. His most well-known counter-example is the Chinese Room thought experiment where he stressed that syntax is not semantics. We reason by analogy to highlight previously unnoticed similarities between Searle and F.A. Hayek's critique of socialist planning. We extend their insights to explain the failure of many reforms in Eastern Europe in the 1990's.
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  17. David A. Booth (2003). Phenomenology is Art, Not Psychological or Neural Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):408-409.
    It is tough to relate visual perception or other achievements to physiological processing in the central nervous system. The diagrammatic, algebraic, and verbal pictures of how sights seem to Lehar do not advance understanding of how we manage to see what is in the world. There are well-known conceptual reasons why no such purely introspective approach can be productive.
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  18. Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.) (2001). Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins.
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  19. Filipe Herkenhoff Carijó, Maria Clara Almeida & Virgínia Kastrup (2013). On Haptic and Motor Incorporation of Tools and Other Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):685-701.
    This article presents a conceptual discussion on the phenomenon of incorporation of tools and other objects in the light of Maine de Biran’s philosophy of the relation between the body and the motor will. Drawing on Maine de Biran’s view of the body as that portion of the material world which directly obeys one’s motor will, as well as on his view (supported by studies in contemporary cognitive science) of active touch as the perceptual modality that is sensitive to objects (...)
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  20. Mazviita Chirimuuta, Psychophysical Methods and the Evasion of Introspection.
    While introspective methods went out of favour with the decline of Titchener’s analytic school, many important questions concern the rehabilitation of introspection in contemporary psychology. Hatfield (2005) rightly points out that introspective methods should not be confused with analytic ones, and goes on to describe their “ineliminable role” in perceptual psychology. Here I argue that certain methodological conventions within psychophysics reflect a continued uncertainty over appropriate use of subjects’ perceptual observations and the reliability of their introspective judgements. My first claim (...)
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  21. Michael A. Cohen & Daniel C. Dennett (2011). Consciousness Cannot Be Separated From Function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):358--364.
    Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.
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  22. Jonathan Cole (2009). Impaired Embodiment and Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):343-360.
    This paper considers the importance of the body for self-esteem, communication, and emotional expression and experience, through the reflections of those who live with various neurological impairments of movement and sensation; sensory deafferentation, spinal cord injury and Möbius Syndrome (the congenital absence of facial expression). People with severe sensory loss, who require conscious attention and visual feedback for movement, describe the imperative to use the same strategies to reacquire gesture, to appear normal and have embodied expression. Those paralysed after spinal (...)
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  23. G. Colombetti (2013). Some Ideas for the Integration of Neurophenomenology and Affective Neuroscience. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):288-297.
    Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. (...)
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  24. Matteo Colombo (2012). Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Psychology (ahead-of-print):1–24.
    Can facts about subpersonal states and events be constitutively relevant to personal-level phenomena? And can knowledge of these facts inform explanations of personal-level phenomena? Some philosophers, like Jennifer Hornsby and John McDowell, argue for two negative answers whereby questions about persons and their behavior cannot be answered by using information from subpersonal psychology. Knowledge of subpersonal states and events cannot inform personal-level explanation such that they cast light on what constitutes persons? behaviors. In this paper I argue against this position. (...)
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  25. A. J. J. de Koning & F. A. Jenner (eds.) (1982). Phenomenology and Psychiatry. Grune & Stratton.
  26. Natalie Depraz (2009). The Failing of Meaning: A Few Steps Into a First-Person Phenomenological Practice. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    The experience I am going to go into refers to a process of emergence of meaning in consciousness. More particularly, what was given to me in terms of 'meaning' was the very lack of meaning of what was happening to me in the very moment. There is a crucial hypothesis here: this is the discovery of one's own experience and the production of a personal description of it within the framework of a disciplined practice. It is the only way to (...)
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  27. Steven M. Duncan, Mind, Body, Space, and Time.
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
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  28. Uljana Feest (2012). Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness. Inquiry 55 (1):1 - 16.
    Abstract If we take for granted that introspection is indispensable for the study of conscious mental states, the question arises what criteria have to be met in order for introspective reports to qualify as scientific evidence. There have been some attempts to argue (implicitly or explicitly) that it is possible to provide a satisfactory answer to this question while remaining agnostic with respect to questions about the nature of consciousness. Focusing on the aim of using introspection in order to generate (...)
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  29. Owen J. Flanagan (2011). The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized. Mit Press.
    An Essay in Comparative Neurophilosophy -- Preface -- Introduction: Buddhism Naturalized -- The Bodhisattva's Brain -- The Colour of Happiness -- Buddhist Epistemology and Science -- Buddhism as a Natural Philosophy. Buddhist Persons -- Being No-self & Being Nice -- Virtue & Happiness -- Postscript: Cosmopolitanism and Comparative Philosophy.
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  30. T. Froese, C. Gould & A. Barrett (2011). Re-Viewing From Within: A Commentary on First- and Second-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):254-269.
    Context: There is a growing recognition in consciousness science of the need for rigorous methods for obtaining accurate and detailed phenomenological reports of lived experience, i.e., descriptions of experience provided by the subject living them in the “first-person.” Problem: At the moment although introspection and debriefing interviews are sometimes used to guide the design of scientific studies of the mind, explicit description and evaluation of these methods and their results rarely appear in formal scientific discourse. Method: The recent publication of (...)
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  31. Thomas Fuchs (2013). The Phenomenology and Development of Social Perspectives. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  32. David Galin (1993). Beyond the Fringe. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):113-118.
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  33. Shaun Gallagher, Neurophilosophy and Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology 2005.
    I consider two specific issues to show the difference between a neurophilosophical approach and a neurophenomenlogical approach, namely, the issues of self and intersubjectivity. Neurophilosophy (which starts with theory that is continuous with common sense) and neurophenomenology (which generates theory in methodically controlled practices) lead to very different philosophical views on these issues.
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  34. Robert Gordon, Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  35. Rosalyn M. Greenwald-Baumrind (1967). The Effects of Sex, Stress, and Personality on Risk-Taking.
  36. Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan (2011). Introspecting Perceptual, Motor, and Decision Events. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1918-1919.
  37. Walter Gulick (2009). Polanyi's Epistemology in the Light of Neuroscience. Tradition and Discovery 36 (2):73-82.
    In Search of Memory, Eric Kandel’s excellent account of the rise of neuroscience, in which his own research has a prominent place, is reviewed with special attention given to its relation to Michael Polanyi’s philosophy. It is found that Polanyi’s epistemological theory, although established on quite different grounds, accords well with Kandel’ s description of how the brain operates. In particular, Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowing seems to be both enriched and validated by Kandel’s account of how memory functions.
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  38. Jennifer Hansen (2013). From Hinge Narrative to Habit: Self-Oriented Narrative Psychotherapy Meets Feminist Phenomenological Theories of Embodiment. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):69-73.
    In what follows, I offer some friendly amendments to Potter’s psychotherapeutic model—‘the hinge narrative’ (HN)—designed to help bipolar patients cultivate self-trust. My primary contribution is to suggest an alliance between narrative theory and feminist phenomenological theories of embodiment. I argue that these projects are mutually supporting in both the metaphysical and therapeutic project of constituting a rich moral self, that is, a self who has self-trust and thereby satisfying relationships with others. I also register a slight disagreement with Potter concerning (...)
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  39. Frank Hindriks (2011). Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
    Skill or control is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for intentional action. This received wisdom is challenged by experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer, which suggest that moral considerations sometimes trump considerations of skill and control. I argue that this effect (as well as the Knobe effect) can be explained in terms of the role normative reasons play in the concept of intentional action. This explanation has significant advantages over its rivals. It involves at most a conservative (...)
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  40. William Hirstein (2012). Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. OUP Oxford.
    Can consciousness and the human mind be understood and explained in sheerly physical terms? Materialism is a philosophical/scientific theory, according to which the mind is completely physical. This theory has been around for literally thousands of years, but it was always stymied by its inability to explain how exactly mere matter could do the amazing things the mind can do. Beginning in the 1980s, however, a revolution began quietly boiling away in the neurosciences, yielding increasingly detailed theories about how the (...)
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  41. Phil Jenkins (2011). Constructing the Self. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):873 - 876.
  42. Mark Johnson (1991). Knowing Through the Body. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):3-18.
    Abstract Recent empirical studies of categorization, concept development, semantic structure, and reasoning reveal the inadequacies of all theories that regard knowledge as static, propositional, and sentential. These studies show that conceptual structure and reason are grounded in patterns of bodily experience. Structures of our spatial/temporal orientations, perceptual interactions, and motor programs provide an imaginative basis for our knowledge of, and reasoning about, more abstract domains. Such a view transcends both foundationalism and extreme relativism or scepticism.
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  43. David A. Jopling (1996). “Take Away the Life-Lie … “: Positive Illusions and Creative Self-Deception. Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):525 – 544.
    In a well-known paper “Illusion and well-being”, Taylor and Brown maintain that positive illusions about the self play a significant role in the maintenance of mental health, as well as in the ability to maintain caring inter-personal relations and a sense of well-being. These illusions include unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and unrealistic optimism about one's future. Accurate self-knowledge, they maintain, is not an indispensable ingredient of mental health and well-being. Two lines of criticism are directed against (...)
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  44. Marta Jorba (2013). Book Review: Bayne, T. And Montague, M. (Eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):883-890.
  45. Gunnar Karlsson (1993). Psychological Qualitative Research From a Phenomenological Perspective. Almqvist & Wiksell International.
  46. Ernest Keen (1975/1982). A Primer in Phenomenological Psychology. University Press of America.
  47. Sachiko Kinoshita (1999). Memorial States of Awareness Versus Volitional Control: The Role of Task Differences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):772-772.
    Dienes & Perner's analysis provides a clear theoretical justification for using a demonstration of volitional control as a criterion for conscious awareness. However, in memory tasks, the converse does not hold: A phenomenological awareness of a memory episode can arise involuntarily, even when the task does not require retrieval of the episode. The varying amounts of volitional retrieval required by different memory tasks need to be recognized.
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  48. Tse-fu Kuan (2012). Cognitive Operations in Buddhist Meditation: Interface with Western Psychology. Contemporary Buddhism 13 (1):35-60.
    This paper interprets Buddhist meditation from perspectives of Western psychology and explores the common grounds shared by the two disciplines. Cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation are mainly characterized by mindfulness and concentration in relation to attention. Mindfulness in particular plays a pivotal role in regulating attention. My study based on Buddhist literature corroborates significant correspondence between mindfulness and metacognition as propounded by some psychologists. In vipassan? meditation, mindfulness regulates attention in such a way that attention is directed to monitor the (...)
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  49. Rebecca Kukla (2002). Attention and Blindness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (Supplement):319-346.
  50. Joseph Lacey (2013). Moral Phenomenology and a Moral Ontology of the Human Person. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):51-73.
    Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations (...)
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