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  1. William P. Alston (1972). Can Psychology Do Without Private Data? Behaviorism 1 (1):71-102.
  2. Lynne Rudder Baker, Science and the First-Person.
    I want to raise a question for which I have no definitive answer. The question is how to understand first-personal phenomena—phenomena that that can be discerned only from a first-personal point of view. The question stems from reflection on two claims: First, the claim of scientific naturalism that all phenomena can be described and explained by science; and second, the claim of science that everything within its purview is intersubjectively accessible, and hence that all science is constructed exclusively form the (...)
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  3. Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA
    We should eventually understand how exactly first person phenomenal consciousness is generated. When we do, we should be able to enginner one for robots. This is the engineering thesis in machine consciousness.
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  4. Piotr Boltuc (2010). Sloman and H-Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):23-26.
  5. Franz Brentano (1982/1995). Descriptive Psychology. Routledge.
    Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which proved (...)
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  6. Franz Brentano (1874/1973/1973). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.
  7. Franz Brentano (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Duncker & Humblot.
    Im Zentrum der 1874 erschienenen bewußtseinspsychologischen Abhandlungen Brentanos steht die Beschreibung und Analyse des Psychischen. Damit bahnte sich jene Abwendung von der sensualistischen Tradition der philosophischen Bewußtseinslehre an, die in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls vollendet wurde.
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  8. Franz Brentano, The Concept and Purpose of Psychology.
    This is a selection from Chapter 1 of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
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  9. Jesse Butler (2013). Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the First-Person Perspective. Palgrave MacMillan.
    We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a (...)
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  10. David J. Chalmers (2004). How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. MIT Press 1111--1119.
    In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.
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  11. David J. Chalmers (1999). First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin.
    As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our direct knowledge (...)
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  12. Roderick Chisholm (1967). Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional. In E. N. Lee & M. Mandelbaum (eds.), Phenomenology and Existentialism.
  13. Tamlin C. Christensen (2004). Experience-Sampling Procedures: Are They Probes to Autonoetic Awareness? Dissertation, Boston College
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  14. D. Conrad (1996). Consciousness, Privacy, and Information. Biosystems 38:207-10.
  15. Daniel C. Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science.
    A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions: " Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, perception or dream? " Kant: How is it possible for something even to _be_ a thought? What are the conditions for the possibility of experience at all?
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  16. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.
    Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
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  17. Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.
    To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing (...)
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  18. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Tarja Kallio-Tamminen (2016). Long-Term Meditation Training Induced Changes in the Operational Synchrony of Default Mode Network Modules During a Resting State. Cognitive Processing 17 (1):27-37.
    Using theoretical analysis of self-consciousness concept and experimental evidence on the brain default mode network (DMN) that constitutes the neural signature of self-referential processes, we hypothesized that the anterior and posterior subnets comprising the DMN should show differences in their integrity as a function of meditation training. Functional connectivity within DMN and its subnets (measured by operational synchrony) has been measured in ten novice meditators using an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording in a pre-/post-meditation intervention design. We have found that while the (...)
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  19. Luca Forgione (2013). Kant and the I as Subject. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 117-128.
    In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any mechanical (...)
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  20. Luca Forgione (2011). L'autocoscienza: Un Problema Filosofico. Carocci.
    Questo libro indaga la natura dell’autocoscienza, ossia la capacità tutta umana di essere consapevoli della propria sfera mentale. E si colloca nell’alveo della riflessione strettamente filosofica, privilegiando sia un approccio filosofico-linguistico e mentalista sia una ricostruzione del pensiero di alcuni tra i protagonisti della modernità e del dibattito contemporaneo. In particolare, vengono affrontate le caratteristiche specifiche della capacità dell’uomo di rappresentare linguisticamente e mentalmente il proprio io, esaminando gli aspetti problematici dell’argomento: se si parte dal cosiddetto modello riflessivo e si (...)
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  21. Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.) (2004). The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press.
    "The Cognitive Neurosciences III is a magnificent accomplishment. It covers topics trom ions to consciousness, from reflexes to social psychology. ...
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  22. Carl Ginsburg (2005). First-Person Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.
    The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The (...)
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  23. Amedeo Giorgi (2004). A Way to Overcome the Methodological Vicissitudes Involved in Researching Subjectivity. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 35 (1):1-25.
    Four research strategies currently employed by mainstream psychologists in researching the experiences and behaviors of human subjects are criticized for diminishing the presence of subjectivity. Two perspectives that tend to exaggerate subjectivity are also criticized. A balanced approach to subjectivity is offered that: acknowledges a theoretical perspective that recognizes that there are invisible or nonsensorial characteristics of subjectivity that have to be theoretically appropriated, and that emphasizes the intersubjective dimension as being critical for properly assessing a balanced approach to human (...)
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  24. A. Goldman (1997). Science, Publicity, and Consciousness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):525-45.
    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which should give way? This paper argues against the publicity requirement and against a fallback (...)
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  25. Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.) (1998). Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996. MIT Press.
    Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National ... Casti, JL 1996. Confronting science's logical limits. ...
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  26. Simon Høffding & Kristian Martiny (forthcoming). Framing a Phenomenological Interview: What, Why and How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Research in phenomenology has benefitted from using exceptional cases from pathology and expertise. But exactly how are we to generate and apply knowledge from such cases to the phenomenological domain? As researchers of cerebral palsy and musical absorption, we together answer the how question by pointing to the resource of the qualitative interview. Using the qualitative interview is a direct response to Varela’s call for better pragmatics in the methodology of phenomenology and cognitive science and Gallagher’s suggestion for phenomenology to (...)
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  27. Anthony I. Jack (ed.) (2004). Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    This phenomenon is an extension of the 'why trust the subject' question asked in the introduction ... critical use of verbal reports in cognitive science. ...
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  28. Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2003). Why Trust the Subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    It is a great pleasure to introduce this collection of papers on the use of introspective evidence in cognitive science. Our task as guest editors has been tremendously stimulating. We have received an outstanding number of contributions, in terms of quantity and quality, from academics across a wide disciplinary span, both from younger researchers and from the most experienced scholars in the field. We therefore had to redraw the plans for this project a number of times. It quickly became clear (...)
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  29. Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  30. Marianne Janack (2012). What We Mean by Experience. Stanford University Press.
    Social scientists and scholars in the humanities all rely on first-person descriptions of experience to understand how subjects construct their worlds. The problem they always face is how to integrate first-person accounts with an impersonal stance. Over the course of the twentieth century, this problem was compounded as the concept of experience itself came under scrutiny. First hailed as a wellspring of knowledge and the weapon that would vanquish metaphysics and Cartesianism by pragmatists like Dewey and James, by the century's (...)
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  31. Marvin Eli Kirsh, The Hard Problem of Consciousness Studies.
    The question addressed by the hard problem of philosophy (3), how cognitive representation is acquired from the physical properties of self and the external, is examined from a perspective originating with Boethius(14) that knowledge is dependant on the nature of the perceiver and discussed with respect to the philosophy of George Berkeley (1,2,7) concerning the existence of matter with respect to perception. An account of the trails of history, scientific method, with respect to the naming and delineation of the hard (...)
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  32. Marvin Eli Kirsh, The Universe Framed with Respect to Paradox: Is Memory Physically All That Exists?
    If all of the motive forces of the physical world, physically of the world, can be agreed upon to occur from the conceptual/ethereal as a confrontation of the logically entailed with its' antithesis, as the paradox, a scheme might be evolved to detail all phenomenon as occurrences that are the result of an elemental universal construction effected by the inversion, then one might account for the sciences, its' theory, the questions of nature, natural history, human history, rather than as explanation, (...)
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  33. Stan Klein (2014). Sameness and the Self: Philosophical and Psychological Considerations. Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception 5:1-15.
    In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries -- e.g.,how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self overtime in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity(for example,Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and (...)
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  34. Stan Klein (2013). The Complex Act of Projecting Oneself Into the Future. WIREs Cognitive Science 4:63-79.
    Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then (...)
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  35. Stan Klein (2012). The Self and its Brain. Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.
    In this paper I argue that much of the confusion and mystery surrounding the concept of "self" can be traced to a failure to appreciate the distinction between the self as a collection of diverse neural components that provide us with our beliefs, memories, desires, personality, emotions, etc (the epistemological self) and the self that is best conceived as subjective, unified awareness, a point of view in the first person (ontological self). While the former can, and indeed has, been extensively (...)
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  36. Stan Klein & Shaun Nichols (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind 121 (483):677-702.
    Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity — the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating (...)
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  37. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  38. Steven Lehar (2000). The Dimensions of Conscious Experience: A Quantitative Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2).
    Psychology was originally formulated as the science of the _psyche_, i.e. the subjective side of the mind / brain barrier. However time and again it has been diverted from this objective in the supposed interest of scientific rigor. The Behaviorists proposed to transform psychology to a science of behavior, and today the Neuroreductionists propose to transform it to a science of neurophysiology. In the process they attempt to deny the very existence of conscious experience as valid object of scientific scrutiny. (...)
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  39. Paul M. Livingston (2002). Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience. Synthese 132 (3):239-272.
    Over a period of several decades spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle, Schlick repeatedly attacked Husserl''s phenomenological method for its reliance on the ability to intuitively grasp or see essences. Aside from its significance for phenomenologists, the attack illuminates significant and little-explored tensions in the history of analytic philosophy as well. For after coming under the influence of Wittgenstein, Schlick proposed to replace Husserl''s account of the epistemology of propositions describing the overall structure of experience with his own account (...)
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  40. John Macnamara (1993). Cognitive Psychology and the Rejection of Brentano. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (2):117–137.
  41. Giorgio Marchetti (2010). Consciousness, Attention and Meaning. Nova Science Publishers.
    This book presents a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains both human consciousness and meanings through the working of attention. By arguing for a first-person approach to consciousness, this book offers a critical overview of the major theories and empirical findings on consciousness and attention, and exemplifies how one of the most difficult and fundamental conscious experiences to account for, that is, time, can be analyzed by adopting the kind of semantics developed within the presented theoretical framework: Attentional Semantics.
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  42. Christophe Menant (2008). Evolution as Connecting First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives of Consciousness (2008). Dissertation,
    First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point (...)
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  43. Benito Muller (2000/1). Proterosis and Noticing a Red Tint: An Essay Concerning Franz Brentano's Descriptive Psychology. Brentano Studien 9:267–278.
    The paper tries to analyze two notions, namely 'proterosis' ('Proterose') and 'proteraethesis' ('Proterasthese'), as used in these lectures to describe certain psychical phenomena, and to suggest a symbolic notation as a means of representing the results of this analysis. These results (and the notation) will be put to use in an interpretation of an uncharacteristically difficult passage of these lectures concerning the methodology of bringing someone to 'notice' something.
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  44. Eddy A. Nahmias (2005). The Problem of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/MIT Press
  45. Gregory Nixon (2011). Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  46. Alva Noë (2000). Experience and Experiment in Art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
    A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...)
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  47. J. Petranker (2003). Inhabiting Conscious Experience: Engaged Objectivity in the First-Person Study of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):3-23.
    First-person methodologies have been criticized for their inability to arrive at reliable and verifiable knowledge of the contents of conscious experience. Consciousness, however, is not its contents, but the cognitive capacity that makes those contents available. That capacity is directly and uniquely accessible to first-person inquiry, provided a suitable methodology can be developed. As a framework for such inquiry, this paper distinguishes two structures that give rise to conscious contents: narrative and story. While narratives are told, stories are inhabited. Stories (...)
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  48. Ian Phillips (2015). Consciousness and Criterion: On Block's Case for Unconscious Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    Block highlights two experimental studies of neglect patients which, he contends, provide ‘dramatic evidence’ for unconscious seeing. In Block's hands this is the highly non-trivial thesis that seeing of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur outside of phenomenal consciousness. Block's case for it provides an excellent opportunity to consider a large body of research on clinical syndromes widely held to evidence unconscious perception. I begin by considering in detail the two studies of neglect to which Block (...)
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  49. Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (9):1-16.
    First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects issuing first-person reports and other sources of (...)
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  50. Vincent A. Punzo & Emily Miller (2002). Investigating Conscious Experience Through the Beeper Project. Teaching of Psychology 29 (4):295-297.
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