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  1. William P. Alston (1972). Can Psychology Do Without Private Data? Behaviorism 1:71-102.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker, Science and the First-Person.
    I want to raise a question for which I have no definitive answer. The question is how to understand first-personal phenomena—phenomena that that can be discerned only from a first-personal point of view. The question stems from reflection on two claims: First, the claim of scientific naturalism that all phenomena can be described and explained by science; and second, the claim of science that everything within its purview is intersubjectively accessible, and hence that all science is constructed exclusively form the (...)
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  3. Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA.
    We should eventually understand how exactly first person phenomenal consciousness is generated. When we do, we should be able to enginner one for robots. This is the engineering thesis in machine consciousness.
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  4. Piotr Boltuc (2010). Sloman and H-Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):23-26.
  5. Franz Brentano (1982/1995). Descriptive Psychology. Routledge.
    Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is a key figure in the development of Twentieth Century thought. It was his work that set Husserl on to the road of phenomenology and intentionality, that inspired Meinong's theory of the object which influenced Bertrand Russell, and the entire Polish school of philosophy. ^Descriptive Psychology presents a series of lectures given by Brentano in 1887; they were the culmination of his work, and the clearest statement of his mature thought. It was this later period which proved (...)
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  6. Franz Brentano (1874/1973/1973). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.
  7. Franz Brentano (1874). Psychologie Vom Empirischen Standpunkte. Duncker & Humblot.
  8. Franz Brentano, The Concept and Purpose of Psychology.
    This is a selection from Chapter 1 of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.
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  9. David J. Chalmers (2004). How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. Mit Press. 1111--1119.
    In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda.
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  10. David J. Chalmers (1999). First-Person Methods in the Science of Consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin.
    As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our direct knowledge of subjective (...)
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  11. Tamlin C. Christensen (2004). Experience-Sampling Procedures: Are They Probes to Autonoetic Awareness? Dissertation, Boston College
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  12. D. Conrad (1996). Consciousness, Privacy, and Information. Biosystems 38:207-10.
  13. Daniel C. Dennett, The Fantasy of First-Person Science.
    A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions:
    Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, perception or dream?
    Kant: How is it possible for something even to _be_ a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?
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  14. Natalie Depraz, F. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.
    Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
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  15. Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Andrew A. Fingelkurts (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.
    To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing (...)
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  16. Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.) (2004). The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press.
    "The Cognitive Neurosciences III is a magnificent accomplishment. It covers topics trom ions to consciousness, from reflexes to social psychology. ...
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  17. Carl Ginsburg (2005). First-Person Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.
    The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The (...)
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  18. Amedeo Giorgi (2004). A Way to Overcome the Methodological Vicissitudes Involved in Researching Subjectivity. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 35 (1):1-25.
  19. A. Goldman (1997). Science, Publicity, and Consciousness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):525-45.
    A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which should give way? This paper argues against the publicity requirement and against a fallback (...)
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  20. Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.) (1998). Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996. MIT Press.
    Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness. Proceedings of the National ... Casti, JL 1996. Confronting science's logical limits. ...
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  21. Anthony I. Jack (ed.) (2004). Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    This phenomenon is an extension of the 'why trust the subject' question asked in the introduction ... critical use of verbal reports in cognitive science. ...
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  22. Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2003). Why Trust the Subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    It is a great pleasure to introduce this collection of papers on the use of introspective evidence in cognitive science. Our task as guest editors has been tremendously stimulating. We have received an outstanding number of contributions, in terms of quantity and quality, from academics across a wide disciplinary span, both from younger researchers and from the most experienced scholars in the field. We therefore had to redraw the plans for this project a number of times. It quickly became clear (...)
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  23. Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  24. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  25. Steven Lehar (2000). The Dimensions of Conscious Experience: A Quantitative Phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2).
    Psychology was originally formulated as the science of the _psyche_, i.e. the subjective side of the mind / brain barrier. However time and again it has been diverted from this objective in the supposed interest of scientific rigor. The Behaviorists proposed to transform psychology to a science of behavior, and today the Neuroreductionists propose to transform it to a science of neurophysiology. In the process they attempt to deny the very existence of conscious experience as valid object of scientific scrutiny. (...)
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  26. Paul M. Livingston (2002). Husserl and Schlick on the Logical Form of Experience. Synthese 132 (3):239-272.
    Over a period of several decades spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle, Schlick repeatedly attacked Husserl''s phenomenological method for its reliance on the ability to intuitively grasp or see essences. Aside from its significance for phenomenologists, the attack illuminates significant and little-explored tensions in the history of analytic philosophy as well. For after coming under the influence of Wittgenstein, Schlick proposed to replace Husserl''s account of the epistemology of propositions describing the overall structure of experience with his own account (...)
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  27. John Macnamara (1993). Cognitive Psychology and the Rejection of Brentano. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (2):117–137.
  28. Benito Muller (2000/1). Proterosis and Noticing a Red Tint: An Essay Concerning Franz Brentano's Descriptive Psychology. Brentano Studien 9:267–278.
    The paper tries to analyze two notions, namely 'proterosis' ('Proterose') and 'proteraethesis' ('Proterasthese'), as used in these lectures to describe certain psychical phenomena, and to suggest a symbolic notation as a means of representing the results of this analysis. These results (and the notation) will be put to use in an interpretation of an uncharacteristically difficult passage of these lectures concerning the methodology of bringing someone to 'notice' something.
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  29. Eddy A. Nahmias (2005). The Problem of Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
  30. Gregory Nixon (2011). Editor's Introduction: Transcending Self-Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (7):889-1022.
    What is this thing we each call “I” and consider the eye of consciousness, that which beholds objects in the world and objects in our minds? This inner perceiver seems to be the same I who calls forth memories or images at will, the I who feels and determines whether to act on those feelings or suppress them, as well as the I who worries and makes plans and attempts to avoid those worries and act on those plans. Am I (...)
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  31. Alva Noë (2000). Experience and Experiment in Art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9):8-9.
  32. J. Petranker (2003). Inhabiting Conscious Experience: Engaged Objectivity in the First-Person Study of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):3-23.
  33. Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (9):1-16.
    First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects issuing first-person reports and other sources of (...)
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  34. Vincent A. Punzo & Emily Miller (2002). Investigating Conscious Experience Through the Beeper Project. Teaching of Psychology 29 (4):295-297.
  35. Jonathan Shear (1996). The Hard Problem: Closing the Empirical Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.
  36. Evan Thompson (2001). Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.
    This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
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  37. Edward Bradford Titchener (1921). Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Psychology. American Journal of Psychology 32:108-120.
  38. F. Varela (1998). A Science of Consciousness as If Experience Mattered. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996. MIT Press.
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  39. F. J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (2003). The Point of View of the Researcher. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins. 115-154.
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  40. Francisco Varela & Jonathan Shear (1999). First-Person Methodologies: What, Why, How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):1-14.
  41. Max Velmans (1994). A Reflexive Science of Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 404--416.
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...)
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  42. Max Velmans (1994). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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  43. Sebastian Watzl & Wayne Wu (2012). Perplexities of Consciousness, by Eric Schwitzgebel. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (482):524-529.
    In this review of Eric Schwitzgebel's "Perplexities of Consciousness", we discuss the book's arguments in light of the role of attention in introspection.
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