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  1. Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
    Roderick Chisholm contrasts semantic theories that presuppose “the primacy of the intentional” with those that presuppose “the primacy of the linguistic”. In The First Person he attempts to develop an analysis of first person singular reference that presupposes the primacy of the intentional. In this paper I attempt to develop a semantics of first person singular reference (what I call ‘I-reference’) that presupposes the primacy of the linguistic. I do three things in the paper. First, I criticize Chisholm’s (and Frege’s) (...)
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  2. G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). The First Person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. 45–65.
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  3. S. Ashford (2001). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):298 – 300.
    Book Information The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. By José Luis Bermúdez. Bradford/MIT. Cambridge, MA. 1998. Pp. xv + 338. $US30.00.
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  4. Kent Bach, Content, Indexical.
    Many of our thoughts are about particular individuals (persons, things, places, etc.). For example, one can spot a certain Ferrari and think that it is red. What enables this thought to latch onto that particular object? It cannot be how the Ferrari looks, for this could not distinguish one Ferrari from another just like it. In general, how a thought represents something cannot determine which thing it represents. What a singular thought latches onto seems to depend also on features of (...)
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  5. L. R. Baker (2013). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84:19--38.
  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Ganeri, Jonardon., The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness and the First-Person Stance. Review of Metaphysics 67 (1):160-162.
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (2012). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  9. Gunnar Beck (1996). From Kant to Hegel—Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Theory of Self-Consciousness. History of European Ideas 22 (4):275-294.
    This article emphasizes Fichte's role as a central figure in the period of transition from Kantian moral universalism to Hegelian ontological collectivism and _Sittlichkeitsethik. Echoing Rousseau's insights into the sociological determinants of human consciousness and drawing on Herder's more comprehensive theory of the linguistic and cultural conditions of all human thought, Fichte, in his writings from 1796 onward, develops a radical reformulation and extension of Kant's theory of reason and self-consciousness. Fichte's theory of the origins and nature of consciousness and (...)
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  10. Kathy Behrendt (2003). The New Neo-Kantian and Reductionist Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):331-350.
    Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. I (...)
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  11. José Luis Bermúdez (2003). 'I'-Thoughts and Explanation: Reply to Garrett. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432–436.
    Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are not. The (...)
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  12. Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). The Sources of Self-Consciousness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):87-107.
    This paper explores the relation between two ways of thinking about the sources of self-consciousness. We can think about the sources of self-consciousness either in genetic terms (as the origins or precursors of self-conscious thoughts) or in epistemic terms (as the grounds of self-conscious judgements). Using Christopher Peacocke's account of self-conscious judgements in Being Known as a foil, this paper brings out some important ways in which we need to draw upon the sources of self-consciousness in the genetic sense for (...)
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  13. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Nonconceptual Self-Awareness and the Paradox of Self-Consciousness. In Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein und seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen. Mentis.
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  14. Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 10 (35).
  15. Jose Luis Bermudez (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.
  16. Sven Bernecker (1997). On Knowing One's Own Mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  17. Alexandre Billon (2014). Why Are We Certain That We Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  18. Matthew Brendan Boyle (forthcoming). Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  19. Cordula Brand (2013). Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW] Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  20. Ingar Brinck (1998). Self-Identification and Self-Reference. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.
    [1] To know who one is, and also know whether one's experiences really belong to oneself, do not normally present any problem. It nevertheless happens that people do not recognise themselves as they walk by a mirror or do not understand that they fit some particular description. But there are situations in which it really seems impossible to be wrong about oneself. Of that, Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote:
    It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel pain (...)
    In the passage in which this remark is found, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of use of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", he holds, involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error as concerns the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is. (shrink)
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  21. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 9--30.
  22. J. Campbell (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
  23. J. Campbell (1994). Past, Space, and Self. MIT Press.
    In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
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  24. John Campbell (2004). What is It to Know What 'I' Refers To? The Monist 87 (2):206-218.
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  25. Quassim Cassam (ed.) (1994). Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds. Contributions include "Introduction" by Gilbert Ryle, "Knowing One's Own Mind" by Donald Davidson, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" and "Introspection and the Self" by Sydney Shoemaker, "On the Observability of (...)
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  26. H. N. Castaneda, J. G. Hart & T. Kapitan (1999). The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness. Indiana University Press.
    This unique volume will appeal to those interested in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence as well as students of Castaneda and Latin American philosophy.
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  27. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989). The Reflexivity of Self-Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):27-58.
  28. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987). Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing. Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
  29. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1979). Philosophical Method and Direct Awareness of the Self. Grazer Philosophische Studien 8:1-58.
    Here are crucial data for any theory of the self, self-consciousness or the structure of experience. We discuss the fundamental structure of both indexical reference, especially first-term reference, and quasi-indexical reference, used in attributing first-person reference to others. Chisholm's ingenious account of direct awareness of self is tested against the two sets of data. It satisfies neither. Chisholm's definitions raise serious questions both about philosophical methodology and about the underlying ontology of individuation, identity, and predication. Chisholm's adverbial account of non-physical (...)
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  30. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967). Omniscience and Indexical Reference. Journal of Philosophy 64 (7):203-210.
  31. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1966). 'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness. Ratio 8 (December):130-57.
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  32. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1966). `He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness. Ratio 7 (2):130--57.
  33. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1966). ``He*: On the Logic of Self-Consciousness&Quot. Ratio 8:130-157.
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  34. A. J. Chien (1985). Demonstratives and Belief States. Philosophical Studies 47 (2):271 - 289.
  35. Roderick Chisholm (1981). The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. University of Minnesota Press.
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  36. Romane L. Clark (1988). Self Knowledge and Self Consciousness: Thoughts About Oneself. Topoi 7 (March):47-55.
    You and I reach for a dollar bill on the floor, each saying “I saw it first.” The content of what we say is identically the same. How then is your claim referred to you and mine to me? We argue that the reference of self-ascriptions is effected by the occasion of the occurrence of the first-person indexical rather than by the content of the thought or assertion which then occurs. That this is true has further implications for exotic, self-fulfilling (...)
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  37. Eros Corazza (2004). Essential Indexicals and Quasi-Indicators. Journal of Semantics 21 (4):341-374.
    In this paper I shall focus on Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators and I shall defend the following theses: (i) Essential indexicals (‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’) are intrinsically perspectival mechanisms of reference and, as such, they are not reducible to any other mechanism reference...
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  38. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2002). Who is I?(Indexical Reference, Answering Machine Paradox). Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1 - 21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
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  39. Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser (2012). Facets of Self-Consciousness-Special Issued Edited by Katja Crone, Kristine Musholt and Anna Strasser. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84.
  40. John Divers & Alexander Miller (1994). Best Opinion, Intention-Detecting and Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):239-245.
  41. Andy Egan (2010). Disputing About Taste. In Ted Warfield & Richard Feldman (eds.), Disagreement. OUP.
    i> “There’s no disputing about taste.” That’s got a nice ring to it, but it’s not quite the ring of truth. While there’s definitely something right about the aphorism – there’s a reason why it is, after all, an aphorism, and why its utterance tends to produce so much nodding of heads and muttering of “just so” and “yes, quite” – it’s surprisingly difficult to put one’s finger on just what the truth in the neighborhood is, exactly. One thing that’s (...)
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  42. Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
    The discussion in this book range over all the main kinds of referring expressions, starting with the work of Frege and Russell on singular reference.
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  43. Maite Ezcurdia (2001). Thinking About Myself. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.
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  44. Arthur E. Falk (1995). Consciousness and Self-Reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.
    Reflection on the self's way of being "in" consciousness yields two arguments for a theory of self-reference not based in any way all all on self-cognition. First, I show that one theory of self-reference predicts an experience of the self because the theory inadequately analyzes the semantical facts about indexicality. I construct a dilemma for this cognitivism, which it cannot get out of, for it requires even solitary self-reference to be based on some original self-knowledge, which is not available. I (...)
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  45. Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory, Past and Self. Synthese 160 (1):103-121.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...)
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  46. Manfred Frank (2007). Non-Objectal Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
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  47. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 203--239.
  48. Brian J. Garrett (2003). Bermudez on Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.
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  49. Thor Grünbaum (2012). First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--273.
  50. Marie Guillot (2013). The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts. Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...)
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