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  1. Raziel Abelson (1977). Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology. London: Macmillan.
  2. Torin Alter, Access Disunity Without Phenomenal Disunity: Tye on Split-Brain Cases.
    Consider the conscious states of a single subject at a time. Arguably, split-brain cases show that such states need not be jointly accessible. It is less clear that these cases also show that such states need not be jointly experienced. Michael Tye (2004) argues split-brain cases do have that implication, and Timothy Bayne and David Chalmers (2003) argue that they do not. I will develop two objections to Tye’s arguments. First, an analogy to blindsight on which he relies is questionable. (...)
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  3. Susan L. Anderson (1976). Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity of the Person. Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.
    The phenomenon of multiple personality--Like the "split-Brain" phenomenon--Involves a disintegration of the normally unified self to the point where one must question whether there is one, Or more than one, Person associated with the body even at a single moment in time. Besides the traditional problem of determining identity over time, There is now a new problem of personal identity--Determining identity at a single moment in time. We need the conceptual apparatus to talk about this new problem and a test, (...)
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  4. H. E. Baber (1983). The Lifetime Language. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):139 - 146.
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  5. James Baillie (1991). Split Brains and Single Minds. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:11-18.
    This paper challenges the widely held theory that split-brain patients have ‘two-minds’ and can thus be described as being two distinct persons. A distinction is made between the singularity of mind and the coherence of mind. It is stressed that ‘a single mind’ is not something posited to explain coherence among mental contents, but is merely a mark that such coherence holds to a certain degree. However, there is no sharp dividing line regarding what counts as a single mind. It (...)
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  6. Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
    How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I (...)
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  7. Y. Michael Barilan (2003). One or Two: An Examination of the Recent Case of the Conjoined Twins From Malta. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 28 (1):27 – 44.
    The article questions the assumption that conjoined twins are necessarily two people or persons by employing arguments based on different points of view: non-personal vitalism, the person as a sentient being, the person as an agent, the person as a locus of narrative and valuation, and the person as an embodied mind. Analogies employed from the cases of amputation, multiple personality disorder, abortion, split-brain patients and cloning. The article further questions the assumption that a conjoined twin's natural interest and wish (...)
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  8. Tim Bayne (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome (...)
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  9. Simon Beck (1992). Should We Tolerate People Who Split? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
  10. Marvin Belzer (2005). Self-Conception and Personal Identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an Eye on the Grip of the Unity Reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):126-164.
    Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...)
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  11. Henk Bij de Weg, Can a Person Break a World Record?
    Most philosophers in the analytical philosophy answer the question what personal identity is in psychological terms. Arguments for substantiating this view are mainly based on thought experiments of brain transfer cases and the like in which persons change brains. However, in these thought experiments the remaining part of the body plays only a passive part. In this paper I argue that the psychological approach of personal identity cannot be maintained, if the whole body is actively involved in the analysis, and (...)
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  12. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  13. Montserrat Bordes Solanas (1998). Filosofía en clave de ciencia ficción: las personas y sus condiciones de supervivencia en el tiempo. Teorema 17 (2):59-75.
    Disagreements about the criteria for personal identity are usually discussed by means of thought experiments, which describe counterfactual science fiction situations, in order to test the explanatory force of the different accounts. In this paper the basic analyzes of the survival of persons through time are presented and the higher plausibility of psychological criteria to solve the puzzle cases is stressed. I argue that because of their capability to account for fission and fusion cases psychological criteria rooted in a four-dimensionalist (...)
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  14. E. J. Borowski (1978). Puzzle Cases: The Wrong Approach to Personal Identity. Metaphilosophy 9 (3-4):252-258.
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  15. H. Skott Brill (2003). The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma. Social Theory and Practice 29 (3):419-430.
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  16. Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  17. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages. Dialogue 47 (02):377-.
    ABSTRACT: We begin by discussing some logical constraints on the psychological approach to personal identity. We consider a problem for the psychological approach that arises in fission cases. The problem engenders the need for a non-branching clause in a psychological account of the co-personality relation. We look at some difficulties in formulating such a clause. We end by rejecting a recently proposed formulation of non-branching. Our criticism of the formulation raises some interesting questions about the individuation of person stages.RÉSUMÉ: Ce (...)
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  18. Hugh S. Chandler, Parfit on Division.
    Parfit’s well known book, Reasons and Persons, argues, among other things, that ‘what matters’ in regard to ‘survival’ is not personal identity but something he calls ‘relation R.’ On this basis, plus other considerations, he rejects the ‘Self-interest’ theory as to what should be our aim in life. Here I show, or try to show, that his over-all argument is seriously defective. In particular, he fails to prove that personal identity is not what matters for survival.
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  19. Charles L. Y. Cheng (1978). On Puccetti's Two-Persons View of Man. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):605-616.
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  20. Lawrence H. Davis (1997). Cerebral Hemispheres. Philosophical Studies 87 (2):207-22.
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  21. L. Dewitt (1975). Consciousness, Mind, Self: The Implications of the Split-Brain Studies. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (March):41-47.
  22. Frederick Doepke (1996). The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument. Open Court Publishing Company.
    The Kinds of Things strongly supports the commonsense belief that in normal human life even changes in our deeply-held affections and ideals do not erode the ...
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  23. Douglas Ehring (1987). Personal Identity and Time Travel. Philosophical Studies 52 (3):427 - 433.
    Memory theories of personal identity are subject to the difficulty that distinct simultaneous person stages may both stand in the memory relation to an earlier person stage. Apparently, Such theories entail that these two duplicate person stages are stages of the same person, A claim argued to be "obviously false". In this paper, I argue that the characteristics of these duplication cases usually cited to support this claim do not provide adequate evidence to make it cogent.
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  24. Douglas E. Ehring (1999). Fission, Fusion, and the Parfit Revolution. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):329-32.
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  25. Douglas E. Ehring (1995). Personal Identity and the R-Relation: Reconciliation Through Cohabitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):337-346.
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  26. Matti Eklund (2002). Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence. Noûs 36 (3):465-485.
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  27. Robert Elliot (1978). Personal Identity, Reduplication and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Philosophical Papers 7 (2):73-75.
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  28. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  29. Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
    Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented (...)
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  30. Brian J. Garrett (2004). Johnston on Fission. Sorites 15 (December):87-93.
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  31. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2002). Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):34-54.
    Through careful analysis of a specific example, Parfit’s ‘fission argument’ for the unimportance of personal identity, I argue that our judgements concerning imaginary scenarios are likely to be unreliable when the scenarios involve disruptions of certain contingent correlations. Parfit’s argument depends on our hypothesizing away a number of facts which play a central role in our understanding and employment of the very concept under investigation; as a result, it fails to establish what Parfit claims, namely, that identity is not what (...)
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  32. Jerry H. Gill (1980). Of Split Brains and Tacit Knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.
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  33. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Brain Bisection and Personal Identity. Mind 95 (April):224-9.
    It has been argued that 'brain bisection' data leads us to abandon our traditional conception of personal identity. Nagel has remarked: The ultimate account of the unity of what we call a single mind consists of an enumeration of the types of functional integration that typify it. We know that these can be eroded in different ways and to different degrees. The belief that even in their complete version they can be explained by the presence of a numerically single subject (...)
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  34. R. Gillon (1996). Brain Transplantation, Personal Identity and Medical Ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 22 (3):131-132.
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  35. John D. Greenwood (1993). Split Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
    In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients.
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  36. Katherine Hawley (2005). Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
    Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. (...)
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  37. David Hershenov (2008). A Hylomorphic Account of Personal Identity Thought Experiments. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (3):481 - 502.
    Hylomorphism offers a third way between animalist approaches to personal identity that maintain psychology is irrelevant to our persistence and neo-Lockean accounts that deny we are animals. A Thomistic-inspired account is provided that explains the intuitive responses to thought experiments involving brain transplants and the transformation of organic bodies into inorganic ones without having to follow the animalist in abandoning the claim that it is our identity that matters in survival nor countenance the puzzles of spatially coincident entities that plague (...)
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  38. E. Hirsch (1991). Divided Minds. Philosophical Review 1 (January):3-30.
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  39. Marco Iacoboni (1997). Word Recognition in the Split Brain and PET Studies of Spatial Stimulus-Response Compatibility Support Contextual Integration. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):690-691.
    The neural substrates of context effects in word perception are still largely unclear. Interhemispheric priming phenomena in word recognition, typically observed in normal subjects, are absent in commissurotomized patients. This suggests that callosal fibers may provide contextual integration. In addition, certain characteristics of human frontal cortical fields subserving sensorimotor learning, as investigated by positron emission tomography, provide evidence for contextual integration not confined to the visual system. This supports the notion of common aspects of cortical computations in different cerebral areas.
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  40. Jens Johansson (2010). Parfit on Fission. Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...)
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  41. Jens Johansson (2009). Francescotti on Fission. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481.
    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a 'non-branching' requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests (...)
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  42. Mark Johnston (1989). Fission and the Facts. Philosophical Perspectives 3:369-97.
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  43. Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Reasoning Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge.
    According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...)
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  44. A. J. Lambert (1993). Attentional Interaction in the Split-Brain: Evidence From Negative Priming. Neuropsychologia 31 (4):313-324.
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  45. J. Levy (1977). Manifestations and Implications of Shifting Hemi-Inattention in Commissurotomy Patients. Advances in Neurology 18:83-92.
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  46. Joseph Margolis (1975). Puccetti on Brains, Minds, and Persons. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):275-280.
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  47. Charles E. Marks (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind. MIT Press.
  48. R. Martin (1995). Fission Rejuvenation. Philosophical Studies 80 (1):17-40.
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  49. Carl A. Matheson (1990). Consciousness and Synchronic Identity. Dialogue 523 (04):523-530.
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  50. Trenton Merricks (1997). Fission and Personal Identity Over Time. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
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