|Summary||"Formalism about Legal Reasoning" refers to the use of (often logic-based) formalisms to shed light on legal reasoning. "Formal Models of Legal Reasoning," in contrast refers to the use of such formalisms to model actual legal reasoning. Some works fit into both categories. The former is also apt for discussions of the limits of the latter. Both categories apply best to modeling or shedding light on judicial reasoning, or on the analysis of legal texts (be they statutes, constitutions [written or not], regulations, or exegeses of these), but are less applicable to modeling or shedding light on the legislative or regulatory processes which produce these.|
|Key works||Gardner 1987 is a general key work, while Gordon 1995 introduces dialogical models and dialogue logic, more generally, and discusses the issue of epistemic logic in formal models of law. The seminal book Toulmin 2003 indirectly contributed far more to formal modeling using logic than the author intended, because for each objection Toulmin raised to the use of formal logic as a model, subsequent authors came along and found means of answering them within logic(s).|
|Introductions||Hamfelt 1995 is a wonderful introduction to formal modeling of law, using classical logic as a framework. The issue of epistemic logic in formal models of law is introduced extensively in Hage 2003.|
- Formalism about Legal Reasoning (47)
- Realism about Legal Reasoning (4)
- Indeterminacy of Legal Reasoning (9)
- Legal Reasoning and Adjudication, Misc (44)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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