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  1. Kenneth M. Adams (1991). Peer Review: An Unflattering Picture. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (1):135-136.
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  2. I. Alon (2001). Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Power of Disruptive Technologies. Knowledge, Technology & Policy 13 (4):138-139.
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  3. John Anderson (1926). Discussions: Propositions and Judgments. Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  4. John Anderson (1926). Propositions and Judgments. Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  5. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  6. Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving (2012). Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.
    We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen's Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall for an (...)
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  7. Nick Baigent & Daniel Eckert (2004). Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 56 (4):359-366.
    An impossibility result for completely abstract social aggregation rules is presented. It is shown that non-imposition and a new no-veto property (two properties in the spirit of the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship respectively) are incompatible with an inter-profile consistency condition formulated in terms of proximity preservation.
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  8. Jean-Marie Blin (1973). Preference Aggregation and Statistical Estimation. Theory and Decision 4 (1):65-84.
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  9. R. Bradley & Wagner (2012). Realistic Opinion Aggregation: Lehrer-Wagner with a Finite Set of Opinion Values. [REVIEW] Episteme 9 (2):91-99.
    An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable (...)
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  10. Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
  11. Richard Bradley & Thompson (2012). A Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule. Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
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  12. Rachael Briggs (2012). The Normative Standing of Group Agents. Episteme 9 (3):283-291.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that groups of people can be agents – beings that believe, desire and act. Their account combines a non-reductive realist view of group attitudes, on which groups literally have attitudes that cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitudes of their members, with methodological individualism, on which good explanations of group-level phenomena should not posit forces above individual attitudes and behaviors. I then discuss the main normative conclusion that LP draw from the claim that (...)
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  13. V. C. C. (1956). Peer Gynt. Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):519-519.
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  14. John Cable (2013). More Equal Than Others: A View From the Grassroots. Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 27.
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  15. David Christensen (2014). Conciliation, Uniqueness and Rational Toxicity. Noûs 49 (3).
    Conciliationism holds that disagreement of apparent epistemic peers often substantially undermines rational confidence in our opinions. Uniqueness principles say that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to any given batch of total evidence. The two views are often thought to be tightly connected. This paper distinguishes two ways of motivating conciliationism, and two ways that conciliationism may be undermined by permissive accounts of rationality. It shows how conciliationism can flourish under certain strongly permissive accounts of rationality. This (...)
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  16. David Coady (2010). Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
    I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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  17. Stewart Cohen (2013). Equal Weight View. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press 98.
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  18. Tim Dare (2010). Disagreeing About Disagreement in Law: The Argument From Theoretical Disagreement. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):1-15.
    Ronald Dworkin argues that disagreement in hard cases is ‘theoretical’ rather than empirical and of central importance to our understanding of law, showing ‘plain fact’ theories such as H. L. A. Hart’s sophisticated legal positivism to be false. The argument from theoretical disagreement targets positivism’s commitment to idea that the criteria a norm must meet to be valid in a given jurisdiction are constituted by a practice of convergent behavior by legal officials. The ATD suggests that in hard cases there (...)
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  19. Franz Dietrich, Opinion Pooling on General Agendas.
    How can di¤erent individuals’probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’ of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for many practical applications. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. Our main theorems characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for large classes of agendas, with standard results as special cases.
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  20. Franz Dietrich & C. List, Opinion Pooling on General Agendas: Linearity or Just Neutrality?
    How can di¤erent individuals’probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Although there are several classic results on this problem, they all assume that the ‘agenda’ of relevant events forms a -algebra, an overly demanding assumption for many practical applications. We drop this assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. Our main theorems characterize linear pooling and neutral pooling for large classes of agendas, with standard results as special cases.
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  21. Igor Douven (2009). Uniqueness Revisited. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.
    Various authors have recently argued that you cannot rationally stick to your belief in the face of known disagreement with an epistemic peer, that is, a person you take to have the same evidence and judgmental skills as you do. For, they claim, because there is but one rational response to any body of evidence, a disagreement with an epistemic peer indicates that at least one of you is not responding rationally to the evidence. Given that you take your peer (...)
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  22. Igor Douven & Jan-Willem Romeijn (2007). The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):301-319.
    List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.
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  23. S. Fabrice & R. Ghanea-Hercock (2004). Beyond Anarchy: Self-Organized Topology for Peer-to-Peer Networks. Complexity 9 (2):49-53.
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  24. Perm C. Fishburn, Algebraic Aggregation Theory.
    An aggregation procedure merges a list of objects into a representative object. This paper considers the problem of aggregating n rows in an n-by-m matrix into a summary row, where every entry is an element in an algebraic field. It focuses on consistent aggregators, which require each entry in the summary row to depend only on its column entries in the matrix and to be the same as the column entry if the column is constant. Consistent aggregators are related to (...)
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  25. Peter C. Fishburn & William V. Gehrlein (1982). Majority Efficiencies for Simple Voting Procedures: Summary and Interpretation. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 14 (2):141-153.
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  26. Luciano Floridi (2002). On Defining Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Information. Social Epistemology 16 (1):37 – 49.
    This paper analyses the relations between philosophy of information (PI), library and information science (LIS) and social epistemology (SE). In the first section, it is argued that there is a natural relation between philosophy and LIS but that SE cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for LIS. SE should rather be seen as sharing with LIS a common ground, represented by the study of information, to be investigated by a new discipline, PI. In the second section, the nature of PI is (...)
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  27. Karyn L. Freedman (2013). Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk. Dialogue 52 (3):587-604.
    In this paper, I develop an interest-relative theory of justification in order to answer the question, “How can I maintain that P when someone whom I consider to be my epistemic peer maintains that not-P?” The answer to this question cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone, I argue, since justification cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone. Rather, in order to determine whether a subject S is justified in believing that P at time t, we need to (...)
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  28. Joseph S. Fulda (1998). A New Standard for Appropriation, with Some Remarks on Aggregation. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (4):6-11.
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  29. C. Genest, S. Weerahandi & J. V. Zidek (1984). Aggregating Opinions Through Logarithmic Pooling. Theory and Decision 17 (1):61-70.
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  30. William Gerber (1958). The Significance of Disagreement Among Philosophers. Hibbert Journal 57:368.
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  31. Alvin Goldman & Moshe Shaked (1993). Comment. Social Epistemology 7 (3):249 – 253.
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  32. Robert E. Goodin (2009). Rationalising Discursive Anomalies. Theoria 56 (119):1-13.
    Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.
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  33. K. Gordon (1924). Group Judgments in the Field of Lifted Weights. Journal of Experimental Psychology 7 (5):398.
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  34. Michel Grabisch (2006). Aggregation on Bipolar Scales. In Harrie de Swart, Ewa Orlowska, Gunther Smith & Marc Roubens (eds.), Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments Ii. Springer 355--371.
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  35. Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger (eds.) (2010). Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Logic Journal of the IGPL (Special Issue).
    Special issue. With contributions by Rogier De Langhe and Matthias Greiff, Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger, Carl Wagner, Paul Weirich, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla.
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  36. Stephan Hartmann & Gabriella Pigozzi (2006). Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking. In Jerome Lang & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Computational Social Choice 2006. University of Amsterdam
    The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The dificulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the (...)
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  37. Iwao Hirose (2014). Moral Aggregation. OUP Usa.
    This book elucidates the theoretical structure and scope of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation--a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals--and defends a form of aggregation -- formal aggregation -- that resolves a variety of outstanding problems arising from the conventional understanding of aggregation, including the Number Problem concerning the moral relevance of the number of individuals.
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  38. Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2015). Epistemic Modals and Credal Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.
    Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does (...)
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  39. Yoko Imaizumi (1988). Familial Aggregation of Consanguineous Marriages in Japan. Journal of Biosocial Science 20 (1):99.
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  40. Edward James (2012). Too Soon to Say. Philosophy 87 (03):421-442.
    (1) Rupert Read charges that Rawls culpably overlooks the politicized Euthyphro: Do we accept our political perspective because it is right or is it right because we accept it? (2) This charge brings up the question of the deficiency dilemma: Do others disagree with us because of our failures or theirs? —where the two dilemmas appear to be independent of each other and lead to the questions of the logic of deficiency, moral epistemic deficiency, epistemic peers, and the hardness of (...)
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  41. Serguei Kaniovski & Alexander Zaigraev (2011). Optimal Jury Design for Homogeneous Juries with Correlated Votes. Theory and Decision 71 (4):439-459.
    In a homogeneous jury, in which each vote is correct with the same probability, and each pair of votes correlates with the same correlation coefficient, there exists a correlation-robust voting quota, such that the probability of a correct verdict is independent of the correlation coefficient. For positive correlation, an increase in the correlation coefficient decreases the probability of a correct verdict for any voting rule below the correlation-robust quota, and increases that probability for any above the correlation-robust quota. The jury (...)
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  42. Christoph Kelp & Igor Douven (2012). Sustaining a Rational Disagreement. In H. DeRegt, S. Hartmann & S. Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 101--110.
    Much recent discussion in social epistemology has focussed on the question of whether peers can rationally sustain a disagreement. A growing number of social epistemologists hold that the answer is negative. We point to considerations from the history of science that favor rather the opposite answer. However, we also explain how the other position can appear intuitively attractive.
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  43. Amir Konigsberg (2013). Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss. Episteme 10 (1):87-97.
    In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would be acceptable and unproblematic to regard as (...)
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  44. Jennifer Lackey (ed.) (2012). New Essays on Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  45. Julien Laflaquière (2005). Les « autres » applications des technologies Peer-to-Peer. Multitudes 2 (2):59-68.
    In the flow of information concerning Peer-to-Peer, it is difficult to get away from the apparently inexhaustible topic of music file sharing. This article invites us to refocus our attention towards the vast diversity of possible uses of the P2P technologies. After a survey of a few examples, the article denounces the ongoing confusion between an innovative and promising technology and the uses to which it can be subjected.
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  46. Jean Laine, Michel Le Breton & Alain Trannoy (1986). Group Decision Making Under Uncertainty a Note on the Aggregation of “Ordinal Probabilities”. Theory and Decision 21 (2):155-161.
    This paper is a first attempt to study the problem of aggregation of individual ordinal probabilistic beliefs in an Arrowian framework. We exhibit some properties an aggregation rule must fulfil; in particular we prove the existence of a “quasi-dictator”.
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  47. Louisa Lam & Ching Y. Suen (1996). Majority Vote of Even and Odd Experts in a Polychotomous Choice Situation. Theory and Decision 41 (1):13-36.
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  48. Betsy Carol Postow Latta (1970). A Conciliatory Approach to Morals. Dissertation, Yale University
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  49. Carl Lebeck (2005). Constitutions, Disagreement and Rationality: A Reply to Cerar. Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 91 (2):266-272.
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  50. Matthew Lee (2014). Conciliationism Without Uniqueness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 88:161-188.
    I defend Conciliationism: rationality requires belief revision of epistemic peers who find themselves in disagreement and lack dispute-independent reason to suspect each other of error. argues that Conciliationists are committed to the Uniqueness Thesis: a given body of evidence rationalizes a unique degree of confidence for a given proposition. cogently critique Kelly's argument and propose an improved version. I contend that their version of the argument is unsound, and I offer some friendly amendments. But I show that even this amended (...)
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