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  1. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen, Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  2. Richard Bradley (2005). Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
  3. Richard Bradley & Thompson (2012). A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule. Episteme 9 (1):63-79.
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
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  4. Rachael Briggs (2012). The Normative Standing of Group Agents. Episteme 9 (3):283-291.
    Christian List and Philip Pettit (henceforth LP) argue that groups of people can be agents – beings that believe, desire and act. Their account combines a non-reductive realist view of group attitudes, on which groups literally have attitudes that cannot be analyzed in terms of the attitudes of their members, with methodological individualism, on which good explanations of group-level phenomena should not posit forces above individual attitudes and behaviors. I then discuss the main normative conclusion that LP draw from the (...)
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  5. David Coady (2010). Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
    I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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  6. Luciano Floridi (2002). On Defining Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Information. Social Epistemology 16 (1):37 – 49.
    This paper analyses the relations between philosophy of information (PI), library and information science (LIS) and social epistemology (SE). In the first section, it is argued that there is a natural relation between philosophy and LIS but that SE cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for LIS. SE should rather be seen as sharing with LIS a common ground, represented by the study of information, to be investigated by a new discipline, PI. In the second section, the nature of PI is (...)
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  7. Alvin Goldman & Moshe Shaked (1993). Comment. Social Epistemology 7 (3):249 – 253.
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  8. Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger (eds.) (2010). Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Logic Journal of the IGPL (special issue).
    Special issue. With contributions by Rogier De Langhe and Matthias Greiff, Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger, Carl Wagner, Paul Weirich, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla.
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  9. Stephan Hartmann & Gabriella Pigozzi (2006). Merging Judgments and the Problem of Truth-Tracking. In Jerome Lang & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Computational Social Choice 2006. University of Amsterdam.
    The problem of the aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. The dificulty lies in the fact that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective outcome. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such dilemmas as the discursive paradox. So far, three procedures have been proposed to overcome the paradox: the premise-based and conclusion-based procedures on the (...)
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  10. Christian List (2006). Introduction. Episteme 3 (3):139-140.
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  11. Karl R. Popper (1979). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.
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  12. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.
    In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between (...)
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  13. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Kuhn Vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science, Part II: How to Strike the Balance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):161-168.
    This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules of scientific method.
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  14. Frederick Schmitt (2004). What Are the Aims of Education? Episteme 1 (3):223-234.
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  15. Frederick Schmitt (1988). On the Road to Social Epistemic Interdependence. Social Epistemology 2 (4):297 – 307.
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  16. Frederick F. Schmitt (1998). Realism, Antirealism and Epistemic Truth. Social Epistemology 12 (3):267 – 287.
  17. Gerhard Schurz (2009). Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games. Episteme 6 (2):200-220.
    The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally (...)
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  18. Gerhard Schurz, Markus Werning & Alvin I. Goldman (eds.) (2009). Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman. Rodopi.
    The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman¿s replies in the sixth ...
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  19. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology. Erkenntnis 76 (1):59-72.
    This paper addresses the meta-epistemological dispute over the basis of epistemic evaluation from the standpoint of meliorative epistemology. Meliorative epistemology aims at guiding our epistemic practice to better results, and it comprises two levels of epistemic evaluation. At the social level (meliorative social epistemology) appropriate experts conduct evaluation for the community, so that epistemic evaluation is externalist since each epistemic subject in the community need not have access to the basis of the experts' evaluation. While at the personal level (meliorative (...)
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  20. Nico Stehr (1998). The University in Knowledge Societies. Social Epistemology 12 (1):33 – 42.
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  21. William J. Talbott (2002). The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):199–206.
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  22. Elizabeth Tropman & Patrick McKee (2011). “ S Knows That P ” Expanded: Apology 20 D-24 B. Social Epistemology 24 (1):29-43.
    There are calls to expand the schema “ S knows that p ” to accommodate ways of knowing that are socially important but neglected in recent epistemology. A wider, more adequate conception of human knowing is needed that will include interested or motivated inquirers as “S,” and personal traits of persons as “ p .” Historically important treatments of knowing that accommodate these features deserve examination as part of the effort to create a broader epistemology. We find such a treatment (...)
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  23. Sylvia Wenmackers, Danny E. P. Vanpoucke & Igor Douven (2014). Rationality: A Social-Epistemology Perspective. Frontiers in Psychology 5 (581).
    Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an “individualistic” perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these (...)
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  24. Sylvia Wenmackers, Danny E. P. Vanpoucke & Igor Douven (2012). Probability of Inconsistencies in Theory Revision. European Physical Journal B 85 (1):44 (15).
    We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their belief states by averaging (in a specified way) the belief states of other agents in the community. The agents in our model have a rich belief state, involving multiple independent issues which are interrelated in such a way that they form a theory of the world. Our main goal is to calculate the probability for an agent to end up in an inconsistent belief state due to (...)
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  25. James Wong (2000). Book Review: Real Knowing: New Versions of Coherence Theory. By Linda Martin Alcoff. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. [REVIEW] Hypatia 15 (3):192-198.
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Common Knowledge
  1. Rodrigo Laera (2012). Garantía y Cooperación Epistémica. Logos 21:193-211.
    This paper discusses there is no sustainable theoretical alternative for building knowledge without principles including cooperation –aimed at the preparation and distribution of beliefs– among individuals. This principle helps to conceive both the relation among internalist and externalist theories, and a cognitive explanation based on the concept of epistemic warrant. The concluding remark is that concepts, like evidence or reliability, can only be conceived as skills of subjects belonging to a community.
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  2. Nicholas John Munn (2012). The New Political Blogosphere. Social Epistemology 26 (1):55-70.
    This article discusses the current epistemological status of the political blogosphere, in light both of the concerns raised by Alvin Goldman in his 2008 paper ?The Social Epistemology of Blogging? and the recent drastic changes in the structure of the blogosphere. I argue that the political blogosphere replicates epistemically beneficial functions of the mainstream media for the functioning of democracy, and defend this claim from objections to the blogosphere that have been levelled by Goldman and Richard Posner. I then provide (...)
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  3. María G. Navarro (2013). El Razonamiento Ordinario y Sus Heurísticas. In Magda Bandera (ed.), La Uni en la calle. Libro de textos. La marea ediciones.
    Las heurísticas son procedimientos de estimación utilizados por todos nosotros al razonar en nuestra vida ordinaria.
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  4. Cedric Paternotte (2013). The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    Over the last three decades, joint action has received various definitions, which for all their differences share many features. However, they cannot fit some perplexing cases of weak joint action, such as demonstrations, where agents rely on distinct epistemic sources, and as a result, have no first-hand knowledge about each other. I argue that one major reason why the definition of such collective actions is akin to the classical ones is that it crucially relies on the concept of common knowledge. (...)
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  5. Cedric Paternotte (2011). Being Realistic About Common Knowledge: A Lewisian Approach. Synthese 183 (2):249-276.
  6. Lucinda Vandervort (2005). Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief in Consent. Canadian Bar Review 84 (1):89-105.
    Despite amendments to the sexual assault provisions in the Criminal Code, decisions about the availability and operation of the defence of belief in consent remain vulnerable to the influence of legally extraneous considerations. The author proposes an approach designed to limit the influence of such considerations.
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  7. Michael Wilby (2010). The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100.
    Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer’s iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, (...)
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Formal Social Epistemology, Misc
  1. Betsy Jane Becker (1996). Discourse Synthesis in Meta-Analysis. Social Epistemology 10 (1):89 – 105.
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  2. Endre Begby (2013). The Epistemology of Prejudice. Thought 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
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  3. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  4. Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List (forthcoming). Aggregating Causal Judgments. The University of Chicago Press on Behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association: Philosophy of Science.
    Decision making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals’ causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network (...)
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  5. Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder (2014). How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement. Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381.
    How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...)
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  6. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  7. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized -- Part One: General Agendas.
    How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a sigma-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or (...)
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  8. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  9. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2004). A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence. Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.
    Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common cause is a (...)
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  10. Simon J. Evnine (2005). Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups. Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
    The thesis of the paper is that persons are similar to a kind of group: multiple-expert epistemic unities (MEUs). MEUs are groups in which there are multiple experts on whom other members of the group model their opinion. An example would be a group of children playing Telephone. Any child nearer the source is an 'expert' for any child further away. I argue that, with certain important qualifications, it is both rational and necessary for persons to treat their future selves (...)
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  11. James Hawthorne, Voting in Search of the Public Good: The Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments.
    I argue for an epistemic conception of voting, a conception on which the purpose of the ballot is at least in some cases to identify which of several policy proposals will best promote the public good. To support this view I first briefly investigate several notions of the kind of public good that public policy should promote. Then I examine the probability logic of voting as embodied in two very robust versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and some related results. (...)
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  12. Christian List (2012). Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction. In U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier.
    The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, (...)
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  13. Christian List (2011). Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
    While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be (...)
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  14. Christian List (2005). Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective. Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the case (...)
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  15. Christian List (2004). On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
    that a defendant is guilty (a patient has condition C), and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors (diagnostic tests) have voted for H, and a minority of k n – h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By Condorcet's formula, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h – k, but (...)
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  16. Christian List (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective From Social Choice Theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck.
    Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, (...)
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  17. Christian List, Collective Wisdom: Lessons From the Theory of Judgment Aggregation.
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In particular, it has been suggested that groups are good at meeting what I call the correspondence challenge (as in correspondence with the facts): By pooling information that is dispersed among the individual members, a group can arrive at judgments that accurately track some independent truths (...)
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  18. Christian List & Robert E. Goodin (2001). Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...)
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