|Summary||"Formalism about Legal Reasoning" refers to the use of (often logic-based) formalisms to shed light on legal reasoning. "Formal Models of Legal Reasoning," in contrast refers to the use of such formalisms to model actual legal reasoning. Some works fit into both categories. The former is also apt for discussions of the limits of the latter. Both categories apply best to modeling or shedding light on judicial reasoning, or on the analysis of legal texts (be they statutes, constitutions [written or not], regulations, or exegeses of these), but are less applicable to modeling or shedding light on the legislative or regulatory processes which produce these.|
|Key works||As the key works, the debate between Haack 2007 and Bulygin 2008 is most interesting, and a good starting point on the limits if any of formal modeling of law. See also Deleted forthcoming.|
|Introductions||Hage et al 1993 is an excellent book-length article introducing the subject in great depth; it discusses the difficulties and the subtleties involved, reflected in the large number of classifications given the monograph.|
- Realism about Legal Reasoning (4)
- Indeterminacy of Legal Reasoning (9)
- Formal Models of Legal Reasoning (86)
- Legal Reasoning and Adjudication, Misc (45)
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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