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  1. George Allan (2005). On Foundationalism. Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-198.
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  2. Karl-Otto Apel & Benjamin Gregg (1993). Can an Ultimate Foundation of Knowledge Be Non-Metaphysical? Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):171 - 190.
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  3. Robert Audi (1982). Axiological Foundationalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):163 - 183.
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  4. Gordon Barnes (2003). Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Philosophical Books 44 (1):53-62.
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  5. R. J. Bernstein (2003). Anti_foundationalism. In Gerard Delanty & Piet Strydom (eds.), Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings. Open University.
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  6. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  7. Nigel Blake (1996). The Democracy We Need: Situation, Post-Foundationalism and Enlightenment. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (2):215–238.
  8. Richard B. Brandt (1995). Foundationalism for Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):51-65.
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  9. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2014). Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought. Lexington Books.
    Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.
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  10. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Stellung der Theorie der Intersubjektivität im System der Husserlschen transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Conceptus 32 (80):99-138.
    Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...)
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  11. Predrag Cicovacki (1993). Is Epistemological Foundationalism Untenable? Dialogos 28 (61):139-148.
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  12. James Van Cleve (1979). Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle. Philosophical Review 88 (1):55 - 91.
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  13. Mark Colby (1999). The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason. Inquiry 42 (1):25 – 47.
    One consequence of the later Wittgenstein's influential critique of epistemological foundationalism has been to convince many contemporary philosophers that the ideal of universal and necessary cognitive grounds for moral or political norms is illusory. Recent neo-Wittgensteinian accounts of practical reason attempt to formulate a conception of a post-foundational politics in which a political ethos can be legitimate, rational or just even if its informing practices and cognitive standards lack foundational justification. Against these appropriations of Wittgenstein, I argue that his account (...)
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  14. Andrew Cortens (2002). Foundationalism and the Regress Argument. Disputatio 12:1 - 16.
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  15. Jan Czerniawski (2013). Obrona Protofizyki I Fundamentalizmu / A Defense of Protophysics and Foundationalism. Annales Umcs. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia) 38 (1):147-157.
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  16. Michael Davis (2011). A Little Give and Take: Problems in the Empiricism of Sellars and His Followers. Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):53-67.
    The starting point of this paper is Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist empiricism as found in his discussion of the Myth of the Given. Sellars attacks the Myth from two main angles, corresponding to the two elements of empiricism: the idea that our beliefs are justified by the world, and the idea that our concepts are derived from experience. In correctly attacking the second, Sellars is also, incorrectly, led to attack the first. Thus, Sellars rejects the commonsensical idea that at least (...)
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  17. Jane Duran (2000). Naturalized Foundationalism. Critica 32 (94):29 - 41.
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  18. Jane Duran (1995). Chisholmian Foundationalism and the Naturalization of Epistemology. Critica 27 (81):55 - 78.
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  19. Robert J. Fogelin (1981). When I Look at a Tomato There is Much I Cannot See. The Monist 64 (January):109-123.
  20. James B. Freeman (1996). Why Classical Foundationalism Cannot Provide a Proper Account of Premise Acceptability. Inquiry 15 (4):17-26.
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  21. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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  22. Richard A. Fumerton (1988). Foundationalism, Conceptual Regress, and Reliabilism. Analysis 48 (4):178 - 184.
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  23. Richard Fumerton, Laurence Bonjour, John L. Pollock & Alvin Plantinga (2000). Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  24. Richard Garrett (1991). Are There Foundations for Human Knowledge? Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):19 - 33.
    Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge has become one of the most complicated and esoteric areas of philosophy. This paper attempts to defend a form of foundationalism in epistemology which does not require the reader to be familiar with the philosophical literature; so, it should be of interest to psychologists concerned with the nature and character of human knowledge as well as, of course, to philosophers. The heart of the foundationalism defended here is the thesis that a belief is epistemically (...)
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  25. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  26. John Greco (1998). Foundationalism and Philosophy of Religion. In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject. Georgetown University Press. 35.
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  27. John Greco (1988). Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-Referential Incoherence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:187-193.
    Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundationalist can provide arguments which ground the criteria in question in properly basic propositions.
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  28. Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  29. Thomas Guarino (1989). Foundationalism and Contemporary Theology. Philosophy and Theology 3 (3):241-252.
    The article discusses current philosophical issues in foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as well as their ramifications for theological epistemology. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the anti-foundationalist theological current are also assessed.
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  30. Lars Bo Gundersen (2003). Dispositional Theories of Knowledge a Defence of Aetiological Foundationalism. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  31. Aw Van Haaften & G. L. M. Snik (forthcoming). Foundational Development Without Foundationalism. Philosophy of Education.
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  32. R. Haller (1988). Praxeological Foundationalism. Inquiry 31:339.
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  33. Hendrik Hart (1999). Faith After Foundationalism. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):123-124.
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  34. Gary Hatfield (2006). The Cartesian Circle. In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. 122--141.
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  35. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  36. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  37. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2006). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  38. Daniel M. Johnson & Adam C. Pelser (2014). Foundational Beliefs and Persuading with Humor. Faith and Philosophy 31 (3):267-285.
    The most important and common solution to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s regress problem is foundationalism. Reason-giving must stop somewhere, argues the foundationalist, and the fact that it does stop does not threaten knowledge or justification. The foundationalist has a problem, though; while foundationalism might adequately answer skepticism, it does not allow for a satisfying reply to the skeptic. The feature that makes a belief foundationally justified is not the sort of thing that can be given to another as a reason. Thus, (...)
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  39. Jeremy Koons (2005). Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification. Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
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  40. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
    attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting in some sense. Thus, (...)
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  41. Živan Lazović (1993). Wittgenstein and Basic Beliefs. Theoria 36 (3-4):7-20.
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  42. Byeong D. Lee (2013). BonJour's Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and His Explanatory Account. Dialogue 52 (2):287-304.
    BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour’s notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called “constitutive awareness of content” from his conception of conscious occurrent belief. But this conception also faces an (...)
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  43. William G. Lycan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
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  44. Wojciech Małecki (2010). Experiential Foundationalism, Linguistic Practice, and Historicity. Human Affairs 20 (3).
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  45. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2000). Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
    John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and (...)
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  46. Paul K. Moser (1995). Foundationalism. In Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 276--278.
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  47. Paul K. Moser (1987). Does Foundationalism Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Studies 31 (48):183-196.
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  48. Bence Nanay (2005). Foundationalism Strikes Back? In Search of Epistemically Basic Mental States. In Rene van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser & Ron Rood (eds.), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge. Ontos-Verlag. 4--41.
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  49. G. C. Nerlich (1960). Regress Arguments in Plato. Mind 69 (273):88-90.
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  50. Kai Nielsen (1988). The Tradition in Retreat. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:195-200.
    The traditional ways in which philosophy is conceived are in retreat. Classical foundationalism, in both its epistemological and its semantical phrasing, not only rests on a mistake, its very self-image of philosophy is both presumptuous and unsound. Richard Rorty's work has done much to establish these things. Most of his critics have accepted his critique of classical foundationalism while continuing to espouse either some form of modest foundationalism or a coherentist naturalized epistemology. But in doing so they have, either explicitly (...)
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