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  1. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  2. Nigel Blake (1996). The Democracy We Need: Situation, Post-Foundationalism and Enlightenment. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (2):215–238.
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  3. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Stellung der Theorie der Intersubjektivität im System der Husserlschen transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Conceptus 32 (80):99-138.
    Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...)
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  4. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  5. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  6. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  7. Mark Pastin (1978). ``Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant&Quot. In Pappas & Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  8. D. Z. Phillips (1988). Faith After Foundationalism. Routlege.
    1 Foundationalism and Religion: a Philosophical Scandal It has been one of the scandals of the philosophy of religion that foundationalism in epistemology ...
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  9. John Pollock (1970/1975). Knowledge and Justification. Princeton University Press.
    Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).
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  10. Steven Rappaport (1992). A Mistake About Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):111-125.
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  11. Steven Rappaport (1989). Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism. Dialogue 28 (03):433-.
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  12. E. S. Shirley (1987). Chisholm's Foundationalism and His Theory of Perception. Erkenntnis 27 (3):371 - 378.
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  13. Edward S. Shirley (1980). A Flaw in Chisholm's Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):155 - 160.
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Foundationalism and Coherentism
  1. William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  2. William P. Alston (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted? Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
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  3. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  4. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  5. Robert Audi (1988). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 2:407-442.
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  6. Robert Audi (1980). Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  7. Bruce Aune (1967). Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation? In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House.
  8. Laurence BonJour (1999). The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell.
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  9. Yves Bouchard (2007). The Foundationalism–Coherentism Opposition Revisited: The Case for Complementarism. Foundations of Science 12 (4).
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
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  10. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  11. Matthew Burstein (2006). Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition. In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi.
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  12. Hasok Chang (2007). Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 82 (61).
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  13. Joseph Cruz, Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism.
    Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement (Bonjour, 1999; Dancy, 1989; Haack, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999). Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a belief, one intuitive and appealing (...)
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  14. Jordan Curnutt (1998). Huang on Wittgenstein on Religious Epistemology. Religious Studies 34 (1):81-89.
    Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a 'reflective equilibrium' with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different 'forms of life'. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the (...)
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  15. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  16. Sven Ove Hansson (2007). The False Dichotomy Between Coherentism and Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):290-300.
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  17. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
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  18. Patrick Hawley (2008). What Justifies That? Synthese 160 (1):47 - 61.
    I clarify and defuse an argument for skepticism about justification with the aid of some results from recent linguistic theory. These considerations illuminate debates about the structure of justification.
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  19. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
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  20. Michael Huemer (2006). Review of Erik Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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  21. Michael Huemer (1997). Probability and Coherence Justification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):463-472.
    In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge , Laurence BonJour argues that coherence among a set of empirical beliefs can provide justification for those beliefs, in the sense of rendering them likely to be true. He also repudiates all forms of foundationalism for empirical beliefs, including what he calls "weak foundationalism" (the weakest form of foundationalism he can find). In the following, I will argue that coherence cannot provide any justification for our beliefs in the manner BonJour suggests unless some form (...)
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  22. Henry Jackman (2003). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Rule-Following Skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.
    Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands (...)
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  23. James A. Keller (1986). Foundationalism, Circular Justification, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 68 (2):205 - 212.
    In Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit, David Shatz argued that foundationalists must countenance a circular mediate justification of perceptual beliefs which the foundationalist holds are already immediately justified. Because the circularity of coherentist accounts of the justification of beliefs is a major basis of foundationalist criticism of coherentism, Shatz's claim is a serious challenge to foundationalism. In this paper, using a moderate foundationalism with a reliabilist conception of justification, I give an account of immediately and mediately justified beliefs which (...)
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  24. Dirk Koppelberg (1998). Foundationalism and Coherentism Reconsidered. Erkenntnis 49 (3):255-283.
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  25. Hilary Kornblith (1980). Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):597-612.
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  26. Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  27. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Coherentism&Quot. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press.
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  28. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1997). ``In Defense of Coherentism&Quot. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:299-306.
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  29. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1995). ``Coherentists' Distractions&Quot. Philosophical Topics 23:257-275.
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  30. Keith Lehrer (2003). Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge: Foundationalism Versus Coherentism. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):543-552.
  31. Jack Lyons (2008). Evidence, Experience, and Externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):461 – 479.
    The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived (...)
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  32. Jared A. Millson (2009). The Reflexive Relativism of Georg Simmel. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 23 (3):pp. 180-207.
  33. Paul K. Moser (1989). Knowledge and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we have (...)
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  34. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein's on Certainty. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, On Certainty, has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of scepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-in, a primitive confidence or ur-trust whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved categorial gap between belief and action.
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  35. Nicholas Rescher (1974). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization. Journal of Philosophy 71 (19):695-708.
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  36. William A. Roche (2006). Can A Coherentist Be An Externalist? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):269-280.
    It is standard practice, when distinguishing between the foundationalist and the coherentist, to construe the coherentist as an internalist. The coherentist, the construal goes, says that justification is solely a matter of coherence, and that coherence, in turn, is solely a matter of internal relations between beliefs. The coherentist, so construed, is an internalist (in the sense I have in mind) in that the coherentist, so construed, says that whether a belief is justified hinges solely on what the subject is (...)
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  37. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2007). A Refutation of Foundationalism? Analysis 67 (296):345–346.
  38. Michael J. Shaffer (2002). Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision. In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
    In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson) theory of belief revision can be given an epistemic basis by interpreting the revision postulates of that theory in terms of a version of the coherence theory of justification. To accomplish this goal Gärdenfors suggests that the AGM revision postulates concerning the conservative nature of belief revision can be interpreted in terms of a concept of epistemic entrenchment and that there are good empirical reasons (...)
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  39. Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick (2004). Bursting Bealer's Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.
    In his 1993 article George Bealer offers three separate arguments that are directed against the internal coherence of empiricism, specifically against Quine’s version of empiricism. One of these arguments is the starting points argument (SPA) and it is supposed to show that Quinean empiricism is incoherent. We argue here that this argument is deeply flawed, and we demonstrate how a Quinean may successfully defend his views against Bealer’s SPA. Our defense of Quinean empiricism against the SPA depends on showing (1) (...)
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  40. David Shatz (1983). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
    A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper I (...)
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  41. Roger A. Shiner (1980). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Activism. Philosophical Investigations 3 (3):33-38.
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  42. Ernest Sosa (1997). Mythology of the Given. History of Philosophy Quarterly 14 (3):275 - 286.
  43. Ernest Sosa (1980). The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.
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  44. Ernest Sosa (1980). The Foundations of Foundationalism. Noûs 14 (4):547-564.
    There is a controversy in contemporary philosophy over the question whether or not knowledge must have a foundation. On one side are the foundationalists, who do accept the metaphor and find the foundation in sensory experience or the like. The coherentists, on the other side, reject the foundations metaphor and consider our body of knowledge a coherent whole floating free of any foundations. This controversy grew rapidly with the rise of idealism many years ago, and it is prominent today not (...)
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  45. Ernest Sosa & Richard E. Grandy (1980). Review. [REVIEW] Synthese 43 (3).
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  46. Mark Timmons (1987). Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification. Ethics 97 (3):595-609.
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  47. Peter Tramel (2008). Haack's Foundherentism is a Foundationalism. Synthese 160 (2):215 - 228.
    Susan Haack has always maintained that her unquestionably important foundherentist theory of epistemic justification is not a foundationalism. In a 1997 Synthese exchange, Laurence BonJour questioned her right to this claim, and she dug in and defended it. What was at stake is of timeless importance to epistemology: it goes directly to the question, “What is foundationalism?” I inquire with greater care than either Haack or BonJour took in 1997, and I find decisively in favor of the view that foundherentism (...)
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  48. Ryszard Wójcicki (2007). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Foundherentism : The Controversies From an Alternative Point of View. In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books.
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Foundationalism, Misc
  1. Scott F. Aikin (2007). Prospects for Skeptical Foundationalism. Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
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  2. George Allan (2005). Tom Rockmore's "On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism&Quot. [REVIEW] The Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-8.
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  3. William P. Alston (1980). Some Remarks on Chisholm's Epistemology. Noûs 14 (4):565-586.
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  4. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  5. David B. Annis (1977). Epistemic Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 31 (5):345 - 352.
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  6. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but (...)
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  7. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  8. Robert Audi (1983). Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility. Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not (...)
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  9. Robert Audi (1980). Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  10. Michael Baurmann (2007). Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs. Episteme 4 (2):150-166.
    Abstract The article sketches a theoretical model which explains how it is possible that fundamentalist beliefs can emerge as a result of an individual rational adaptation to the context of special living conditions. The model is based on the insight that most of our knowledge is acquired by trusting the testimony of some kind of authority. If a social group is characterized by a high degree of mistrust towards the outer society or other groups, then the members of this group (...)
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  11. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180:357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
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  12. Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  13. Laurence BonJour (1999). Foundationalism and the External World. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):229-249.
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  14. Richard Boyd (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
  15. Franz Clemens Brentano (1981). Sensory and Noetic Consciousness. Routledge.
  16. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2009). Recognizing Targets: Wittgenstein's Exploration of a New Kind of Foundationalism in on Certainty. Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):1-22.
    Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...)
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  17. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquiantance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Russell 20 (1):33-65.
  18. James Robert Brown (1996). Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic Stewart Shapiro Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, Xx + 277 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (03):624-.
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  19. Anthony Brueckner (1994). Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
  20. Roderick M. Chisholm (1980). A Version of Foundationalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):543-564.
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  21. Drew Christie (1989). Contemporary "Foundationalism" and the Death of Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 20 (2):114–126.
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  22. Andrew D. Cling (1985). Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes' Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.
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  23. Nino B. Cocchiarella (1993). Book Review: Stewart Shapiro. Foundations with Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (3):453-468.
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  24. Ivo Coelho (2008). Rorty's Anti-Foundationalism and Fides Et Ratio. In Manimala, Varghese & J. (eds.), Fides Et Ratio in a Post-Modern Era: Indian Philosophical Studies, Xiii. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
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  25. Peter M. Collins (1991). Newman, Foundationalism and Teaching Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):143-161.
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  26. Christian Coseru (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. [REVIEW] Philosophy East and West.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  27. Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  28. Justin Cruickshank (2003). Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology, and Social Research. Routledge.
    In recent years methodological debates in the social sciences have increasingly focused on issues relating to epistemology. Realism and Sociology makes an original contribution to the debate, charting a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism.
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  29. Ann E. Cudd (1990). Conventional Foundationalism and the Origin of Norms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):485-504.
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  30. Neil Curry (2007). Mediating Realism and Sociology. Review of Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology and Social Research by Justin Cruikshank. Journal of Critical Realism 2 (1).
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  31. Gregor Damschen (2010). Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions? Universitas Philosophica 54:163-177.
    Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according (...)
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  32. C. F. Delaney (1973). Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism. The Monist 57 (2):240-251.
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  33. Michael R. DePaul (1998). Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):103-120.
    Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John (...)
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  34. John M. DePoe (2007). In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument That Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):245-251.
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  35. Jane Duran (2002). Two Arguments Against Foundationalism. Philosophia 29 (1-4):241-252.
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  36. Jane Duran (1988). Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory. Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
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  37. Nicholas Everitt (2003). Review: Epistemic Justification. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):572-575.
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  38. Richard Foley, Epistemology.
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justified. (...)
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  39. Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a (...)
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