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  1. George Allan (2005). On Foundationalism. Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-198.
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  2. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  3. Nigel Blake (1996). The Democracy We Need: Situation, Post-Foundationalism and Enlightenment. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (2):215–238.
  4. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2014). Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought. Lexington Books.
  5. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Stellung der Theorie der Intersubjektivität im System der Husserlschen transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Conceptus 32 (80):99-138.
    Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...)
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  6. Mark Colby (1999). The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason. Inquiry 42 (1):25 – 47.
    One consequence of the later Wittgenstein's influential critique of epistemological foundationalism has been to convince many contemporary philosophers that the ideal of universal and necessary cognitive grounds for moral or political norms is illusory. Recent neo-Wittgensteinian accounts of practical reason attempt to formulate a conception of a post-foundational politics in which a political ethos can be legitimate, rational or just even if its informing practices and cognitive standards lack foundational justification. Against these appropriations of Wittgenstein, I argue that his account (...)
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  7. Andrew Cortens (2002). Foundationalism and the Regress Argument. Disputatio 12:1 - 16.
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  8. Michael Davis (2011). A Little Give and Take: Problems in the Empiricism of Sellars and His Followers. Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):53-67.
    The starting point of this paper is Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist empiricism as found in his discussion of the Myth of the Given. Sellars attacks the Myth from two main angles, corresponding to the two elements of empiricism: the idea that our beliefs are justified by the world, and the idea that our concepts are derived from experience. In correctly attacking the second, Sellars is also, incorrectly, led to attack the first. Thus, Sellars rejects the commonsensical idea that at least (...)
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  9. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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  10. Richard Garrett (1991). Are There Foundations for Human Knowledge? Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):19 - 33.
    Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge has become one of the most complicated and esoteric areas of philosophy. This paper attempts to defend a form of foundationalism in epistemology which does not require the reader to be familiar with the philosophical literature; so, it should be of interest to psychologists concerned with the nature and character of human knowledge as well as, of course, to philosophers. The heart of the foundationalism defended here is the thesis that a belief is epistemically (...)
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  11. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  12. John Greco (1988). Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-Referential Incoherence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:187-193.
    Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundationalist can provide arguments which ground the criteria in question in properly basic propositions.
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  13. Thomas Guarino (1989). Foundationalism and Contemporary Theology. Philosophy and Theology 3 (3):241-252.
    The article discusses current philosophical issues in foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as well as their ramifications for theological epistemology. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the anti-foundationalist theological current are also assessed.
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  14. Hendrik Hart (1999). Faith After Foundationalism. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):123-124.
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  15. Gary Hatfield (2006). The Cartesian Circle. In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. 122--141.
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  16. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  17. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  18. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  19. Jeremy Koons (2005). Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification. Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
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  20. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2000). Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
    John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and (...)
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  21. Paul K. Moser (1987). Does Foundationalism Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Studies 31 (48):183-196.
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  22. Mark Pastin (1978). ``Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant&Quot. In Pappas & Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 279-288.
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  23. D. Z. Phillips (1988). Faith After Foundationalism. Routlege.
    1 Foundationalism and Religion: a Philosophical Scandal It has been one of the scandals of the philosophy of religion that foundationalism in epistemology ...
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  24. John Pollock (1970/1975). Knowledge and Justification. Princeton University Press.
    Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB).
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  25. John F. Post (1996). The Foundationalism in Irrealism, and the Immorality. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:1-14.
    The foundationalism in irrealism is structural foundationalism, according to which reason giving must terminate with some affair beyond the reach of noncircular inferential justification or critique. Even relativist irrealists are structural foundationalists. But structural foundationalism is only as good as the regress argument for it, which presupposes that the relevant forms of inferential justification are all transitive. Since they are not, structural foundationalism fails. So too does the “God’s-eye-view” or look-see argument against realism, to the effect that when it comes (...)
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  26. John Post & Derek Turner (2000). Sic Transitivity. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:67-82.
    In order to defend the regress argument for foundationalism against Post’s objection that relevant forms of inferential justification are not transitive, Lydia McGrew and Timothy McGrew define a relation E of positive evidence, which, they contend, has the following features: It is a necessary condition for any inferential justification; it is transitive and irreflexive; and it enables both a strengthened regress argument proof against Post’s objection and an argument that nothing can ever appear in its own justificational ancestry. In reply, (...)
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  27. Steven Rappaport (1992). A Mistake About Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):111-125.
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  28. Steven Rappaport (1989). Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism. Dialogue 28 (03):433-.
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  29. James F. Sennett (1998). Direct Justification and Universal Sanction. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:257-287.
    In this paper I demonstrate the need for a plausible theory of direct justification (epistemic justification without propositional evidence) by discussing the pitfalls of skepticism and relativism that await theories dedicated to either of two extremes. I also survey two attempts to navigate between these extremes, and point out shortcomings that leave both of them wanting. I then present my own theory against this background---a theory grounded in a property I call universal sanction. I argue that universal sanction is necessary (...)
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  30. David Shatz (1986). Circularity and Epistemic Principles: A Reply to James Keller. Synthese 68 (2):369 - 382.
    This paper is a reply to James Keller's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit (Synthese 55, April 1983).Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, the (...)
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  31. Gila Sher (2010). Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 72 (2):151 - 176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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  32. E. S. Shirley (1987). Chisholm's Foundationalism and His Theory of Perception. Erkenntnis 27 (3):371 - 378.
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  33. Edward S. Shirley (1980). A Flaw in Chisholm's Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):155 - 160.
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  34. Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1997). Belief and Resistance: Dynamics of Contemporary Intellectual Controversy. Harvard University Press.
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Foundationalism and Coherentism
  1. William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  2. William P. Alston (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted? Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
    It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...)
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  3. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  4. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  5. Robert Audi (1988). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 2:407-442.
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  6. Robert Audi (1980). Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  7. Bruce Aune (1967). Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation? In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House.
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  8. Selim Berker, Coherentism Via Graphs.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  9. Laurence BonJour (1999). The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. 117-144.
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  10. Yves Bouchard (2007). The Foundationalism–Coherentism Opposition Revisited: The Case for Complementarism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 12 (4):325-336.
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
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  11. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  12. Matthew Burstein (2006). Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition. In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. 197-216.
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  13. Hasok Chang (2007). Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (61):1-20.
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  14. Joseph Cruz, Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism.
    Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement (Bonjour, 1999; Dancy, 1989; Haack, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999). Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a belief, one intuitive and appealing (...)
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  15. Jordan Curnutt (1998). Huang on Wittgenstein on Religious Epistemology. Religious Studies 34 (1):81-89.
    Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a 'reflective equilibrium' with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different 'forms of life'. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the (...)
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  16. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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