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  1. William P. Alston (1983). What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge? Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  2. William P. Alston (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted? Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295.
    It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...)
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  3. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  4. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  5. Robert Audi (1988). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 2:407-442.
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  6. Robert Audi (1980). Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  7. Bruce Aune (1967). Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation? In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House
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  8. R. J. B. (1968). Knowledge, Mind, and Nature. Review of Metaphysics 22 (2):371-372.
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  9. Selim Berker (2015). Coherentism Via Graphs. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
    Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...)
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  10. Michael Bloome-Tillman, Foundationalism and Coherentism From a Contextualist Point of View.
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  11. Laurence BonJour (1999). The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism. In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell 117-144.
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  12. Laurence Bonjour (1989). Reply to Steup. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):57 - 63.
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  13. Yves Bouchard (2007). The Foundationalism–Coherentism Opposition Revisited: The Case for Complementarism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 12 (4):325-336.
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
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  14. Yves Bouchard (ed.) (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe.
  15. Lajos L. Brons (2016). Putnam and Davidson on Coherence, Truth, and Justification. The Science of Mind 54:51-70.
    Putnam and Davidson both defended coherence theories of justification from the early 1980s onward. There are interesting similarities between these theories, and Putnam’s philosophical development lead to further convergence in the 1990s. The most conspicuous difference between Putnam’s and Davidson’s theories is that they appear to fundamentally disagree on the role and nature of conceptual schemes, but a closer look reveals that they are not as far apart on this issue as usually assumed. The veridicality of perceptual beliefs is a (...)
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  16. Matthew Burstein (2006). Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition. In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Rodopi 197-216.
    Many philosophers have equated the denial of foundationalism with a call for coherentist approaches to epistemology. I think such equations are spurious, and to show why this is so I contrast the views of a paradigmatic coherentist with an antifoundationalist alternative. This article examines the coherentism of Laurence BonJour with an eye toward the way in which BonJour's views fail to fully adopt the insights of their Sellarsian roots. In particular, I argue that BonJour's view endorses the philosophy of mind (...)
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  17. Matthew A. Burstein (2003). Neither Tortoises nor Snakes: How to Be a Conscientious Objector in the Conflict Between Foundationalism and Coherentism. Dissertation, Georgetown University
    A great deal of ink has been spilt debating the relative merits of foundationalism and coherentism in contemporary epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that the debate itself, lively as it's been, rides atop a fundamental mistake. Careful examination of the defenses of these views indicates that both sides rest on a set of problematic presuppositions about justification and the nature of mind. More specifically, they all assume, in one form or another, that epistemic dependence must be inferential, and, as (...)
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  18. Elgin Catherine & James Cleve (2013). Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? In Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 244-273.
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  19. Marc Champagne (2015). Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief. Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.
    This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow. Conversely, since says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it (...)
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  20. Hasok Chang (2007). Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (61):1-20.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.
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  21. Soonok Choi (1992). A Critical Discussion of Bonjour's Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge. Dissertation, The University of Iowa
    The debate between coherentism and foundationalism is familiar in the literature of epistemology. But neither position has been satisfactorily worked out. My project is to examine critically a specific type of coherence theory of justification, namely Laurence BonJour's internalist coherentism. In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, he is willing to confront coherentism's difficulties as he tries to establish a coherence theory of justification, married to a correspondence theory of truth. ;My aim is to expose the inadequacies of BonJour's (...)
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  22. Joseph Cruz, Epistemic Norms and the Sellarsian Dilemma for Foundationalism.
    Foundationalists and coherentists disagree over the structure of the part of the mental state corpus that is relevant for epistemic achievement (Bonjour, 1999; Dancy, 1989; Haack, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Pollock and Cruz, 1999). Given the goals of a theory of epistemic justification and the trajectory of the debate over the last three decades, it is not difficult to see how structural questions possess a kind of immediacy. In order to undertake an epistemic evaluation of a belief, one intuitive and appealing (...)
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  23. Jordan Curnutt (1998). Huang on Wittgenstein on Religious Epistemology. Religious Studies 34 (1):81-89.
    Yong Huang has recently claimed that after the demise of foundationalism, philosophy and theology can turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-foundationalist or coherentist religious epistemology where, it is said, religious beliefs are justified by a 'reflective equilibrium' with other kinds of beliefs, with action, and with different 'forms of life'. I argue that there are very good reasons to reject this reading of Wittgenstein: not only unsupported, it is seriously mistaken. Once the epistemological terms of the debate are properly understood, the (...)
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  24. Finnur Dellsén (forthcoming). Review of Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coheretism, by Ted Poston. [REVIEW] Dialectica.
  25. Susannah Kate Devitt, Homeostatic Epistemology : Reliability, Coherence and Coordination in a Bayesian Virtue Epistemology.
    How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of (...)
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  26. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  27. Andrea Guardo (2007). Empirismo senza fondamenti - Cinque lezioni su "Empirismo e filosofia della mente". CUEM.
    A study guide to Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.
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  28. Anil Gupta (2013). The Relationship of Experience to Thought. The Monist 96 (2):252-294.
  29. Sven Ove Hansson (2007). The False Dichotomy Between Coherentism and Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 104 (6):290-300.
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  30. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
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  31. Patrick Hawley (2008). What Justifies That? Synthese 160 (1):47 - 61.
    I clarify and defuse an argument for skepticism about justification with the aid of some results from recent linguistic theory. These considerations illuminate debates about the structure of justification.
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  32. Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which perceptual experience (...)
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  33. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
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  34. Michael Huemer (2006). Review of Erik Olsson, Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
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  35. Michael Huemer (1997). Probability and Coherence Justification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):463-472.
    In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge , Laurence BonJour argues that coherence among a set of empirical beliefs can provide justification for those beliefs, in the sense of rendering them likely to be true. He also repudiates all forms of foundationalism for empirical beliefs, including what he calls "weak foundationalism" (the weakest form of foundationalism he can find). In the following, I will argue that coherence cannot provide any justification for our beliefs in the manner BonJour suggests unless some form (...)
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  36. Noriaki Iwasa (2013). Moral Applicability of Agrippa's Trilemma. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (37):109-128.
    According to Agrippa's trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifiable.
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  37. Henry Jackman (2003). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Rule-Following Skepticism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):25-41.
    Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands (...)
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  38. Christoph Jäger (2007). Is Coherentism Coherent? Analysis 67 (4):341 - 344.
    In ‘A reductio of coherentism’ (Analysis 67, 2007) Tom Stoneham offers a novel argument against epistemological coherentism. ‘On the face of it’, he writes, ‘the argument gives a conclusive reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. But that cannot be right, can it?’ (p. 254). It could be right, but it isn’t. I argue that coherentists need not accept the central premises of Stoneham’s argument and that, even if these premises were acceptable and true, Stoneham’s reductio would not (...)
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  39. James A. Keller (1986). Foundationalism, Circular Justification, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 68 (2):205 - 212.
    In Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit, David Shatz argued that foundationalists must countenance a circular mediate justification of perceptual beliefs which the foundationalist holds are already immediately justified. Because the circularity of coherentist accounts of the justification of beliefs is a major basis of foundationalist criticism of coherentism, Shatz's claim is a serious challenge to foundationalism. In this paper, using a moderate foundationalism with a reliabilist conception of justification, I give an account of immediately and mediately justified beliefs which (...)
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  40. Dirk Koppelberg (1998). Foundationalism and Coherentism Reconsidered. Erkenntnis 49 (3):255-283.
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  41. Hilary Kornblith (1980). Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):597-612.
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  42. Jonathan Kvanvig, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2010). ``Coherentism&Quot. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press
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  44. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1997). ``In Defense of Coherentism&Quot. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:299-306.
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  45. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1995). ``Coherentists' Distractions&Quot. Philosophical Topics 23:257-275.
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  46. Keith Lehrer (2003). Chisholm on Perceptual Knowledge: Foundationalism Versus Coherentism. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):543-552.
  47. Keith Lehrer (1999). Justification, Coherence and Knowledge. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):243-258.
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  48. Jack Lyons (2008). Evidence, Experience, and Externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):461 – 479.
    The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived (...)
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  49. Joseph Margolis (1984). Pragmatism Without Foundations. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):69 - 80.
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  50. Conor Mayo-Wilson (2011). Russell on Logicism and Coherence. Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31 (1).
    According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell's logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as a prioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell's explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent (...)
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