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  1. Scott F. Aikin (2007). Prospects for Skeptical Foundationalism. Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.
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  2. George Allan (2005). Tom Rockmore's "On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism&Quot. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-8.
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  3. William P. Alston (1980). Some Remarks on Chisholm's Epistemology. Noûs 14 (4):565-586.
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  4. William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
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  5. David B. Annis (1977). Epistemic Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 31 (5):345 - 352.
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  6. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2006). Probability Without Certainty: Foundationalism and the Lewis–Reichenbach Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):442-453.
    Like many discussions on the pros and cons of epistemic foundationalism, the debate between C.I. Lewis and H. Reichenbach dealt with three concerns: the existence of basic beliefs, their nature, and the way in which beliefs are related. In this paper we concentrate on the third matter, especially on Lewis’s assertion that a probability relation must depend on something that is certain, and Reichenbach’s claim that certainty is never needed. We note that Lewis’s assertion is prima facie ambiguous, but (...)
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  7. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  8. Robert Audi (1983). Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility. Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not (...)
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  9. Robert Audi (1980). Foundationalism and Epistemic Dependence. Journal of Philosophy 77 (10):612-613.
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  10. Michael Baurmann (2007). Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs. Episteme 4 (2):150-166.
    Abstract The article sketches a theoretical model which explains how it is possible that fundamentalist beliefs can emerge as a result of an individual rational adaptation to the context of special living conditions. The model is based on the insight that most of our knowledge is acquired by trusting the testimony of some kind of authority. If a social group is characterized by a high degree of mistrust towards the outer society or other groups, then the members of this group (...)
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  11. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist account of justification, (...)
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  12. Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  13. Laurence BonJour (1999). Foundationalism and the External World. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):229-249.
    Outlines a tenable version of a traditional foundationalist account\nof empirical justification and its implications for the justification\nof beliefs about physical or material objects. Presupposing the acceptability\nof other beliefs about physical objects; Concept of a basic belief;\nMetabeliefs about one's own occurrent beliefs; Beliefs about sensory\nexperience.
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  14. Richard Boyd (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
  15. Franz Clemens Brentano (1981). Sensory and Noetic Consciousness. Routledge.
  16. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2009). Recognizing Targets: Wittgenstein's Exploration of a New Kind of Foundationalism in on Certainty. Philosophical Investigations 32 (1):1-22.
    Bringing the views of Grayling, Moyal-Sharrock and Stroll together, I argue that in On Certainty, Wittgenstein explores the possibility of a new kind of foundationalism. Distinguishing propositional language-games from non-propositional, actional certainty, Wittgenstein investigates a foundationalism sui generis . Although he does not forthrightly state, defend, or endorse what I am characterizing as a "new kind of foundationalism," we must bear in mind that On Certainty was a collection of first draft notes written at the end of Wittgenstein's life. The (...)
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  17. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). Semantic Empiricism and Direct Acquiantance in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Russell 20 (1):33-65.
  18. James Robert Brown (1996). Foundations Without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic Stewart Shapiro Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, Xx + 277 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 35 (03):624-.
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  19. Anthony Brueckner (1994). Review: Skepticism and Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):533 - 547.
  20. Roderick M. Chisholm (1982). Schlick on the Foundations of Knowing. Grazer Philosophische Studien 16:149-157.
    Schlick held that our knowledge is founded upon certain contingent apprehensions which he described as follows: "I grasp their meaning at the same time that I grasp their truth." He cites as an example the apprehension expressed by "Yellow here now." When such apprehensions are expressed in syntactically well-formed sentences, they can be seen to have certain psychological states as their objects - and therefore to be similar in all essential respects to what members of the Brentano school had called (...)
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  21. Roderick M. Chisholm (1980). A Version of Foundationalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):543-564.
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  22. Drew Christie (1989). Contemporary "Foundationalism" and the Death of Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 20 (2):114–126.
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  23. Andrew D. Cling (1985). Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes' Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.
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  24. Nino Cocchiarella (1993). Book Review: Stewart Shapiro. Foundations with Foundationalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (3):453-468.
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  25. Ivo Coelho (2008). Rorty's Anti-Foundationalism and Fides Et Ratio. In Manimala, Varghese & J. (eds.), Fides Et Ratio in a Post-Modern Era: Indian Philosophical Studies, Xiii. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
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  26. Peter M. Collins (1991). Newman, Foundationalism and Teaching Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):143-161.
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  27. Christian Coseru (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. [REVIEW] Philosophy East and West.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  28. Christian Coseru (2009). Buddhist 'Foundationalism' and the Phenomenology of Perception. Philosophy East and West 59 (4):409-439.
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the Buddhist (...)
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  29. Justin Cruickshank (2003). Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology, and Social Research. Routledge.
    In recent years methodological debates in the social sciences have increasingly focused on issues relating to epistemology. Realism and Sociology makes an original contribution to the debate, charting a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism.
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  30. Ann E. Cudd (1990). Conventional Foundationalism and the Origin of Norms. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):485-504.
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  31. Neil Curry (2007). Mediating Realism and Sociology. Review of Realism and Sociology: Anti-Foundationalism, Ontology and Social Research by Justin Cruikshank. Journal of Critical Realism 2 (1):157-160.
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  32. Gregor Damschen (2010). Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions? Universitas Philosophica 54 (54):163-177.
    Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according (...)
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  33. C. F. Delaney (1973). Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism. The Monist 57 (2):240-251.
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  34. Michael R. DePaul (1998). Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):103-120.
    Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John (...)
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  35. John M. DePoe (2007). In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument That Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):245-251.
    In numerous works, Alvin Plantinga argues that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge because of its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga's argument, however, fails to demonstrate that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga's argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting, as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga's argument against classical foundationalism, which shows (...)
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  36. Jane Duran (2002). Two Arguments Against Foundationalism. Philosophia 29 (1-4):241-252.
    Bringing to bear two major lines of argument, I claim that foundationalism is vitiated by its reliance (in its various forms) on privileged access, and by its noninstantiability. The notion of privileged access is examined, and the status of propositions said to be evocative of privileged access addressed. Noninstantiability is viewed through the current project of naturalizing epistemology, and naturalized alternatives to the rigorous foundationalism of the normative epistemologists are brought forward.
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  37. Jane Duran (1988). Reliabilism, Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemic Justification Theory. Metaphilosophy 19 (2):113–127.
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  38. Nicholas Everitt (2003). Review: Epistemic Justification. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):572-575.
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  39. Richard Foley, Epistemology.
    In epistemology Chisholm was a defender of FOUNDATIONALISM [S]. He asserted that any proposition that it is justified for a person to believe gets at least part of its justification from basic propositions, which are themselves justified but not by anything else. Contingent propositions are basic insofar as they correspond to selfpresenting states of the person, which for Chisholm are states such that whenever one is in the state and believes that one is in it, one’s belief is maximally justified. (...)
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  40. Richard Foley (1993). Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a (...)
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  41. Michael Forest (2007). Peirce and Semiotic Foundationalism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4):728 - 744.
    : This paper articulates a view of the relation between cognition and being in Peirce's thought, especially derived from his early papers of 1868–69. Based on the rejection of intuitions, I argue that Peirce realized an isomorphic relation between cognition and being that functions as a semiotic foundation. I consider several challenges to these notions in the literature, including doubts about pansemioticism, foundationalism, and realism. In the end, I suggest that the semiotic foundation be thought of as a kind of (...)
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  42. Nancy Frankenberry (1987). Functionalism, Fallibilism, and Anti-Foundationalism in Wieman's Empirical Theism. Zygon 22 (1):37-47.
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  43. Richard Fumerton (2009). Markie, Speckles, and Classical Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):207-212.
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  44. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (forthcoming). Knowledge and Justification of the First Principles. In Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.
    The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a (...)
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  45. Carl Ginet (1975). Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    INTRODUCTION . What is it to know that something is the case? What am I saying when I say, 'I know that the temperature outside is below freezing' or 'I ...
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  46. Alan H. Goldman (1982). Epistemic Foundationalism and the Replaceability of Observation Language. Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):136-154.
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  47. Thomas Guarino (1995). Philosophy Within Theology in Light of the Foundationalism Debate. Philosophy and Theology 9 (1/2):57-69.
    My paper proceeds in three stages: 1) the traditional relationship between philosophy and theology; 2) how the “foundationalist” issue affects this debate; 3) some final reflections. This essay, along with the previous one by Jack Bonsor, was originally presented to the “Theology in the Seminary Context” seminar at the Catholic Theological Society of America convention in June, 1995.
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  48. Rudolf Haller (1988). Justification and Praxeological Foundationalism. Inquiry 31 (3):335 – 345.
    At least since Descartes the epistemological turn derived its impetus from the sceptical challenge to provide a justification for all knowledge claims. According to a foundational view, a claim to know something is justified only when the justification refers to ultimate grounds in the form of self?supporting propositions. This paper's title suggests that justification may be seen from a different perspective, namely that of acting. Wittgenstein's examples show that the sceptic's maxim ? doubt everything ? breaks down because some beliefs (...)
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  49. James G. Hanink (1986). Thomas Reid and Common Sense Foundationalism. New Scholasticism 60 (1):91-115.
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  50. Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
    Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases (...)
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