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  1. George Allan (2005). On Foundationalism. Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-198.
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  2. Robert F. Almeder (1983). Basic Knowledge and Jusificaton. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):115 - 127.
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  3. William P. Alston (1976). Self-Warrant: A Neglected Form of Privileged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (4):257 - 272.
    This paper defends the view that a belief to the effect that the believer is currently in some conscious state is "self-Warranted," in the sense that what warrants it is simply its being a belief of that sort. This position is compared with other views as to the epistemic status of such beliefs--That they are warranted by their truth and that they are warranted by an immediate awareness of their object. In the course of the discussion, Various modes of immediate (...)
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  4. Pedro Amaral, TOPICS: 150. Foundations of Knowledge.
    Integration Area C. Nature, sources, and limits of human knowledge; roles of perception, reason, testimony, and intuition in acquiring rational beliefs; e.g. science, mathematics, values, the arts, religion, social issues, and psychological states. G.E. Integration IC.
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  5. Karl-Otto Apel & Benjamin Gregg (1993). Can an Ultimate Foundation of Knowledge Be Non-Metaphysical? Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):171 - 190.
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  6. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2004). Probability Without Certainty? Foundationalism and the Lewis. Philosophy of Science 52:95-124.
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  7. Robert Audi (1983). The Causal Structure of Indirect Justification. Journal of Philosophy 80 (7):398-415.
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  8. Robert Audi (1982). Axiological Foundationalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):163 - 183.
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  9. Albert E. Avey (1923). Immediate Inference Revised. Journal of Philosophy 20 (22):589-596.
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  10. Gordon Barnes (2003). Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Philosophical Books 44 (1):53-62.
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  11. Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
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  12. Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
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  13. R. J. Bernstein (2003). Anti_foundationalism. In Gerard Delanty & Piet Strydom (eds.), Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings. Open University.
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  14. Roberta M. Berry (2009). Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW] In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  15. Nigel Blake (1996). The Democracy We Need: Situation, Post-Foundationalism and Enlightenment. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (2):215–238.
  16. George Boas (1926). The Truth of Immediate Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):5-10.
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  17. Richard B. Brandt (1995). Foundationalism for Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):51-65.
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  18. Richard B. Brandt (1964). Epistemic Priority and Coherence: Comments. Journal of Philosophy 61 (19):557-559.
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  19. Robert Greenleaf Brice (2014). Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought. Lexington Books.
    Exploring Certainty: Wittgenstein and Wide Fields of Thought considers how, where, and to what extent the thoughts and ideas found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can be applied to other areas of thought, including: ethics, aesthetics, religious belief, mathematics, cognitive science, and political theory. Robert Greenleaf Brice opens new avenues of thought for scholars and students of the Wittgensteinian tradition, while introducing original philosophies about human knowledge and cognition.
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  20. Jessica Brown (2004). Non-Inferential Justification and Epistemic Circularity. Analysis 64 (4):339–348.
    Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning only to the (...)
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  21. Allen Buchanan (1976). Basic Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (1):101-108.
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  22. Roderick M. Chisholm (1990). The Status of Epistemic Principles. Noûs 24 (2):209-216.
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  23. Terry J. Christlieb (1986). Coherence and Truth: BonJour's Metajustification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):397-413.
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  24. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (1999). Die Stellung der Theorie der Intersubjektivität im System der Husserlschen transzendentalen Phänomenologie. Conceptus 32 (80):99-138.
    Die Theorie der Intersubjektivität bildet einen der zentralen Punkte des Husserlschen Systems. Im Rahmen der konsequenten Epistemisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, die Husserl von Brentano übernommen hat, wird die objektive Realität mittels des Begriffs der intersubjektiven epistemischen Begründung definiert. Die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft bildet demgemäß die unentbehrliche Vorbedingung für die Konstitution der intersubjektiven Welt. Wir zeigen, daß die Husserlsche Theorie nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Es ist vor allem das Zusammenspiel des Begriffsempirismus mit dem epistemologischen Fundamentalismus, das das Scheitern seiner Version der Analogieschluß-Theorie (...)
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  25. Predrag Cicovacki (1993). Is Epistemological Foundationalism Untenable? Dialogos 28 (61):139-148.
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  26. James Van Cleve (1979). Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle. Philosophical Review 88 (1):55 - 91.
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  27. Mark Colby (1999). The Epistemological Foundations of Practical Reason. Inquiry 42 (1):25 – 47.
    One consequence of the later Wittgenstein's influential critique of epistemological foundationalism has been to convince many contemporary philosophers that the ideal of universal and necessary cognitive grounds for moral or political norms is illusory. Recent neo-Wittgensteinian accounts of practical reason attempt to formulate a conception of a post-foundational politics in which a political ethos can be legitimate, rational or just even if its informing practices and cognitive standards lack foundational justification. Against these appropriations of Wittgenstein, I argue that his account (...)
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  28. Andrew Cortens (2002). Foundationalism and the Regress Argument. My Cms 12:1 - 16.
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  29. A. A. Cournot (1956). An Essay on the Foundations of Our Knowledge. New York, Liberal Arts Press.
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  30. Jan Czerniawski (2013). Obrona Protofizyki I Fundamentalizmu / A Defense of Protophysics and Foundationalism. Annales Umcs. Sectio I (Filozofia, Socjologia) 38 (1):147-157.
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  31. Michael Davis (2011). A Little Give and Take: Problems in the Empiricism of Sellars and His Followers. Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):53-67.
    The starting point of this paper is Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist empiricism as found in his discussion of the Myth of the Given. Sellars attacks the Myth from two main angles, corresponding to the two elements of empiricism: the idea that our beliefs are justified by the world, and the idea that our concepts are derived from experience. In correctly attacking the second, Sellars is also, incorrectly, led to attack the first. Thus, Sellars rejects the commonsensical idea that at least (...)
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  32. Jane Duran (2000). Naturalized Foundationalism. Critica 32 (94):29 - 41.
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  33. Jane Duran (1995). Chisholmian Foundationalism and the Naturalization of Epistemology. Critica 27 (81):55 - 78.
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  34. Robert J. Fogelin (1981). When I Look at a Tomato There is Much I Cannot See. The Monist 64 (January):109-123.
  35. James B. Freeman (1996). Why Classical Foundationalism Cannot Provide a Proper Account of Premise Acceptability. Inquiry 15 (4):17-26.
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  36. Richard Fumerton (2009). Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
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  37. Richard A. Fumerton (1988). Foundationalism, Conceptual Regress, and Reliabilism. Analysis 48 (4):178 - 184.
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  38. Richard Fumerton, Laurence Bonjour, John L. Pollock & Alvin Plantinga (2000). Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    The contributions in this volume make an important effort to resurrect a rather old fashioned form of foundationalism. They defend the position that there are some beliefs that are justified, and are not themselves justified by any further beliefs. This epistemic foundationalism has been the subject of rigorous attack by a wide range of theorists in recent years, leading to the impression that foundationalism is a thing of the past. DePaul argues that it is precisely the volume and virulence of (...)
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  39. Richard Garrett (1991). Are There Foundations for Human Knowledge? Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):19 - 33.
    Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge has become one of the most complicated and esoteric areas of philosophy. This paper attempts to defend a form of foundationalism in epistemology which does not require the reader to be familiar with the philosophical literature; so, it should be of interest to psychologists concerned with the nature and character of human knowledge as well as, of course, to philosophers. The heart of the foundationalism defended here is the thesis that a belief is epistemically (...)
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  40. Sanford Goldberg (2012). A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenntnis 77 (2):187-196.
    While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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  41. John Greco (1998). Foundationalism and Philosophy of Religion. In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject. Georgetown University Press. 35.
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  42. John Greco (1988). Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-Referential Incoherence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:187-193.
    Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundationalist can provide arguments which ground the criteria in question in properly basic propositions.
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  43. Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  44. Thomas Guarino (1989). Foundationalism and Contemporary Theology. Philosophy and Theology 3 (3):241-252.
    The article discusses current philosophical issues in foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as well as their ramifications for theological epistemology. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the anti-foundationalist theological current are also assessed.
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  45. Lars Bo Gundersen (2003). Dispositional Theories of Knowledge a Defence of Aetiological Foundationalism. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  46. Aw Van Haaften & G. L. M. Snik (forthcoming). Foundational Development Without Foundationalism. Philosophy of Education.
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  47. R. Haller (1988). Praxeological Foundationalism. Inquiry 31:339.
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  48. Hendrik Hart (1999). Faith After Foundationalism. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):123-124.
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  49. Gary Hatfield (2006). The Cartesian Circle. In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. 122--141.
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  50. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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