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Summary The central issue in the free will debate is whether freedom is compatible with causal determinism. Closely parallel issues are raised by considering God's foreknowledge. God is usually held to be omniscient, and His omniscience extends to knowing how agents will act in future. The problem of freedom and foreknowledge is the problem of reconciling our freedom to act with the claim that God knows how we will act prior to our acting. If God knows how I will act before I will, it appears that I must act in the way God predicts and therefore lack the freedom to do otherwise.
Key works The problem of freedom and foreknowledge was and remains central to the philosophy of religion, beginning in the 6th century with Boethius 2008, who argued that God was outside of time and therefore it is false that God's knowledge of how I will act precedes my acting.Ockham 1983 distinguished between hard and soft facts, where hard facts alone are entirely about the past. Since God's foreknowledge consists of soft facts which is supposed to undermine its having a kind of necessity that threatens free will. The Molinist solution - Molina 1988 - turns on the claim that foreknowledge is "middle knowledge", consisting of a set of counterfactuals concerning how every free being would act in particular circumstances.
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  1. Robert Ackermann (1982). An Alternative Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 18 (3):365 - 372.
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  2. Warwick Aiken (1973). Predestination and Free Will! [Charlston, S.C..
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  3. W. S. Anglin (1990). Free Will and the Christian Faith. Oxford University Press.
    Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...)
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  4. Steven S. Aspenson (1989). Reply to O'Connor. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):95-98.
    In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. (...)
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  5. Augustine (2009). God's Foreknowledge and Free Will. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy of Religion: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  6. David Basinger (1991). Process Theism Versus Free-Will Theism. Process Studies 20 (4):204-220.
  7. David Basinger & Randall Basinger (1982). Divine Determinateness and the Free Will Defense. Philosophy Research Archives 8:531-534.
    Proponents of The Free Will Defense frequently argue that it is necessary for God to create self-directing beings who possess the capacity for producing evil because, in the words of F.R. Tennant, “moral goodness must be the result of a self-directing developmental process.” But if this is true, David Paulsen has recently argued, then the proponent of the Free Will Defense cannot claim that God has an eternally determinate nature. For if God has an eternally determinatenature and moral goodness must (...)
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  8. Endre Begby (2005). Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge. Studia Leibnitiana 37 (1):83-98.
    Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die Unterscheidung (...)
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  9. Yemima Ben-Menahem (1988). Free Will and Foreknowledge: A Fresh Approach to a Classic Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):486-490.
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  10. Michael Bergmann (1999). Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga's Free Will Defence. Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):336-351.
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) employs the following proposition as a premise:◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy.(The notion of transworld untrustworthiness is the might-counterfactual counterpart to Plantinga’s would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity.) I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, (...)
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  11. Abdur Rashid Bhat (2006). Free Will and Determinism. Journal of Islamic Philosophy 2 (1):7-24.
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  12. Alex Blum (2012). Foreknowledge and Free Will. Organon F 19 (1):55-57.
  13. Alex Blum (2012). Foreknowledge and Free Will. Organon F 19 (1):55-57.
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  14. Steven E. Boër (1978). The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defence. Analysis 38 (2):110 - 112.
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  15. Kenneth Boyce (2011). Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
    Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there are non-moral evils in (...)
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  16. Robert F. Brown (1991). Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will. Religious Studies 27 (3):285-295.
  17. Anthony Brueckner (2000). On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):132-134.
    Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the incompatibilist to reject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclusion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection requires the the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which the fatalist’s premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then (...)
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  18. Hugh S. Chandler (1985). Book Review:God, Free Will, and Morality. Robert J. Richman. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (3):743-.
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  19. Ian Clausen (2011). On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings. [REVIEW] Augustinian Studies 42 (1):123-125.
  20. Michael J. Coughlan (1987). In Defence of Free Will Theodicy. Religious Studies 23 (4):543 - 554.
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  21. Steven B. Cowan (2011). Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven. Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):416-431.
    In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe seek to respond to the so-called “Problem of Heavenly Freedom,” the problem ofexplaining how the redeemed in heaven can be free yet incapable of sinning. In the course of offering their solution, they argue that compatibilism is inadequateas a solution because it (1) undermines the free will defense against the logical problem of evil, and (2) exacerbates the problem of evil by making God the “author of sin.” (...)
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  22. William Lane Craig (1990). Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. London: E. J. Brill.
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  23. William Lane Craig (1986). Temporal Necessity; Hard Facts/Soft Facts. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):65 - 91.
    In conclusion, then, the notion of temporal necessity is certainly queer and perhaps a misnomer. It really has little to do with temporality per se and everything to do with counterfactual openness or closedness. We have seen that the future is as unalterable as the past, but that this purely logical truth is not antithetical to freedom or contingency. Moreover, we have found certain past facts are counterfactually open in that were future events or actualities to be other than they (...)
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  24. William Lane Craig (1984). Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will. Augustinian Studies 15:41-63.
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  25. Dennis Danielson (1977). Timelessness, Foreknowledge, and Free Will. Mind 86 (343):430-432.
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  26. Stephen T. Davis (1972). A Defence of the Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 8 (4):335 - 343.
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  27. Maria De Cillis (2014). Free Will and Predestination in Iislamic Thought: Theoretical Compromises in the Works of Avicenna, Ghazali and Ibn Arabi. Routledge.
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  28. Amos Edelheit (2008). Human Will, Human Dignity, and Freedom: A Study of Giorgio Benigno Salviati's Early Discussion of the Will, Urbino 1474-1482. Vivarium 46 (1):82-114.
    This article presents the first detailed account of Giorgio Benigno Salviati's discussion of the will written in Urbino during the mid-1470s and the early 1480s. A Franciscan friar and a prominent professor of theology and philosophy, Salviati was a prolific author and central figure in the circles of Cardinal Bessarion in Rome and of Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence. This article focuses on his defense of the Scotist theory of the will. It considers its fifteenth-century context, in which both humanist (...)
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  29. Jonathan Edwards (2009). Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, The Works of Jonathan Edward, Vol. I. Yale University Press.
    Presents an analysis of Jonathan Edwards' theological position. This book includes a study of his life and the intellectual issues in the America of his time, and examines the problem of free will in connection with Leibniz, Locke, and Hume.
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  30. Jonathan N. Evans (1983). Lafollette on Plantinga's Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (2):117 - 121.
  31. Austin Marsden Farrer (1960). The Freedom of the Will. New York, Scribner.
  32. J. M. Fischer & N. A. Tognazzini (2013). The Logic of Theological Incompatibilism: A Reply to Westphal. Analysis 73 (1):46-48.
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  33. John M. Fischer (2008). Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Vihvelin. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 327-342.
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  34. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Of course, this work has in many instances built on and extended the historical treatments of this great area of philosophical interest. The issues range from fairly abstract philosophical questions about the logic of arguments about human freedom (and its relationship to prior predictability of our choices and actions, or God's foreknowledge, or causal (...)
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  35. John Martin Fischer (1985). Scotism. Mind 94 (April):231-243.
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  36. John Martin Fischer (1983). Freedom and Foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  37. Samuel Fisk (1973). Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom. Neptune, N.J.,Loizeaux Bros..
  38. Joseph S. Fulda (1998). Partially Resolving the Tension Between Omniscience and Free Will: A Mathematical Argument. Sorites 9:53-55.
    As the journal is effectively defunct, I am uploading a full-text copy, but only of my abstract and article, and some journal front matter. -/- Note that the pagination in the PDF version differs from the official pagination because A4 and 8.5" x 11" differ. -/- Note also that this is not a mere repetition of the argument in /Mind/, nor merely an application of it; there are subtle differences. -/- Finally, although Christians are likely to take this as applicable (...)
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  39. B. Garrett (2012). A Comment on McCall. Analysis 72 (2):293-295.
    Storrs McCall claims to have a novel solution to the age-old problem of the incompatibility of free will and God's omniscience. His solution is based on the thesis of the supervenience of truth on being. I argue that this thesis plays no role in solving the ancient conundrum.
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  40. Richard M. Gaskin (1994). Fatalism, Foreknowledge, and the Reality of the Future. The Modern Schoolman 71 (2):83-113.
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  41. Daniel W. Goodenough (1986). Providence and Free Will in Human Actions. Swedenborg Scientific Association.
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  42. David Gordon (1983). Paulsen on the Free Will Defence. Analysis 43 (1):63 - 64.
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  43. Peter A. Graham (2008). Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78.
    Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that (...)
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  44. Rowan A. Greer (1996). Augustine's Transformation of the Free Will Defence. Faith and Philosophy 13 (4):471-486.
    Augustine’s first conversion is to the Christian Platonism of his day, which brought along with it a free-will defence to the problem of evil. Formative as this philosophical influence was, however, Augustine’s own experience of sin combines with his sense of God’s sovereignty to lead him to modify the views he inherited in significant ways. This transformation is demonstrated by setting Augustine’s evolving position against that of Gregory of Nyssa.
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  45. David Ray Griffin (2000). Traditional Free Will Theodicy and Process Theodicy. Process Studies 29 (2):209-226.
  46. Susan Haack (1974). On a Theological Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):156-159.
    It is the aim of this paper to show that [the theological argument from Divine omniscience] is not more than a needlessly (and confusingly) elaborate version of the argument for fatalism discussed by Aristotle in de Interpretatione 9, which, since its sole premise is the Principle of Bivalence, may conveniently be called the logical argument for fatalism. If this is right, if the theological premisses of the theological argument can be shown to be strictly irrelevant to the fatalist conclusion, then (...)
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  47. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.
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  48. William Hasker (2001). The Foreknowledge Conundrum. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50 (1/3):97-114.
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  49. William Hasker (2000). The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism. Process Studies 29 (2):194-208.
  50. Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz (1980). On Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Philosophical Studies 37 (3):289 - 296.
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