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Summary Since for very many philosophers the central issue in the free will debate is the compatibility question - the question whether free will is compatible with deterministic causation - philosophers of free will have a stake in knowing whether causation is deterministic. In particular, libertarians require that causation be indeterministic. Since physics is the fundamental science which has in its remit the nature of the basic causal processes, philosophers of free will turn to physics to discover whether our actions may be caused by indeterministic processes.
Key works Recent work in physics, especially quantum mechanics, has seemed to many to promise to show that brain processes are likely to be indeterministic.Hodgson 2002 reviews some of this evidence; more recently Hodgson 2012 develops an account of free will that builds on claims about quantum mechanics. 
Introductions Bishop 2002; Hodgson 2005
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  1. Harald Atmanspacher, Preface.
    The machine sculpture “Klamauk” (English: hubbub) by the Swiss artist Jean Tinguely (1925–1991), featured on the cover, looks like a perfect example of a deterministic process, but it also looks as if thrown together “by chance”. This tension between determinism and chance has been of longstanding concern in the sciences and the humanities. And nowhere is this tension stronger than in debates about free will and our place in the world, where determinism seems bound to crowd freedom out of the (...)
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  2. Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.) (2002). Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    These and other questions emphasize the fact that chance and choice are two leading actors on stage whenever issues of determinism are under discussion. ...
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  3. Robert C. Bishop (2002). Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Bruce Bridgeman (2005). Hyperbolas and Hyperbole: The Free Will Problem Remains. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):652-653.
    Hyperbolic theories have the fatal flaw that because of their vertical asymptote they predict irresistible choice of immediate rewards, regardless of future contingencies. They work only for simple situations. Theories incorporating intermediate unconscious choices are more flexible, but are neither exponential nor hyperbolic in their predictions. They don't solve the free will paradox, which may be just a consistent illusion.
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  5. R. J. C. Burgener (1964). Book Review:Free Will and Determinism Allan M. Munn. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 31 (2):188-.
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  6. Jean E. Burns (2012). The Action of Consciousness and the Uncertainty Principle. Journal of Nonlocality 1 (1).
    The term action of consciousness is used to refer to an influence, such as psychokinesis or free will, that produces an effect on matter that is correlated to mental intention, but not completely determined by physical conditions. Such an action could not conserve energy. But in that case, one wonders why, when highly accurate measurements are done, occasions of non-conserved energy (generated perhaps by unconscious PK) are not detected. A possible explanation is that actions of consciousness take place within the (...)
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  7. Eric Cator & Klaas Landsman (2014). Constraints on Determinism: Bell Versus Conway–Kochen. Foundations of Physics 44 (7):781-791.
    Bell’s Theorem from Physics 36:1–28 (1964) and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen from Notices AMS 56:226–232 (2009) both exclude deterministic hidden variable theories (or, in modern parlance, ‘ontological models’) that are compatible with some small fragment of quantum mechanics, admit ‘free’ settings of the archetypal Alice and Bob experiment, and satisfy a locality condition akin to parameter independence. We clarify the relationship between these theorems by giving reformulations of both that exactly pinpoint their resemblance and their (...)
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  8. Ernest F. Champness (1929). The Relativity of Free Will. Philosophy 4 (16):579-.
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  9. Mary T. Clark (ed.) (1973). The Problem of Freedom. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
    Eddington, A. The decline of determinism.--Heisenberg, W. and others. Dialogue concerning science and philosophical positions.--Sinnott, E. Biology and freedom.--Nuttin, J. The unconscious and freedom.--Nagel, E. Determinism in history.--Ayer, A. J. Freedom and necessity.--Campbell, C. A. Philosophical defence of freedom.--Hare, R. M. Freedom and reason.--Dewey, J. Freedom as a problem.--Sartre, J.-P. Freedom and total responsibility.--Camus, A. Freedom and rebellion.--Rand, A. Freedom and individualism.--Thévenaz, P. Freedom and action.--Luijpen, W. A. Phenomenology of freedom.--Teilhard de Chardin, P. Cosmic freedom.--Jaspers, K. Freedom and society.--Macmurray, J. (...)
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  10. John H. Conway, The Strong Free Will Theorem.
    The two theories that revolutionized physics in the twentieth century, relativity and quantum mechanics, are full of predictions that defy common sense. Recently, we used three such paradoxical ideas to prove “The Free Will Theorem” (strengthened here), which is the culmination of a series of theorems about quantum mechanics that began in the 1960s. It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if (...)
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  11. J. Cover & John Hawthorne (1996). Free Agency and Materialism. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield.
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  12. Jasper Doomen (2011). Cornering 'Free Will'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (3):165-179.
  13. John Dupré (1995). The Solution to the Problem of the Freedom of the Will. Noûs 30:385 - 402.
    It has notoriously been supposed that the doctrine of determinism conflicts with the belief in human freedom. Yet it is not readily apparent how indeterminism, the denial of determinism, makes human freedom any less problematic. It has sometimes been suggested that the arrival of quantum mechanics should immediately have solved the problem of free will and determinism. It was proposed, perhaps more often by scientists than by philosophers, that the brain would need only to be fitted with a device for (...)
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  14. Michael G. Dyer (1994). Quantum Physics and Consciousness, Creativity, Computers: A Commentary on Goswami's Quantum-Based Theory of Consciousness and Free Will. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):265-90.
  15. Willard F. Enteman (1967). The Problem of Free Will. New York, Scribner.
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  16. Michael Esfeld (2000). Is Quantum Indeterminism Relevant to Free Will? Philosophia Naturalis 37 (1):177-187.
    Quantum indeterminism may make available the option of an interactionism that does not have to pay the price of a force over and above those forces that are acknowledged in physics in order to explain how intentions can be physically effective. I show how this option might work in concrete terms and offer a criticism of it.
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  17. D. A. Evans & P. T. Landsberg (1972). Free Will in a Mechanistic Universe? An Extension. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):336-343.
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  18. Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
    Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free (...)
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  19. James W. Garson (1995). Chaos and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):365-74.
    This paper explores the possibility that chaos theory might be helpful in explaining free will. I will argue that chaos has little to offer if we construe its role as to resolve the apparent conflict between determinism and freedom. However, I contend that the fundamental problem of freedom is to find a way to preserve intuitions about rational action in a physical brain. New work on dynamic computation provides a framework for viewing free choice as a process that is sensitive (...)
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  20. GianCarlo Ghirardi & Raffaele Romano (2013). About Possible Extensions of Quantum Theory. Foundations of Physics 43 (7):881-894.
    Recently it has been claimed that no extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power, the statement following, according to the authors, from the assumptions of free will and of the correctness of quantum predictions concerning the correlations of measurement outcomes. Here we prove that the argument is basically flawed by an inappropriate use of the assumption of free will. In particular, among other implications, the claim, if correct, would imply that Bohmian Mechanics is incompatible with free will. This (...)
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  21. Sheldon Goldstein, What Does the Free Will Theorem Actually Prove?
    Conway and Kochen have presented a “free will theorem” [4, 6] which they claim shows that “if indeed we humans have free will, then [so do] elementary particles.” In a more precise fashion, they claim it shows that for certain quantum experiments in which the experimenters can choose between several options, no deterministic or stochastic model can account for the observed outcomes without violating a condition “MIN” motivated by relativistic symmetry. We point out that for stochastic models this conclusion is (...)
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  22. Ravi Gomatam, Commentary on Hodgson's Paper on Plain Person's Free Will.
    Hodgson formulates nine propositions that elaborate this plain person’s view of free will. He also offers detailed justifications that he hopes are philosophically and scientifically respectable. While Hodgson doesn't state anywhere what would count as a "scientifically respectable" proposition, he seems to expect that any scientific theory of consciousness and free will must fully account for his nine propositions, not just explain them away. Or, alternatively, any scientific theory of free will that is incompatible with his nine propositions cannot serve (...)
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  23. Attila Grandpierre & Menas Kafatos (2012). Biological Autonomy. Philosophy Study 2 (9):631-649.
    We argue that genuine biological autonomy, or described at human level as free will, requires taking into account quantum vacuum processes in the context of biological teleology. One faces at least three basic problems of genuine biological autonomy: (1) if biological autonomy is not physical, where does it come from? (2) Is there a room for biological causes? And (3) how to obtain a workable model of biological teleology? It is shown here that the solution of all these three problems (...)
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  24. David Hodgson, The Conway-Kochen 'Free Will Theorem' and Unscientific Determinism.
    One has it that earlier circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine later circumstances, and the other has it that past present and future all exist tenselessly in a ‘block universe,’ so that the passage of time and associated changes in the world are illusions or at best merely apparent.
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  25. David Hodgson (2005). Response to Commentators. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):76-95.
    I am very grateful to the commentators for their consideration of my target article. I found their comments thought-provoking and challenging, but I am not persuaded that any substantial departure is required from the views I expressed in the article. I will respond to each comment in turn, and then I will briefly review how my nine propositions have fared.
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  26. Ted Honderich, Coming to Terms with the Determined.
    From a bird's-eye view, the central argument of A Theory of Determinism appears as follows: (A) The mind is the brain; every mental event (including every decision and every framing of intention) is intimately related to a neural event. (B) Probably all neural events are deterministically caused, so, thanks to the intimate relation, determinism is likely to be true of our decisions and actions. (C) Does this mean that there is no free will? Incompatibilists say yes, Compatibilists say no, and (...)
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  27. Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and (...)
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  28. Christof Koch (2009). Free Will, Physics, Biology, and the Brain. In. In Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag. 31--52.
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  29. Christof Koch (2009). Free Will, Physics, Biology and the Brain: An Introduction. In Nancey Murphy, George Ellis, O. ’Connor F. R. & Timothy (eds.), Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will. Springer Verlag. 1--23.
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  30. Nathaniel M. Lawrence (1955). Causality, Will and Time. Review of Metaphysics 9 (September):14-26.
  31. Chris Lindsay (2012). Hume and Reid on Newtonianism, Naturalism and Liberty. In Ilya Kasavin (ed.), David Hume and Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    There has been a recent flurry of work comparing and contrasting the respective methodologies of David Hume and his contemporary Thomas Reid. Both writers are explicit in their commitments to a Newtonian methodology. Yet they diverge radically on the issue of human liberty. In this paper I want to unpack the methodological commitments underlying the two different accounts of liberty. How is it that two avowed Newtonians end up diametrically opposed to one another with respect to such a fundamental aspect (...)
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  32. Chuang Liu, How We Can Be Free From Physics.
    Our discussion in the first five sections shows that little new can be said about compatibilism, that van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism still stands, and that the view of free agency for a libertarian has little chance unless she believes that agency contains elements that are not within the natural order. Borrowing from a suggestion from Russell we expanded the Nozick-Kane model of libertarian free agency and connected it to the Wignerian interpretation of quantum measurement. As such, free decisions and (...)
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  33. Barry M. Loewer (1996). Freedom From Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):91-112.
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  34. G. Malinas (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem * by Mark Balaguer. Analysis 70 (4):793-795.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  35. Henry Margenau (1967). Quantum Mechanics, Free Will, and Determinism. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):714-725.
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  36. Nicholas Maxwell (2010). Reply to Comments on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom. Philosophia 38 (4):667-690.
    In this article I reply to comments made by Agustin Vicente and Giridhari Lal Pandit on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom (McHenry 2009 ). I criticize analytic philosophy, go on to expound the argument for the need for a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge, defend aim-oriented empiricism, outline my solution to the human world/physical universe problem, and defend the thesis that free will is compatible with physicalism.
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  37. Michael McKenna (2012). The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Balaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.
  38. Alfred R. Mele (2013). A Dialogue on Free Will and Science. Oup Usa.
    A Dialogue on Free Will and Science is a brief and intriguing book discussing the scientific challenges of free will. Presented through a dialogue, the format allows ideas to emerge and be clarified and then evaluated in a natural way. Engaging and accessible, it offers students a compelling look at free will and science.
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  39. David L. Miller (1959/1969). Modern Science and Human Freedom. New York, Greenwood Press.
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  40. J. Moreh (1994). Randomness, Game Theory and Free Will. Erkenntnis 41 (1):49 - 64.
    Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make (...)
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  41. Antonio Moreno (1976). The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and Free Will. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 50:14-23.
  42. Jörg Neunhäuserer, Ein modernes Konzept des interaktionistischen Dualismus.
    We develop a modern interactive libertarian dualism of physical and mental events using the concept of probability.
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  43. Shaun Nichols (2013). Free Will and Error. In Gregg Caruso (ed.), Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Lexington Books. 203.
  44. Gustavo L. T. Oliveirdea (2006). On Recent Scientific Advances and Incompatibilist Freedom. Florida Philosophical Review 6 (1):17-30.
  45. Asher Peres (1986). Existence of “Free Will” as a Problem of Physics. Foundations of Physics 16 (6):573-584.
    The proof of Bell's inequality is based on the assumption that distant observers can freely and independently choose their experiments. As Bell's inequality isexperimentally violated, it appears that distant physical systems may behave as a single, nonlocal, indivisible entity. This apparent contradiction is resolved. It is shown that the “free will” assumption is, under usual circumstances, an excellent approximation.I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life.... —Deuteronomy XXX, 19.
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  46. Mark Stephen Pestana (2001). Complexity Theory, Quantum Mechanics and Radically Free Self Determination. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):365-388.
  47. H. C. Plaut (1960). Condition, Cause, Free Will, and the Direction of Time. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (43):212-221.
  48. Karl Roretz (1958). Modern Physics and the Freedom of the Will. Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):70-73.
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  49. Herbert Samuel (1929). The Relativity of Free Will. Philosophy 4 (15):325-.
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  50. Orly R. Shenker (1999). Maxwell's Demon and Baron Munchausen: Free Will as a Perpetuum Mobile. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 30 (3):347-372.
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