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Summary Free will seems to require powers of rational choice. Some philosophers have looked to empirical psychology to tell us whether we have these powers. A range of experimental evidence has been interpreted as showing that we are less rational than we believe, that our actions are profoundly influenced by factors outside us in ways we do not realise and that consciousness is not directly involved in producing actions. Both the experimental data and its proper interpretation are very controversial. 
Key works The work of John Bargh has convinced some philosophers that we are influenced by factors of which we are unaware in a way that threatens freedom; Bargh 1994 reviews some of the evidence. Caruso 2012 advances this argument more philosophically. Wegner 2003 is an extended argument that consciousness plays no direct role in behaviour. The situationist literature and its challenge to free will is a focus of Doris 2002Bayne 2004 is representative of philosophical criticism of Wegner. 
Introductions Mele 2011;Mele 2008
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  1. Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.) (2012). Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
    This volume presents chapters from internationally renowned scholars in the area of goals and social behavior.
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  2. George Ainslie (2001). Breakdown of Will. Cambridge University Press.
    Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of (...)
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  3. B. Satpute Ajay, N. Ochsner Kevin & David Badre (2012). The Neuroscience of Goal-Directed Behavior. In Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
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  4. Wayne K. Andrew (1980). Human Freedom and the Science of Psychology. Journal of Mind and Behavior 1:271-290.
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  5. Silvano Arieti (1972). The Will to Be Human. [New York]Quadrangle Books.
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  6. Roberto Assagioli (1973). The Act of Will. New York,Viking Press.
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  7. Robert N. Audi (1976). B.F. Skinner on Freedom, Dignity, and the Explanation of Behavior. Behaviorism 4 (2):163-186.
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  8. J. Baer, J. Kaufman & R. Baumeister (eds.) (2009). Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  9. John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.) (2008). Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like (...)
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  10. John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (2008). Introduction: Psychology and Free Will. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
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  11. Albert Bandura (2008). Reconstrual of "Free Will" From the Agentic Perspective of Social Cognitive Theory. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
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  12. John A. Bargh (2008). 7 Free Will Is Un-Natural. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. 128.
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  13. Michael Barnwell (2010). The Problem of Negligent Omissions: Medieval Action Theories to the Rescue. Brill.
    Introduction : what's the problem? -- The problem may lurk in Aristotle's ethics -- Aristotle's akratic : foreshadowing a solution -- A negligent omission at the root of all sinfulness : Anselm and the Devil -- Negligent vs. non-negligent : a Thomistic distinction directing us toward a solution -- Can I have your divided attention? : Scotus, indistinct intellections, and type-1 negligent omissions almost solved -- I can't get you out of my mind : Scotus, lingering indistinct intellections, and type-2 (...)
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  14. M. I͡A Basov (2007). Voli͡a Kak Predmet Funkt͡sionalʹnoĭ Psikhologii. Aleteĭi͡a.
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  15. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  16. Roy F. Baumeister (2010). 3 Understanding Free Will and Consciousness on the Basis ofCurrent Research Findings in Psychology. In Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press. 24.
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  17. Roy F. Baumeister (2008). Free Will, Consciousness, and Cultural Animals. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
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  18. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture. Neuroethics 4 (1):1-11.
    Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably distinguish free actions from (...)
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  19. Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (eds.) (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
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  20. Henri Bergson (1971). Time and Free Will. New York,Humanities Press.
  21. Henri Bergson (1913/2001). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  22. Kent C. Berridge & J. Wayne Aldridge (2009). Decision Utility, Incentive Salience, and Cue-Triggered Wanting. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  23. Preben Bertelsen (2003/2006). Free Will, Consciousness, and Self: Anthropological Perspectives on Psychology. Berghahn Books.
    Introduction General Anthropology What is it to be human? Human existence means human co-existence; this is an inevitable part of the human condition. ...
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  24. Karin C. A. Bongers & Ap Dijksterhuis (2009). Consciousness as a Trouble Shooting Device? The Role of Consciousness in Goal Pursuit. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  25. Gregory B. Bonn (2013). Re-Conceptualizing Free Will for the 21st Century: Acting Independently with a Limited Role for Consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 4:920.
    This paper examines the concept of free will, or independent action, in light of recent research in psychology and neuroscience. Reviewing findings in memory, prospection, and mental simulation, as well as the neurological mechanisms underlying behavioral control, planning, and integration, it is suggested in accord with previous arguments (e.g. Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2003) that a folk conception of free will as entirely conscious control over behavior should be rejected. However, it is argued that, when taken together, these findings can also (...)
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  26. Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
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  27. Merry Bullock (ed.) (1991). The Development of Intentional Action: Cognitive, Motivational, and Interactive Processes. Karger.
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  28. A. V. Bykov (2007). Genezis Volevoĭ Reguli͡at͡sii: Monografii͡a. I͡ugo-Vostok-Servis.
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  29. John S. Callender (2010). Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners. Oxford University Press.
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. In the overlap (...)
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  30. Richard E. Carney (1971). Risk-Taking Behavior; Concepts, Methods, and Applications to Smoking and Drug Abuse. Springfield, Ill.,Thomas.
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  31. Steven Carter (1993). He's Scared, She's Scared: Understanding the Hidden Fears That Sabotage Your Relationships. Delacorte Press.
    Available for the first time in paperback, this follow-up to the phenomenally successful Men Who Can't Love tackles the issue of commitmentphobia, that persistent obstacle to truly satisfying contemporary relationships. Authors Stephen Carter and Julia Sokol explore why modern men and women are torn between the desire for intimacy and the equally intense need for independence. Drawing on numerous interviews and real-life scenarios, and written with humor, insight, and the kind of wisdom gained by personal experience, He's Scared, She's Scared (...)
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  32. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
  33. Charles S. Carver (1998). On the Self-Regulation of Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
    This book presents a thorough overview of a model of human functioning based on the idea that behavior is goal-directed and regulated by feedback control processes. It describes feedback processes and their application to behavior, considers goals and the idea that goals are organized hierarchically, examines affect as deriving from a different kind of feedback process, and analyzes how success expectancies influence whether people keep trying to attain goals or disengage. Later sections consider a series of emerging themes, including dynamic (...)
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  34. Charles S. Carver & Michael F. Scheier (2009). Action, Affect, and Two-Mode Models of Functioning. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. 298--327.
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  35. Justin V. Cavallo & Gráinne M. Fitzsimons (2012). Goal Competition, Confl Ict, Coordination, and Completion : How Intergoal Dynamics Affect Self-Regulation. In Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
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  36. Tanya L. Chartrand & Amy N. Dalton (2009). Mimicry: Its Ubiquity, Importance, and Functionality. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press. 458--483.
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  37. John Clarke, Janet Newman & Louise Westmarland (2007). Creating Citizen-Consumers? Public Service Reform and (Un)Willing Selves. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.
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  38. Barbara Cruikshank (2007). Neopolitics : Voluntary Action in the New Regieme. In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan. 146.
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  39. Clayton E. Curtis & Mark D'Esposito (2009). The Inhibition of Unwanted Actions. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  40. Ruud Custers, Baruch Eitam & John A. Bargh (2012). Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Goal Pursuit. In Henk Aarts & Andrew J. Elliot (eds.), Goal-Directed Behavior. Psychology Press.
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  41. John Dagsvik (1983). Discrete Dynamic Choice: An Extension of the Choice Models of Thurstone and Luce. I Kommisjon Hos H. Aschehoug Og Universitetsforlaget.
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  42. A. Rosenbaum David, Ruud Jonathan Vaughan, Rajal G. J. Meulenbroek Steven Jax & G. Cohen (2009). The Activation, Selection, and Expression. Smart Moves: The Psychology of Everyday Perceptual-Motor Acts. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  43. D. N. Davis (ed.) (2004). Visions of Mind: Architectures for Cognition and Affect. IDEA Group Publishing.
    Well, not anymore. This collection presents a diverse overview of where the development of artificial minds is as the twenty first century begins.
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  44. Felipe De Brigard & William Brady (2013). The Effect of What We Think May Happen on Our Judgments of Responsibility. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):259-269.
    Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward compatibilism than when those descriptions use non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system. The (...)
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  45. Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys (forthcoming). Being Free by Losing Control: What Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Can Tell Us About Free Will. In Walter Glannon (ed.), Free Will and the Brain: Neuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives on Free Will.
    According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...)
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  46. Geert de Soete, Hubert Feger & Karl C. Klauer (eds.) (1989). New Developments in Psychological Choice Modeling. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub..
    A selection of 15 papers on choice modeling are presented in this volume.
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  47. Jean Decety & Jessica A. Sommerville (2009). Action Representation as the Bedrock of Social Cognition: A Developmental Neuroscience Perspective. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (forthcoming). Defending the Free-Will Intuitions Scale: Reply to Stephen Morris. Philosophical Psychology:1-7.
    In our paper, ?The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the question of natural compatibilism? (this issue), we seek to advance empirical debates about free will by measuring the relevant folk intuitions using the scale methodology of psychology, as a supplement to standard experimental methods. Stephen Morris (this issue) raises a number of concerns about our paper. Here, we respond to Morris's concerns.
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  49. Daniel C. Dennett (2008). Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oup Usa.
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  50. Ezio Di Nucci (2012). Priming Effects and Free Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):725-734.
    Abstract I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh ? the ?elderly? stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment?s room than (...)
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