Free Will and Science Edited by Neil Levy (Oxford University)

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  1. A. E. Taylor (1911). Book Review:Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Henri Bergson, F. L. Pogson. Ethics 21 (3):350-.
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Free Will and Genetics
  1. Patricia S. Greenspan, Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem(S).
    I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ true of the world (...)
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  2. Patricia S. Greenspan (2001). Genes, Electrotransmitters, and Free Will. In Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press.
    There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior. Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic.
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  3. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Free Will and the Genome Project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43.
    Popular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in (...)
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  4. Peter Lipton (2004). Genetic and Generic Determinism: A New Threat to Free Will? In D. Rees & Steven P. R. Rose (eds.), The New Brain Sciences: Perils and Prospects. Cambridge University Press.
    We are discovering more and more about the human genotypes and about the connections between genotype and behaviour. Do these advances in genetic information threaten our free will? This paper offers a philosopher’s perspective on the question.
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  5. Garry Young (2007). Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario. Philosophia 35 (2):171-180.
    This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own (...)
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Free Will and Neuroscience
  1. George J. Agich (2004). Seeking the Everyday Meaning of Autonomy in Neurologic Disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (4):295-298.
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  2. Rosemary Agonito (1975). Neurological Information Processing and Free Persons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):3-11.
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  3. Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will, and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
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  4. Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
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  5. Joel Anderson (2007). Introduction: Free Will, Neuroscience, and the Participant Perspective. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):3 – 11.
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  6. Kristin Andrews (2003). Neurophilosophy of Free Will by Henrik Walter. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):166-175.
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  7. Mark Balaguer (2010). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem. Mit Press.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open ...
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  8. Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele & Kathleen D. Vohs (2010). Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? University Press.
    This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating ...
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  9. Tim Bayne, Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism.
    Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in (...)
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  10. Helen Beebee (forthcoming). Free Will Sans Metaphysics? Metascience.
    Free will sans metaphysics? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9525-5 Authors Helen Beebee, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  11. Dennis Bielfeldt (2009). Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. By John R. Searle. Zygon 44 (4):999-1002.
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  12. Jean E. Burns (1999). Volition and Physical Laws. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (10):27-47.
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  13. Graham Cairns-Smith, Thomas W. Clark, Ravi Gomatam, Robert H. Kane, Nicholas Maxwell, J. J. C. Smart, Sean A. Spence & Henry P. Stapp (2005). Commentaries on David Hodgson's "a Plain Person's Free Will". Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):20-75.
    REMARKS ON EVOLUTION AND TIME-SCALES, Graham Cairns-Smith; HODGSON'S BLACK BOX, Thomas Clark; DO HODGSON'S PROPOSITIONS UNIQUELY CHARACTERIZE FREE WILL?, Ravi Gomatam; WHAT SHOULD WE RETAIN FROM A PLAIN PERSON'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL?, Gilberto Gomes; ISOLATING DISPARATE CHALLENGES TO HODGSON'S ACCOUNT OF FREE WILL, Liberty Jaswal; FREE AGENCY AND LAWS OF NATURE, Robert Kane; SCIENCE VERSUS REALIZATION OF VALUE, NOT DETERMINISM VERSUS CHOICE, Nicholas Maxwell; COMMENTS ON HODGSON, J.J.C. Smart; THE VIEW FROM WITHIN, Sean Spence; COMMENTARY ON HODGSON, Henry Stapp.
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  14. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  15. Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?
    As neuroscience uncovers these and other mechanisms regulating choices and social behaviour, we cannot help but wonder whether anyone truly chooses anything (though see "Is the universe deterministic?"). As a result, profound questions about responsibility are inescapable, not just regarding criminal justice, but in the day-to-day business of life. Given that, I suggest that free will, as traditionally understood, needs modification. Because of its importance in society, any description of free will updated to fit what we know about the nervous (...)
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  16. Patricia Smith Churchland (2002). Brain Wise. The MIT Press.
    A neurophilosopher?s take on the self, free will, human understanding, and the experience of God, from the perspective of the brain.
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  17. Wim E. Crusio (1999). Behavioral Neurogenetics Beyond Determinism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):890-891.
    Rose's Lifelines justifiably attacks the rigid genetic determinism that pervades the popular press and even some scientific writing. Genes do not equate with destiny. However, Rose's argument should not be taken too far: genes do influence behavior, in animals as well as in man.
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  18. Joseph Dumit (2003). Is It Me or My Brain? Depression and Neuroscientific Facts. Journal of Medical Humanities 24 (1/2):35-47.
    This article considers the roles played by brain images (e.g., from PET scans) in mass media as experienced by people suffering from mental illness, and as used by scientists and activist groups in demonstrating a biological basis for mental illness. Examining the rhetorical presentation of images in magazines and books, the article describes the persuasive power that brain images have in altering the understanding people have of their own body—their objective self. Analyzing first-person accounts of encounters with brain images, it (...)
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  19. Bruce Edmonds, Towards Implementing Free-Will.
    Some practical criteria for free-will are suggested where free-will is a matter of degree. It is argued that these are more appropriate than some extremely idealised conceptions. Thus although the paper takes lessons from philosophy it avoids idealistic approaches as irrelevant. A mechanism for allowing an agent to meet these criteria is suggested: that of facilitating the gradual emergence of free-will in the brain via an internal evolutionary process. This meets the requirement that not only must the choice of action (...)
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  20. C. M. Fisher (2001). If There Were No Free Will. Medical Hypotheses 56:364-366.
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  21. A. Flew (1984). Book Reviews : Free Will: A Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism. By John Thorp. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. XII + 162. 8.95. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (4):585-586.
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  22. Walter J. Freeman (1999). Neurogenetic Determinism is a Theological Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):893-894.
    In “Lifelines” Steven Rose constructs a case against neurogenetic determinism based on experimental data from biology and in favor of a significant degree of self determination. Two philosophical errors in the case favoring neurogenetic determinism are illustrated by Rose: category mistakes and an excessively narrow view of causality restricted to the linear form.
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  23. Christopher D. Frith (1996). Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):91-93.
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  24. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  25. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Intentionality and Intentional Action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.
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  26. Grant R. Gillett (2001). Free Will and Events in the Brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):287-310.
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  27. Walter Glannon (2005). Neurobiology, Neuroimaging, and Free Will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):68-82.
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  28. Robert B. Glassman (1983). Free Will has a Neural Substrate: Critique of Joseph F. Rychlak's Discovering Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Zygon 18 (1):67-82.
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  29. I. Goldberg, S. Ullman & R. Malach (2008). Neuronal Correlates of “Free Will” Are Associated with Regional Specialization in the Human Intrinsic/Default Network. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):587-601.
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  30. J. Habermas (2007). The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism? Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):13 – 50.
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  31. Patrick Haggard, P. Catledge, M. Dafydd & David A. Oakley (2004). Anomalous Control: When "Free Will" is Not Conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.
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  32. Dirk Hartmann (2004). Neurophysiology and Freedom of the Will. Poiesis and Praxis 2 (4):275-284.
    In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments (...)
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  33. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2011). The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 20:151-176.
    When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...)
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  34. Ted Honderich, Mind the Guff -- John Searle's Thinking On Consciousness and Free Will Examined.
    (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness -- such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our (...)
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  35. Ted Honderich (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press.
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  36. No Authorship Indicated (2001). Review of Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):184-184.
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  37. Robert H. Kane (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and (...)
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  38. T. Kapitan (2011). Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem, by Mark Balaguer. Mind 120 (479):848-852.
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  39. Chris Kaposy (2009). Will Neuroscientific Discoveries About Free Will and Selfhood Change Our Ethical Practices? Neuroethics 2 (1).
    Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral (...)
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  40. Alexander George Karczmar (2001). Sir John Eccles, 1903-1997: Part 2: The Brain as a Machine or as a Site of Free Will? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44 (2):250-262.
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  41. Alexander George Karczmar (2001). Sir John Eccles, 1903-1997: Part 2: The Brain as a Machine or as a Site of Free Will? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44 (2):250-262.
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  42. Matt King & Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Consciousness. Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, in contrast, have aimed to (...)
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  43. Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (forthcoming). Free Will and the Bounds of the Self. In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford.
    If you start taking courses in contemporary cognitive science, you will soon encounter a particular picture of the human mind. This picture says that the mind is a lot like a computer. Specifically, the mind is made up of certain states and certain processes. These states and processes interact, in accordance with certain general rules, to generate specific behaviors. If you want to know how those states and processes got there in the first place, the only answer is that they (...)
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  44. Guus Labooy (2004). Freedom and Neurobiology: A Scotistic Account. Zygon 39 (4):919-932.
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  45. Robert A. Larmer (1986). Free Will, Hegemony and Neurophysiological Indeterminism. Philosophia 16 (August):177-189.
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  46. Donald Levy (2003). Neural Holism and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):205-229.
    Both libertarian and compatibilist approaches have been unsuccessful in providing an acceptable account of free will. Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience, including the connectionist theory of mind and empirical findings regarding modularity and integration of brain functions, provide the basis for a new approach: neural holism. This approach locates free will in fully integrated behavior in which all of a person's beliefs and desires, implicitly represented in the brain, automatically contribute to an act. Deliberation, the experience of volition, and cognitive (...)
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  47. Benjamin W. Libet (2002). Do We Have Free Will? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain: Commentary on John Searle's Article (with Reply From Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.
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  49. Benjamin W. Libet (1999). Do We Have Free Will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:47-57.
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  50. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Commentary on Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96.
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  51. Benjamin W. Libet, Anthony Freeman & Keith Sutherland (1999). The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Imprint Academic.
    It is widely accepted in science that the universe is a closed deterministic system in which everything can, ultimately, be explained by purely physical...
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  52. Daniel Lim (2008). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. By Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown. Zygon 43 (3):748-753.
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  53. Don Locke (1974). Action, Movement, and Neurophysiology. Inquiry 17 (1-4):23 – 42.
    Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent-causation and event-causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive (...)
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  54. Nicholas Maxwell (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
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  55. Ulrich Mayr (2004). Conflict, Consciousness, and Control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):145-148.
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  56. Storrs McCall, Does the Brain Lead the Mind?
    Over the last 25 years, experimental findings published by Benjamin Libet have indicated that conscious acts of will are preceded by a characteristic kind of brain event of which the agent is not conscious. It, Libet says, rather than the will, is what causes actions. His discoveries, if correct, would seem to imply that the notion of a free, conscious will is an illusion, and that actions are initiated by neural processes not under conscious control. In what follows it is (...)
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  57. Alfred R. Mele (2010). Testing Free Will. Neuroethics 3 (2).
    This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments (...)
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  58. Alfred R. Mele (2007). Review of John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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  59. Stephen G. Morris (2007). Neuroscience and the Free Will Conundrum. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):20 – 22.
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  60. Daniel Moseley (2008). Review of Carlton Erickson, "The Science of Addiction". [REVIEW] Metapsychology.
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  61. Sabine Müller & Henrik Walter (2010). Reviewing Autonomy: Implications of the Neurosciences and the Free Will Debate for the Principle of Respect for the Patient's Autonomy. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (02):205-.
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  62. Nancey C. Murphy (2007/2009). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction: New approaches to knotty old problems -- Avoiding Cartesian materialism -- From causal reductionism to self-directed systems -- From mindless to intelligent action -- How can neural nets mean? -- How does reason get its grip on the brain? -- Who's responsible? -- Neurobiological reductionism and free will.
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  63. Natika Newton (2003). A Critical Review of Nicholas Maxwell's the Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will, and Evolution. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):149 – 156.
    Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to (...)
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  64. Timothy O'Connor (2009). Degrees of Freedom. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):119 – 125.
    I propose a theory of freedom of choice on which it is a variable quality of individual conscious choices that has several dimensions that admit of degrees, even though - as many theorists have traditionally supposed - it also has as a necessary condition the possession of a capacity that is all or nothing. I argue that the proposed account better fits the phenomenology of ostensibly free actions, as well as empirical findings in the human sciences.
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  65. David A. Oakley & H. C. Plotkin (1979). Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.
    It has always concentrated upon man, and usually the comparative approach has not been used to study the evolution of behaviour, but in the hope that ...
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  66. Palmyre M. F. Oomen (2003). On Brain, Soul, Self, and Freedom: An Essay in Bridging Neuroscience and Faith. Zygon 38 (2):377-392.
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  67. Jaak Panksepp & Georg Northoff (2009). The Trans-Species Core SELF: The Emergence of Active Cultural and Neuro-Ecological Agents Through Self-Related Processing Within Subcortical-Cortical Midline Networks☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):193-215.
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  68. Ingmar Persson (1989). A Theory of Determinism. The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes. Theoria 55 (1):62-76.
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  69. Susan Pockett (2004). Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):23-40.
  70. Susan Pockett (2002). Backward Referral, Flash-Lags, and Quantum Free Will: A Response to Commentaries on Articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and Trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.
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  71. C. G. Prado (1983). Free Will: A Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism John Thorp London, Boston, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Pp. Xi, 162. $25.75. Dialogue 22 (03):547-550.
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  72. James Rocha (forthcoming). Sean A. Spence, the Actor's Brain: Exploring the Cognitive Neuroscience of Free Will. Journal of Value Inquiry.
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  73. Adina L. Roskies, Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility.
    phenomena that are hallmarks of what it is to be human free will whether or not the universe is deterministic, many [1,2,4,26]. There is now a widespread and industrious people think that freedom can yet be salvaged if the scientific community, whose aim is to understand the universe is indeterministic, for they favor a Libertarian mechanisms underlying these phenomena [7,9,10, account which posits an agent as an uncaused cause 27–32]. The underlying worry is that those things that [17,18]. In that (...)
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  74. Joseph F. Rychlak (1983). Free Will as Transcending the Unidirectional Neural Substrate. Zygon 18 (4):439-442.
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  75. Markus E. Schlosser (forthcoming). Free Will and the Unconscious Precursors of Choice. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Benjamin Libet's empirical challenge to free will has received a great deal of attention and criticism. A standard line of response has emerged that many take to be decisive against Libet's challenge. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that this standard response fails to put the challenge to rest. It fails, in particular, to address a recent follow-up experiment that raises a similar worry about free will (Soon et al. 2008). In the second part, however, I (...)
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  76. Markus E. Schlosser (2008). Review: John R. Searle: Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1127-1130.
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  77. Jay Schulkin (2007). Effort and Will: A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Mind and Matter 5 (1):111-126.
    Earlier views associated cognition with the cortex, and the will with sub-cortical non-cognitive structures. But an emerging perspective is that cognition runs throughout the central nervous sys- tem, including areas typically linked to motor control. It is an important realization that perceptual/effector systems are pregnant with cognitive resources. Staying the course to achieve one 's goals amidst diverse pulls is the primary function of the will. One adaptation is to pre-commit oneself to future recursive actions consistent with one's plans. Diverse (...)
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  78. John R. Searle (2007). Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):69 – 76.
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  79. John R. Searle (2001). Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology. Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.
    The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two (...)
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  80. John R. Searle (2000). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.
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  81. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2010). The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the (...)
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  82. Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters (2008). The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most (...)
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  83. J. J. C. Smart (2005). Comments on Hodgson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):58-64.
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  84. Sean A. Spence (1996). Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):75-90.
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  85. Roger W. Sperry (1979). Consciousness, Free Will and Personal Identity. In David A. Oakley & H.C. Plotkin (eds.), Brain, Behaviour, and Evolution. Methuen and Company.
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  86. Henry Stapp, Gazzaniga's “The Ethical Brain”.
    Michael S. Gazzaniga is a renowned cognitive neuroscientist. He was Editor-in-Chief of the 1447 page book The Cognitive Neurosciences, which, for the past decade, has been the fattest book in my library, apart from the ‘unabridged’. His recent book The Ethical Brain has a Part III entitled “Free Will, Personal Responsibility, and the Law”. This Part addresses, from the perspective of cognitive neuroscience, some of the moral issues that have been dealt with in the present book. The aim of this (...)
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  87. G. Lynn Stephens (1996). Commentary on "Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):97-98.
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  88. Takayuki Suzuki (2009). Brain Science and Free Will. Kagaku Tetsugaku 42 (2):13-28.
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  89. Irving Thalberg (1970). New Light on Brain Physiology and Free Will? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (4):379-383.
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  90. Mary Tiles (1989). A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience and Life Hopes By Ted Honderich Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, Xi + 644 Pp., £55.00. Philosophy 64 (247):109-.
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  91. Matthew Usher (2006). Control, Choice, and the Convergence/Divergence Dynamics: A Compatibilistic Probabilistic Theory of Free Will. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):188-213.
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  92. Max Velmans (2004). Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
    Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and (...)
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  93. Henrik Walter (2002). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
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  94. Henrik Walter (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will. MIT Press.
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