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Summary This category is a catch-all for papers that do not fit - or much more commonly, have aspects that do not fit - anywhere else in the taxonomy. Most papers in this category are also categorized under some other heading as well. 
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  1. Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.) (2009). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
  2. Roksana Alavi (2005). Robert Kane, Free Will and Neuro-Indeterminism. Philo 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
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  3. Patrick Proctor Alexander (1866/1977). Mill and Carlyle: An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom Wth an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig by Smelfungus. R. West.
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  4. Robert Allen (2008). Free Agency and Self-Esteem. Sorites 20:74-79.
    In this paper I define the role of self-esteem in promoting free agency, in order to meet some objections to the content-neutrality espoused by the reflective acceptance approach to free agency, according to which an agent has acted freely if and only if she would reflectively accept the process by which her motive was formed -- in other words, any volition the agent forms is an impetus to a free action just in case she would positively appraise its genesis. For (...)
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  5. Roman Altshuler (2010). An Unconditioned Will: The Role of Temporality in Freedom and Agency. Dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook
    Eliminativists about free will and moral responsibility argue that no action can be free and responsible because in order to be actions, our movements must be caused by features of our character or will. However, either the will is constituted by states that are themselves produced by events outside our control, or it is constituted by our own choices, which must themselves stem from our will in order to be up to us. Thus, any attempt to account for freedom and (...)
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  6. Paul C. Anders, Joshua C. Thurow & Kenneth Hochstetter (2014). On Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom: Is There Anything I Would Have Done If I Could Have Done Otherwise? American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):85-94.
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  7. José Antúnez Cid (2006). La intersubjetividad en Xavier Zubiri. PUG.
    A deep research in the philosophical (between phenomenology and new metaphysics) anthropology of Zubiri looking for how the human person connects and grows with others from metaphysical root until social development, studying love as personalist connection. Origin, embryo ontological status and death are also studied.
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  8. Takuo Aoyama, Shogo Shimizu & Yuki Yamada (2015). Free Will and the Divergence Problem. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:1-18.
    This paper presents what the authors call the ‘divergence problem’ regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the ‘active cause’ on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the ‘second-person freedom’ which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination (...)
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  9. Marcus Arvan (2013). A New Theory of Free Will. Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical (...)
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  10. Michael Ayers (1968). The Refutation of Determinism: An Essay in Philosophical Logic. London, Methuen.
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  11. Charles A. Baylis (1950). Rational Preference, Determinism, and Moral Obligation. Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):57-63.
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  12. W. Benett (1914). Religion and Free Will: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Values. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (23):639-641.
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  13. Rüdiger Bittner (2002). Autonomy, and Then. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):217 – 228.
    Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. (...)
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  14. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Incompatibilism and "Bypassed" Agency. In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press
    Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray have recently argued that when people take agents to lack responsibility in deterministic scenarios, they do so because they take agents’ beliefs, desires and decisions to be bypassed, having no effect on their actions. This might seem like an improbable mistake, but the Bypass Hypothesis is bolstered by intriguing experimental data. Moreover, if the hypothesis is correct, it provides a straightforward error theory for incompatibilist intuitions. This chapter argues that the Bypass Hypothesis, although promising and (...)
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  15. Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom (forthcoming). Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Blackwell
    Examines the relevance of empirical studies of responsibility judgments for traditional philosophical concerns about free will and moral responsibility. We argue that experimental philosophy is relevant to the traditional debates, but that setting up experiments and interpreting data in just the right way is no less difficult than negotiating traditional philosophical arguments. Both routes are valuable, but so far neither promises a way to secure significant agreement among the competing parties. To illustrate, we focus on three sorts of issues. For (...)
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  16. D. H. Blanchard (1899). Some Deterministic Implications of the Psychology of Attention. Philosophical Review 8 (1):23-39.
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  17. Susanne Bobzien (2011). Freedom. In Hubert Cancik, Christine F. Salazar & et al (eds.), Brill's New Pauly. Brill
    ABSTRACT: One-page entry on freedom in the philosophical (as opposed to political) sense in antiquity, noting (among other things) that a notion of freedom of choice that requires that the person not be causally predetermined in his/her actions is developed only in the 1st-3rd cents. CE in Alexander of Aphrodisias, building on elements of Aristotelian ethics and logic, Stoic psychology and perhaps Christian and Middle Platonic influences. Both German version (1998) and English translation (2011).
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  18. Susanne Bobzien (1998). The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem. Phronesis 43 (2):133-175.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century AD. It undergoes (...)
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  19. Peter Archibald[from old catalog] Carmichael (1930). The Nature of Freedom. Chapel Hill [N.C.]Dept. Of Philosophy, University of North Carolina.
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  20. Herbert Wildon Carr (1928). The Freewill Problem. London, E. Benn Limited.
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  21. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism. In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  22. Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
  23. David J. Chalmers (1998). TT Ontology, the Hard Problem of Experience,-*'-*'Free Will, and Agency. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii. MIT Press 2--79.
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  24. Randolph Clarke (2013). Abilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):451-458.
    The paper is a contribution to a symposium on Dana Nelkin's MAKING SENSE OF FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. Nelkin advances accounts of moral freedom--the freedom required for moral responsibility--and deliberative freedom--the freedom that any rational deliberator must believe in. She argues that the two come to fundamentally the same thing. I raise doubt about this claim, and also about whether the kind of ability that Nelkin characterizes suffices for responsibility in all cases.
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  25. E. Cokely & A. Feltz (2010). Questioning the Free Will Comprehension Question. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society 2440--2445.
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  26. Martin Davidson (1942). The Free Will Controversy. London, Watts.
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  27. Roberta De Monticelli (2009). La Novità di Ognuno: Persona E Libertà. Garzanti.
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  28. Jonathan Edwards (1984/1982). Freedom of the Will. Franklin Library.
    Eighteenth-century theologian_Jonathan Edwards remains a significant influence on modern religion, and this book constitutes his most important contribution to Christian thought. Edwards_raises timeless questions about desire, choice, good, and evil, contrasting the opposing Calvinist and Arminian views of free will and addressing issues related to God's foreknowledge, determinism, and moral agency.
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  29. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). The Embodied and Social Dimensions of Free Will: The Value of Phenomenology. AJOB Neuroscience.
  30. Michael Esfeld & Michael Sollberger (2008). Strukturale Repräsentation – by Andreas Bartels Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität, Personalität. Ein Beitrag Zur Philosophie der Person – by Christian Beyer Bilder Im Geiste. Die Imagery-Debatte – by Verena Gottschling der Blick Von Innen. Zur Transtemporalen Identität Bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen – by Martine Nida-Rümelin Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche Und Unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung – by Michael Pauen Willensfreiheit Und Hirnforschung. Das Freiheitsmodell Des Epistemischen Libertarismus – by Bettina Walde der Mentale Zugang Zur Welt. Realismus, Skeptizismus Und Intentionalität – by Marcus Willaschek. [REVIEW] Dialectica 62 (1):128–135.
  31. Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis (...)
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  32. Adam Feltz, A. Perez & M. Harris (2012). Free Will, Causes, and Decisions: Individual Differences in Written Reports. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):166-189.
    We present evidence indicating new individual differences with people's intuitions about the relation of determinism to freedom and moral responsibility. We analysed participants' written explanations of why a person acted. Participants offered one of either 'decision' or 'causal' based explanations of behaviours in some paradigmatic cases. Those who gave causal explanations tended to have more incompatibilist intuitions than those who gave decision explanations. Importantly, the affective content of a scenario influenced the type of explanation given. Scenarios containing highly affective actions (...)
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  33. David Forman (2008). Free Will and the Freedom of the Sage in Leibniz and the Stoics. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):203-219.
  34. David Forman (2007). Review of Ermanno Bencivenga, Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6).
  35. Joseph S. Fulda (1992). The Mathematical Pull of Temptation. Mind 101 (402):305-307.
    Argues that the mathematical structure of a tempting or, more generally, risk-taking situation may prove far more dispositive of the choice made than either character or the lure/pull of the subject/object of temptation/risk-taking. -/- Briefly discusses some implications of this.
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  36. Ben Gibran (2014). Causal Realism in the Philosophy of Mind. Essays in Philosophy 15 (2):299-313.
    Causal realism is the view that causation is a structural feature of reality; a power inherent in the world to produce effects, independently of the existence of minds or observers. This article suggests that certain problems in the philosophy of mind are artefacts of causal realism; because they presuppose the existence or possibility of a mind-independent causal nexus between the ‘physical’ and the ‘mental’. These dilemmas include the 'hard problem' of consciousness, and the problems of free will and mental causality. (...)
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  37. Johannes Giesinger (2010). Free Will and Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44 (4):515-528.
    It is commonly assumed that to educate means to control or guide a person's acting and development. On the other hand, it is often presupposed that the addressees of education must be seen as being endowed with free will. The question raised in this paper is whether these two assumptions are compatible. It might seem that if the learner is free in her will, she cannot be educated; however, if she is successfully educated, then it is doubtful whether she can (...)
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  38. Patricia Greenspan (2000). Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. In J. H. Aguilar & A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of action: 5 questions. Automatic Press/VIP
    Like many people, I was initially attracted to free will issues – at first embracing hard determinism, as part of a general rejection of doctrines associated with religion, though exposure to Kant’s views in my first philosophy course made me begin to consider nonreligious grounds for an indeterminist conception of free action. Of course, Kant also takes belief in God and immortality as presupposed by moral agency, but I was never much moved by those arguments. On free will, though, I (...)
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  39. Patricia Greenspan (1987). Unfreedom and Responsibility. In F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology.
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  40. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.
    Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives.1 If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. (...)
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  41. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (2013). Introduction: Mapping the Terrain. In Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press 1-25.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  42. Bernard Harrison (2003). Review: The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will, and Evolution. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):765-770.
  43. William Hasker (2003). Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi. Religious Studies 39 (4):431-440.
    David Ciocchi has charged that ‘open’ or free-will theism is religiously inadequate. This is it is because it is unable to affirm the ‘presumption of divine intervention in response to petitionary prayer’ (PDI), a presumption Ciocchi claims is implicit in the religious practice of ordinary Christian believers. I argue that PDI and Ciocchi's other assumptions concerning prayer are too strong, and would upon reflection be rejected by most believers. On the other hand, God as conceived by free-will theism has extensive (...)
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  44. Tobias Hoffmann (ed.) (2008). Weakness of Will From Plato to the Present. Catholic University of America Press.
    This volume contains thirteen original essays on weakness of will by scholars of contemporary philosophy and the history of philosophy. It covers the major periods of Western philosophy.
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  45. Wesley H. Holliday (2012). Freedom and the Fixity of the Past. Philosophical Review 121 (2):179-207.
    According to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP), no one can now do anything that would require the past to have unfolded differently than it actually did, for the past is fixed, over and done with. Why might doing something in the future require the past to be different? Because if determinism is true—if the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the Big Bang determined a unique future for our universe—then doing anything other than what (...)
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  46. Ted Honderich, Agnostic Autonomism.
    Professor Mele uses the term `autonomy' where other philosophers have spoken of `freedom', `free will' and the like. His well-worked-out paper, which is individual in more than its usage, is not committed to either of the tired doctrines that determinism is inconsistent with autonomy and that it is consistent with it. He is agnostic about which choice to make. Some proponents of the first doctrine, those who believe determinism, draw the conclusion that there is no autonomy. Some proponents of the (...)
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  47. Ted Honderich, A Quick Tour of Causation, Probabilism, Determinism, Freedom and Responsibility.
    The same two kinds of conditional connections in the world, each dependent on the situation, hold between each event in certain sets of events that we can call causal circumstances for the lighting. A causal circumstance cc) included the event that for some reason we pick out and call the cause -- the striking s).
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  48. David Hunt (1995). ``Does Theological Fatalism Rest on an Equivocation?&Quot. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2):153-165.
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  49. Mathew Iredale (2012). The Problem of Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction. Acumen.
    The book explores what it is about the free will problem that makes it so intractable and argues that the only acceptable solution must be one consistent with what science tells us about the world. It is here, maintains Iredale, that many works on free will, introductory or otherwise, fall down, by focusing only on how free will relates to determinism. He shows that there are clear areas of scientific research which are directly and significantly relevant to free will in (...)
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  50. Michael Anthony Istvan (2011). Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420.
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