This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
21 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Jan Almäng (2012). Russellian Propositions and Properties. Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
    This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Darren Bradley (2013). Dynamic Beliefs and the Passage of Time. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes De Se. University of Chicago
    How should our beliefs change over time? Much has been written about how our beliefs should change in the light of new evidence. But that is not the question I’m asking. Sometimes our beliefs change without new evidence. I previously believed it was Sunday. I now believe it’s Monday. In this paper I discuss the implications of such beliefs for philosophy of language. I will argue that we need to allow for ‘dynamic’ beliefs, that we need new norms of belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Nicolas Bullot (2007). A Study in the Cognition of Individuals' Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):276-293.
    This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  4. Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (1997). On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of Meaning. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):278–296.
    A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  5. Sean Crawford (2013). Object-Dependent Thought. In Pashler Harold (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Mind. SAGE
  6. Sean Crawford (2004). A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief. Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
  7. Adrian Cussins (1992). Content, Embodiment, and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails. Mind 101 (404):651-88.
  8. Richard G. Heck Jr (2012). Solving Frege's Puzzle. Journal of Philosophy 109 (1/2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  9. Richard G. Heck (2014). In Defense of Formal Relationism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
    In his paper “Flaws of Formal Relationism”, Mahrad Almotahari argues against the sort of response to Frege's Puzzle I have defended elsewhere, which he dubs ‘Formal Relationism’. Almotahari argues that, because of its specifically formal character, this view is vulnerable to objections that cannot be raised against the otherwise similar Semantic Relationism due to Kit Fine. I argue in response that Formal Relationism has neither of the flaws Almotahari claims to identify.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Harold T. Hodes (1982). The Composition of Fregean Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11. Gideon Makin (2000). The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation. Routledge.
    Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted understanding of Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference . Makin compares the work Russell did shortly before his famous essay "On Denoting" with the essay itself and argues that this comparison shows that the traditional view of the problem Russell was trying to solve is untenable. He then examines Frege's classic essay and argues that some of the less well-known views that Frege held have radical implications (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  12. Mohan Matthen (2015). Comments on Gauker's Word and Image. Analysis 75 (1):83-99.
    Christopher Gauker argues that no concept can be extracted from perceptual experience and that imagistic thought cannot draw boundaries between one kind and another. Here, it is argued, on the contrary, that images have extension and are consequently Fregean concepts. Hume’s theory of abstraction as indifference is offered as an account of extra-sensory concepts. Finally, it is argued that modern theories of sensory data processing run parallel to Kant’s idea of synthesis as a pre-condition for perception.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Boyd Millar (2015). Frege's Puzzle for Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  15. Eva Schmidt (2015). Nonconceptual Content. In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer International Publishing
    I defend both conceptualists and nonconceptualists against an attack which has been leveled at them by critics such as Byrne (Perception and conceptual content In: Steup M, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Blackwell, Malden, pp 231-250, 2005), Speaks (Philos Rev 114:359–398, 2005), and Crowther (Erkenntnis 65:5–276, 2006). They distinguish a ‘state’ reading and a ‘content’ reading of ‘(non)conceptual’ and argue that many arguments on either side support only the respective state views, not the respective content views. To prepare (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Barry Smith (1998). An Introduction to Ontology. In Donna Peuquet, Barry Smith & Berit O. Brogaard (eds.), The Ontology of Fields: Report of the Specialist Meeting held under the auspices of the Varenius Project. National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis
    Analytical philosophy of the last one hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that one can arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic) features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by Frege and Russell. More specifically, it is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of first-order logic, where ‘F’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Ludovic Soutif (2012). De Re Thought, Object Identity, and Knowing-Wh*. Analytica 16 (1-2):133-164.
    In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Jason Stanley (2014). Constructing Meanings. Analysis 74 (4):662-676.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Clinton Tolley (2012). Kant on the Content of Cognition. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):200-228.
    I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  20. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2012). Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content From Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57.
  21. Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Self-Verification and the Content of Thought. Synthese 149 (1):59-75.
    Burge follows Descartes in claiming that the category of conceptually self-verifying judgments includes (but is not restricted to) judgments that give rise to sincere assertions of sentences of the form, 'I am thinking that p'. In this paper I argue that Burge’s Cartesian insight is hard to reconcile with Fregean accounts of the content of thought. Burge's intuitively compelling claim that cogito judgments are conceptually self-verifying poses a real challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation