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  1. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  2. Mark Balaguer (2005). Indexical Propositions and de Re Belief Ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3):325 - 355.
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what (...)
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  3. George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
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  4. João Branquinho (1990). Are Salmon's 'Guises' Disguised Fregean Senses? Analysis 50 (1):19 - 24.
    In a review of Frege's Puzzle1, Graeme Forbes makes the claim that Salmon's account of belief might be seen, under certain conditions, as a mere notational variant of a neo-Fregean theory; and thus that such an account might be reduced to a neo-Fregean one simply by rewriting it in terms of Fregean terminology. With a view to supporting his claim, Forbes offers an outline of an account of belief which, according to him, would satisfy the following conditions: (i) it could (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard (2007). Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap? Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
    Attitude reports are reports about people’s states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude reports are successful. Some (...)
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  6. Ray Buchanan (forthcoming). Schiffer's Puzzle: A Kind of Fregean Response. In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meaning and Other Things: Essays on Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or Russellian (...)
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  7. Tyler Burge (1978). Belief and Synonymy. Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):119-138.
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  8. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  9. David J. Chalmers (2011). Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. Mind 120 (479):587 - 635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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  10. David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern (2014). Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem. Analysis 74 (2):210-224.
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show that the two-dimensional (...)
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  11. Alonzo Church (1954). Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief. Philosophical Studies 5 (5):65 - 73.
  12. John Corcoran (2011). Hare and Others on the Proposition. Principia 15 (1):51-76.
    A História atesta diferentes abordagens da “proposição”. A proposição tem sido considerada como objeto de crença, descrença e de dúvida: geralmente como objeto de atitudes proposicionais , aquilo do qual pode se dizer ser acreditado, desacreditado, entendido, etc. Também tem sido tomada como sendo o objeto de apreensão, julgamento, suposição, afirmação, denegação, e de investigação: geralmente como o objeto das ações proposicionais , aquilo que pode ser dito ser apreendido, ser julgado verdadeiro ou falso, ser assumido para fins de raciocínio, (...)
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  13. Sean Crawford (2008). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited. Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
    Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ (or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system is also supposed to suffer from the (...)
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  14. Mark Crimmins (1993). So-Labeled Neo-Fregeanism. Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):265 - 279.
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  15. Michael Dummett (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...
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  16. Michael A. E. Dummett (1981). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
  17. Graeme Forbes (1990). The Indispensability of Sinn. Philosophical Review 99 (4):535-563.
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  18. Graeme Forbes (1987). Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective. Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.
  19. Bryan Frances (2002). A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription. Analysis 62 (2):116–125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...)
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  20. Bryan Frances (1999). Defending the Defense. Mind 108 (431):563-566.
    My hunch has always been that in the end, Fregeanism will defeat Millianism. So I suspect that my (1998) arguments on behalf of Millianism are flawed. Peter Graham (1999) is confident he has found the flaws, but he has not. I hope that some clarification will enccurage others to reveal the errors.
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  21. Bryan Frances (1998). Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle. Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  22. G. Frege, On Sinn and Bedeutung.
  23. Gottlob Frege (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. Mind 65 (259):289-311.
  24. Gottlob Frege (1948). Sense and Reference. Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
    This book is an analysis of Frege's views on language metaphysics raised in On Sense Reference, arguably one of the most important philosophical essays of the past hundred years. It provides a thorough introduction to the function/argument analysis and applies Frege's technique to the central notions of predication, identity, existence and truth. Of particular interest is the analysis of the Paradox of Identity and a discussion of three solutions: the little-known Begriffsschrift solution, the sense/reference solution, and Russell's 'On Denoting' solution. (...)
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  25. David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
  26. Graham Oppy (1992). Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 67 (1):1 - 18.
  27. Adam Pautz (2008). An Argument Against Fregean That-Clause Semantics. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):335 - 347.
    I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some (...)
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  28. Stephen Schiffer (1990). The Mode-of-Presentation Problem. In C. A. Anderson J. Owens (ed.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI. 249-268.
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  29. Philippe Schlenker (2003). A Plea for Monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
    Kaplan claims in Demonstratives that no operator may manipulate the context of evaluation of natural language indexicals. We show that this is not so. In fact, attitude reports always manipulate a context parameter (or, rather, a context variable). This is shown by (i) the existence of De Se readings of attitude reports in English (which Kaplan has no account for), and (ii) the existence of a variety of indexicals across languages whose point of evaluation can be shifted, but only in (...)
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  30. Gabriel Segal (1989). A Preference for Sense and Reference. Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):73-89.
    The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensionality in the reports.
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  31. Mark Textor (2004). Reconstructing Frege. Philosophical Books 45 (3):197-208.
  32. John Tienson (1984). Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):16 – 25.
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  33. Raphael van Riel (2011). Cognitive Significance and Epistemic Intensions. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216).