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  1. Kent Bach, Comparing Frege and Russell.
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  2. Gilead Bar-Elli (1996). The Sense of Reference: Intentionality in Frege. Walter De Gruyter.
    Chapter: Sense and Intentionality A: Reference and Sense — Preliminary Remarks Few people during Frege's lifetime paid due attention to his work and its ...
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  3. David Bell (1984). Reference and Sense: An Epitome. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):369-372.
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  4. Steven E. Boer (1989). Neo-Fregean Thoughts. Philosophical Perspectives 3:187-224.
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  5. John Corcoran (2015). Aristotle’s Semiotic Triangles and Pyramids. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 21 (1):198-9.
    Imagine an equilateral triangle “pointing upward”—its horizontal base under its apex angle. A semiotic triangle has the following three “vertexes”: (apex) an expression, (lower-left) one of the expression’s conceptual meanings or senses, and (lower-right) the referent or denotation determined by the sense [1, pp. 88ff]. One example: the eight-letter string ‘coleslaw’ (apex), the concept “coleslaw” (lower-left), and the salad coleslaw (lower-right) [1, p. 84f]. Using Church’s terminology [2, pp. 6, 41]—modifying Frege’s—the word ‘coleslaw’ expresses the concept “coleslaw”, the word ‘coleslaw’ (...)
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  6. Charles Crittenden (1993). Frege. Review of Metaphysics 46 (3):607-608.
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  7. V. H. Dudman (1969). A Note on Frege on Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):119 – 122.
    This brief note shows that the following three tenets, All to be found in frege's "on sense and reference", Form an inconsistent triad: (1) two proper names express the same sense iff their identity-Sentence "contains no actual knowledge"; (2) sentences are proper names; (3) if in a sentence we replace one proper name by another having a different sense, "we see that in such a case the thought changes".
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  8. Richard Eldridge (1984). Frege. Review of Metaphysics 37 (3):619-621.
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  9. Pieranna Garavaso (2001). Why the New Theorist May Still Need to Explain Cognitive Significance but Not Mind Doing It. Philosophia 28 (1-4):455-465.
    In "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?", Howard Wettstein denies that semantics must account for cognitive significance. He thus rejects Frege's condition of adequacy for semantics and rids the new theorists from seemingly intractable puzzles. In a more recent article, Wettstein claims that not only reference but even cognitive significance is not a matter of how the referent is presented to the mind of the speaker. In this paper, I submit that the crucial element in the debate between new theorists (...)
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  10. Moltke S. Gram (1985). Die Bedeutung von 'Wahr' Und 'Wahrheit'. Review of Metaphysics 38 (3):623-626.
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  11. Karen Green (2006). A Pinch of Salt for Frege. Synthese 150 (2):209-228.
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  12. Karen Green (1992). Logical Renovations-Restoring Frege Functions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):315-334.
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  13. Reinhardt Grossmann (1991). Frege in Perspective. Review of Metaphysics 45 (1):156-157.
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  14. William Gustason (1983). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):706-709.
  15. Martin Hahn (1995). The Frege Puzzle One More Time. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer 169--183.
  16. Robert M. Harnish (2003). Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference. Review of Metaphysics 56 (4):886-887.
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  17. Jennifer Hornsby (1987). Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Books 28 (3):161-163.
  18. L. J. (1974). Frege. Review of Metaphysics 28 (1):121-121.
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  19. L. J. (1974). Frege. Review of Metaphysics 28 (1):121-121.
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  20. Dale Jacquette (1990). A Fregean Solution to the Paradox of Analysis. Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:59-73.
    The paradox of analysis is the problem of formulating analyses that avoid the metaphilosophical dilemma of uninformativeness where analysandum and analysans are identical in meaning, and incorrectness or unsoundness where analysandum and analysans are nonidentical in meaning. Frege's distinction between sense and reference supports an intentional solution to the paradox, incorporating Roderick M. Chisholm's concept of converse intentional properties. Formal definitions of unrestricted Leibnizian or conceptual identity and referential identity or codesignation are provided, under which analysanda and analysantia are referentially (...)
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  21. Charles F. Kielkopf (1987). Frege. Review of Metaphysics 41 (2):372-373.
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  22. Robert H. Kimball (1986). Gottlob Frege. Review of Metaphysics 40 (1):119-120.
  23. Frederick Kroon (1989). Circles and Fixed Points in Description Theories of Reference. Noûs 23 (3):373 - 382.
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  24. Frederick W. Kroon (1987). Causal Descriptivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):1 – 17.
  25. Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski (2014). Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege. Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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  26. James Levine (2004). On the "Gray's Elegy" Argument and its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
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  27. Ronald Loeffler (2001). Demonstrative Reference and Cognitive Significance. Synthese 128 (3):229 - 244.
  28. Guy Longworth (2014). You and Me. Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303.
    Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.
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  29. Dorothea Lotter (2005). Frege and Language. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  30. John MacFarlane (2002). Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism. Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
    Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and (...)
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  31. A. Margalit (ed.) (1979). Meaning and Use. Reidel.
    This book contains a collection of papers presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter and is dedicated to the late Yehoshua Bar-Hillel.
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  32. Paulo Roberto Margutti-Pinto (1999). Frege's Referential Dualism Concerning Proper Names. Manuscrito 22:117.
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  33. Genoveva Martı (2007). 4 Substitution, Identity, and the Subject-Predicate Structure. In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. 93.
    One of the many important tasks of semantics is to provide an account of the substitution patterns of a language—that is, to furnish an explanation of the conditions under which semantic values of complexes are preserved when components are replaced. The importance of this issue is plain: we only have to recall the debates regarding substitutivity between proponents of direct reference theories and advocates of some version of Fregeanism, as well as the disagreements among different proponents of direct reference theories (...)
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  34. Robert May (2006). Frege on Indexicals. Philosophical Review 115 (4):487-516.
    It is a characteristically Fregean thesis that the sense expressed by an expression is the linguistic meaning of that expression. Sense can play this role for Frege since it meets fundamental desiderata for meaning, that it be universal and invariantly expressed and objectively the same for everyone who knows the language. It has been argued,1 however, that, as a general thesis about natural languages, the identi cation of sense and meaning cannot be sustained since it is in con ict with (...)
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  35. Robert May (2006). The Invariance of Sense. Journal of Philosophy 103 (3):111-144.
    How many senses can a given name have, with its reference held fixed? One, more than one? One answer that most would agree to is that sense is unique for each utterance of a name, that is, that a name can have no more than one sense on any given occasion. But is sense unique in any stronger sense than this? The answer that is typically attributed to Frege is that there is not, that, as Tyler Burge puts it, 1 (...)
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  36. John McDowell (2005). Evans's Frege. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press
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  37. Nikolay Milkov (2001). Frege in Context. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3):557 – 570.
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  38. Alan Millar (2008). Reviews Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege by Tyler Burge Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005, Pp. 419 + XII. Philosophy 83 (2):275-279.
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  39. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2011). Loosing the Word–Concept Tie. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):125-143.
    Sainsbury and Tye (2011) propose that, in the case of names and other simple extensional terms, we should substitute for Frege's second level of content—for his senses—a second level of meaning vehicle—words in the language of thought. I agree. They also offer a theory of atomic concept reference—their ‘originalist’ theory—which implies that people knowing the same word have the ‘same concept’. This I reject, arguing for a symmetrical rather than an originalist theory of concept reference, claiming that individual concepts are (...)
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  40. J. N. Mohanty (1984). Sinn and Bedeutung, Studien Zu Frege and Wittgenstein. Review of Metaphysics 38 (1):116-117.
  41. Luis Fernandez Moreno (2007). The Names of Historical Figures: A Descriptivist Reply. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (2):155-168.
    Kripke’s most important arguments in Naming and Necessity against the description theory of reference of proper names are the arguments from ignorance and error concerning names of historical figures. The aim of this paper is to put forward a reply to these arguments. The answer to them is grounded on the development of one component of the version of the description theory proposed by the authors that are regarded as the classical contemporary advocates of this theory, namely Searle and Strawson; (...)
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  42. Nicholas J. Moutafakis (2006). Sense, Reference, and Philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):506-509.
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  43. Reinhard Muskens (2005). Sense and the Computation of Reference. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (4):473 - 504.
    The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends propositions to truth values or sets of possible worlds in Thomason (1980) must be replaced by a relation and the meaning postulates governing the behaviour of (...)
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  44. Michael Nelson (2002). Descriptivism Defended. Noûs 36 (3):408–435.
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  45. Anne Newstead (2006). Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):5.
    This is a very short book review of a recent volume on the philosophy of Gareth Evans with special attention to work on first-person reference.
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  46. Alexander L. Nikiforov (2010). The Sense of Linguistic Expressions and Knowledge. Russian Studies in Philosophy 49 (3):24-42.
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  47. Harold Noonan (1984). Fregean Thoughts. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):205-224.
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  48. D. D. O. (1961). Sinn Und Sein. Review of Metaphysics 14 (3):574-574.
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  49. Mieczysław Omyła (2009). Paradygmat fregowski a teorie sytuacji. Filozofia Nauki 4.
    We try to define the essential features of the Fregean paradigm. Then we demonstrate that Suszko's non-fregean logic, Wolniewicz's ontology of situation and Barwise-Perry's situational semantics go meaningfully beyond the fregean paradigm: what is presupposed in all of these theories is that as semantic correlates of sentences serve certain objects which are not logical values of these sentences.
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  50. Terence Parsons (1982). Fregean Theories of Fictional Objects. Topoi 1 (1-2):81-87.
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