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  1. Diana Ackerman (1979). Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes and Non-Descriptive Connotations. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):55 - 69.
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  2. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  3. Peter Alward, Comments on Mark Kalderon's “The Open Question Argument, Frege's Puzzle, and Leibniz's Law”.
    A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of its (...)
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  4. George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
    This paper provides a new approach to a family of outstanding logical and semantical puzzles, the most famous being Frege's puzzle. The three main reductionist theories of propositions (the possible-worlds theory, the propositional-function theory, the propositional-complex theory) are shown to be vulnerable to Benacerraf-style problems, difficulties involving modality, and other problems. The nonreductionist algebraic theory avoids these problems and allows us to identify the elusive nondescriptive, non-metalinguistic, necessary propositions responsible for the indicated family of puzzles. The algebraic approach is also (...)
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  5. Vojislav Bozickovic (2008). Cognitive Significance and Reflexive Content. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):545-554.
    John Perry has urged that a semantic theory for natural languages ought to be concerned with the issue of cognitive significance—of how true identity statements containing different (utterances of) indexicals and proper names can be informative, held to be unaccountable by the referentialist view. The informativeness that he has in mind—one that has puzzled Frege, Kaplan and Wettstein—concerns knowledge about the world. In trying to solve this puzzle on referentialist terms, he comes up with the notion of cognitive significance as (...)
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  6. João Branquinho (1990). Are Salmon's 'Guises' Disguised Fregean Senses? Analysis 50 (1):19 - 24.
    In a review of Frege's Puzzle1, Graeme Forbes makes the claim that Salmon's account of belief might be seen, under certain conditions, as a mere notational variant of a neo-Fregean theory; and thus that such an account might be reduced to a neo-Fregean one simply by rewriting it in terms of Fregean terminology. With a view to supporting his claim, Forbes offers an outline of an account of belief which, according to him, would satisfy the following conditions: (i) it could (...)
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  7. David M. Braun (1991). Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
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  8. Tyler Burge (2005). Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege. Oxford University Press.
    Tyler Burge presents a collection of his seminal essays on Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who has a strong claim to be seen as the founder of modern analytic philosophy, and whose work remains at the centre of philosophical debate today. Truth, Thought, Reason gathers some of Burge's most influential work from the last twenty-five years, and also features important new material, including a substantial introduction and postscripts to four of the ten papers. It will be an essential resource for any historian (...)
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  9. H. G. Callaway (2008). Sense and Mode of Presentation. In , Meaning without Analyticity.
    Theories of linguistic meaning have been a major influence in twentieth century philosophy. This is due, in part, to the assumption that meaning is the crucial and interesting thing about language. To know the meaning of an expression is to understand it, and since understanding is central to philosophy in many different ways, it should be no surprise that the notion of meaning has often taken center stage. The aim of this paper is to briefly explore some influential views concerning (...)
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  10. James D. Carney (1980). The Hesperus and Phosphorus Puzzle. Mind 89 (356):577-581.
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  11. David J. Chalmers (2011). Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. Mind 120 (479):587 - 635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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  12. Philippe De Rouilhan, For a Truth-Conditional Semantic Solution to Frege-Like Paradoxes.
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  13. Harry Deutsch (1989). On Direct Reference. In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 167-195.
  14. Michael Dummett (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth.
    This highly acclaimed book is a major contribution to the philosophy of language as well as a systematic interpretation of Frege, indisputably the father of ...
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  15. Michael A. E. Dummett (1981). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
  16. Delia Graff Fara (forthcoming). Names Are Predicates. Philosophical Review.
    Tyler Burge convinced us that names are predicates in at least some of their occurrences: -/- There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. -/- Names, when predicates, satisfy the being-called condition: schematically, a name "N" is true of a thing just in case that thing is called N. This paper defends the unified view that names are predicates in all of their occurrences. I follow Clarence Sloat, Paul Elbourne, and Ora Matushansky in saying that when a name seems to occur (...)
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  17. Robert Fiengo & Robert May (2006). De Lingua Belief. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    It is beliefs of this sort--de linguabeliefs--that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book.
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  18. Robert Fiengo & Robert May (1998). Names and Expressions. Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):377-409.
  19. Jesse Fitts (2014). Chalmers on the Objects of Credence. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358.
    Chalmers (Mind 120(479): 587–636, 2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. (...)
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  20. Bryan Frances (1999). Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles. Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
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  21. Bryan Frances (1998). Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle. Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  22. Bryan Frances (1998). Defending Millian Theories. Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
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  23. G. Frege, On Sinn and Bedeutung.
  24. Gottlob Frege (1956). The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. Mind 65 (259):289-311.
  25. Gottlob Frege (1948). Sense and Reference. Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
    This book is an analysis of Frege's views on language metaphysics raised in On Sense Reference, arguably one of the most important philosophical essays of the past hundred years. It provides a thorough introduction to the function/argument analysis and applies Frege's technique to the central notions of predication, identity, existence and truth. Of particular interest is the analysis of the Paradox of Identity and a discussion of three solutions: the little-known Begriffsschrift solution, the sense/reference solution, and Russell's 'On Denoting' solution. (...)
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  26. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior to (...)
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  27. Dirk Greimann (2004). Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth. Inquiry 47 (5):425 – 442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  28. Robert M. Harnish (1994). What is the Sense of Phos and Hes? Grazer Philosophische Studien 47:185-196.
    Frege's puzzle for demonstratives is accounting for the cognitive significance of identity statements containing demonstratives, such as "That [demonstration-1] is identical to that [demonstration-2]". Since the demonstrative 'that' makes the same semantic contribution (has the same 'character') on both occurrences, the difference must be due to the cognitive significance or 'senses' of the associated demonstrations. But what is the sense of a demonstration? Kaplan's suggested solutions in terms of gestures and appearances are not compatible with his general theory, and do (...)
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  29. Richard G. Heck (2014). Intuition and the Substitution Argument. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):1-30.
    The 'substitution argument' purports to demonstrate the falsity of Russellian accounts of belief-ascription by observing that, e.g., these two sentences: -/- (LC) Lois believes that Clark can fly. (LS) Lois believes that Superman can fly. -/- could have different truth-values. But what is the basis for that claim? It seems widely to be supposed, especially by Russellians, that it is simply an 'intuition', one that could then be 'explained away'. And this supposition plays an especially important role in Jennifer Saul's (...)
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  30. Wesley H. Holliday & John Perry (2014). Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic. In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Trends in Logic, Outstanding Contributions: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer. 591-629.
    Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic: Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate logic, implemented formally in Melvin Fitting’s (...)
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  31. Pierre Jacob, Frege's Puzzle and Belief Ascriptions.
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  32. Dale Jacquette (2011). Frege on Identity as a Relation of Names. Metaphysica 12 (1):51-72.
    This essay offers a detailed philosophical criticism of Frege’s popular thesis that identity is a relation of names. I consider Frege’s position as articulated both in ‘On Sense and Reference’, and in the Grundgesetze, where he appears to take an objectual view of identity, arguing that in both cases Frege is clearly committed to the proposition that identity is a relation holding between names, on the grounds that two different things can never be identical. A counterexample to Frege’s thesis is (...)
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  33. A. Kanamori (ed.) (2000). Proceedings of the 20th World Conress of Philosophy, Vol VI , Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Philosophy Document Center.
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  34. Aleksandar Kellenberg (2008). Approaching Frege's Puzzle. Facta Philosophica 10 (1):247-268.
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  35. Leonard Linsky (1959). Hesperus and Phosphorus. Philosophical Review 68 (4):515-518.
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  36. M. A. Moffett (2002). A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle. Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
    In this note I argue that, relative to certain largely uncontroversial background conditions, any instance of Mates’ Puzzle is equivalent to some instance of Frege’s Puzzle. If correct, this result is surprising. For, barring the radical move of rejecting the possibility of synonymous expressions in a language tout court, it shows that there is no strictly lexical solution to at least some instances of Frege’s Puzzle. This forces the hand of theorists who wish to provide a semantic (rather than pragmatic) (...)
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  37. Gary Ostertag (2009). Review of Kit Fine, Semantic Relationism. [REVIEW] Austrlasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):345-9.
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  38. Gary Ostertag (2007). Review of Robert Fiengo, Robert May, De Lingua Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9).
  39. John Perry, Frege on Identity, Cognitive Value, and Subject Matter.
    Frege continues by explaining what bothered him in the Begriffsschrift, and motivated his treatment of identity in that work.2 He goes on to criticize that account. By the end of the paragraph, he has introduced his key concept of sinn, abandonning not only the Begriffsschrift account of identity, but its basical semantical framework. In the Begriffsschrift Frege’s main semantic concept was content [Inhalt ]. Already in the Begriffsschrift, he is struggling with this concept. In §3 he..
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  40. David Ripley (2012). Structures and Circumstances: Two Ways to Fine-Grain Propositions. Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper discusses two distinct strategies that have been adopted to provide fine-grained propositions; that is, propositions individuated more finely than sets of possible worlds. One strategy takes propositions to have internal structure, while the other looks beyond possible worlds, and takes propositions to be sets of circumstances, where possible worlds do not exhaust the circumstances. The usual arguments for these positions turn on fineness-of-grain issues: just how finely should propositions be individuated? Here, I compare the two strategies with an (...)
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  41. R. M. Sainsbury (2004). Sameness and Difference of Sense. Philosophical Books 45 (3):209-217.
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  42. Nathan U. Salmon (2005). Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning brings together Nathan Salmon's influential papers on topics in the metaphysics of existence, non-existence, and fiction; modality and its logic; strict identity, including personal identity; numbers and numerical quantifiers; the philosophical significance of Godel's Incompleteness theorems; and semantic content and designation. Including a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction to orient the reader, the volume offers rich and varied sustenance for philosophers and logicians.
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  43. Nathan U. Salmon (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Ridgeview.
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  44. Nathan Solomon (2010). Frege's Puzzle. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
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  45. Jeff Speaks (2011). Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
    Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is (...)
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  46. William W. Taschek (1992). Frege's Puzzle, Sense, and Information Content. Mind 101 (404):767-791.
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  47. John Tienson (1984). Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):16 – 25.
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  48. Michael Tye (1978). The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):219 – 224.
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  49. Roger Wertheimer (2000). The Synonymy Antinomy. In A. Kanamori (ed.), Proceedings of the 20th World Conress of Philosophy, Vol Vi , Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Philosophy Document Center. 67-88.
    Resolution of Frege's Puzzle by denying that synonym substitution in logical truths preserves sentence sense and explaining how logical form has semantic import. Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth. Logical sentences (GG: Greeks are Greeks; gg: Greece is Greece) and their synonym interceptions (GH: Greeks are Hellenes; gh: Greece is Hellas) share factual content (extrasentential reality asserted). Semantic (cognitive) content is (identifiable with) factual (...)
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  50. Howard Wettstein (1989). Turning the Tables on Frege or How is It That "Hesperus is Hesperus" is Trivial? Philosophical Perspectives 3:317-339.
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