This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
34 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Marshall Abrams, Short-Run Mechanistic Probability.
    This paper sketches a concept of higher-level objective probability (“short-run mechanistic probability”, SRMP) inspired partly by a style of explanation of relative frequencies known as the “method of arbitrary functions”. SRMP has the potential to fill the need for a theory of objective probability which has wide application at higher levels and which gives probability causal connections to observed relative frequency (without making it equivalent to relative frequency). Though this approach provides probabilities on a space of event types, it does (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Max Albert (2005). Should Bayesians Bet Where Frequentists Fear to Tread? Philosophy of Science 72 (4):584-593.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2008). Reichenbach's Posits Reposited. Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
    Reichenbach’s use of ‘posits’ to defend his frequentistic theory of probability has been criticized on the grounds that it makes unfalsifiable predictions. The justice of this criticism has blinded many to Reichenbach’s second use of a posit, one that can fruitfully be applied to current debates within epistemology. We show first that Reichenbach’s alternative type of posit creates a difficulty for epistemic foundationalists, and then that its use is equivalent to a particular kind of Jeffrey conditionalization. We conclude that, under (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. J. Berkovitz (2001). On Chance in Causal Loops. Mind 110 (437):1-23.
    A common line of argument for the impossibility of closed causal loops is that they would involve causal paradoxes. The usual reply is that such loops impose heavy consistency constraints on the nature of causal connections in them; constraints that are overlooked by the impossibility arguments. Hugh Mellor has maintained that arguments for the possibility of causal loops also overlook some constraints, which are related to the chances (single-case, objective probabilities) that causes give to their effects. And he argues that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Noëul Bonneuil (2004). Repertoires, Frequentism, and Predictability. History and Theory 43 (1):117–123.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark R. Crovelli, “A Challenge to Ludwig von Mises's Theory of Probability”.
    The most interesting and completely overlooked aspect of Ludwig von Mises’s theory of probability is the total absence of any explicit definition for probability in his theory. This paper examines Mises’s theory of probability in light of the fact that his theory possesses no definition for probability. It is argued, [...].
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Probability and Randomness. In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  8. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Bas C. Fraassen (1977). Relative Frequencies. Synthese 34 (2):133 - 166.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Maria Carla Galavotti (1995). Operationism, Probability and Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Science 1 (1):99-118.
    This paper investigates the kind of empiricism combined with an operationalist perspective that, in the first decades of our Century, gave rise to a turning point in theoretical physics and in probability theory. While quantum mechanics was taking shape, the classical (Laplacian) interpretation of probability gave way to two divergent perspectives: frequentism and subjectivism. Frequentism gained wide acceptance among theoretical physicists. Subjectivism, on the other hand, was never held to be a serious candidate for application to physical theories, despite the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Amit Hagar & Giuseppe Sergioli (forthcoming). Counting Steps: A Finitist Interpretation of Objective Probability in Physics. Epistemologia.
    We propose a new interpretation of objective deterministic chances in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set--up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the 'distance' (in terms of physical resources) from a physical state to another, and (3) the size of the set of time--complexity functions that are compatible with the physical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Alan Hájek (2009). Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism. Erkenntnis 70 (2):211 - 235.
    This is the sequel to my "Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism" (Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A's among the B's would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B's. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I consider various frequentist responses, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alan Hájek (2009). Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism. Erkenntnis 70 (2):211 - 235.
    This is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” ( Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A ’s among the B ’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B ’s. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Alan Hájek (1996). “Mises Redux” — Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):209--27.
    According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Toby Handfield (2012). A Philosophical Guide to Chance: Physical Probability. Cambridge University Press.
    Contents: 1. The concept of chance; 2. The classical picture; 3. Ways the world might be; 4. Possibilities of thought; 5. Chance in phase space; 6. Possibilist theories of chance; 7. Actualist theories of chance; 8. Anti-realist theories of chance; 9. Chance in quantum physics; 10. Chance in branching worlds; 11. Time and evidence; 12. Debunking chance.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Paul Humphreys (2004). Some Thoughts on Wesley Salmon's Contributions to the Philosophy of Probability. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):942-949.
    Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency‐driven probability models and theory‐driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension of Salmon's ontic account of probabilistic causality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Berna Kilinç (2000). Robert Leslie Ellis and John Stuart Mill on the One and the Many of Frequentism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):251 – 274.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Berna Kilinç (2000). Robert Leslie Ellis and John Stuart Mill on the One and the Many of Frequentism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (2):251-274.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Henry E. Kyburg (1976). Chance. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):355-393.
  20. Isaac Levi (1990). Chance. Philosophical Topics 18 (2):117-149.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Ittay Nissan-Rozen (2013). Jeffrey Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and Adams's Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs039.
    I show that David Lewis’s principal principle is not preserved under Jeffrey conditionalization. Using this observation, I argue that Lewis’s reason for rejecting the desire as belief thesis and Adams’s thesis applies also to his own principal principle. 1 Introduction2 Adams’s Thesis, the Desire as Belief Thesis, and the Principal Principle3 Jeffrey Conditionalization4 The Principal Principles Not Preserved under Jeffrey Conditionalization5 Inadmissible Experiences.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Wesley C. Salmon (1977). Objectively Homogeneous Reference Classes. Synthese 36 (4):399 - 414.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Wesley C. Salmon (1965). What Happens in the Long Run? Philosophical Review 74 (3):373-378.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Wesley C. Salmon (1953). The Frequency Interpretation and Antecedent Probabilities. Philosophical Studies 4 (3):44 - 48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Lawrence Sklar (1973). Unfair to Frequencies. Journal of Philosophy 70 (2):41-52.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Aris Spanos (2013). A Frequentist Interpretation of Probability for Model-Based Inductive Inference. Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.
    The main objective of the paper is to propose a frequentist interpretation of probability in the context of model-based induction, anchored on the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) and justifiable on empirical grounds. It is argued that the prevailing views in philosophy of science concerning induction and the frequentist interpretation of probability are unduly influenced by enumerative induction, and the von Mises rendering, both of which are at odds with frequentist model-based induction that dominates current practice. The differences between (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. M. Strevens (1996). Quantum Mechanics and Frequentism: A Reply to Ismael. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):575-577.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Michael Strevens (2011). Probability Out Of Determinism. In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. 339--364.
    This paper offers a metaphysics of physical probability in (or if you prefer, truth conditions for probabilistic claims about) deterministic systems based on an approach to the explanation of probabilistic patterns in deterministic systems called the method of arbitrary functions. Much of the appeal of the method is its promise to provide an account of physical probability on which probability assignments have the ability to support counterfactuals about frequencies. It is argued that the eponymous arbitrary functions are of little philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Michael Strevens (1996). Quantum Mechanics and Frequentism: A Reply to Ismael. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):575-577.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John Venn (1888/2006). The Logic of Chance. Dover Publications.
    No mathematical background is necessary to appreciate this classic of probability theory, which remains unsurpassed in its clarity, readability, and sheer charm. Its author, British logician John Venn (1834-1923), popularized the famous Venn Diagrams that are commonly used in teaching elementary mathematics.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Lukas M. Verburgt (2014). John Venn's Hypothetical Infinite Frequentism and Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3):248-271.
    The goal of this paper is to provide a detailed reading of John Venn's Logic of Chance as a work of logic or, more specifically, as a specific portion of the general system of so-called ‘material’ logic developed in his Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic and to discuss it against the background of his Boolean-inspired views on the connection between logic and mathematics. It is by means of this situating of Venn 1866 [The Logic of Chance. An Essay on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Louis Vervoort, The Concept of Probability in Physics: An Analytic Version of von Mises’ Interpretation.
    In the following we will investigate whether von Mises’ frequency interpretation of probability can be modified to make it philosophically acceptable. We will reject certain elements of von Mises’ theory, but retain others. In the interpretation we propose we do not use von Mises’ often criticized ‘infinite collectives’ but we retain two essential claims of his interpretation, stating that probability can only be defined for events that can be repeated in similar conditions, and that exhibit frequency stabilization. The central idea (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Richard von Mises (2010). The Definition of Probability. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Peter M. Williams (1992). Review Essay: A Theory of Logical Frequentism. [REVIEW] Synthese 91 (3):337 - 346.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation