This is the first book in English to present F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854) as a major European philosopher in his own right. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy surveys the whole of Schelling's philosophical career and lucidly reconstructs his key arguments, drawing from highly complex, often inaccessible and untranslated texts. Andrew Bowie argues that Schelling, usually considered an interesting but eccentric precursor to Hegel, actually offered serious alternatives to Hegel's thinking. Bowie shows that central ideas and conceptual strategies in the (...) work of thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Davidson relate closely to Schelling's often misunderstood philosophy. The book demonstrates that Schelling was a crucial transitional figure in the development of modern philosophy. (shrink)

The short cover-description of the present book tells that "Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) was one of the formative philosophers of German idealism, whose great service was in the areas of the philosophy of nature, art, and religion." Those having some familiarity with Schelling, and his influence on American philosophy, indirectly via Coleridge and Carlyle and more directly via Emerson and C. S. Peirce, will perhaps not be surprised to learn that German idealism itself looks somewhat different, understanding Schelling's differences (...) with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel; and while the work under review shows no awareness of the distant American influence of Schelling, or American developments in general (except perhaps in some citations of Arthur Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being), I will take the present opportunity to emphasize connections and possible connections to American philosophy, as allowed by the author's account of Schelling and some further citations. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs Schelling's philosophical development during the years 1794-1800. It emphasizes the role of Kant's heritage within Schelling's early philosophy, and the strong relationship between Schelling and Hölderlin during their Tübingen years. The central question it explores is how the Absolute relates to Finiteness - a relation that constitutes the basis of transcendental idealism as well as the essence of a transcendental philosophy, here radically understood as a philosophy of finitude and as a critical aesthetics. The essay shows the (...) young Schelling as he presents a rich and novel field of inquiry, which provides a credible and engaging alternative to Hegelian thinking and anticipates themes from twentieth-century philosophy (Phenomenology, Existentialism, Critical Thinking). The volume thus provides both a historical and a contemporary look at Schelling's early philosophy, and at its original and speculative approach. (shrink)

"Three Ends of the Absolute" discusses (1) Schelling's notion of inhibition in the philosophy of nature, (2) Hölderlin's notion of separation in his "Seyn, Urtheil, Modalität," and (3) Novalis' notion of the density of God in his late scientific notes. All three thinkers can be contrasted with Hegel on the basis of their attacks on philosophical absolutes. Schelling (1775-1854), in his First Projection of a Philosophy of Nature (1799), reflects on the conundrum of absolute inhibition in nature, an inhibition of (...) absolute freedom that is necessary if there is to be a procession of natural products. Inhibition conditions all putative absolutes. Hölderlin (1770-1843) argues that absolute separation is essential to consciousness of any kind. Whereas he advances no "doctrine" of the end of the absolute as such, he does emphasize the tragic separation and dissolution to which all intellectual intuition comes. The absolute "original" suffers from an irremediable "debility." Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772-1801), in his Universal Sketchbook, continues the work of his early Fichte Studies by resisting the notion of the absolute ego. "Everything pure is . . . a deception." For Novalis, the absolute can only be our absolute inability to think or act in conformity with an absolute. The article ends with a reflection on Goethe's opposition between "relative" and "absolute" death. (shrink)

The unfolding of the task -- Freedom, pantheism, and idealism -- The account of the possibility of evil -- The account of the actuality of freedom -- The description of the manifestation of evil in man -- God as moral beingthe nature of the whole with respect to freedom -- Indifference and the birth of love.

It is well known that Sartre describes his form of existentialism as atheistic, and much of the rhetoric of Sartrean existentialism draws off the image of God's absence from the world. There are nevertheless, I argue, deep grounds for thinking that the coherence and well-groundedness of Sartre's thought requires that his phenomenological ontology take finally the form of an onto-theology: Sartre's ontology runs into difficulties concerning the origin of the for-itself and the unity of being; an onto-theology like Schelling's, which (...) avoids the ‘ontological optimism’ that Sartre objects to in Hegel, both releases Sartre's ontology from its difficulties and furthers Sartre's central philosophical purposes. (Published Online July 10 2006). (shrink)

The author argues taht the most important source of Schelling’s ‘later thought’ is undoubtably the Bible. Schelling not only referred to it more than to any other work, he also systematically endeavored to harmonize his philosophical and theological ideas with the content of the Holy Scriptures. This was by no means evident in the post-Enlightenment context, which was characterized by its vehement critique of the Bible. The author thus investigates whether Schelling’s scripturally based forays into exegesis, dogmatic theology, and philosophy (...) are convincing. Two Bible passages to which Schelling himself attached great weight are discussed: the prologue of St John’s gospel and the Christological hymn in St Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians. The conclusion is that Schelling’s philosophy of revelation is worth studying as an original contribution to contemporary systematic theological reflection, even if not all problems concerning the relation between biblical heritage, its possible interpretations and contemporary theological concerns are resolved. (shrink)

One project of philosophical research which would likely prove of little profit is a history of philosophy the epochs of which are the greatest philosophical jokes. Although philosophers have always said innumerable funny things, notable sources of humor have been few and far between: Socrates, though not Plato, Nietzsche, though not Zarathustra, and more recently perhaps Bernard Williams or Jacques Derrida. The most a scholar can usually hope for is a clever barb punctuating pages of deathly earnestness. Such is the (...) case with Hegel: although occasionally possessed of a biting wit, his sense of humor was hardly world-historical. Modernity, although many other things, simply isn't very funny. Schelling, however, had the good fortune to be the victim of Hegel's greatest jest. An "Absolute" such as Schelling's, Hegel says, would be the night in which all cows are black.". (shrink)

Various commentators have acknowledged the fact that Schelling was influenced by Spinoza’s philosophical views (cf. Bowie 1993, 2003; Copleston 1963; Esposito 1977; White 1983; Lawrence 2003; Hegel 1995; Beiser 2002; Richards 2002). However, these commentators have not spelled out in detail this influence, and this situation is particularly true of the Anglo-American tradition. In this article, I investigate Schelling’s Naturphilosophie project in search of its Spinozistic roots and I argue that this provides us with a better understanding of the Schelligian (...) system. (shrink)

Introduction to the Difference Essay. FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL The essay on the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy was ...

This paper concerns the way in which the transition from negative to positive philosophy is executed in Schelling’s critique of modern philosophy. Schelling’s original insight is that the transition occurs within negative philosophy by means of a twofold experience within philosophical reflection: (1) recognizing the failure of the idealist project of the conceptual determination of Being, and (2) the reversal of the idealist conception of the relation between concepts and their objects. I argue that Schelling uses a form of the (...) ontological argument, focusing on Anselm’s formula aliquid, quo nihil maius cogitari potest, both in his critique of traditional formulations of the argument and to navigate the transition to positive philosophy. (shrink)

Michelle Kosch examines the conceptions of free will and the foundations of ethics in the work of Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard. She seeks to understand the history of German idealism better by looking at it through the lens of these issues, and to understand Kierkegaard better by placing his thought in this context. Kosch argues for a new interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of agency, that Schelling was a major influence and Kant a major target of criticism, and that both the (...) theory and the criticisms are highly relevant to contemporary debates. (shrink)

Introduction -- Suspension -- Hegel and Schelling -- Outline of the whole -- The surge of reason : faculty epistemology in Kant and Fichte -- The first critique's basic distinction -- The third critique -- Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre -- Ascendant reason : the early Schelling -- Of the I -- The treatises -- Metastatic reason : Schelling's nature philosophy -- Organic reason : ideas for a philosophy of nature -- Rational nature : on the world-soul -- Inhibition of nature : the (...) Erster entwurf -- Synthetic reason : the system of transcendental idealism -- The idea of system -- The synthetic method -- History and art -- Reason as reflection and speculation : Hegel's collaboration with Schelling -- The differenzschrift -- Krug's pen -- The sacred abyss : Schelling's identity philosophy -- The darstellung -- System of philosophy in general -- Space, time, and suspension : Hegel's absolute knowing -- The phenomenology's critique of Schelling -- Absolute knowing -- Suspended reason : Hegel on the certainty and truth of reason -- Empty idealism -- Observing nature -- Observing self-consciousness -- Self-actualizing reason -- The project of individuality -- Reason on the periphery : Schelling's freedom essay -- Reason as peripheral -- Pantheism and freedom -- God as existing -- Longing for ground -- The possibility of evil -- The actuality of evil -- System, ground, and indifference -- Reason's systematic excess -- Hegel's system -- The myth of totalizing reason -- The philosophy of nature -- History -- Reason's systematic excess -- Schelling's positive philosophy -- The natural history of reason -- The critique of Hegel -- Now what? (shrink)

This essay is a comparison between Schelling's and Blanchot's conceptions of the night of the imaginary. Schelling is the most romantic of the German idealist philosophers and Blanchot the most extreme of the French “deconstructionists.“ Their historical link is actually indirect, but they offer two complementary views on the “same“ impersonal nocturnal experience of the imaginary, the approach of which requires a certain self-overcoming of philosophy towards literature.

Building on recent research exposing Hegel’s debt to esoteric Christianity (both Gnostic and Hermetic traditions), the aim of this paper is to show how Hegel and Schelling resolve an ambiguity in Boehme’s theology of evil in opposing ways. Jacob Boehme’s notion of the individuation of God through the overcoming ofopposition is the central paradigm for both Hegel’s and Schelling’s understanding of the role of evil in the life of God. Boehme remains ambiguous on the question of the modality of evil: (...) Is it necessary to God’s self-unfolding, or is it rather an anarchic act that God permits in the interest of preserving the autonomy of finite freedom? If the former, Boehme becomes much more closely aligned to Gnosticism by identifying finitude with evil. This identification is shown to be exactly Hegel’s solution to the ambiguity, one Hegel opts for in the interest of maintaining the absolute rationality of the system. Hermeticism opposes Gnosticism on this point: for the Hermeticist, finitude / material being / nature is not evil but ‘of God,’ the means of his individuation. This conflict in interpretations of Boehmeilluminates an often overlooked but essential difference between Gnosticism and Hermeticism. Schelling remains faithful to the Hermetic tradition by sacrificing system for the sake of preserving the contingency of evil, and disidentifying finitude and evil. (shrink)

One of the most significant moments in the development of German idealism is Schelling's break from his mentor Fichte. On account of its significance, there have been numerous studies examining the origin and meaning of this transition in Schelling's thought. Not one study, however, considers Goethe's influence on Schelling's development. This is surprising given the fact that in the fall of 1799 Goethe and Schelling meet every day for a week, to go through and edit what came to be Schelling's (...) most path-breaking work. This paper considers Goethe's influence on the development of Schelling's thought, and argues that it was by appropriating Goethe's idea of metamorphosis that Schelling was able to put forth a conception of nature as independent from the mind. (shrink)

CHAPTER I SETTING Hegel, perhaps the most self-questioning of all philosophers, was well aware that his thought was a response to intense social dislocation ...

When we reconstruct Fichte’s philosophy of nature of the Jena period, we notice striking similarities between the conception of organism in the Doctrine of Science and Schelling’s corresponding developments in his early Naturphilosophie. Even though both thinkers agree to consider organic nature within the framework of transcendental idealism, it is nevertheless possible at this stage to discover slight differences in their interpretation which announce their future disagreement on the status of a philosophy of nature. If, for instance, organism for both (...) Fichte and Schelling can be considered as an analogon of the absolute, much depends on whether they conceive this analogy from a practical or theoretical point of view. (shrink)

The seventeenth century background to the emergence of continental idealism -- Monadological world of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz -- Kant's development from physical to moral monadologist -- Kant and the "Copernican" conception of transcendental philosophy -- The moral framework of metaphysics -- The later Kant as a "post-Kantian" philosopher? -- Jena post-Kantianism: Reinhold and Fichte -- The romanticisms of Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schelling -- Hegel's idealist metaphysics of spirit -- Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and the ambiguous end of the idealist tradition -- (...) Postscript: idealism after the end of (its) history. (shrink)

In 1853, two decades after Goethe’s death, Hermann von Helmholtz, who had just become professor of anatomy at Königsberg, delivered an evaluation of the poet=s contributions to science.1 The young Helmholtz lamented Goethe=s stubborn rejection of Newton=s prism experiments. Goethe=s theory of light and color simply broke on the rocks of his poetic genius. The tragedy, though, was not repeated in biological science. In Helmholtz=s estimation, Goethe had advanced in this area two singular and “uncommonly fruitful” ideas.2 The poet (...) recognized, first, that the anatomical structures of various kinds of animals revealed a unity type underlying the superficial differences arising from variability of food, habit, and locality. His second lasting achievement was the related theory of the metamorphosis of organisms: the thesis that the various articulations within an organism developed out of a more basic kind of structure—that, for instance, the different parts of plants were metamorphosed leaves or that the various bones of the animal skull were but transformed vertebrae. These two general morphological conceptions, according to Helmholtz, grounded the biology flourishing at 1 mid-century. Goethe came to these ideas, Helmholtz shrewdly maintained, as the result of a poetically intuitive conception (anschauliche Begriffe).3 He described, for instance, Goethe=s immediate recognition, while playfully tossing around a sheep=s skull on the Lido in Venice, that the fused bones of the battered cranium consisted of transmuted vertebrae. This experience resulted in the poet=s vertebral theory of the skull, which became a standard conception in later morphology.4 Poetic intuition thus liberated an idea initially embedded in matter and made it available to the analytic understanding of the scientist. Forty years later, in 1892, at the meeting of the Goethe Society in Weimar, Helmholtz returned to reexamine the poet=s scientific accomplishments, and, it would seem, implicitly his own; for by the end of his career, Helmholtz himself had achieved a position in German culture only a few steps below that of Goethe.5 His evaluation of Goethe=s achievements in physical science was now more complex than his earlier assessment had been.. (shrink)

The period from Kant to Hegel is one of the most intense and rigorous in modern philosophy. The central problem at the heart of it was the development of a new standard of theoretical reflection and of the principle of rationality itself. The essays in this volume consider both the development of Kant's system of transcendental idealism in the three Critiques, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and the Opus Postumum, as well as the reception and transformation of that idealism (...) in the work of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The contributors include many of today's preeminent philosophers of German idealism. (shrink)

Kant used transcendental reflection to distinguish in judgment what belongs to its form and what to its material. Regarding the form of judgment, Buchdahl's work highlights the analogies between the different levels of judgment in Kant's transcendental ontology. He uses the explicit contingency of judgments of the system of nature to illuminate the contingency of judgments of objects in general. In the Critique of pure reason, Kant had left much of the work of judgment to the unconscious imagination. Fichte and (...) Schelling attempted to make conscious and determinate the work of the unconscious imagination, but found themselves unable to avoid a reflexive regress in trying to objectify and provide a foundation for the activity of the self in judgment. Buchdahl also clarifies the role Kant gave to the object in judgment, as the indeterminate 'thinghood' remaining once all forms of cognition are abstracted. Fichte represented this objective side of consciousness as the not-I, as the limit of the activity of the I, as an unconscious, alien element within consciousness. Schelling struggled to illuminate this unconscious object in judgment, to provide a construction of nature, without dissolving its positive presence into abstract formulations. In pursuing relentlessly Kant's critique of judgment, Fichte and Schelling exposed its opaque points and problematized the ambition to build a complete system of philosophy. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain (...) in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does. The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been . Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future. (shrink)

Drawing on the connection of the I to an absolute ground in the metaphysics of Schelling and the poetry of Hlderlin, this book offers a contemporary model of ...