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  1. Ned Block, Functional Reduction.
    A critique of the functional reduction picture of reductive explanation, a picture shared by proponents such as Lewis and opponents such as Kim, Chalmers and Jackson.
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  2. Michael Bradie (1999). Scaling the Metaphorical Brick Wall. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):947-948.
    Palmer argues that functionalist accounts of the mind are radically incomplete in virtue of a “metaphorical brick wall” that precludes a complete treatment of qualia. I argue that functionalists should remain unmoved by this line of argument to the effect that their accounts fail to do justice to some “intrinsic” features of experience.
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  3. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
    Is it true that if zombies-creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  4. Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  5. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  6. Jonathan Cohen (1999). Why Asymmetries in Color Space Cannot Save Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):950-950.
    Palmer's strategy of saving functionalism by constraining spectrum inversions cannot succeed because (1) there remain many nontrivial transformations not ruled out by Palmer's constraints, and (2) the constraints involved are due to the contingent makeup of our visual systems, and are therefore not available for use by functionalists.
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  7. Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  8. A. Campbell Garnett (1940). Functionalism and the Intentional Act. Philosophical Review 49 (4):453-464.
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  9. Carl Gillett (2007). A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
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  10. Gilbert Harman (1988). Wide Functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.
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  11. Eric Hiddleston (forthcoming). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies.
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is “no”. I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
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  12. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):129-145.
    Concentrating on their treatment of folk psychology, this paper seeks to establish that, in the form advocated by its leading proponents, the Canberra project is presumptuous in certain key respects. Crucially, it presumes (1) that our everyday practices entail the existence of implicit folk theories; (2) that naturalists ought to be interested primarily in what such theories say; and (3) that the core content of such theories is adequately characterized by establishing what everyone finds intuitively obvious about the topics in (...)
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  13. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is (...)
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  14. Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.) (1988). Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.
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  15. Aaron Sloman, Virtual Machine Functionalism: The Only Form of Functionalism Worth Taking Seriously in Philosophy of Mind.
    Most philosophers appear to have ignored the distinction between the broad concept of Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) described in Sloman&Chrisley (2003) and the better known version of functionalism referred to there as Atomic State Functionalism (ASF), which is often given as an explanation of what Functionalism is, e.g. in Block (1995). -/- One of the main differences is that ASF encourages talk of supervenience of states and properties, whereas VMF requires supervenience of machines that are arbitrarily complex networks of causally (...)
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Causal Role Functionalism
  1. Peter Alward (2004). Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain. Sorites 15 (December):73-75.
    Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad pain—pain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian pain—pain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role in normal humans). After all, what it is (...)
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  2. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind). Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
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  4. David M. Armstrong (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge.
    This classic work of recent philosophy was first published in 1968, and remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind , D. M. Armstrong provided insight into the debate surrounding the relationship of the mind and body. He put forth a detailed materialist account of all the main mental phenomena, including perception, sensation, belief, the will, introspection, mental images, and consciousness. This causal analysis of (...)
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  5. Ned Block (ed.) (1978). Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
  6. Clive V. Borst (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  7. David Braddon-Mitchell & K. Jackson (1999). The Divide-and-Conquer Path to Analytic Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-89.
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  8. Austen Clark (1986). Psychofunctionalism and Chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53 (December):535-59.
    The psychofunctionalist claim that psychological terms can be defined through the use of an experimental theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is "chauvinistic": that it denies mentality to any creature of which the selected theory is false. I analyze the "argument from science fiction" that is thought to establish this conclusion, and show that its plausibility rests on a scope ambiguity in formulations of functional definitions. One formulation is indeed chauvinistic, but an alternative rendering is not, and (...)
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  9. Austen Clark (1983). Functionalism and the Definition of Theoretical Terms. Journal of Mind and Behavior 4:339-352.
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  10. James W. Cornman (1968). Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism. Philosophy of Science 35 (March):45-63.
    Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by "correlative physiological states and events instead." But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by proposing definitions of the related terms, 'observation term,' and 'theoretical term,' and then classifying the term 'sensation.' (...)
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  11. Anthony Dardis (1993). Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598.
    Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal (...)
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  12. Ronald P. Endicott (2011). Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
    I resolve an argument over “flat” versus “dimensioned” theories of realization. The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a part-whole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that (...)
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  13. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  14. David R. Hiley (1973). Armstrong's Concept of a Mental State. Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-2):113-118.
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  15. Michael P. Hodges (1979). Armstrong's Causal Analysis and Direct Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):335-343.
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  16. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism and Token Physicalism. Synthese 59 (June):321-38.
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  17. Jennifer Hornsby (1984). On Functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46 (July):75-96.
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  18. Frank Jackson (2005). Ramsey Sentences and Avoiding the Sui Generis. In Hallvard Lillehammer & D.H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  19. Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter & E. W. Prior (1982). Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories. Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.
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  20. Andrew Kernohan (1990). Lewis's Functionalism and Reductive Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):235-46.
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  21. Eric LaRock (2012). An Empirical Case Against Central State Materialism. Philosophia Christi 14 (2).
    I argue on empirical grounds (1) that consciousness is not nothing but a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system; (2) that consciousness is not reducible to an epistemic ability, such as the ability to recognize an object; (3) that mind could not merely be a (material) cause that is apt to bring about a certain range of behaviors; and (4) that recent empirical investigations reveal new problems and new evidence that should compel advocates of causal functionalism (of the sort (...)
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  22. David Lewis (1980). Mad Pain and Martian Pain. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
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  23. David Lewis (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.
  24. David Lewis (1966). An Argument for the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.
  25. Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.) (2005). Ramsey's Legacy. Oxford University Press.
    The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically in 1930 at the age of 26, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors offer fresh perspectives on his work and show its (...)
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  26. Colin McGinn (1980). Functionalism and Phenomenalism: A Critical Note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):35-46.
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  27. Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  28. Thomas Nagel (1970). Armstrong on the Mind. Philosophical Review 79 (July):394-403.
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  29. Joseph Owens (1982). The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):159-73.
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  30. Erwin Rogler (2000). On David Lewis' Philosophy of Mind. Protosociology 14:285-311.
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  31. Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
    The recent literature on mental causation has not been kind to nonreductive, materialist functionalism (‘functionalism’, hereafter, except where that term is otherwise qualified). The exclusion problem2 has done much of the damage, but the epiphenomenalist threat has taken other forms. Functionalism also faces what I will call the ‘problem of metaphysically necessary effects’ (Block, 1990, pp. 157-60, Antony and Levine, 1997, pp. 91-92, Pereboom, 2002, p. 515, Millikan, 1999, p. 47, Jackson, 1998, pp. 660-61). Functionalist mental properties are individuated partly (...)
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  32. Charles Sayward (1995). Taking Actions Seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (24):51-60.
    Two kinds of functionalism are distinguished: intensional and extensional. The former is argued to be superior to the latter. The former is also defended against two objections independently put forth by Ned Block and John Searle.
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  33. Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
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  34. Michael Tye (1983). Functionalism and Type Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
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  35. Raphael van Riel (forthcoming). Pains, Pills, and Properties. Functionalism and the First-Order/Second-Order Distinction. Dialectica.
    Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according to which properties are second order if (...)
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  36. Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). Patrolling the Mind's Boundaries. Erkenntnis 68 (2):265 - 276.
    Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person.
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  37. David Yates (2012). Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (13).
    Given their physical realization, what causal work is left for functional properties to do? Humean solutions to the exclusion problem (e.g. overdetermination and difference-making) typically appeal to counterfactual and/or nomic relations between functional property-instances and behavioural effects, tacitly assuming that such relations suffice for causal work. Clarification of the notion of causal work, I argue, shows not only that such solutions don't work, but also reveals a novel solution to the exclusion problem based on the relations between dispositional properties at (...)
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Machine Functionalism
  1. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind). Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  2. Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.) (2005). Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions.
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  3. John W. Bender (1988). Knotty, Knotty: Comments on Nelson's The New World Knot. In Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  4. John W. Bender (1988). Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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  5. William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.) (1967). Art, Mind, and Religion. [Pittsburgh]University of Pittsburgh Press.
    This volume offers an unusual variety of topics presented during the sixth annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.
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  6. Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.) (1967). Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press.
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  7. Chris Eliasmith (2002). The Myth of the Turing Machine: The Failings of Functionalism and Related Theses. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (1):1-8.
    The properties of Turing’s famous ‘universal machine’ has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. Here, I show that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing’s powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, I further argue that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, I show that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation (...)
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  8. Reinaldo Elugardo (1983). Machine Realization and the New Lilliputian Argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):267-75.
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  9. Reinaldo Elugardo (1981). Machine Functionalism and the New Lilliputian Argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (March):256-61.
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  10. Sidney Hook (ed.) (1960). Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press.
  11. Robert H. Kane (1966). Turing Machines and Mental Reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (December):344-52.
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  12. William G. Lycan (1983). The Moral of the New Lilliputian Argument. Philosophical Studies 43 (March):277-80.
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  13. William G. Lycan (1979). A New Lilliputian Argument Against Machine Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):279-87.
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  14. William G. Lycan (1974). Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):48-62.
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  15. Raymond J. Nelson (1974). Mechanism, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):365-86.
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  16. Tom Polger (web). Computational Functionalism. In J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    An introduction to functionalism in the philosophy of psychology/mind, and review of the current state of debate pro and con. Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (John Symons and Paco Calvo, eds.).
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  17. Alexander R. Pruss, Functionalism and Counting Minds.
    I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated.
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  18. Hilary Putnam (1987). Representation and Reality. MIT Press.
    Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his...
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  19. Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Hilary Putnam has been one of the most influential and sharply original of recent American philosophers in a whole range of fields. His most important published work is collected here, together with several new and substantial studies, in two volumes. The first deals with the philosophy of mathematics and of science and the nature of philosophical and scientific enquiry; the second deals with the philosophy of language and mind. Volume one is now issued in a new edition, including an (...)
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  20. Hilary Putnam (1975). Philosophy and Our Mental Life. In Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
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  21. Hilary Putnam (1967). The Mental Life of Some Machines. In Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception. Wayne State University Press.
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  22. Hilary Putnam (1967). The Nature of Mental States. In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press.
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  23. Hilary Putnam (1960). Minds and Machines. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.
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  24. Richard Rorty (1972). Functionalism, Machines and Incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 64 (April):203-20.
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  25. Oron Shagrir (2005). The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge University Press.
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  26. J. Symons & P. Calvo (eds.) (forthcoming). Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
  27. James E. Tomberlin (1965). About the Identity Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (December):295-99.
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  28. Steven J. Wagner (1988). The Liberal and the Lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):165-74.
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Functionalism, Misc
  1. Frederick R. Adams (1979). Properties, Functionalism, and the Identity Theory. Eidos 1 (December):153-79.
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  2. Murat Aydede, Syntax, Content and Functionalism: What is Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind.
    I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based (...)
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  3. Vadim Batitsky (1998). A Formal Rebuttal of the Central Argument for Functionalism. Erkenntnis 49 (2):201-20.
    The central argument for functionalism is the so-called argument from multiple realizations. According to this argument, because a functionally characterized system admits a potential infinity of structurally diverse physical realizations, the functional organization of such systems cannot be captured in a law-like manner at the level of physical description (and, thus, must be treated as a principally autonomous domain of inquiry). I offer a rebuttal of this argument based on formal modeling of its premises in the framework of automata theory. (...)
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  4. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties canbe defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction ofontologically prior realizations. Ideological (or nonreductive)functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only bedefined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of theirinteraction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argumentestablishes: (1) ontological functionalism is mistaken because itsproposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mentalproperties) into the contents of self-consciousness; (2)ideological (nonreductive) functionalism is the only viable alternativefor functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique misses the (...)
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  5. George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author'ss paper "Self-consciousness.".
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  6. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
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  7. George Bealer (1985). Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has No Functional Definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328.
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  8. George Bealer (1978). An Inconsistency in Functionalism. Synthese 38 (July):333-372.
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  9. William P. Bechtel (1984). Autonomous Psychology: What It Should and Should Not Entail. Philosophy of Science Association 1984:43 - 55.
    In the wake of the cognitivist revolution in psychology, a number of philosophers (e.g., Putnam and Fodor) have argued that the functional ontology underlying cognitivism allows for the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience. It is contended that these arguments do not support the kind of autonomy proposed and that, in any case, such autonomy would be misguided. The last claim is supported by considering the consequences such autonomy would have for a number of research programmes in cognitive psychology. It is (...)
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  10. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1999). An Argument Against Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):320-324.
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  11. John I. Biro & Robert W. Shahan (eds.) (1982). Mind, Brain and Function. Oklahoma University Press.
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  12. Ned Block (1996). What is Functionalism? In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  13. Ned Block (1980). Functionalism. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  14. Ned Block (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
    The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state.
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  15. Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor (1972). What Psychological States Are Not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
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  16. Donald M. Borchert (ed.) (1996). [Book Chapter]. MacMillan.
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  17. Myles Brand (ed.) (1986). The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief. Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  18. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33-50.
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  19. Jonathan Cohen (2005). Colors, Functions, Realizers, and Roles. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):117-140.
    You may speak of a chain, or if you please, a net. An analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without each the future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole cause. There is no such thing.
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  20. S. Marc Cohen (1992). Hylomorphism and Functionalism. In Martha Nussbaum & Amelie Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima.
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