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  1. William P. Alston (1985). Functionalism and Theological Language. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (3):221 - 230.
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  2. Lise Marie Andersen, Functionalism and Embodied, Embedded Mind - The Extended Story.
    In “The Mind Incarnate” Shapiro argues that research in the area of embodied, embedded mind and cognition undermines a functionalist program. In contrast Clark, in “Pressing the Flesh”, argues that embodied, embedded approaches can be viewed as extended functionalistic approaches. In the light of these arguments my thesis is devoted to elucidating the logical relation between functionalism and embodied, embedded approaches. I argue that the functionalist programme is not undermined by embodied and embedded approaches. Shapiro argues that research of embodied, (...)
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  3. R. J. B. (1966). Functionalism. Review of Metaphysics 19 (4):815-815.
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  4. Mark Bauer (2013). Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.
    Shapiro has suggested that the empirical plausibility of the multiple realizability of human-like minds is dubious, because a contrary thesis, the Mental Constraint Thesis, enjoys positive empirical evidence. The Mental Constraint Thesis states that, given the actual physical laws, there is only one way to realize a human-like mind. I will suggest, however, that the Mental Constraint Thesis is not a contrary to the empirical multiple realizability thesis relevant to psychological reduction or autonomy and, as a consequence, has no bearing (...)
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  5. Ned Block (1993). 11 Troubles with Functionalism. In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Mit Press. 231.
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  6. Ned Block (1971). Are Mechanistic and Teleological Explanations of Behaviour Incompatible? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):109-117.
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  7. Darren Bradley (2013). Functionalism and The Independence Problems. Noûs 47 (1):545-557.
    The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.
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  8. Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  9. Neil Campbell (2010). Functional Reduction and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 25 (4):435-446.
    Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his position implies eliminativism about mental properties or (...)
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  10. Lawrence Richard Carleton (1982). The Rise of Chicago Functionalism. Erkenntnis 18 (1):3 - 23.
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  11. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
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  12. Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
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  13. Jonathan Cohen (1999). Why Asymmetries in Color Space Cannot Save Functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):950-950.
    Palmer's strategy of saving functionalism by constraining spectrum inversions cannot succeed because (1) there remain many nontrivial transformations not ruled out by Palmer's constraints, and (2) the constraints involved are due to the contingent makeup of our visual systems, and are therefore not available for use by functionalists.
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  14. Jonas Dagys (2006). Functionalism in Philosophy of Mind: Methodology or Ontology? Problemos 70:113-125.
    Straipsnyje tiriamos dvi XX a. viduryje iðplëtotos funkcionalistinio sàmonës aiðkinimo kryptys: D. Armstrongo ir D. Lewiso analitinis funkcionalizmas ir H. Putnamo komputacinis funkcionalizmas. Siekiamaparodyti, kad ðios dvi kryptys ið esmës sutampa metodologiniu poþiûriu, taèiau jø atstovai suteikiasavøjø teorijø metodologiniam pagrindui skirtingas ontologines interpretacijas. Sutardami, kad fizikinio bûvio ir funkcinio bûvio sàvokos skiriasi, jie nesutaria dël to, ar funkcinio bûvio sàvokà reikialaikyti iðskirianèia atskirà ontologinæ bûviø kategorijà, ar ði sàvoka iðreiðkia tik skirtingà tø paèiø fizikiniø bûviø identifikavimo realiame pasaulyje bûdà. Ðiame (...)
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  15. R. Double (1989). Philosophical Functionalism-Reply. Behaviorism 17 (2):159-160.
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  16. Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  17. Gary Fuller (1992). Functionalism and Personal Identity. The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):133-143.
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  18. A. Campbell Garnett (1940). Functionalism and the Intentional Act. Philosophical Review 49 (4):453-464.
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  19. Carl Gillett (2007). A Mechanist Manifesto for the Philosophy of Mind: A Third Way for Functionalists. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:21-42.
    One of the main early forms of “functionalism,” developed by writers like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, focused on “mechanistic” explanation in the special sciences and argued that “functional properties” in psychology were continuous in nature with the special science properties posited in such mechanistic explanations. I dub the latter position“Continuity Functionalism” and use it to critically examine the “Standard Picture” of the metaphysics of functionalism which takes “functional” properties to be second-order properties and claims there are two metaphysical forms (...)
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  20. Andrew Hampton Gleeson (1998). Three Dogmas of Functionalism. Dissertation, The Australian National University (Australia)
    This thesis is a critique of functionalism in the philosophy of mind. I distinguish three tenets, or 'dogmas' of functionalism, viz: Mental states are causes of behaviour; Mental states can, in principle, be defined in non-mental terms; We understand everything, or at least everything of importance, about the mental states of people, by subsuming token mental states under one or other mental state type. ;The first dogma is rejected in the form which identifies mental state types with physical types, on (...)
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  21. Herbert Granger (1990). Aristotle and the Functionalist Debate. Apeiron 23 (1):27 - 49.
  22. Joe Gray, Susan Chopping, Julia Nunn, David Parslow, Lloyd Gregory, Steve Williams, Michael J. Brammer & Simon Baron-Cohen (2002). Implications of Synaesthesia for Functionalism: Theory and Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):5-31.
    Functionalism offers an account of the relations that hold between behavioural functions, information and neural processing, and conscious experience from which one can draw two inferences: for any discriminable difference between qualia there must be an equivalent discriminable difference in function; and for any discriminable functional difference within a behavioural domain associated with qualia, there must be a discriminable difference between qualia. The phenomenon of coloured hearing synaesthesia appears to contradict the second of these inferences. We report data showing that (...)
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  23. Robert Van Gulick (1982). Functionalism as a Theory of Mind. Philosophy Research Archives 8:185-204.
    A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine several arguments which have been offered to support the (...)
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  24. Gilbert Harman (1988). Wide Functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.
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  25. J. Heil (2004). Functionalism. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press. 139--49.
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  26. Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
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  27. Thomas Hofweber & Paul M. Churchland (2005). Functionalism at Forty: A Critical Retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33 - 50.
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  28. Daniel D. Hutto (2011). Presumptuous Naturalism: A Cautionary Tale. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):129-145.
    Concentrating on their treatment of folk psychology, this paper seeks to establish that, in the form advocated by its leading proponents, the Canberra project is presumptuous in certain key respects. Crucially, it presumes (1) that our everyday practices entail the existence of implicit folk theories; (2) that naturalists ought to be interested primarily in what such theories say; and (3) that the core content of such theories is adequately characterized by establishing what everyone finds intuitively obvious about the topics in (...)
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  29. F. Jackson (1999). The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism David Braddon-Mitchell. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):39-70.
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  30. Frank Jackson (1999). The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):71-88.
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  31. Zoltán Jakab (1999). Overlooking the Resources of Functionalism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):957-957.
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  32. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2005). Against Functional Reductionism in Cognitive Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
    Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David Lewis, he regards psychological properties as being 'higher-order' properties functionally defined over 'lower-order' properties, which are causally efficacious. Though functional reductionism is compatible with the multiple realizability of psychological properties, it is blocked if psychological properties are subdivided or crosscut by neurophysiological properties. I argue that there is (...)
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  33. Allen Lane, Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does Functionalism Really Deal with the Phenomenal Side of Experience?”. [REVIEW]
    Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.
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  34. Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco (2013). Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  35. Corey Maley & Gualtiero Piccinini (2013). Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1. Philosophia Scientiae 17 (2):135-149.
    Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind–body problem. It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of functionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related. Many have been pessimistic about functionalism’s prospects, but most criticisms have missed the latest upgrades. We end by suggesting a version of functionalism that provides a complete account of the mind.
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  36. Richard McDonough (2000). Aristotle's Critique of Functionalist Theories of Mind. Idealistic Studies 30 (3):209-232.
    The present paper argues that Burnyeat's view is fundamentally correct, but approaches the issues from a somewhat different angle. The claim that forAristotle the form and the matter are non-contingently related is an allusion to Aristotle's difficult doctrine of the unity of substances. The functionalist interpretation underestimates Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of substance. Irwin thinks that Aristotle's view is a version of functionalism but acknowledges that his claims go beyond what is normally associated with functionalism. But Irwin too fails (...)
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  37. Darin McNabb (2013). Functionalism and Pierce's Pragmaticism: Toward a More Viable Ontology of Mental States. Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 11 (1):169-182.
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  38. John Henry Melzer (1965). Functionalism. New York, Philosophical Library.
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  39. Block Ned (1978). Troubles with Functionalism. In W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition. University of Minnesota Press. 9--261.
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  40. John O. Nelson (1990). Was Aristotle a Functionalist? Review of Metaphysics 43 (4):791 - 802.
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  41. Alyssa Ney (2010). Convergence on the Problem of Mental Causation: Shoemaker's Strategy for (Nonreductive?) Physicalists. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):438-445.
  42. Thomas M. Olshewsky & Tom Olshewsky (1992). Functionalism Old and New. History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 286.
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  43. Joseph Owens (1986). The Failure of Lewis's Functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):159-173.
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  44. Corinne Painter (2004). Aristotle and Functionalism. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):53-77.
    In this paper I provide a compelling argument against the thesis that Aristotle’s understanding of the relation between the soul and the body can be construed asfunctionalist, despite some passages that would seem to support such an interpretation. Toward this end, in section I of the essay I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the soul-body relation that emphasizes the non-contingent nature of the connection between the soul and a specific kind of body, arguing that Aristotle’s account of the (...)
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  45. Alexander Pruss, Functionalism and the Number of Minds Alexander R. Pruss January 27, 2004.
    I argue that standard functionalism leads to absurd conclusions as to the number of minds that would exist in the universe if persons were duplicated. Rather than yielding the conclusion that making a molecule-by-molecule copy of a material person would result in two persons, it leads to the conclusion that three persons, or perhaps only one person, would result. This is absurd and standard functionalism should be abandoned. Social varieties of functionalism fare no better, though there is an Aristotelian variety (...)
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  46. Hilary Putnam (2002). D. Functionalism. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 73.
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  47. Hilary Putnam (1991). B, Functionalist Approaches. In David M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press. 197.
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  48. Raphael Riel (2012). Pains, Pills and Properties – Functionalism and the First‐Order/Second‐Order Distinction. Dialectica 66 (4):543-562.
    Among philosophers of mind, it is common to assume that at least some mental properties are functional in nature, and that functional properties are second-order properties. In the functionalist literature, the notion of being a second-order property is cashed out in three different ways: (i) in terms of semantic features of characterizations or definitions of properties, (ii) in terms of syntactic features of second-order quantification, and (iii) in terms of a metaphysical criterion, according to which properties are second order if (...)
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  49. Sven Rosenkranz (2011). European Functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.
    Functionalism about mental phenomena must account for their multiple realizability. According to standard doctrine, this can be achieved by allowing our folk theory's realization formula to be multiply satisfied by distinct physical properties. If at all, uniqueness can then be restored by suitable relativization to populations or worlds. Recent arguments suggest that this is a dead end. Here the attempt is made to devise a novel type of functionalism that accounts for multiple realizability but rejects the standard doctrine and thus (...)
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  50. E. Runggaldier (2005). The Aristotelian Soul and Contemporary Functionalism. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 97 (2):243-262.
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