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Summary This category covers questions as to whether self-consciousness can or cannot be incorporated into a functionalist view of the mind, and if it can, what a functionalist account of self-consciousness might look like.
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  1. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  2. George Bealer (2010). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
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  3. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    In “Self-Consciousness” (Philosophical Review, 1997), the author establishes: (I) all the leading formulations of functionalism are mistaken because their proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mental properties themselves) into the contents of self-consciousness, and (II) a certain nonreductive functionalism is the only viable alternative (which no longer underwrites functionalism’s materialist solution to the Mind-Body Problem). Michael Tooley’s critique provides no criticism of (I), except for a failed attack on certain familiar self-intimation principles. Moreover, by advocating a form of nonreductive functionalism (...)
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  4. George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author’s paper “Self-consciousness.” (This argument is designed to refute the extant versions of functionalism -- American functionalism, Australian functionalism, and language-of-thought functionalism.) After this summary is given, two thesis are defended. The first is that the Self-consciousness Argument is not guilty of a Fregean equivocation regarding embedded occurrences of mental predicates, as has been suggested by many commentators, including Mark McCullagh. The second thesis is that the (...)
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  5. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates (...)
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  6. George Bealer (1985). Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has No Functional Definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328.
    Functionalism would be mistaken if there existed a system of deviant relations (an “anti-mind”) that had the same functional roles as the standard mental relations. In this paper such a system is constructed, using “Quinean transformations” of the sort associated with Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. For example, a mapping m from particularistic propositions (e.g., that there exists a rabbit) to universalistic propositions (that rabbithood is manifested). Using m, a deviant relation thinking* is defined: x thinks* p iff (...)
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  7. Mario Beauregard (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  8. Robert James M. Boyles (2012). Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness. In Proceedings of the Research@DLSU Congress 2012: Science and Technology Conference. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his (...)
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  9. Cordula Brand (2013). Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW] Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  10. Selmer Bringsjord (2010). Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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  11. Glenn Carruthers (2011). The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  12. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1989). The Reflexivity of Self-Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):27-58.
  13. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2000). Did Consciousness Evolve From Self-Paced Probing of the Environment, and Not From Reflexes? Brain and Mind 1 (2):283-298.
    It is suggested that the anatomical structures whichmediate consciousness evolved as decisiveembellishments to a (non-conscious) design strategypresent even in the simplest monocellular organisms.Consciousness is thus not the pinnacle of ahierarchy whose base is the primitive reflex, becausereflexes require a nervous system, which the monocelldoes not possess. By postulating that consciousness isintimately connected to self-paced probing of theenvironment, also prominent in prokaryotic behavior,one can make mammalian neuroanatomy amenable todramatically simple rationalization.
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  14. Eva-Maria Engelen (2014). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins. In Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien Zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein Und Sprache. De Gruyter 5-42.
    Wie ist zu erklären, dass wir uns lebendig fühlen und nicht lediglich lebendig sind? Es werden Voraussetzungen dafür erörtert, was es bedarf, damit sich ein Lebewesen lebendig fühlt. Denn fühlt es sich lebendig, verfügt es über eine rudimentäre, einfache Form des Bewusstseins, die die Schwelle zwischen Leben und Erleben darstellt. Es geht um ein präreflexives Selbst-Gewahrseins des lebendigen Körpers, das die erste Stufe einer Entwicklungsreihe bezüglich des Bewusstseins darstellt. Überlegungen zu einer solchen Form des empfindenden Selbstgewahrseins erlauben es zugleich zeitgenössische (...)
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  15. Ted Everett (2014/2015). Other Minds and the Origins of Consciousness. Anthropology and Philosophy 11.
    Why are we conscious? What does consciousness enable us to do that cannot be done by zombies in the dark? This paper argues that introspective consciousness probably co-evolved as a "spandrel" along with our more useful ability to represent the mental states of other people. The first part of the paper defines and motivates a conception of consciousness as a kind of "double vision" – the perception of how things seem to us as well as what they are – along (...)
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  16. Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2012). The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for (...)
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  17. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  18. Robert Van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (2):149 - 181.
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  19. Owen Holland, Rob Knight & Richard Newcombe (2007). The Role of the Self Process in Embodied Machine Consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic 156-173.
  20. William J. Kelleher, Consciousness as Pure Self-Reflection in the Writings of Michael Polanyi.
    Recognition that Michael Polanyi is one of the greatest minds of the Post-Modern era is rapidly increasing. His theory of "tacit knowledge" is one of Polanyi's most significant contributions to the philosophy of mind. In our view, that notion can be most fully understood when read in the context of his general assertions and assumptions about the nature of consciousness. Our analysis of Polanyi's use of the term "consciousness" finds three distinct meanings. These are: Consciousness 1, consciousness as self-awareness; Consciousness (...)
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  21. Andrew Kelley (1995). Against a Functionalist Reading of Apperception. Idealistic Studies 25 (3):231-240.
  22. Tomasz Kubalica (2011). Świadomość jako relacja w ujęciu Paula Natorpa. Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia:23-36.
    Przedmiotem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza teorii świadomości rozumianej jako dwuczłonowa relacja asymetryczna. Koncepcja taka została sformułowana przez Paula Natorpa w Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Według tej teorii świadomość nie jest ani aktem, ani czynnością, ani stanem, lecz czystym stosunkiem podmiotu do przedmiotu. Świadomość jako relacja różnicująca jest w tym ujęciu relacją asymetryczną, to znaczy, że nie można podmiotu ująć jako przedmiotu i odwrotnie, czyli tylko przedmiot może być uświadomiony przez podmiot.
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  23. Gerald Matthews & Adrian Wells (1988). Relationships Between Anxiety, Self-Consciousness, and Cognitive Failure. Cognition and Emotion 2 (2):123-132.
  24. H. R. Maturana (2008). Anticipation and Self-Consciousness. Are These Functions of the Brain? Commentary on the Target Artcle by Martin V. Butz. Constructivist Foundations 4 (1).
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  25. H. R. Maturana (2008). Anticipation and Self-Consciousness. Are These Functions of the Brain? Constructivist Foundations 4 (1):18-20.
    Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: My reflections will be first, about how the brain operates in the generation of the adequate behavior of an organism in a changing medium, and second, about how self-consciousness appears in the course of the history of humanness.
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  26. Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play (...)
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  27. Christophe Menant (2008). Evolution as Connecting First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives of Consciousness (2008). Dissertation,
    First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point (...)
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  28. Christophe Menant (2004). Performances of Self-Awareness Used to Explain the Evolutionary Advantages of Consciousness (2004). Dissertation, Tucson TSC 2004
    The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years (...)
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  29. Thomas Metzinger (2010). The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. Humanta Mente 14:1-28.
  30. Thomas Metzinger, Self Models. Scholarpedia.
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  31. Thomas K. Metzinger (1999). Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation. In [Book Chapter].
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  32. Marvin L. Minsky, Interior Grounding, Reflection, and Self-Consciousness.
    Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child—and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child’s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes.
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  33. Alain Morin (2009). Self-Awareness Deficits Following Loss of Inner Speech: Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor's Case Study☆. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):524-529.
    In her 2006 book ‘‘My Stroke of Insight” Dr. Jill Bolte Taylor relates her experience of suffering from a left hemispheric stroke caused by a congenital arteriovenous malformation which led to a loss of inner speech. Her phenomenological account strongly suggests that this impairment produced a global self-awareness deficit as well as more specific dysfunctions related to corporeal awareness, sense of individuality, retrieval of autobiographical memories, and self-conscious emotions. These are examined in details and corroborated by numerous excerpts from Taylor’s (...)
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  34. T. O. Nelson (2000). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):220-223.
  35. Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, How to Read Your Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Consciousness.
    The topic of self-awareness has an impressive philosophical pedigree, and sustained discussion of the topic goes back at least to Descartes. More recently, selfawareness has become a lively issue in the cognitive sciences, thanks largely to the emerging body of work on “mindreading”, the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last 15 years, the processes underlying mindreading have been a major focus of attention in cognitive and developmental psychology. Most of this work has been (...)
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  36. Steve Pearce (2016). A Pure Representationalist Account of Belief and Desire. Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    According to the traditional view, beliefs and desires are mental representations that play particular functional roles. A belief that P is state which represents P and plays the belief-role, while a desire that P is a state which represents that P and plays the desire-role. In this dissertation I argue that the traditional view has trouble accounting for (a) role that belief and desire play in the causal and rational explanation of behaviour and (b) our knowledge of our own conscious, (...)
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  37. Donald R. Perlis (1997). Consciousness as Self-Function. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
    I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...)
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  38. C. Thomas Powell (1990). Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    From Descartes to Hume, philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic and with the character of the experiencing self. In this study, Powell seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, showing that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key to understanding both Kant's critique of "rational psychology" and his theory of (...)
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  39. Alexei V. Samsonovich & Giorgio A. Ascoli (2005). The Conscious Self: Ontology, Epistemology and the Mirror Quest. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):621-636.
  40. J. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp & Mario Beauregard (2004). The Volitional Influence of the Mind on the Brain, with Special Reference to Emotional Self-Regulation. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. In Mario Beauregard (ed.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins
  41. William Seager (2006). Is Self-Representation Necessary for Consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).
    Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I (...)
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  42. Joshua Shepherd (forthcoming). The Moral Insignificance of Self-Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper I examine the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness’s significance take the indirect route. I examine them, and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on (...)
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  43. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Realization and Mental Causation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  44. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Functionalism and Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174) 481-499.
  45. Philip E. Tetlock (1991). Some Thoughts About Thought Systems. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), The Content, Structure, and Operation of Thought Systems. Lawrence Erlbaum 4--197.
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  46. Michael Tooley (2001). Functional Concepts, Referentially Opaque Contexts, Causal Relations, and the Definition of Theoretical Terms. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):251-79.
    In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness', George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained.In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the relevant (...)
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  47. David Tribe (2014). On Consciousness. Australian Humanist, The 114:10.
    Tribe, David In my reply to criticisms of my article 'On Death', I observed that 'the origin and nature of consciousness and self-awareness, though clearly related to brain function, are still hotly debated among scientists'. They are increasingly being joined in the fray by philosophers.
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  48. Rüdiger Vaas, Evolving Persons and Free Will.
    Human beings are masters of deception if they want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, because those are the most successful liars who believe their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more radical self-deception which is quite useful (...)
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  49. Robert van Gulick (2012). Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  50. Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
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