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Summary This category covers questions as to whether self-consciousness can or cannot be incorporated into a functionalist view of the mind, and if it can, what a functionalist account of self-consciousness might look like.
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  1. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we (and other organisms) have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by (...)
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  2. George Bealer (2009). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  3. George Bealer (2001). The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties canbe defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction ofontologically prior realizations. Ideological (or nonreductive)functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only bedefined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of theirinteraction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argumentestablishes: (1) ontological functionalism is mistaken because itsproposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mentalproperties) into the contents of self-consciousness; (2)ideological (nonreductive) functionalism is the only viable alternativefor functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique misses the (...)
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  4. George Bealer (2000). Fregean Equivocation and Ramsification on Sparse Theories: Response to McCullagh. Mind and Language 15 (5):500-510.
    This paper begins with a brief summary of the Self-consciousness Argument, developed in the author'ss paper "Self-consciousness.".
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  5. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
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  6. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69 - 117.
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  7. George Bealer (1985). Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has No Functional Definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):283-328.
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  8. Mario Beauregard (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  9. Cordula Brand (2013). Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW] Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  10. Selmer Bringsjord (2010). Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness. Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
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  11. Glenn Carruthers (2011). The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  12. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1989). The Reflexivity of Self-Consciousness: Sameness/Identity, Data for Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):27-58.
  13. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2000). Did Consciousness Evolve From Self-Paced Probing of the Environment, and Not From Reflexes? Brain and Mind 1 (2):283-298.
    It is suggested that the anatomical structures whichmediate consciousness evolved as decisiveembellishments to a (non-conscious) design strategypresent even in the simplest monocellular organisms.Consciousness is thus not the pinnacle of ahierarchy whose base is the primitive reflex, becausereflexes require a nervous system, which the monocelldoes not possess. By postulating that consciousness isintimately connected to self-paced probing of theenvironment, also prominent in prokaryotic behavior,one can make mammalian neuroanatomy amenable todramatically simple rationalization.
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  14. Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris (2012). The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):125-144.
    The Phenomenal Self (PS) is widely considered to be dependent on body representations, whereas the Narrative Self (NS) is generally thought to rely on abstract cognitive representations. The concept of the Bodily Social Self (BSS) might play an important role in explaining how the high level cognitive self-representations enabling the NS might emerge from the bodily basis of the PS. First, the phenomenal self (PS) and narrative self (NS), are briefly examined. Next, the BSS is defined and its potential for (...)
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  15. Brie Gertler (2012). Conscious States as Objects of Awareness: On Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 159 (3):447-455.
    Conscious states as objects of awareness: on Uriah Kriegel, Subjective consciousness: a self - representational theory Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9763-9 Authors Brie Gertler, Corcoran Department of Philosophy, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  16. Robert Van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (2):149 - 181.
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  17. Owen Holland, Rob Knight & Richard Newcombe (2007). The Role of the Self Process in Embodied Machine Consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. 156-173.
  18. S. Ionta, R. Gassert & O. Blanke (2010). Multi-Sensory and Sensorimotor Foundation of Bodily Self-Consciousness - an Interdisciplinary Approach. Frontiers in Psychology 2:383-383.
    Scientific investigations on the nature of the self have so far focused on high-level mechanisms. Recent evidence, however suggests that low-level, bottom-up, mechanisms of multisensory integration play a fundamental role in encoding some specific components of bodily self-consciousness, such as self-location and first-person perspective (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-location and the first-person perspective are abnormal in neurological patients suffering from out-of body experiences (Blanke et al., 2004), and can be experimentally manipulated in healthy subjects by multisensory conflicts (Lenggenhager et al., (...)
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  19. Andrew Kelley (1995). Against a Functionalist Reading of Apperception. Idealistic Studies 25 (3):231-240.
  20. Gerald Matthews & Adrian Wells (1988). Relationships Between Anxiety, Self-Consciousness, and Cognitive Failure. Cognition and Emotion 2 (2):123-132.
  21. H. R. Maturana (2008). Anticipation and Self-Consciousness. Are These Functions of the Brain? Constructivist Foundations 4 (1):18-20.
    Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: My reflections will be first, about how the brain operates in the generation of the adequate behavior of an organism in a changing medium, and second, about how self-consciousness appears in the course of the history of humanness.
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  22. Mark McCullagh (2000). Functionalism and Self-Consciousness. Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
    I offer a philosophically well-motivated solution to a problem that George Bealer has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem is that there seems to be no way to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental-state predicates occur within the scopes of mental-state predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play (...)
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  23. Thomas Metzinger, Self Models.
  24. Thomas Metzinger (2010). The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. Humanta Mente 14:1-28.
  25. Thomas K. Metzinger (1999). Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation. In [Book Chapter].
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  26. Marvin L. Minsky, Interior Grounding, Reflection, and Self-Consciousness.
    Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child—and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child’s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes.
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  27. T. O. Nelson (2000). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):220-223.
  28. Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich, How to Read Your Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Consciousness.
    The topic of self-awareness has an impressive philosophical pedigree, and sustained discussion of the topic goes back at least to Descartes. More recently, selfawareness has become a lively issue in the cognitive sciences, thanks largely to the emerging body of work on “mindreading”, the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last 15 years, the processes underlying mindreading have been a major focus of attention in cognitive and developmental psychology. Most of this work has been (...)
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  29. Donald R. Perlis (1997). Consciousness as Self-Function. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.
  30. C. Thomas Powell (1990). Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    From Descartes to Hume, philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed a dialectic of radically conflicting claims about the nature of the self. In the Paralogisms of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant comes to terms with this dialectic and with the character of the experiencing self. In this study, Powell seeks to elucidate these difficult texts, showing that the structure of the Paralogisms provides an essential key to understanding both Kant's critique of "rational psychology" and his theory of (...)
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  31. Alexei V. Samsonovich & Giorgio A. Ascoli (2005). The Conscious Self: Ontology, Epistemology and the Mirror Quest. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):621-636.
  32. J. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp & Mario Beauregard (2004). The Volitional Influence of the Mind on the Brain, with Special Reference to Emotional Self-Regulation. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. In Mario Beauregard (ed.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.
  33. William Seager (2006). Is Self-Representation Necessary for Consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).
    Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I (...)
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  34. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Realization and Mental Causation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  35. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Functionalism and Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 481-499.
  36. Michael Tooley (2001). Functional Concepts, Referentially Opaque Contexts, Causal Relations, and the Definition of Theoretical Terms. Philosophical Studies 105 (3):251-79.
    In his recent article, ``Self-Consciousness', George Bealer has set outa novel and interesting argument against functionalism in the philosophyof mind. I shall attempt to show, however, that Bealer's argument cannotbe sustained.In arguing for this conclusion, I shall be defending three main theses.The first is connected with the problem of defining theoreticalpredicates that occur in theories where the following two features arepresent: first, the theoretical predicate in question occurswithin both extensional and non-extensional contexts; secondly, thetheory in question asserts that the relevant (...)
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  37. Rüdiger Vaas, Evolving Persons and Free Will.
    Human beings are masters of deception if they want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, because those are the most successful liars who believe their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more radical self-deception which is quite useful (...)
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  38. Robert van Gulick (2012). Subjective Consciousness and Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):457-465.
    Subjective consciousness and self-representation Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7 Authors Robert Van Gulick, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  39. Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
  40. Simine Vazire & Richard W. Robins (2004). Beyond the Justification Hypothesis: A Broader Theory of the Evolution of Self-Consciousness. Journal of Clinical Psychology. Special Issue 1 (12):1271-1273.
  41. Wolfgang Wildgen & Barend van Heusden (eds.) (2009). Metarepresentation, Self-Organization and Art. Peter Lang.
    This book is about the interrelationship between nature, semiosis, metarepresentation and (self-)consciousness, and the role played by metarepresentation in ...
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  42. Kenneth Williford (2006). The Self-Representational Structure of Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.