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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. José Antonio Guerrero del Amo (2009). Reseña de "Las dificultades del compatibilismo de Dennett" de Guerrero del Amo, J. A. Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):269-275.
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  3. Michael V. Antony (2002). Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett S Theory. Philosophia 29:343.
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  4. Michael V. Antony (1994). Against Functionalist Theories of Consciousness. Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.
    The paper contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain (or of whatever else might realize the individual's mental states, processes, etc.) that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments to which it appears, on the (...)
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  5. Julian Baggini (2005). Dennett's Dangerous Ideas. The Philosophers' Magazine 30:52-56.
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  6. H. Heath Bawden (1903). The Functional Theory of Parallelism. Philosophical Review 12 (3):299-319.
  7. Ned Block (1993). Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett. Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):181-193.
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  8. Ned Block (1992). Le fonctionnalisme face au problème Des qualia. Les Etudes Philosophiques (3):337-369.
  9. Boyd H. Bode (1918). Consciousness as Behavior. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (17):449-453.
  10. Manuel Bremer (2008). Conceptual Atomism and Justificationist Semantics. Lang.
    Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.
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  11. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  12. Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.) (2007). Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.
  13. Donald J. DeGracia & S. LaBerge (forthcoming). In the Theater of Dreams: Global Workspace Theory, Dreaming, and Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition. In Submission.
  14. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  15. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  16. Pascal Engel (1995). Le « patternalisme » de Dennett. Philosophiques 22 (2):197-212.
    On expose et discute dans cet article la théorie instrumentante de l'intentionnalité de Dennett. Ce dernier a tenté récemment de montrer que cette théorie n'avait pas les conséquences antiréalistes qu'on lui prête habituellement, en recourant à la notion de « trames » sous tendant les attributions en « posture intentionnelle ». On montre cependant que cette notion ne permet pas d'accomplir le travail que Dennett entend lui faire accomplir. Elle est trop indéterminée pour satisfaire les intuitions réalistes, parce que Dennett (...)
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  17. Jordi Fernandez (2001). Don Ross, Andrew Brook and David Thompson, Eds., Dennett's Philosophy. A Comprehensive Assessment Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (3):208-210.
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  18. John Gregg, Functionalism: Can't We Just Say That Consciousness Depends on the Higher-Level Organization of a Given System?
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  19. Lynn Holt (1999). Metaphor, History, Consciousness: From Locke to Dennett. Philosophical Forum 30 (3):187-200.
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  20. N. Humphrey (1997). Daniel C. Dennett: Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 94:97-102.
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  21. Daniel Hutto (1995). Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett's Project. The Monist 78 (4):464 - 479.
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  22. Diego Lawler & Diego Parente (2013). Otra vuelta de tuerca sobre Dennett y la hermenéutica artefactual: tensiones y aporíar. Estudios de Filosofía 47:83-105.
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  23. S. Leyens (2000). The Imagined Consciousness-The Eliminativism of Daniel Dennett. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 98 (4):761-782.
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  24. Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco (2013). Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  25. Eric Lormand (2000). Comments on "a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.
  26. Fiona Macpherson (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection Series: Studies in Brain and Mind, Vol. 4. Kleuwer.
    Synaesthesia is most often characterised as a union or mixing of the senses. i Richard Cytowic describes it thus: “It denotes the rare capacity to hear colours, taste shapes or experience other equally startling sensory blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” ([1995] 1997, 7). One famous example is of a man who “tasted shapes”. When he experienced flavours he also experienced shapes rubbing against his face or hands. ii Such popular characterisations are rough and ready. (...)
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  27. Bruce Mangan (1998). Against Functionalism: Consciousness as an Information-Bearing Medium. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--135.
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  28. Anthony J. Marcel (2000). On a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness: Commentary on J. Prinz. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):267-273.
  29. Anthony J. Marcel (1988). Phenomenal Experience and Functionalism. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  30. José Julián Martínez (2012). Ficción, cuerpo y mente: el caso Dennett. Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38):63-75.
    Resumen Este artículo examina el papel de la ficción como laboratorio mental, que ayuda al filósofo a plantear y discutir los diferentes análisis creados en el campo de la filosofía de la mente. De manera particular se enfoca en algunos de los cuentos que Daniel Dennett ha contado acerca del problema de la conciencia. Es por eso que este artículo también intenta responder preguntas como: ¿Cuál es la relación entre la conciencia y el Centro de Gravedad Narrativo propuesto por Dennett? (...)
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  31. Erik Myin (1998). Holism, Functionalism and Visual Awareness. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):3-19.
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  32. Orland O. Norris (1929). A Behaviorist Account of Consciousness. II: Its Qualitative Aspect. Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):57-67.
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  33. Diego Parente (2008). Artefactos y textos: algunas aporías en la "hermenéutica artefactual" de Dennett. Scientiae Studia 6 (3):345-357.
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  34. Donald R. Perlis (1995). Consciousness and Complexity: The Cognitive Quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21.
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  35. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  36. Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Marcel. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):279-287.
  37. Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Lormand. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278.
  38. Bjørn Ramberg (1999). Dennett's Pragmatism. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 (207):61-86.
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  39. Lee C. Rice (1971). "Content and Consciousness," by D. C. Dennett. Modern Schoolman 48 (2):177-178.
  40. Marco Salvioli (2012). Adversus Dennett. Perché l'eterofenomenologia non può essere praticata senza un'autentica fenomenologia. Divus Thomas 115 (1):284-301.
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  41. Sonia Sedivy (1995). Consciousness Explained. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.
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  42. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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  43. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Functionalism and Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 481-499.
  44. Robert van Gulick (2012). On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates--A Reply to Tye. Philosophical Review 121 (2):277-284.
    In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P according to (...)
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  45. Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
  46. Bram van Heuveln & Eric Dietrich (1999). Brute Association is Not Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):171-171.
    O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.
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Dennett's Functionalism
  1. A. Spafadora (ed.) (1995). Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.
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  2. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
    : In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical (...)
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  4. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
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