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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson & Jennifer Matey (2012). Synesthesia. In J. Feiser & B. Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  2. Michael V. Antony (1994). Against Functionalist Theories of Consciousness. Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.
    The paper contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain (or of whatever else might realize the individual's mental states, processes, etc.) that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments to which it appears, on the (...)
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  3. H. Heath Bawden (1903). The Functional Theory of Parallelism. Philosophical Review 12 (3):299-319.
  4. Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi (2012). Predictive Brains: Forethought and the Levels of Explanation. Frontiers in Psychology 3 (511).
    Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dating back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gaining the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as (Edelman 2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental findings and (...)
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  5. Boyd H. Bode (1918). Consciousness as Behavior. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (17):449-453.
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  6. Manuel Bremer (2008). Conceptual Atomism and Justificationist Semantics. Lang.
    Conceptual atomism of this type is incompatible with many other semantic approaches. One of these approaches is justificationist semantics. This book assumes conceptual atomism.
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  7. Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.) (2005). Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in (...)
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  8. Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.) (2007). Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.
  9. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  10. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  11. John Gregg, Functionalism: Can't We Just Say That Consciousness Depends on the Higher-Level Organization of a Given System?
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  12. Eric Lormand (2000). Comments on "a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.
  13. Fiona Macpherson (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection Series: Studies in Brain and Mind, Vol. 4. Kleuwer.
    Synaesthesia is most often characterised as a union or mixing of the senses. i Richard Cytowic describes it thus: “It denotes the rare capacity to hear colours, taste shapes or experience other equally startling sensory blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” ([1995] 1997, 7). One famous example is of a man who “tasted shapes”. When he experienced flavours he also experienced shapes rubbing against his face or hands. ii Such popular characterisations are rough and ready. (...)
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  14. Bruce Mangan (1998). Against Functionalism: Consciousness as an Information-Bearing Medium. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--135.
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  15. Anthony J. Marcel (2000). On a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness: Commentary on J. Prinz. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):267-273.
  16. Anthony J. Marcel (1988). Phenomenal Experience and Functionalism. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
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  17. Erik Myin (1998). Holism, Functionalism and Visual Awareness. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):3-19.
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  18. Orland O. Norris (1929). A Behaviorist Account of Consciousness. II: Its Qualitative Aspect. Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):57-67.
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  19. Donald R. Perlis (1995). Consciousness and Complexity: The Cognitive Quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21.
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  20. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). A Neurofunctional Theory of Consciousness. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. 381-396.
    Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...)
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  21. Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Marcel. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):279-287.
  22. Jesse J. Prinz (2000). A Reply to Lormand. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278.
  23. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).
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  24. Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Functionalism and Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). 481-499.
  25. Robert van Gulick (1988). A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.
  26. Bram van Heuveln & Eric Dietrich (1999). Brute Association is Not Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):171-171.
    O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.
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Dennett's Functionalism
  1. A. Spafadora (ed.) (1995). Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.
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  2. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness. Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.
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  4. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  5. Kathleen Akins (1996). Ships in the Night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. In , Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Michael V. Antony (2002). Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-370.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  7. Michael A. Arbib (1972). Consciousness: The Secondary Role of Language. Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):579-591.
  8. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Content Meets Consciousness. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):1-22.
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  9. John Barresi & John R. Christie (2002). Using Illusory Line Motion to Differentiate Misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and Misremembering (Orwellian) Accounts of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.
    It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A (...)
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  10. Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):23-40.
    A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett.
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  11. Paul Bloomfield (1998). Dennett's Misrememberings. Philosophia 26 (1-2):207-218.
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  12. John Bricke (1985). Consciousness and Dennett's Intentionalist Net. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):249-56.
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  13. John Bricke (1984). Dennett's Eliminative Arguments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):413-29.
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  14. Selmer Bringsjord, Explaining Phi Without Dennett's Exotica: Good Ol' Computation Suffices.
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  15. Andrew Brook (2002). The Appearance of Things. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 41.
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  16. Andrew Brook (2000). Judgments and Drafts Eight Years Later. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    Now that some years have passed, how does this picture of consciousness look? On the one hand, Dennett's work has vastly expanded the range of options for thinking about conscious experiences and conscious subjects. On the other hand, I suspect that the implications of his picture have been oversold (perhaps more by others than by Dennett himself). The rhetoric of _CE_ is radical in places but I do not sure that the actual implications for commonsense views of Seemings and Subjects (...)
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  17. Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.) (2002). Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary Philosophy in Focus will offer a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Each volume will consist of newly commissioned essays that will cover all the major contributions of a preeminent philosopher in a systematic and accessible manner. Author of such groundbreaking and influential books as Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett has reached a huge general and professional audience that extends way beyond the confines of academic philosophy. (...)
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  18. Taylor Carman (2007). Dennett on Seeming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):99-106.
    Dennett’s eliminativist theory of consciousness rests on an implausible reduction of sensory seeming to cognitive judgment. The “heterophenomenological” testimony to which he appeals in urging that reduction poses no threat to phenomenology, but merely demonstrates the conceptual indeterminacy of small-scale sensory appearances. Phenomenological description is difficult, but the difficulty does not warrant Dennett’s neo-Cartesian claim that there is no such thing as seeming at all as distinct from judging.
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  19. David Carr (1998). Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):331-344.
    In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first (...)
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  20. Patricia S. Churchland & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (1993). Filling In: Why Dennett is Wrong. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  21. Paul M. Churchland (2002). Catching Consciousness in a Recurrent Net. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge University Press. 64-80.
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  22. Paul M. Churchland (1999). Densmore and Dennett on Virtual Machines and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):763-767.
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  23. Stephen R. L. Clark (1993). Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric. Inquiry 36 (1-2):3-16.
    Dennett's Consciousness Explained presents, but does not demonstrate, a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very consciousness he purports to explain. If he were correct, realism and methodological individualism would collapse, as would the very enterprise of giving reasons. The metaphors he deploys actually testify to the power of metaphoric imagination that can no more be identified with the metaphors it creates than minds can be identified with memes. That latter equation, of minds with meme?complexes, (...)
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  24. Mark Crooks (2004). The Last Philosophical Behaviorist: Content and Consciousness Explained Away. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):50-121.
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