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  1. Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann (2011). Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction. International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
    We conceive of a player in dynamic games as a set of agents, which are assigned the distinct tasks of reasoning and node-specific choices. The notion of agent connectedness measuring the sequential stability of a player over time is then modeled in an extended type-based epistemic framework. Moreover, we provide an epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Besides, it is argued that the epistemic independence assumption underlying backward induction is stronger than usually presumed.
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  2. Giacomo Bonanno (2008). A Syntactic Approach to Rationality in Games with Ordinal Payoffs. In Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.), Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory. Amsterdam University Press.
    We consider strategic-form games with ordinal payoffs and provide a syntactic analysis of common belief/knowledge of rationality, which we define axiomatically. Two axioms are considered. The first says that a player is irrational if she chooses a particular strategy while believing that another strategy is better. We show that common belief of this weak notion of rationality characterizes the iterated deletion of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The second axiom says that a player is irrational if (...)
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  3. John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1999). Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game. Analysis 59 (264):237–242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y might doubt (...)
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  4. Colin F. Camerer (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Plausible Formal Models That Predict Accurately. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):157-158.
    Many weaknesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formalism and generality that makes game theory useful. Social preference models can generate team reasoning by combining reciprocation and correlated equilibrium. Models of limited iterated thinking explain data better than equilibrium models do; and they self-repair problems of implausibility and multiplicity of equilibria.
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  5. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents. In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer.
    I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except what can be found (...)
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  6. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Reducible and Nonsensical Uses of Game Theory. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):247-266.
    The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game theoretical statements, and argue for two claims: (1) explanatory game theory can and should be reduced to rational choice theory in all cases; and (2) prescriptive game theory gives bad advice in some cases, is (...)
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  7. Vincenzo Denicolò & Marco Mariotti (2000). Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings. Theory and Decision 48 (4):351-358.
    In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.
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  8. Johan E. Gustafsson (2010). A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences. Dialectica 64 (2):251–257.
    The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is the pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a money-pump only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump agents who violate transitivity but without a cycle of strict preferences, one needs to somehow induce such a cycle. Methods for inducing cycles of strict preferences from non-cyclic violations of transitivity have been proposed in the literature, based either on offering the agent small monetary transaction premiums or on multi-dimensional preferences. (...)
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  9. Sven Ove Hansson, Decision Theory.
    This text is a non-technical overview of modern decision theory. It is intended for university students with no previous acquaintance with the subject, and was primarily written for the participants of a course on risk analysis at Uppsala University in 1994.
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  10. Bernard Linsky (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, Decision Theory). Philosophical Books 34 (1):27-28.
  11. Susanne Lohmann (1995). The Poverty of Green and Shapiro. Critical Review 9 (1-2):127-154.
    Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory?driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in (...)
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  12. Julius Sensat (1997). Game Theory and Rational Decision. Erkenntnis 47 (3):379-410.
    In its classical conception, game theory aspires to be a determinate decision theory for games, understood as elements of a structurally specified domain. Its aim is to determine for each game in the domain a complete solution to each player's decision problem, a solution valid for all real-world instantiations, regardless of context. “Permissiveness” would constrain the theory to designate as admissible for a player any conjecture consistent with the solution function's designation of admissible strategies for the other players. Given permissiveness (...)
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  13. Mariam Thalos (1997). Self-Interest, Autonomy, and the Presuppositions of Decision Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):287 - 297.
    the voluntary actions of such beings cannot be covered by causal laws. Decision theorists, accepting the premise of this argument, appeal instead to noncausal laws predicated on principles of success—oriented action, and use these laws to produce substantive and testable predictions about large—scale human behavior. The primary directive of success-oriented action is maximization of some valuable quantity. Many economists and social scientists use the principles of decision theory to explain social and economic phenomena, while many political philosophers use them to (...)
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  14. Martin van Hees & Olivier Roy (2007). Intentions and Plans in Decision and Game Theory. In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate Pub. Ltd..